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1 Abstract 
Medical  confidentiality  is  integral  to  the  doctor  -  patient  relationship  and  an  important 
element  in  efficient  and  effective  medical  practice.  However,  it  is  generally 
acknowledged  that  medical  confidentiality  can  not  be  absolute.  At  times  it  must  be 
broken  in  order  to  serve  a  `higher'  interest  -  be  it  public  health  or  the  legal  justice 
system.  Yet,  very  little  is  known  about  the  historical  evolution  of  the  boundaries  of 
medical  confidentiality  in  Britain.  The  absence  of  detailed  historical  research  on  the 
subject  has  meant  that  contemporary  writers  have  tended  to  use  citations  of  the 
Hippocratic  Oath  or  short  quotations  from  key  legal  cases  to  place  their  work  into 
longer  term  context.  The  current  thesis  provides  a  more  detailed  examination  of  the 
delineation  of  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality  during  a  period  of  intense 
debate  -  the  interwar  years  of  the  twentieth  century.  The  increase  in  state  interest  in 
the  health  of  the  population,  the  growth  in  divorce  after  the  First  World  War  and  the 
prominence  of  the  medical  issues  of  venereal  disease  and  abortion,  all  brought 
unprecedented  challenges  to  the  traditional  concept  of  medical  confidentiality.  Having 
examined  the,  oft-cited,  benchmark  precedent  for  medical  confidentiality  from  the  late 
eighteenth  century,  the  thesis  proceeds  to  examine  the  ways  in  which  medicine  had 
changed  by  the  interwar  years.  The  high-point  of  the  debate  in  the  early  1920s  is 
examined  from  the  perspective  of  the  three  key  interest  groups  -  the  Ministry  of 
Health,  the  British  Medical  Association  and  the  Lord  Chancellor.  Overall,  the  work 
provides  insight  into  the  historical  delineation  of  medical  confidentiality  in  Britain, 
both  in  statute  and  common  law.  As  such  it  lends  a  longer-term  context  to  current 
debates  over  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality  in  the  twenty-first  century. 
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5 Chapter  1--Introduction 
The  doctor's  consulting-room  should  be  as  sacrosanct  as  the  priest's 
confessional.  The  whole  of  the  art  and  science  of  medicine  is  based  on  the 
intimate  personal  relationship  between  patient  and  doctor,  and  to  this  it  always 
returns,  however  scientific  medicine  becomes  and  whatever  the  great  and 
undeniable  benefits  society  receives  from  the  application  of  social  and 
preventive  medicine.  ' 
Confidentiality  is  the  cornerstone  of  the  doctor-patient  relationship.  From  the  citation 
of  its  importance  in  the  Hippocratic  Oath  to  its  prominence  in  discussions  about  ethics 
in  twenty-first  century  medicine,  successive  generations  have  acknowledged  that 
medical  confidentiality  must  be  protected.  2  Yet,  for  a  concept  regarded  as  integral  to 
medical  practice,  very  little  is  known  about  the  historical  development  of  medical 
confidentiality  in  Britain.  Writers  tend  to  point  to  the  Hippocratic  Oath  or  the  lines  of 
a  few  judicial  rulings  in  order  to  place  current  challenges  to  medical  confidentiality 
into  some  historical  context.  3  In  the  absence  of  detailed  research  on  the  more  recent 
history  of  medical  confidentiality,  contemporary  accounts  give  the  impression  that, 
until  recently,  medical  confidentiality  has  been  a  relatively  unchallenged  feature  of 
medical  practice.  It  is  the  aim  of  this  thesis  to  bring  a  more  accurate  historical 
perspective  to  the  debates  over  medical  confidentiality  by  examining  its  development 
during  the  interwar  period  of  the  twentieth  century. 
The  interwar  years  provide  a  useful  period  of  analysis  because  of  the 
unprecedented  challenges  that  medical  confidentiality  faced  at  that  time.  The 
emphasis  on  the  individual  patient  in  the  traditional  doctor-patient  relationship  came 
under  increasing  pressure  from  a  rising  concern  about  the  health  of  the  population  as  a 
whole.  The  growth  of  state  interest  in  the  health  of  the  population  from  the  late 
nineteenth  century  was  heightened  by  the  circumstances  of  the  First  World  War. 
HA  Clegg,  `Professional  Ethics',  in  M  Davidson  (ed),  Medical  Ethics.  A  Guide  to  Students  and 
Practitioners  (London,  1957),  44. 
ZR  Gillon,  Philosophical  Medical  Ethics  (Chichester,  1996),  106. 
3A  key  example  of  this  can  be  found  in  JV  McHale,  Medical  Confidentiality  and  Legal  Privilege, 
(London,  19),  13.  For  a  discussion  of  confidentiality  with  regard  to  HIV  /  AIDS  see  A  Campbell  et 
al.,  Medical  Ethics  (Oxford,  1999),  115-117;  for  a  discussion  of  confidentiality  and  the  Human 
Genome  Project  see  IJ  Brown  and  P  Gannon,  `Confidentiality  and  the  Human  Genome  Project:  A 
Prophecy  for  Conflict?  '  in  SAM  McLean  (ed)  Contemporary  Issues  in  Law,  Medicine  and  Ethics 
(Dartmouth,  1996). 
6 Britain  needed  not  only  a  healthy  workforce  but  an  effective  armed  force.  The  state 
targeted  medical  issues  of  particular  concern  -  doctors  had  a  statutory  duty  to  notify 
the  local  authorities  about  cases  of  infectious  disease  or  illegal  abortions.  Venereal 
disease  (VD)  was  widespread  and  a  national  policy  for  combating  it  was  developed  in 
1916,  including  a  well  advertised  pledge  that  all  treatment  would  be  strictly 
confidential.  Societal  changes  placed  demands  on  medical  information  too,  with  a 
sharp  rise  in  the  number  of  divorce  cases  putting  further  pressure  on  doctors  whose 
testimony  was  often  required.  4  Aldous  Huxley's  Brave  New  World,  regarded  by  the 
present  day  media  as  the  model  against  which  to  measure  society's  move  towards 
factory-style  medicine  concerned  with  the  collective  rather  than  the  individual,  was 
written  during  the  early  1930s  and,  along  with  many  other  dystopian  novels,  reflected 
a  concern  over  the  loss  of  individual  liberty  in  the  drive  for  state  control  and  the 
primacy  of  collective  interest  -a  drive  from  which  medicine  was  by  no  means 
exempt.  5 
The  State  is  beginning  to  assert  its  regulative  powers  in  departments  of  social 
and  even  family  life  from  which  hitherto  it  has  held  aloof,  and  its  justification 
will  always  be  that  the  interests  of  public  health  override  the  personal  interest 
of  the  individual....  We  may  expect  sharp  controversy,  for  example,  if  and 
when  the  State  concerns  itself  directly  with  eugenics,  and  asserts  its  solicitude 
for  a  generation  not  yet  born,  not  by  the  creation  of  cradles  and  nurseries,  but 
even  by  the  very  determination  of  parentage  itself.  6 
In  recent  years,  work  looking  specifically  at  the  history  of  medical  ethics  has  begun  to 
shed  light  on  the  development  of  the  subject  in  Britain.  The  advent  of  modem  day 
medical  ethics  is  generally  traced  back  to  the  late  eighteenth  century  and  the  writings 
of  John  Gregory  and  Thomas  Percival.  Regarded  as  the  founding  fathers,  these  writers 
have  received  much  attention.  Laurence  McCullough  makes  a  strong  argument  for 
seeing  Gregory's  work  as  an  early  instance  of  what  today  is  termed  `bioethics'.  7  The 
4R  Phillips,  Putting  Asunder.  A  History  of  Divorce  in  Western  Society  (Cambridge,  1988),  516-517.  SA  Huxley,  -frrave  New  World  (London,  1994);  E  Zamiatan,  'We'  in  BG  Guerney  (ed)  An  Anthology 
of  Russian  Literature  (New  York,  1960),  163-353;  G  Orwell,  Nineteen  Eighty-Four  (London,  1989).  6  Robert  George  Hogarth's  presidential  address  to  the  BMA  as  cited  in  the  BMJ  1926  vol.  2,146.  7LB  McCullough,  `Laying  Medicine  Open:  Understanding  Major  Turning  Points  in  the  History  of  Medical  Ethics'  in  Kennedy  Institute  of  Ethics  Journal,  9,  (1999),  7-23;  LB  McCullough,  `Virtues, 
Etiquette,  and  Anglo-American  Medical  Ethics  in  the  Eighteenth  and  Nineteenth  Centuries'  in  E  Shelp 
7 basis  of  Gregory's  arguments  within  a  philosophical  framework  -  namely  the 
Humean  concept  of  sympathy  -  and  his  stress  on  the  importance  of  the  patient 
(medicine  being  emphasised  as  a  fiduciary  profession)  bear  obvious  similarity  to 
twentieth  century  bioethics.  By  contrast,  Percival's  work  has  often  been  construed  as 
little  more  than  a  treatise  on  medical  etiquette  with  scant  bearing  on  ethics  as  defined 
in  the  modem  day  sense.  This  criticism  has  been  refuted  by  later  writers  who  point  to 
Percival's  emphasis  on  the  doctor's  duty  to  society  as  an  example  of  ethics.  8 
However,  while  Gregory  and  Percival  had  a  significant  impact  on  the 
development  of  codes  of  ethics  in  America,  culminating  in  the  American  Medical 
Association's  code  of  ethics  in  1848,  no  such  code  was  adopted  in  Britain  despite 
attempts  by  Jukes  Styrap,  a  Shrewsbury  practitioner  with  an  established  interest  in 
medical  ethics,  to  have  his  code  adopted  by  the  British  Medical  Association-9  Rather, 
as  Crowther  has  pointed  out,  doctors  found  guidance  on  medical  ethics  within  the 
legal  framework,  mainly  in  textbooks  of  medical  jurisprudence.  10  Thus  when  Styrap 
tackled  the  question  of  confidentiality  in  his  code,  the  importance  of  legal  precedent 
was  evident 
The  obligation  of  secrecy  extends  beyond  the  period  of  professional  services;  - 
none  of  the  privacies  of  personal  and  domestic  life,  no  infirmity  of  disposition 
or  defect  of  character  observed  during  professional  attendance,  should  ever  be 
disclosed  by  the  medical  adviser,  unless  imperatively  required.  The  force  and 
necessity  of  this  obligation  are  indeed  so  great,  that  professional  men  have, 
under  certain  circumstances,  been  protected  in  their  observance  of  secrecy  by 
courts  of  justice.  " 
(ed)  Virtue  and  Medicine  (D  Reidel  Publishing,  1985),  81-92;  LB  McCullough,  `John  Gregory  (1724- 
1773)  and  the  Invention  of  Professional  Relationships  in  Medicine',  The  Journal  of  Clinical  Ethics,  8, 
(1997),  11-21;  LB  McCullough,  John  Gregory  and  the  Invention  of  Professional  Medical  Ethics  and 
the  Profession  Medicine,  (Dordrecht,  1998). 
8  For  a  concise  analysis  of  the  debate  see  Robert  Baker's  introductory  chapter  in  R  Baker  (ed),  The 
Codification  of  Medical  Morality  vol.  2  (Dordrecht,  1995),  1-22. 
9P  Bartrip,  `-An  Introduction  to  Jukes  Styrap's  A  Code  of  Medical  Ethics  (1878)',  in  R.  Baker  (ed),  The 
Codification  of  Medical  Morality  vol.  2  (Dordrecht,  1995),  145-148. 
10  MA  Crowther,  `Forensic  Medicine  and  Medical  Ethics  in  Nineteenth-Century  Britain'  in  R  Baker 
(ed),  The  Codification  of  Medical  Morality  vol.  2.  (Dordrecht,  1995),  173-190. 
11  J  Styrap,  `A  Code  of  Medical  Ethics',  in  R  Baker  (ed),  The  Codification  of  Medical  Morality,  vol.  2 
(Dordrecht,  1995),  150. 
8 One  of  the  key  implications  of  the  basing  of  medical  ethics  in  a  legal  framework  was 
that  medical  confidentiality  was  discussed  in  legal  rather  than  philosophical  terms. 
Members  of  the  medical  profession  often  referred  to  honour  and  duty  in  connection 
with  the  medical  tradition  -  Styrap's  code  stated  `the  familiar  and  confidential 
intercourse  to  which  a  "doctor"  is  admitted  in  his  professional  visits,  should  be  used 
with  discretion,  and  with  the  most  scrupulous  regard  to  fidelity  and  honour'  12.  But  this 
generally  referred  to  the  social  ideal  of  an  upper-class  gentleman  and  relevant 
philosophical  terms  like  `deontology'  were  never  included  in  such  accounts.  Similarly 
the  Ministry  of  Health's  concern  with  public  health  led  it  to  judge  the  merits  of 
keeping  or  breaching  medical  confidentiality  based  on  the  consequences  for  society 
rather  than  for  the  individual  patient.  However,  they  did  not  use  philosophical  terms 
like  utilitarianism  or  even  the  more  generic  consequentialism.  Reflecting  the  historical 
position,  the  main  focus  of  what  follows  is  the  interaction  between  medicine  and  the 
law  over  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality. 
With  the  law's  centrality  to  the  debate,  a  significant  distinction  must  be  drawn 
between  medical  confidentiality  outside  and  within  the  course  of  legal  proceedings. 
The  general  recognition  that  the  doctor-patient  relationship  has  an  implied  measure  of 
confidentiality  does  not  extend  to  a  claim  of  privileged  communications  which  would 
enable  such  information  to  be  withheld  from  legal  proceedings  in  a  court  of  law.  The 
issue  of  medical  privilege  is  an  important  one.  There  are  two  forms  of  privilege. 
Statements  made  within  the  course  of  legal  proceedings  are  considered  privileged  in 
so  far  as  a  doctor  (or  any  witness)  cannot  be  sued  for  giving  relevant  and  accurate 
information  in  the  witness  box.  The  second  form  of  privilege  is  a  claim  that  certain 
information  which  is  required  during  legal  proceedings  was  obtained  in  circumstances 
which  do  not  permit  its  disclosure.  It  is  this  latter  form  of  privilege  which  was  the 
subject  of  much  of  the  debate  described  in  this  thesis.  A  central  aim  of  the  current 
work  is  to  shed  light  on  the  historical  reasons  for  the  absence  of  medical  privilege  (in 
the  latter  of  the  two  senses)  in  Britain  in  contrast  to  certain  other  European  and 
Commonwealth  countries  and  American  states  by  looking  in  greater  detail  at  some 
influential  legal  precedents.  13  It  must  be  stressed  that  key  legal  precedents  will  be  set 
back  into  their  historical  context  in  order  to  obtain  a  greater  perspective  on  the 
12  P  Bartrip,  `An  Introduction  to  Jukes  Styrap's  A  Code  of  Medical  Ethics  (1878)',  150. 
13  For  a  list  of  European  countries  that  developed  statutory  protection  for  medical  confidentiality  see  A 
H  Maehle,  `Protecting  Patient  Privacy  or  Serving  Public  Interests?  Challenges  to  Medical 
Confidentiality  in  Imperial  Germany',  in  Social  History  of  Medicine,  16,  (2003),  383-401. 
9 significance  of  their  short  and  long-term  impact  on  medical  confidentiality.  Trials, 
particularly  high  profile  trials,  have  a  considerable  element  of  theatre  to  them  which  is 
lost  to  the  reader  who  is  given  a  few  lines  of  judicial  ruling  extracted  from  the  context 
of  the  case  as  precedent.  14  In  this  respect,  it  follows  the  example  set  by  Angus 
McLaren  in  his  examination  of  the  celebrated  trial  of  Kitson  v  Playfair,  1896.15 
Linda  Kitson  was  the  wife  of  Arthur,  a  `ne'er-do-well'  who  was  the  youngest 
son  of  a  wealthy  Leeds  iron  founder.  The  couple  met  and  married  in  Australia  in 
1881.  In  1892  Linda  Kitson  returned  to  England  while  her  husband,  pursued  by 
creditors,  stayed  abroad.  Shortly  after  her  arrival,  Arthur's  two  elder  brothers  decided 
that  she  should  receive  the  £500  annual  allowance  that  had  previously  been  sent  to  her 
husband.  Suffering  poor  health,  Linda  Kitson  consulted  Dr  Muzio  Williams  who 
suspected  some  form  of  obstetrical  problem.  Arthur's  sister  had  married  Dr  William 
Smoult  Playfair  `perhaps  the  best  known  obstetrician  in  Britain'  and  royal 
accoucheur.  Williams  suggested  that  Linda  Kitson  should  consult  her  brother-in-law, 
which  she  reluctantly  consented  to  do  in  early  1894.  During  the  medical  examination, 
Playfair  and  Williams  found  evidence  of  a  recent  miscarriage  or  abortion.  As  she  had 
left  her  husband  in  Australia  almost  a  year  and  a  half  previously,  Playfair  concluded 
that  she  must  have  had  an  affair.  With  nothing  to  confirm  Linda  Kitson's  suggestions 
that  her  husband  had  secretly  been  in  London  and  had  caused  the  pregnancy,  Playfair 
felt  bound  to  inform  his  wife  of  the  situation.  His  wife,  in  the  face  of  more 
unsubstantiated  claims  from  Linda  Kitson  that  Arthur  had  secretly  been  in  London, 
instructed  Playfair  to  notify  her  eldest  brother  of  the  situation.  As  a  result  the  £500 
allowance  was  stopped. 
Although  Playfair  issued  a  grudging  apology  when  Arthur  returned  to  England 
later  in  the  year  and  (falsely)  claimed  that  his  wife's  account  of  his  secret  visit  to 
London  was  true,  the  allowance  remained  unpaid.  This  was  the  key  factor  in  Linda 
Kitson's  decision  to  sue  Playfair  for  libel  and  slander.  McLaren  emphasises  the  point 
that  while  Playfair  sought  his  defence  in  the  concept  of  privileged  communications, 
this  was  not  related  to  his  position  as  a  doctor,  but  rather  because  the  disclosure  was 
made  within  the  family.  Thus  medical  confidentiality  was  not  the  issue  at  hand  in  the 
t4  For  more  on  this  element  of  state  and  notable  trials  see  L  Farmer,  `Notable  Trials  and  the  Criminal 
Law  in  Scotknd  and  England,  1750-1950'  in  Ph  Chassaigne  and  J-P  Genet  (eds.  )  Droit  et  Societe  en 
France  et  Grande  Bretagne  (12-20  siecles).  Fonctions,  Usages  et  Representations,  (Paris,  2003),  149- 
170. 
13  A  McLaren,  `Privileged  Communications:  Medical  Confidentiality  in  Late  Victorian  Britain', 
Medical  History,  37,  (1993),  129-147. 
10 trial,  although  Playfair's  position  as  an  eminent  doctor,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  he 
had  attended  Linda  Kitson  in  a  medical  capacity,  led  to  comment  being  passed  on  the 
duty  of  the  medical  profession  to  notify  cases  of  abortion.  Despite  being  regarded  as  a 
high-profile  case  questioning  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality,  largely 
because  of  comments  made  by  the  judge  (Henry  `Hanging'  Hawkins)  during  his 
summing-up,  the  medical  aspect  was  incidental: 
Hawkins  himself  refused  to  instruct  the  jury  on  whether  or  not  a  doctor  who 
gratuitously  revealed  a  patient's  secret  was  making  an  illegitimate  breach  of 
confidence.  So  the  general  question  was  left  unsettled,  Hawkins  leaving  the 
issue  of  privileged  communication  as  confused  as  ever.  16 
McLaren  also  demonstrates  how,  far  from  always  being  an  impartial  consideration  of 
facts,  the  legal  process  was  open  to  manipulation.  Despite  having  the  weight  of 
medical  opinion  in  support  of  his  conclusion  that  Linda  Kitson  was  suffering  from  a 
miscarriage  or  abortion  stemming  from  an  adulterous  relationship,  and  her  confession 
that  she  had  lied  about  her  husband  being  secretly  in  London,  Playfair  was  found 
guilty  of  the  charges  and  ordered  to  pay  the  considerable  sum  of  £12,000  in  damages. 
The  reasons  for  this  apparently  illogical  outcome  can  be  found  in  the  detail  and 
context  of  the  trial.  McLaren  points  to  the  fact  that  a  trial  of  this  nature,  involving  the 
question  of  whether  the  royal  accoucheur  had  exposed  the  adultery  of  his  sister-in- 
law,  raised  public  and  press  interest  in  the  case.  '?  In  turn,  he  emphasises  the 
importance  of  appearance  in  influencing  opinion,  citing  the  manner  in  which  Linda 
and  Arthur  Kitson  succeeded  in  portraying  themselves  as  innocent  parties: 
Linda  Kitson  was  the  picture  of  the  affronted  female;  attractive  but  wracked 
by  anxiety,  dressed  elegantly  but  demurely  in  black,  a  white  rose  at  her  throat. 
She  wept;  she  swooned.  The  first  day  of  her  trial  she  almost  fainted  and  was 
led  by  her  husband  into  the  open  air.  The  judge  asked  her  to  sit  while 
testifying.  She  spoke  in  a  whisper;  her  water  glass  rattled  against  her  teeth. 
When  what  the  press  described  as  the  "ordeal"  of  her  testifying  was  over,  she 
wa&  assisted  from  the  box  by  her  husband.  He  too  made  a  good  impression  as 
16  Ibid.,  138. 
17  Ibid.,  140. 
11 the  poor  relative  fighting  his  wealthy  and  powerful  family  to  protect  the 
honour  of  his  wife.  '8 
Kitson's  lawyer  succeeded  in  promoting  the  idea  that  Linda  Kitson  was  the  innocent 
party  who  had  suffered  as  a  result  of  Playfair's  actions  as  `moral  inquisitor'.  While 
Victorian  society  had  strong  notions  of  morality,  moral  inquisitions  were  directed 
towards  the  lower  classes  of  society.  Kitson  succeeded  largely  because  she 
successfully  portrayed  herself  as  a  wronged  middle-class  woman  whose  character  had 
been  unfairly  brought  into  disrepute.  In  McLaren's  words:  `Linda  Kitson  won  much 
support  by  perfectly  playing  the  role  of  the  lady  in  distress'.  19  The  stress  on  the 
importance  of  class  and  gender  is  clear. 
The  question  of  medical  confidentiality  was  raised  during  the  questioning  of 
the  expert  medical  witnesses.  As  a  crime,  abortion  was  supposed  to  be  notified,  but 
when  Hawkins  asked  Sir  John  Williams  -a  leading  obstetrician  giving  evidence  - 
whether  he  would  report  a  woman  who  had  attempted  to  procure  abortion,  his  positive 
reply  met  with  criticism.  20  Distinguishing  between  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the  law 
Hawkins  went  so  far  as  to  declare  in  open  court  that  if  a  woman  aborted  to 
save  her  character,  her  reputation  and  her  livelihood  he  doubted  `very,  very, 
very  much'  the  justification  of  a  doctor  running  off  to  the  police  to  say:  `I  have 
been  attending  a  poor,  young  woman  who  has  been  trying  to  procure  abortion 
with  the  assistance  of  her  sister.  She  is  now  pretty  well,  and  is  getting  better, 
and  in  the  course  of  a  few  days  she  will  be  out  again,  but  I  think  I  ought  to  put 
you  on  to  the  woman  '.  21 
It  was  this  statement,  effectively  unconnected  with  the  facts  of  the  case,  which 
impacted  on  the  debate  over  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality  heightening  the 
confusion  around  the  doctor's  duty  to  notify  cases  of  criminal  abortion. 
McLaren's  work  shows  how  issues  such  as  gender,  class  and  social  context 
can  influence  the  outcome  of  legal  cases.  Moreover  Kitson  v  Playfair  demonstrates 
how  a  judicial  opinion  on  a  matter  not  wholly  relevant  to  the  case  -  namely 
18  Ibid.,  1357 
19  Ibid.,  142. 
20  Ibid.,  139. 
21  Ibid.,  145. 
12 notification  of  abortion  -  could  have  significant  repercussions.  Many  of  these  themes 
will  be  explored  further  in  this  thesis.  While  McLaren  gives  a  fascinating  account  of 
an  intriguing  trial,  by  his  own  admission  its  impact  for  medical  confidentiality  was 
felt  outside  more  than  inside  the  courtroom.  It  contributed  to  the  confusion 
surrounding  the  medical  profession's  duty  to  notify  abortion  and  the  high  level  of 
damages  preyed  on  doctors'  minds  whenever  disclosure  of  medical  information  left 
room  for  allegations  of  libel  or  slander.  However,  the  case  was  not  a  legal  precedent 
for  confidentiality.  A  central  objective  in  the  current  work  is  to  apply  the  same  style 
of  historical  analysis  to  the  precedents  that  have  had  an  impact  on  the  legal  definition 
of  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality.  The  case  most  frequently  cited  as 
determining  the  absence  of  medical  privilege  is  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  trial  for 
bigamy  in  1776.  Called  as  a  witness  during  the  hearing  in  the  House  of  Lords,  Caesar 
Hawkins,  Serjeant-Surgeon  to  the  King,  claimed  that  the  required  information  was 
covered  by  medical  privilege.  The  Lord  Chief  Justice,  Lord  Mansfield,  ruled  against 
the  claim  and  his  words  have  been  cited  as  precedent  on  medical  confidentiality  ever 
since.  22  Chapter  2  looks  in  detail  at  the  historical  context  of  the  Duchess's  trial  with  a 
view  to  gaining  a  greater  understanding  of  the  genesis  of  this  long-standing  and 
greatly  influential  precedent. 
Hayek  observes  that  the  rule  of  law  requires  the  enforcement  of  clearly  stated 
and  consistently  applied  rules  which  allow  individuals  to  foresee  with  fair  certainty 
how  the  authority  will  use  its  coercive  powers  in  given  circumstances.  23  An  intention 
of  the  current  work  is  to  investigate  the  extent  to  which  the  law  was  clear  and 
consistent  in  defining  the  boundaries  of  confidentiality  with  regard  to  the  prominent 
issues  of  abortion  and  VD.  Doctors  had  a  statutory  obligation  to  notify  cases  of 
criminal  abortion,  while  VD  treatment  was  bound  by  a  well-publicised  pledge  of 
confidentiality  from  the  Ministry  of  Health.  Examination  of  these  two  issues  will 
provide  insight  into  the  relationship  between  statute  law,  common  law,  governmental 
rules  and  professional  ideals  of  conduct  in  determining  the  limits  of  medical 
confidentiality.  Chapter  3  looks  at  the  debate  over  abortion  around  the  turn  of  the 
twentieth  century  and  up  until  the  First  World  War.  The  tension  that  resulted  from 
differing  interpretations  of  correct  action  with  regard  to  abortion  provides  a  necessary 
22  Details  of  its  citations  are  given  in  chapter  2  of  the  current  work.  For  evidence  of  a  late  twentieth 
century  citation  of  the  case  see  JV  McHale,  Medical  Confidentiality  and  Legal  Privilege  (London, 
1993),  13. 
23  J  Harris,  Legal  Philosophies  (Edinburgh,  1997),  151. 
13 backdrop  to  the  intense  debate  over  medical  confidentiality  in  relation  to  VD  in  the 
early  interwar  years. 
To  a  limited  extent  the  historical  examination  of  these  debates  was  begun  by 
Andrew  Morrice.  His  MD  thesis,  examining  the  ethical  issues  addressed  by  the  BMA 
in  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  led  him  to  publish  a  paper  on  medical 
confidentiality  covering  the  debate  of  the  early  interwar  years.  24  As  this  was  published 
during  the  preparation  of  this  thesis,  there  has  been  some  overlap  with  the  present 
study.  However,  while  Morrice  provides  an  overview  of  part  of  the  debate,  his 
account  is  restricted  in  focus  to  the  perspective  of  the  BMA.  It  is  a  contention  of  this 
thesis  that  a  subject,  like  medical  confidentiality,  involving  a  number  of  conflicting 
interest  groups,  benefits  from  multi-faceted  analysis.  The  middle  section  of  the  thesis 
(chapters  4,5  and  6)  considers  the  dispute  over  medical  confidentiality  and  VD  from 
the  perspectives  of  the  three  main  protagonists:  the  Ministry  of  Health,  the  British 
Medical  Association  and  the  Lord  Chancellor.  For  each  group,  examination  will  be 
made  of  the  reasons  for  their  involvement  with  the  question,  the  individuals  who 
played  a  significant  role,  and  the  justification  for  the  positions  they  adopted.  Such 
details  will  provide  an  insight  into  the  practical  process  of  debating  the  boundaries  of 
medical  confidentiality. 
The  final  section  (chapters  7  and  8)  opens  with  an  examination  of  the  attempts 
(one  in  1927  and  the  other  in  1936)  to  promote  a  private  member's  bill  endorsing 
medical  privilege.  Having  discussed  the  difficulties  inherent  in  changing  the  common 
law  position  on  medical  privilege  in  the  middle  section  of  the  thesis,  chapter  7 
analyses  the  complexities  of  attempts  to  incorporate  medical  privilege  into  statute  law. 
While  the  thesis  takes  a  chronological  approach  in  order  to  follow  how  issues 
developed  over  time,  overlapped  and  intertwined,  chapter  8  encapsulates  a  range  of 
different  issues  from  throughout  the  time  period  which  demonstrate  the  breadth  of 
areas  where  questions  of  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality  could  be  raised. 
The  key  themes  and  recurrent  analogies  of  the  study  will  be  highlighted  in  the 
conclusion. 
24  A  Morrice,  `Honour  and  Interests:  Medical  Ethics  in  Britain  and  the  Work  of  the  British  Medical 
Association'-s-Central  Ethical  Committee,  1902-1939'  (MD  thesis,  University  of  London,  1999);  A 
Morrice,  `Should  the  doctor  tell?  Medical  Secrecy  in  Early  Twentieth-Century  Britain',  in  S  Sturdy 
(ed)  Medicine,  Health  and  the  Public  Sphere  in  Britain,  1600-2000,  (London,  2002);  see  also  A 
Morrice,  `Honour  and  Interests:  Medical  Ethics  and  the  British  Medical  Association',  in  AH  Maehle 
and  3  Geyer-Kordesch  (eds)  Historical  and  Philosophical  Perspectives  on  Biomedical  Ethics 
(Aldershot,  2002),  11-35. 
14 As  a  crucible  in  which  beliefs  about  medical  confidentiality  were  severely 
tested,  the  interwar  years  of  the  twentieth  century  have  the  potential  to  provide  useful 
historical  insight  on  the  development  of  the  issue  in  Britain.  However,  to  find  the  case 
frequently  cited  as  the  benchmark  precedent  in  the  debates  of  the  1920s,  it  is 
necessary  to  go  back  to  the  trial  of  a  bigamous  Duchess  before  her  peers  in  the  House 
of  Lords  in  1776.  In  terms  of  the  law,  it  is  here  that  the  delineation  of  the  boundaries 
of  medical  confidentiality  begins. 
15 Chapter  2-  The  Duchess  of  Kingston's  Trial 
`A  precedent  embalms  a  principle'  stated  Lord  Stowell  while  Advocate-General, 
words  echoed  by  Benjamin  Disraeli  in  a  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  1848.1 
Medical  ethics  and  the  law  share  the  same  task  of  providing  clear  and  fixed  guidelines 
for  practice,  to  be  implemented  within  a  context  of,  and  to  be  reflective  of  the 
opinions  and  standards  of,  a  perpetually  changing  society.  For  these  reasons,  there  is  a 
great  emphasis  placed  upon  the  importance  of  legal  precedent  in  the  ongoing 
interpretation  of  the  law.  Single  cases  can  have  a  lasting  influence  on  individuals, 
professions  and  society  as  a  whole,  by  means  of  clarifying  penumbral  issues  within 
the  legal  framework  and  embalming  the  principle  of  the  law  for  future  practice.  One 
such  case  was  the  trial  of  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  for  the  crime  of  bigamy  in  1776.2 
Many  have  been  drawn  to  write  accounts  of  the  more  scandalous  aspects  of 
the  infamous  Duchess's  life.  3  This  is  unsurprising  given  the  wealth  of  such  material 
the  Duchess  provided.  John  Bernard  Burke  provides  the  following  assessment  of  the 
Duchess  in  his  mid-nineteenth  century  work,  Anecdotes  of  the  Aristocracy: 
With  talents  of  no  mean  order,  with  personal  attractions  that  charmed  every 
eye,  and  with  accomplishments,  captivating,  even  after  the  influence  of  beauty 
had  ceased  to  exert  itself,  the  celebrated  lady,  the  heroine  of  the  extraordinary 
episode  in  real  life  we  are  about  to  recount,  lived  a  memorable  example  of  the 
inefficacy  of  wealth  or  grandeur  to  secure  happiness. 
Amongst  the  many  memorable  tales  from  the  Duchess's  highly  eventful  life  is  her 
appearance  at  a  Masquerade  as  the  character  of  Iphigenia  -  her  costume  leaving  her,  in 
Burke's  words  `almost  in  the  unadorned  simplicity  of  primitive  nature'.  There  was 
also  her  brief  career  in  politics,  when,  shortly  after  Bonnie  Prince  Charlie  had 
captured  Carlisle  during  the  Jacobite  uprising  of  1745,  and  amidst  a  room  full  of 
'JM  and  MJ  Cohen,  The  Penguin  Dictionary  of  Quotations,  (Harmondsworth,  1960),  307  &  140. 
2  Though  she  pleads  in  her  married  name  of  Elizabeth  Pierrepoint,  for  the  sake  of  clarity  she  will 
throughout  this  paper  be  referred  to  as  either  `the  Duchess'  or  by  her  maiden  name  `Elizabeth 
Chudleigh'.  - 
3BC  BrownjElizabeth  Chudleigh,  Duchess  of  Kingston  (London,  1927);  M  Elwood,  The  Bigamous 
Duchess.  A  romantic  biography  of  Elizabeth  Chudleigh,  Duchess  of  Kingston  (New  York,  1960);  D. 
Leslie,  The  incredible  duchess:  the  life  and  times  of  Elizabeth  Chudleigh,  (London,  1974),  C  Gervat, 
Elizabeth.  The  Scandalous  life  of  the  Duchess  of  Kingston,  (London,  2003). 
4J  Bernard  Burke,  Anecdotes  of  the  Aristocracy,  (London,  1849). 
16 inebriated  dinner  guests  at  Leicester  House,  the  Prince  of  Wales  expressed  his 
disapproval  of  the  new  government  by  dictating  a  letter  giving  instructions  to  appoint 
the  young  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  as  Secretary  for  War.  However,  her  many  biographers 
have  bypassed  her  significant,  if  unwitting,  contribution  to  the  definition  of  medical 
confidentiality.  Even  when  the  case  is  cited  in  writings  on  the  history  of  medical 
ethics,  it  is  done  so  en  passant,  with  little  discussion  of  the  original  details  of  the 
cases  Yet,  the  story  is  no  less  scandalous  than  the  other  areas  of  Elizabeth 
Chudleigh's  life.  For  the  details  of  the  trial  reveal  that  the  case  which  became  the 
foundation  of  modem  interpretations  of  medical  confidentiality  arose  from  little  more 
than  an  attempt  by  a  private  surgeon,  Caesar  Hawkins,  to  secure  his  personal  interests 
and  status  as  a  gentleman  in  eighteenth-century  high  society. 
Elizabeth  Chudleigh's  indictment  stated  that  she  had  married  a  second 
husband,  Evelyn  Pierrepoint,  Duke  of  Kingston,  while  her  first  husband,  Augustus 
John  Hervey,  recently  made  Earl  of  Bristol,  was  still  living.  Standing  accused  of  being 
twice  married,  she  was  rumoured  to  have  been  engaged  originally  to  a  third  person, 
the  Duke  of  Hamilton,  a  betrothal  which  never  came  to  fruition  as  a  result  of  the 
interference  of  her  aunt,  Mrs  Harmer.  Obviously  intent  that  her  niece  should 
discontinue  the  relationship  with  the  Duke,  she  intercepted  and  destroyed  the 
correspondence  which  he  sent  to  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  whilst  on  his  Grand  Tour. 
Consequently  Elizabeth  believed  he  had  lost  interest  in  her  and  their  engagement.  6  It 
was  under  pressure  from  this  same  aunt  that  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  secretly  married 
Hervey,  by  the  light  of  a  single  candle,  in  a  small  church  in  Lainston  in  1744.  The 
reasons  for  such  secrecy  appear  to  have  been  that  Hervey,  as  the  younger  son  of  a 
younger  son,  had  no  resources  except  his  meagre  pay  from  the  Navy;  while  Elizabeth 
would  lose  her  position  as  maid  of  honour  to  the  Princess  of  Wales  if  she  were  known 
to  be  married.  7  Following  the  ceremony,  the  couple  spent  the  next  three  days  together 
at  Mrs  Hanmer's  house  before  Hervey  returned  to  his  ship  and  his  wife,  maintaining 
5A  Morrice,  `  "Should  the  doctor  tell?  ":  medical  secrecy  in  early  twentieth-century  Britain.  '  in  S 
Sturdy  (ed.  ),  Medicine,  Health  and  the  Public  Sphere  in  Britain,  1600-2000,  (London,  2002),  60-82, 
64;  A  Morrice,  '  "Honour  and  Interests":  Medical  Ethics  and  the  British  Medical  Association.  '  in  A-H 
Maehle  and4.  Geyer-Kordesch  (eds),  Historical  and  Philosophical  Perspectives  on  Biomedical  Ethics, 
(Aldershot,  2002),  11-35,26;  A-H  Maehle,  `Protecting  Patient  Privacy  or  Serving  Public  Interests? 
Challenges  to  Medical  Confidentiality  in  Imperial  Germany',  Social  History  of  Medicine,  16  (2003), 
383-401,400. 
6J  Lee  Osborn,  Lainston  and  Elizabeth  Chudleigh.,  (Winchester,  1915),  6. 
Brown,  Elizabeth  Chudleigh,  18  ;  Lee  Osborn,  Lainston,  6-7. 
17 her  name  as  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  and  her  status  of  maid,  returned  to  her  service  in 
Leicester  House. 
Hervey  was  abroad  for  approximately  two  years.  In  that  period  there  was  little, 
if  any,  correspondence  between  the  newly  weds.  On  his  return  to  London,  Hervey  had 
to  threaten  to  publish  the  fact  of  their  marriage  in  order  to  gain  an  audience  with  his 
wife.  Nonetheless,  in  the  following  November  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  was  delivered  of 
their  only  child,  a  boy  who  died  when  only  a  few  months  old.  Over  the  next  twenty 
years,  with  a  series  of  deaths  making  it  increasingly  likely  that  Hervey  would  become 
the  next  Earl  of  Bristol,  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  seemed  to  be  torn  between  trying  firmly 
to  establish  their  marriage,  potentially  making  her  the  Countess  of  Bristol,  and 
denying  that  the  wedding  had  ever  taken  place,  leaving  her  free  to  seek  marriage  and 
title  elsewhere.  In  1769,  using  the  couple's  mutual  friend  and  surgeon,  Caesar 
Hawkins,  as  a  messenger  Hervey  indicated  to  his  wife  that  he  wanted  a  divorce.  In 
response,  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  instigated  a  suit,  heard  in  an  ecclesiastical  court, 
against  Hervey  for  "jactitation"  of  marriage  -  an  injunction  against  Hervey  making, 
what  she  argued  were,  false  claims  about  them  being  married.  8  Although  the  case  was 
decided  in  her  favour,  Hervey's  weak  defence  led  many  to  suspect  that  the  whole  suit 
was  a  collusive  venture  by  the  couple,  both  of  whom  wanted  to  remarry.  Only 
Elizabeth  Chudleigh  did  so,  becoming  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  shortly  after  the  suit 
ended.  After  five  years  of  marriage,  the  Duke  of  Kingston  died,  leaving  her  the  bulk 
of  his  property  and  wealth  in  his  will.  This  was  not  well  received  by  the  Duke's 
nephews,  Evelyn  and  Charles  Meadows.  The  former  was  entirely  passed  over  in  the 
will,  and  the  latter  was  the  next  heir  to  the  estate.  Potentially,  both  had  much  to  gain  if 
they  could  establish  the  prior  marriage  between  the  Duchess,  by  now  living  in  Rome, 
and  the  new  Earl  of  Bristol.  It  was  as  a  result  of  their  efforts  that  on  Monday  15  April 
1776,  Elizabeth  Chudleigh,  Duchess  Dowager  of  Kingston  stood  trial  in  Westminster 
Hall  for  the  crime  of  bigamy. 
The  trial  of  a  duchess  in  front  of  the  House  of  Peers  naturally  received  much 
publicity  at  the  time.  The  Gentleman's  Magazine  of  that  year  showed  a  continued 
interest  in  all  things  connected  with  the  trial.  In  its  January  edition  it  reported  that  the 
date  of  the  trial  had  been  fixed  for  15  April.  The  following  month  it  noted  the 
appointment  of  the  Lord  High  Steward  on  the  trial  by  the  King.  In  March,  it  reported  a 
B  "Jactitation  of  marriage":  A  false  assertion  that  one  is  married  to  someone  to  whom  one  is  not  in  fact 
married.  EA  Martin  (ed)  A  Dictionary  of  Law,  (Oxford,  2002). 
18 motion  considered  by  the  House  of  Peers  on  whether  they  could  legally  proceed  with 
the  trial,  the  decision  being  made  in  the  affirmative.  9  The  resultant  crescendo  of 
publicity  meant  that  by  the  time  the  full  account  of  the  trial  was  printed  in  the 
magazine,  it  came  with  a  postscript  stating:  `The  importance  of  the  above  trial,  and 
our  desire  to  gratify  our  readers  with  the  substance  of  it  at  once,  has  obliged  us  to 
postpone  the  Account  of  American  Affairs'.  Its  priority  over  American  affairs  at  the 
time  of  the  War  of  Independence  highlights  the  impact  of  the  Duchess's  trial. 
Similarly,  The  Annual  Register  for  1776  devoted  six  pages  to  a  detailed  account  of  the 
trial.  10  Samuel  Foote's  play:  A  trip  to  Calais,  published  in  1778,  prolonged  the  public 
interest  in  the  Duchess  with  an  overt  character-assassination  of  her  through  the 
fictional  Lady  Kitty  Crocodile.  "  The  Duchess  attempted  to  suppress  the  publication 
of  the  play  by  offering  Foote  financial  incentives,  though  when  these  were  rejected, 
her  friend  Lord  Mountstuart  approached  the  lord  chamberlain  in  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  forbid  its  production  12. 
The  unique  circumstances  surrounding  the  case  have  resulted  in  citations  of 
the  Duchess's  trial  being  found  in  cases  ranging  from  those  focused  on  confidentiality 
in  the  practice  of  both  law  and  medicine,  to  those  which  raise  the  question  of  the  re- 
litigation  of  issues.  This  last  point  was  discussed  at  length  in  the  Duchess's  case, 
because  of  the  prior  ecclesiastical  hearing,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  decisions 
reached  thereby  were  cited  in  the  first  appeal  trial  of  the  Birmingham  six  in  1980.13 
The  trial  itself  was  resplendent  in  ceremony,  replete  with  all  the  etiquette  and 
display  of  courtesy  which  the  trial  of  a  duchess  by  her  peers  in  full  parliament 
demanded.  Hannah  More,  the  eighteenth-century  writer,  provided  the  following 
description: 
Garrick  would  have  me  take  his  ticket  to  go  to  the  trial  of  the  Duchess  of 
Kingston;  a  sight  which,  for  beauty  and  magnificence,  exceeded  any  thing 
which  those  who  were  never  present  at  a  coronation  or  a  trial  by  peers  can 
9  The  Gentleman's  Magazine  and  Historical  Chronicle,  46  (1776). 
10  The  Annual  Register,  or  a  view  of  the  history,  politics,  and  literature  for  the  year  1776,  (London, 
1788). 
11  S  Foote,  A  trip  to  Calais;  a  comedy  in  three  acts,  (London,  1778). 
2  http:  //www.  southfrm.  demon.  co.  uk/Bigamy/Chudleigh.  html 
13  Hunter  v  Chief  Constable  of  the  West  Midlands  (19801  O.  B.  283. 
19 have  the  least  notion  of.  Mrs  Garrick  and  I  were  in  full  dress  by  seven...  You 
will  imagine  the  bustle  of  five  thousand  people  getting  into  one  hall!  14 
After  a  description  of  the  grand  entrance  of  the  Peers  into  the  court  at  Westminster, 
Bathurst's  account  of  the  trial  relates  how  the  Duchess  was  called  and  brought, 
making  three  reverences  on  her  approach  before  falling  to  her  knees  at  the  Bar.  On 
being  permitted  to  rise  by  the  Lord  High  Steward,  the  Duchess  curtsied  to  the  Lord 
High  Steward  and  to  the  House  of  Peers,  the  compliment  being  returned  her  by  his 
Grace,  and  the  Lords.  15 
Granted  permission  to  address  the  court,  the  Duchess  recounted  her  voluntary 
return  from  Rome,  at  serious  risk  to  her  life,  in  order  to  submit  to  the  law.  She 
requested  that  the  court  would  understand  that  her  poor  health  and  oppressed  spirits 
affected  her  ability  to  recollect  certain  facts,  but  `it  can  only  be  with  the  loss  of  life, 
that  I  can  be  deprived  of  the  knowledge  of  the  respect  that  is  due  to  this  high  and 
awful  tribunal.  '  16  Such  dramatic  and  overstated  deference  make  it  simple  to  see  where 
Foote  found  inspiration.  The  Duchess  attempted  to  win  the  support  of  those  who  stood 
in  judgement  of  her  by  portraying  herself  not  only  as  courteous  and  co-operative,  but 
as  an  ill  and  oppressed  lady.  These  traits  are  reflected  in  the  manipulation  and  self- 
interest,  concealed  behind  a  facade  of  grief  for  her  dead  husband,  in  Foote's 
characterization  of  the  Duchess  as  Kitty  Crocodile. 
Theatrics  aside,  there  could  be  no  doubt  of  the  seriousness  of  the  charge.  In 
court  it  was  stated  that  bigamy  was 
A  crime  so  destructive  of  the  peace  and  happiness  of  private  families,  and  so 
injurious  in  its  consequences  to  the  welfare  and  good  order  of  society,  that  by 
statute  law  of  this  Kingdom  it  was  for  many  years  (in  your  sex)  punishable 
with  death;  the  lenity,  however,  of  later  times  has  substituted  a  milder 
punishment  in  its  stead.  '? 
It  is  worth  noting  not  only  the  severity  of  the  charge,  but  also  the  description  of  the  ill 
effects  of  the  crime.  It  was  destructive  to  private  families  and  it  had  injurious 
14  R Hole  (ed.  ),  Selected  Writings  of  Hannah  More  (London,  1996),  12. 
15  The  trial  of  Elizabeth  Duchess  Dowager  of  Kingston  for  bigamy  (London,  1776),  7. 
16  Ibid.,  8. 
17 
Ibid.,  7 
20 consequences  for  society.  These  two  factors  emphasize  the  intrusion  into  family  life 
which  the  law  saw  as  necessary  to  protect  the  welfare  of  society.  In  legal  proceedings 
of  this  nature,  such  intrusion  was  inevitable,  but  it  became  increasingly  evident  as 
witnesses  were  called  to  testify,  that  there  was  doubt  over  its  nature  and  extent.  This  is 
a  clear  example  of  the  fundamental  point  that  medical  confidentiality  is  not  in  itself 
morally  valuable,  but  rather  derives  its  moral  worth  from  the  balance  it  maintains 
between  the  interests  of  the  individual  and  society.  '8  That  the  social  welfare  could  be 
adversely  affected  by  an  individual's  behaviour  emphasized  the  apparent  potential  for 
conflict  between  a  patient's  interests  in  maintaining  secrecy,  a  doctor's  interests  in 
maintaining  honour  and  the  wider  interests  of  society. 
The  first  witness  to  be  called  was  Ann  Craddock,  servant  to  Elizabeth 
Chudleigh's  aunt,  the  interfering  Mrs  Harmer,  and  wife  of  Hervey's  servant19.  She 
was  very  forthcoming  with  her  evidence,  testifying  that  she  witnessed  the  marriage 
between  the  accused  and  Hervey  and  saw  the  parties  in  bed  together  afterwards. 
Craddock  stated  that  while  she  never  actually  saw  a  child  from  the  marriage,  she  did 
observe  that  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  appeared  to  be  with  child.  Subsequently,  the 
accused  told  her  that  a  boy  had  been  born  in  Chelsea  but  before  she  was  taken  to  see 
him,  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  informed  her  that  the  boy  had  died.  Anne  Craddock's 
evidence  was  straightforward  -  she  made  no  protest  when  asked  to  give  evidence  and 
was  perfectly  willing  to  divulge  information  received  in  conversation  with  the 
accused.  This  was  not  a  pattern  repeated  with  subsequent  witnesses. 
Next  called  to  give  evidence,  and  central  to  the  present  interest  in  this  case, 
was  the  surgeon,  Caesar  Hawkins.  Hawkins  had  served  as  Serjeant-Surgeon  to  King 
George  II,  and,  at  the  time  of  the  trial,  held  the  same  post  to  George  111.20  He  had 
known  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  and  Hervey  for  around  thirty  years,  initially  attending 
them  in  a  professional  capacity,  an  acquaintance  which  had  developed  into  friendship. 
Counsel,  on  asking  if  Hawkins  knew  from  the  parties  of  any  marriage  between  them, 
received  the  reply:  `I  do  not  know  how  far  any  thing,  that  has  come  before  me  in  a 
confidential  trust  in  my  profession,  should  be  disclosed,  consistent  with  my 
professional  honour.  12l  The  question  and  answer  were  repeated.  With  Hawkins's 
18  R  Gillon,  Philosophical  Medical  Ethics  (Chippenham,  1985),  107-8. 
19  This  marriage  took  place  in  1752,  after  the  marriage  of  Chudleigh  and  Hervey,  and  is  noted  here  as  it 
shows  Craddock  had  links  with  both  families. 
20  C  Hibbert,  George  Ill  A  Personal  History,  (London,  1998),  67-8. 
21  The  Trial  of  Elizabeth  (London,  1776),  119. 
21 reluctance  to  answer,  the  question  was  referred  to  the  Peers  to  decide,  and  there 
followed  a  lengthy  statement  on  the  matter  by  Lord  Mansfield. 
Mansfield  (William  Murray)  was  a  highly  influential  Lord  Chief  Justice, 
renowned  for  his  emphasis  on  making  prompt  decisions.  Noting  the  pronounced  laxity 
in  the  practices  for  the  reporting  of  precedent  in  the  eighteenth  century,  James 
Oldham  indicates  that  this  goes  some  way  to  explaining  the  `rarity  of  cases  in  which 
Mansfield  was  prevented  by  prior  authority  from  reaching  a  desired  result.  '22 
However,  Mansfield's  authoritative  approach  did  not  meet  with  universal  approval. 
Oldham  notes  that  critics  saw  his  `chancellorlike'  behaviour  as  inappropriate  for  a 
common  law  judge.  23  Nonetheless,  Mansfield  carried  a  great  deal  of  influence  in  the 
shaping  of  the  law  in  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century.  24  In  what  seems  to 
have  been  a  typically  quick  and  definitive  response,  he  stated: 
I  suppose  Mr.  Hawkins  means  to  demur  to  the  question  upon  the  ground,  that 
it  came  to  his  knowledge  some  way,  from  his  being  employed  as  a  surgeon  for 
one  or  both  of  the  parties;  and  I  take  it  for  granted,  if  Mr.  Hawkins, 
understands  that  it  is  your  Lordships  opinion,  that  he  has  no  privilege  on  that 
account  to  excuse  himself  from  giving  the  answer,  that  then,  under  the 
authority  of  your  Lordships  judgement,  he  will  submit  to  answer  it  :  Therefore, 
to  save  your  Lordships  the  trouble  of  an  adjournement,  if  no  Lord  differs  in 
opinion,  but  thinks  that  a  surgeon  has  no  privilege  to  avoid  giving  evidence  in 
a  court  of  justice,  but  is  bound  by  the  law  of  the  land  to  do  it;  [  if  any  of  your 
Lordships  think  he  has  such  a  privilege,  it  will  be  a  matter  to  be  debated 
elsewhere,  but  ]  if  all  your  Lordships  acquiesce,  Mr.  Hawkins  will  understand, 
that  it  is  your  judgement  and  opinion,  that  a  surgeon  has  no  privilege,  where  it 
is  a  material  question,  in  a  civil  or  criminal  cause,  to  know  whether  parties 
were  married,  or  whether  a  child  was  born,  to  say,  that  his  introduction  to  the 
parties  was  in  the  course  of  his  profession,  and  that  in  that  way  he  came  to 
knowledge  of  it.  I  take  it  for  granted,  that  if  Mr.  Hawkins  understands  that,  it 
is  a  satisfaction  to  him,  and  a  clear  justification  to  all  the  world.  If  a  surgeon 
22  J  Oldham,, 
_The 
Mansfield  Manuscripts  and  the  Growth  of  English  Law  in  the  Eighteenth  Century, 
vol.  1,  (London,  1992),  105. 
23  Ibid.,  107. 
24  An  account  of  his  life  can  be  found  both  in  the  Dictionary  of  National  Biography  and  in  The 
International  Magazine  of  Literature,  Art  and  Science,  vol.!,  3  (1850). 
22 was  voluntarily  to  reveal  these  secrets,  to  be  sure  he  would  be  guilty  of  a 
breach  of  honour,  and  of  great  indiscretion;  but,  to  give  that  information  in  a 
court  of  justice,  which  by  the  law  of  the  land  he  is  bound  to  do,  will  never  be 
imputed  to  him  as  any  indiscretion  whatever.  25 
The  rest  of  the  House,  without  discussion,  agreed.  Seemingly  placated  by  this 
response,  Hawkins  answered  the  question  by  stating  he  had  understood,  from  the 
conversation  between  the  two  parties,  that  there  was  a  marriage  but  that  he  had 
nothing  of  proof  `I  mean  nothing  as  legal  proof,  but  conversation.  '  26  The  importance 
of  the  stress  on  the  word  `conversation',  as  it  appears  in  the  original  text,  must  not  be 
overlooked.  At  this  stage  of  his  evidence,  Hawkins  was  not  revealing  information  he 
had  gained  by  virtue  of  his  status  as  a  medical  man.  Rather,  the  question  of  divulging 
information  was  more  fundamentally  grounded  in  honour.  His  introduction  to  the  two 
parties  involved  in  the  case  had  been  on  a  professional  level,  when  he  was  called  to  be 
present  at  the  birth  of  their  child.  Though  present,  Hawkins  did  not  deliver  the  child 
himself  and  at  the  trial  he  stated  he  could  not  remember  who  had  delivered  it. 
However,  professional  attendance  aside,  his  knowledge  of  any  marriage  between  them 
was  gained  through  conversation.  Much  of  the  medical  world  of  the  eighteenth 
century  equated  ethical  practice  with  courtesy,  manners  and  etiquette  -a  hierarchical 
world  in  which  successful  practitioners  strove  for  the  status  of  gentlemen.  7 
Hawkins's  request  not  to  break  the  confidences  of  the  two  parties  was  based  on  the 
ethic  of  a  gentleman's  honour.  As  noted  earlier,  Hervey  and  Elizabeth  Chudleigh  had 
used  Hawkins  as  their  mutual  envoy  in  the  correspondence  preceding  the 
ecclesiastical  trial.  During  his  evidence  in  the  criminal  trial,  Hawkins  recounted  how 
Hervey  had  wished  to  convey  to  his  wife  the  regard  and  respect  which  he  had  for  her 
and  to  assure  her  that  he  would 
appear  and  act  on  the  line  of  a  man  of  honour  and  of  a  gentleman;  that  he 
wished  (he  said)  she  would  understand  that  his  soliciting  me  to  carry  the 
message  should  be  received  by  her  as  a  mark  of  that  disposition  28 
25  The  Trial'  Elizabeth  (London,  1776),  120. 
26  Ibid.,  120 
27  ME  Fissel,  `Innocent  and  Honourable  Bribes:  Medical  Manners  in  Eighteenth  Century  Britain',  in  R 
Baker  et  at.  (eds.  ),  The  codification  of  medical  morality,  (Dordrecht,  1993),  19-45,25. 
28  The  Trial  of  Elizabeth  (London,  1776),  122. 
23 Hawkins  was  thus  being  entrusted  not  only  with  the  delivering  of  the  pertinent 
information  from  one  party  to  the  next,  but  with  being  a  symbol  of  gentlemanly 
honour.  Put  in  this  context,  it  is  clear  that  during  the  trial  he  was  keen  not  to  betray  the 
trust  which  had  been  put  in  him,  and,  what  is  more,  he  was  trying  to  accentuate  the 
status  of  honourable  and  trustworthy  gentleman  bestowed  upon  him  by  Hervey.  While 
Hawkins  may  have  been  drawing  on  a  perceived  long-standing  duty  of  medical 
practitioners  to  maintain  patient  confidences,  his  actions,  when  seen  within  the 
specific  context  of  this  trial,  show  Hawkins  to  be  making  his  request  in  a  manner  that 
would  appeal  to  the  code  of  honour  of  the  upper  echelons  of  society  represented  in  the 
courtroom. 
It  is  of  little  surprise  that  a  trial  of  this  nature,  at  this  time,  became  centrally 
focused  on  the  issue  of  honour.  The  honour  of  the  peerage  was  itself  being  brought 
into  question  with  such  a  scandalous  trial  for  a  crime  involving  three  of  its  members. 
Similarly,  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  a  medical  man  was  so  prominent  in  the 
proceedings.  By  virtue  of  their  profession,  medical  men  were  party  to  private  and 
sensitive  information  about  patients  and  their  families.  Recognizing  this,  the 
contemporary  medical  ethicist  John  Gregory  wrote:  `Hence  appears  how  much  the 
characters  of  individuals,  and  the  credit  of  families  may  sometimes  depend  on  the 
discretion,  secrecy,  and  honour  of  a  physician.  '29  In  light  of  these  words,  it  is  worthy 
of  particular  note  that  it  was  a  surgeon,  not  the  socially  superior  physician,  who  was 
embroiled  in  the  wrangle  for  recognition  within  the  role  of  honourable  gentleman,  on 
the  high-profile  stage  of  this  prominent  trial  in  such  a  powerful  court. 
Hawkins  was  the  first  of  the  witnesses  to  question  the  extent  to  which 
information  should  be  divulged  in  keeping  with  honour,  but  he  was  not  the  last.  The 
Honourable  Sophia  Charlotte  Fettiplace  requested  to  be  excused  from  giving  evidence 
on  the  grounds  that  she  had  no  knowledge  of  the  issue  other  than  what  arose  from  her 
former  connection  as  friend  and  confidante  of  the  Duchess.  The  Lord  High  Steward 
responded  with  a  categorical  statement  that  she  must  disclose  what  she  knew  for  the 
purposes  of  justice.  30  Still  the  issue  was  not  resolved. 
29  As  quoted  in  LB  McCullough,  John  Gregory  and  the  Invention  of  Professional  Medical  Ethics  and 
the  Profession  of  Medicine,  (Dordrecht,  1998),  223. 
3'  The  Trial  of  Elizabeth  (London,  1776),  126. 
24 The  next  witness  was  Viscount  Barrington.  While  each  of  the  reports  of  the 
trial  lists  Barrington  simply  as  a  friend  of  the  Duchess,  William  Wildman  Barrington 
served  as  Member  of  Parliament  for  Berwick-upon-Tweed  and  later  Plymouth.  He 
held  a  number  of  official  posts  throughout  his  career,  including  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer,  and  at  the  time  of  the  trial  he  was  in  his  second  term  as  Secretary  for  War. 
His  opening  remarks  made  clear  his  reluctance  to  follow  the  court's  line  of  thought 
and  divulge  all  information 
if  any  thing  has  been  confided  to  my  Honour,  or  confidentially  told  me,  I  do 
hold,  with  humble  submission  to  your  Lordships,  that  as  a  man  of  honour,  as  a 
man  regardful  of  the  laws  of  society,  I  cannot  reveal  it.  31 
When  reminded  of  the  court's  reaction  to  Hawkins's  request  for  privilege,  Barrington 
acknowledged  the  court's  response  but  stated:  `I  think  every  man  must  act  from  his 
own  feelings,  and  I  feel,  that  any  Private  Conversation  intrusted  to  me,  is  not  to  be 
reported  again.  '32This  is  a  very  important  statement.  Barrington  asserted  that  it  would 
contravene  his  honour  to  reveal  what  he  had  learned  in  conversation  with  the 
Duchess,  yet  that  is  precisely  the  method  by  which  Hawkins  had  apprehended  that 
there  was  a  marriage  -  information  he  had  been  forced  to  divulge. 
While  Hawkins  received  a  unanimous  rebuff  to  his  request  to  maintain 
confidences,  Barrington's  petition,  at  least  initially,  fell  on  more  sympathetic  ears.  In 
the  discussion  in  open  court,  Lord  Camden  stated:  `As  to  casuistical  points,  how  far 
he  should  conceal  or  suppress  that,  which  the  justice  of  his  country  calls  upon  him  to 
reveal,  that  I  must  leave  to  the  witness's  own  conscience.  '33  Camden  may  have 
imposed  the  weight  of  the  situation  on  Barrington's  conscience,  but  this  was  clearly 
more  lenient  in  contrast  to  the  Lord  High  Steward's  categorical  response  to  Sophia 
Charlotte  Fettiplace.  The  Duke  of  Richmond  went  further:  `For  one  I  think  it  would 
be  improper  in  the  noble  Lord  to  betray  any  private  conversations.  I  submit  to  your 
Lordships,  that  every  matter  of  fact,  not  of  conversation,  which  can  be  requested,  the 
noble  Lord  is  bound  to  disclose.  '34 
31  Ibid.,  12i- 
32  Ibid.,  127. 
33  Ibid.,  128. 
34  Ibid.,  127. 
25 After  an  adjournment  of  some  time  to  discuss  the  matter,  the  Peers  returned 
and  the  Lord  High  Steward  informed  Barrington  that  they  had  judged  that  he  was 
bound  by  law  to  answer  all  questions  put  to  him.  The  matter  being  seemingly  decided, 
both  counsel  for  the  prosecution  and  defence  stated  that  they  had  no  questions  for 
Barrington.  Thus,  even  when  the  court  had  taken  the  opportunity  to  adjourn  and 
consider  the  matter  -  more  than  was  deemed  necessary  when  Hawkins  made  his 
request  -  the  two  opposing  counsels  were  reluctant  to  compromise  Barrington's 
honour.  Lord  Radnor,  however,  did  take  the  opportunity  to  ask  Barrington  direct 
questions  relating  to  his  conversations  with  the  Duchess  which  made  mention  of  her 
marriage  to  Hervey.  Having  taken  further  advice  from  counsel,  Barrington  gave  a 
tentative  but  positive  response,  making  the  evasive  qualification  that  he  was  not 
lawyer  or  civilian  enough  to  judge  whether  it  was  a  legal  marriage.  35 
The  first  witness  for  the  defence  was  Berkley,  attorney  to  Hervey.  He 
immediately  declared  his  interest  in  the  cause,  stating  that  his  knowledge  of  the 
business  arose  from  his  professional  position  in  relation  to  Hervey.  Consequently,  he 
posed  a  similar  question  as  Hawkins  and  Barrington  had  done  before  him:  Did  his 
professional  position  as  attorney  to  one  of  the  parties  in  the  cause  exempt  him  from 
answering  questions  from  counsel?  In  his  own  words,  would  the  disclosing  of 
information  gained  in  the  lawyer-client  relationship  be  `consistent  with  honour  to 
myself  and  the  duty  I  owe  to  him.  '36  As  with  Hawkins,  it  was  Mansfield  who 
attempted  to  clarify  the  legal  position  by  stating  that  the  privilege  of  attorneys 
extended  only  to  information  received  from  clients  in  order  to  gain  legal  advice 
relevant  to  their  defence.  The  questions  being  put  to  Berkley  did  not  request  the 
divulging  of  secrets  of  the  client,  but  rather  sought  collateral  facts  and  `it  has  often 
been  determined,  that  as  to  fact  an  attorney  or  counsel  has  no  privilege  to  withhold  his 
evidence.  '37  It  is  noteworthy  that  Mansfield  treated  this  as  a  firmly  established  point 
of  law,  and  he  concluded  his  remarks  by  stating  his  supposition  that  Berkley  only 
raised  the  question  in  order  to  justify  his  action  in  giving  evidence.  Questions 
proceeded  and  Berkley  co-operated  in  answering  them. 
Professional  and  personal  honour  were  prominent  themes  throughout  the  trial, 
and  it  is  worth  pausing  to  consider  the  court's  reaction  to  the  various  petitions  for 
35  Ibid.,  130. 
36  Ibid.,  146. 
31  Ibid.,  146. 
26 exemption  from  testifying.  In  Hawkins's  case,  his  request  was  unanimously  thrown 
out  with  no  discussion  beyond  the  statement  by  Mansfield.  When  Berkley  was  called, 
he  sought  clarification  on  his  position  relative  to  the  established  privilege  granted  to 
members  of  the  legal  profession.  The  reply  of  Mansfield  recognized  the  existence  of  a 
qualified  legal  privilege  and  his  assertion  that  Berkley  was  only  looking  for 
justification  of  his  giving  evidence,  is  a  clear  demonstration  of  Berkley's  desire  to 
maintain  honour  and  reputation  while  satisfying  the  court's  requirements.  This  point 
also  holds  true  for  Hawkins.  A  medical  man  in  the  eighteenth  century  relied  on 
reputation,  perceived  status  and  etiquette  in  order  to  gain  wealthy  patients  and  the 
accompanying  fees.  By  appealing  for  privilege  on  the  basis  of  his  professional  status, 
Hawkins  was  attempting  to  safeguard  his  reputation  as  an  honourable  and  trustworthy 
gentleman.  Such  overt  moral  characteristics  were  central  to  the  success  of  his  practice 
and,  consequently,  his  livelihood. 
Kiernan,  in  his  examination  of  the  code  of  honour  amongst  the  upper  classes, 
provides  two  alternative  sources  for  a  sense  of  honour:  innate  virtue  or  conformity  to 
stereotyped  rules  of  conduct.  In  practice,  he  states:  `an  individual's  honour. 
.. 
had  little 
to  do  with  any  ethical  convictions;  its  meaning  was  much  closer  to  'prestige'...  [used] 
to  impress  his  underlings  as  well  as  his  peers.  '38  There  is  little  doubt  that  a  large 
element  of  the  motive  of  each  of  the  witnesses  who  challenged  the  court  on  the 
question  of  honour,  can  be  attributed  to  the  individual's  desire  for  personal  prestige 
and  recognition  by  such  a  distinguished  court.  Yet  perhaps  a  slightly  different  light 
should  be  cast  over  Hawkins's  motivations. 
Roy  Porter's  analysis  of  the  career  of  the  famous  eighteenth-century  surgeon 
William  Hunter  shows  how  mainstream  histories  of  medicine  which 
compartmentalized  physicians,  surgeons  and  apothecaries  into  a  three-tiered  hierarchy 
in  which  only  the  physician  could  achieve  the  status  of  gentleman,  were  overly 
rigid.  39  Rather,  while  hierarchy  did  exist,  the  power  which  the  patient  had  to  choose 
from  the  wide  variety  of  formal  and  informal  healers  available  left  opportunity 
enough  for  enterprising  individuals  to  gain  social  advancement  and  wealthy  clients, 
38  VG  Kiernan,  The  Duel  in  European  History.  Honour  and  the  Reign  of  the  Aristocracy,  (Oxford, 
1988),  155. 
39  R  Porter,  `William  Hunter:  a  Surgeon  and  a  Gentleman',  in  WF  Bynum  and  R  Porter  (eds.  ),  William 
Hunter  and  the  Eighteenth  Century  Medical  World,  (Cambridge,  1985),  7. 
27 without  practising  physic.  40  Porter  draws  on  Jewson's  classic  paper  on  eighteenth- 
century  medical  life  in  which  he  states  that  the  ethical  propriety  of  medical  men  was  a 
central  criterion  for  their  selection.  While  the  ambitious  physician  was  required  to 
establish  his  credentials  as  a  gentleman,  he  further  had  to  distinguish  himself  from  the 
rest  of  the  marketplace  crowd.  So,  as  Jewson  states:  `Physicians  were  encouraged 
therefore  to  bring  themselves  before  the  public  eye  by  every  devious  method  of  self 
advertisement  their  prolific  ingenuity  could  devise.  Al 
In  light  of  Porter  and  Jewson,  it  is  possible  to  view  Hawkins's  performance  in 
court,  not  so  much  as  a  demonstration  of  status  to  equals  and  underlings,  but  rather  as 
a  defence  of  his  elite  position  within  the  profession,  with  all  its  financial  trappings,  by 
using  his  enforced  appearance  in  court  as  a  means  to  advertise  his  ethical  propriety  to 
a  courtroom  attended  by  Royalty,  filled  with  Peers,  and  on,  through  conversation  and 
publication,  to  the  wider  public.  42  As  noted  earlier,  the  continued  coverage  of  the  trial 
in  The  Gentleman's  Magazine  gives  an  indication  of  the  interest  shown  in  the 
Duchess's  trial.  This  would  have  brought  Hawkins's  connection  with,  and 
performance  in,  the  witness-box  to  the  attention  of  many  clients,  actual  and  potential, 
amongst  the  upper  class.  At  its  peak  this  publication  had  an  estimated  circulation  of 
over  10,000  copies  and  far  more  readers.  In  Porter's  words,  it  can  `thus  safely  be 
assumed  to  mirror  the  sober  opinions  of  the  enlightened  reading  elite,  the  catholic 
taste  of  anyone  with  the  rank,  education,  or  presumption  to  consider  himself 
genteel.  '43  Certainly,  the  proceedings  did  Hawkins's  career  no  harm:  he  became  a 
Baronet  in  1778. 
While  all  witnesses  were  eventually  compelled  to  answer  all  questions  put  to 
them,  there  were  vast  differences  in  the  method  and  manner  of  treatment  they 
received  from  the  court.  While  Hawkins's  request  was  rapidly  rejected,  Barrington's 
was  given  far  more  consideration,  indeed  the  court  was  adjourned  while  the  matter 
was  debated,  and  there  was  certainly  some  evidence  of  agreement  with  his  position. 
The  conversation  between  a  viscount  and  a  duchess  would  seem  to  have  been  more 
worthy  of  consideration  for  a  privilege  of  confidentiality  than  that  between  a  medical 
40  An  interesting  account  of  the  eighteenth  century  patient's  viewpoint  is  given  in  R  Porter,  `Lay 
Medical  Knowledge  in  the  Eighteenth  Century:  the  Evidence  of  the  Gentleman's  Magazine',  Medical 
History,  2951985),  138-168. 
41  ND  Jewson,  `Medical  Knowledge  and  the  Patronage  System  in  18th  Century  England',  Sociology,  13 
(1974),  379. 
42  C  Pelham  The  Chronicles  of  Crime;  or,  the  Newgate  Calendar  vol.!  (London,  1845),  261.  43  R  Porter,  `Lay  Medical  Knowledge',  141. 
28 man  and  his  clients.  Or  perhaps  the  court  was  more  willing  to  accommodate  the 
principle  of  private  duty  as  asserted  by  a  viscount  in  his  platonic  dealings  with  a 
duchess,  when  compared  with  a  similar  plea  from  a  medical  man  whose  desire  for 
honour  was  entangled  with  his  commercial  interests,  thereby  compromising  the  purity 
of  his  appeal  to  moral  principles. 
The  Duchess  was  unanimously  found  guilty  of  the  crime  of  bigamy.  The 
decision  itself  must  have  proved  quite  a  spectacle  as  each  of  119  members  of  the 
House  of  Peers,  starting  with  the  youngest,  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  stood  in  turn,  placed 
their  right  hand  on  their  chest  and  declared  `Guilty,  upon  my  honour.  '44  It  is  no  small 
irony  that  the  only  claim  for  privilege  which  was  successful  in  its  petition  to  the  court, 
was  the  guilty  Duchess's  request  for  the  privilege  of  the  peerage,  exempting  her  from 
corporal  punishment.  45  After  her  trial  the  Duchess,  hearing  that  the  Duke's  nephews 
were  about  to  proceed  against  her,  left  England,  being  conveyed  across  the  Channel  to 
Calais  in  an  open  boat  by  the  captain  of  her  yacht  on  the  very  day  that  a  ne  exeat 
regno  was  issued  against  her.  She  was,  however,  left  in  possession  of  her  fortune. 
The  English  legal  system  has  a  firm  historical  foundation  in  common  law  and  judicial 
precedent.  Even  with  the  vast  increase  in  statute  law  in  the  nineteenth-century,  much 
of  which  confirmed  prior  practice,  judicial  precedent  was  still  highly  influential  via  its 
interpretation  of  penumbral  issues.  As  Chief  Justice  Lord  Kenyon  put  it  in  1792,  the 
discretion  of  the  court  `will  be  best  exercised  by  not  deviating  from  the  rules  laid 
down  by  our  predecessors;  for  the  practice  of  the  Court  forms  the  law  of  the  Court.  A6 
A.  H.  Manchester  points  out  that  one  of  the  crucial  elements  in  a  judge's  awareness 
and  knowledge  of  the  common  law  was  gained  through  accurate  published  reporting 
of  cases.  47  While  this  was  not  a  widespread  practice  in  the  eighteenth-century,  the 
perceived  importance  of  the  Duchess's  case  led  the  House  of  Peers  to  order  an  official 
report  to  be  made.  In  fact,  in  addition  to  Bathurst's  account  of  the  trial  published  in 
1776,  the  case  was  fully  reported  by  both  Hargrave  in  his  collection  of  State  trials  in 
44  TB  Howelt,  A  complete  collection  of  State  Trials  and  proceedings  for  high  treason  and  other  crimes 
and  misdemagnours  from  the  earliest  period  to  1783,  (London,  1816),  623-5. 
45  The  Annual  Register  1776,236. 
46  Wilson  v  Rastall,  The  English  Reports,  vol.  99,  King's  Bench  Division,  Term  Reports  (Edinburgh, 
1909),  1286. 
47  AH  Manchester,  A  Modern  Legal  History  of  England  and  Wales  1750-1950,  (London,  1980),  23 
29 1781  and  by  Howell  in  a  similar  work  published  in  1816.8  Clearly  then,  in  addition  to 
the  populist  reporting  of  the  case,  the  legal  mind  was  given  ample  opportunity  to  read 
any  one  of  at  least  three  verbatim  accounts  of  the  trial.  49  Evidence  that  these  reports 
were  read  and  impacted  upon  practice  can  be  found  in  several  later  cases  in  which 
questions  of  confidentiality  and  privilege  were  raised.  The  ruling  against  Caesar 
Hawkins  was  cited  by  Justice  Buller  in  Wilson  v  Rastall,  1792.  The  case  related  to  the 
bribing  of  voters  in  an  election  in  which  it  was  clearly  stated  that  privilege  extended 
only  to  members  of  the  legal  profession  when  they  were  acting  in  that  specific 
capacity  in  preparation  for  legal  proceedings.  50  Wilson  v  Rastall  was,  in  turn,  further 
cited  in  Rex  v  Gibbons,  1823.  In  this  latter  case,  a  surgeon,  called  to  give  evidence  as 
to  a  confession  made  to  him  by  a  woman  accused  of  murdering  her  bastard  child, 
objected  on  grounds  of  professional  privilege.  The  judge  dismissed  this  appeal  to 
privilege,  drawing  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Duchess's  case  had  made  clear  the 
duty  to  disclose  which  the  law  imposed  upon  a  medical  man  in  court.  Rex  v  Gibbons, 
was  later  cited  by  Lord  Chief  Justice  Best  in  the  case  of  Broad  v  Pitt,  1828.  During 
this  case  a  witness  was  called  who  had  been  attorney  for  the  defendant.  He  was  asked 
about  a  conversation  which  he  had  had  with  the  defendant,  when  the  defendant  had 
executed  a  deed  which  the  witness  had  prepared  for  him  as  his  professional  adviser. 
The  witness  contended  that  the  conversation  was  confidential,  but  was  ruled  against 
on  grounds  that  the  communication  was  not  made  for  the  purposes  of  bringing  or 
defending  a  legal  action.  Amidst  what  became  a  famous  statement  on  the  secrecy 
attached  to  confessions  to  a  clergyman,  Best  clearly  indicated  that  there  was  no 
privilege  for  a  medical  man  and  cited  the  Duchess's  case  as  evidence. 
The  House  of  Lords  was  the  highest  court  of  appeal  in  Britain,  except  with 
regard  to  criminal  cases  in  Scotland.  As  the  Duchess  was  tried  for  the  crime  of 
bigamy,  the  decisions  established  by  the  Lords  were  not  binding  on  the  Scottish 
criminal  courts.  51  It  is  therefore  important  to  examine  the  impact  of  the  Duchess's  trial 
in  Scotland.  In  addition  to  the  published  reports,  written  treatises  were  a  further 
48  F  Hargrave,  A  Complete  Collection  of  State  Trials,  vol.  11,  (London,  1781);  TB  Howell,  A 
Complete  Collection  of  State  Trials,  (London,  1816). 
49  This  is  not  an  exhaustive  list.  For  example  Lewis  Melville  included  the  Duchess's  trial  in  his  Notable 
British  Trial-Series  (Edinburgh  and  London,  1927  &  1996  reprint). 
so  The  English  Reports,  vol.  99,1286. 
51  While  the  present  focus  is  on  the  Duchess's  impact  in  Britain,  the  trial's  circumstances  had 
ramifications  which  were  felt  much  further  afield.  See  for  instance  Rossiter  v  Thornton,  1834.  This 
was  heard  in  The  Supreme  Court  of  New  South  Wales  and  is  reported  in  the  Sydney  Herald  10  March 
1834. 
30 source  of  the  principles  of  law  as  established  in  particular  decisions.  Interestingly,  a 
number  of  the  key  nineteenth-century  Scottish  commentators  categorically  stated  that 
surgeons  and  physicians  had  no  privilege  in  a  court  of  law,  but  cited  no  cases  in 
relation  to  this  point.  52  One  exception  was  William  Gillespie  Dickson,  whose  treatise 
cited  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  as  its  earliest  precedent.  53 
Another  case  to  which  Dickson  pays  particular  attention  is  that  of  AB  v  CD, 
1851.54  Heard  in  the  Scottish  Court  of  Session,  the  case  established  in  Scottish  Law 
that  secrecy  was  an  essential  element  of  the  contract  between  a  medical  man  and  his 
employers.  The  case  involved  an  elder  of  the  Kirk  Session  in  an  undisclosed  parish  in 
Scotland,  whose  wife  gave  birth  to  a  child  only  six  months  after  their  marriage.  In  a 
misunderstanding  of  his  position,  the  medical  man  called  in  to  give  his  opinion  on  the 
age  of  the  child,  indicated  to  the  Minister  of  the  parish  that  the  child  was  not 
premature.  The  elder  was  dismissed  from  the  Kirk  Session  and  brought  an  action 
against  the  doctor  for  breach  of  confidentiality.  The  doctor's  lawyers  attempted  to 
counter  this  on  the  grounds  that  secrecy  could  not  be  taken  to  be  an  essential  element 
of  the  contract  between  a  medical  man  and  his  clients  as  there  were  instances  in  which 
the  medical  man  could  be  forced  to  divulge  patient  information.  Their  justification  for 
this  position  was  the  fact  that  a  medical  man  could  not  claim  privilege  in  court  and 
their  precedent  was  the  Duchess  of  Kingston.  Although  the  court  did  not  accept  the 
defence's  argument  with  regard  to  there  being  no  secrecy  involved  in  the  doctor-client 
relationship,  Lord  Fullerton  did  make  clear  that  the  medical  profession  did  not  have 
any  form  of  privilege  to  decline  giving  evidence  in  a  court  of  law. 
While  AB  v  CD,  1851  is  the  earliest  case  cited  in  many  works  relating  to 
medical  confidentiality  in  Scotland,  the  issue  of  medical  privilege  was  not  raised  for 
discussion,  but  rather  received  passing  comment  by  one  of  the  Judges  in  the  case.  In 
fact,  while  the  Duchess's  trial  was  cited  in  further  Scottish  cases,  it  appears  that  the 
specific  question  of  medical  privilege  was  never  the  issue  of  immediate  focus.  55  Thus, 
52  See  for  instance:  D  Hume,  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Scotland,  Respecting  Crimes,  2nd  ed.  Vol.  2 
(Edinburgh,  1819),  338;  J  Burnett,  A  Treatise  on  Various  Branches  of  the  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland, 
(Edinburgh,  1811),  437;  G  Tait,  A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Evidence  in  Scotland,  3rd  ed.  (Edinburgh, 
1834),  387. 
53  WG  Dickson,  A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Evidence  in  Scotland  vol.  2,  (Edinburgh,  1855),  1095. 
Repeated  vatim  in  the  1864  edition. 
54  AB  v  CD  14  D  177. 
ss  See  for  example:  AB  v  CD  7  Fraser  (Court  of  Session)  72;  Watson  v  McKeown,  12  SLT  248  &  599 
&  13  SLT  340  &7  Fraser  (Court  of  Session)  109.  The  point  also  holds  true  for  English  cases,  see:  Wilson  v  Rastall  The  English  Reports,  vol.  99,1286. 
31 even  Wilkinson,  writing  in  1986,  was  forced  to  state  that  while  there  is  no  reported 
Scottish  decision  on  the  point,  `it  is  settled  practice  that  he  (a  medical  practitioner) 
may  also  be  compelled  to  speak  to  communications  passing  between  him  and  his 
patient.  06  The  case  cited  with  this  is  once  again  AB  v  CD  from  1851.  With 
Wilkinson's  work  being  cited,  in  connection  with  the  absence  of  medical  privilege  in 
the  witness  box,  by  the  online  edition  of  the  Stair  Memorial  Encyclopedia,  it  is  quite 
clear  that  the  Duchess's  impact  in  Scotland  was  not  inconsiderable.  57 
The  discipline  of  medical  jurisprudence,  encompassing  both  forensic  medicine 
and  medical  police,  was  gaining  impetus  as  a  necessary  element  of  taught  medical 
education  throughout  the  eighteenth-century.  5S  The  very  public  appearance  of  medical 
men  in  the  witness  box  was  a  severe  testing  ground  not  just  for  the  individuals 
involved  but  also  for  the  reputation  of  the  professions  they  represented.  One 
contemporary  commentator  went  as  far  as  to  question:  `Is  there  any  object  of  dread, 
paramount  in  the  eye  of  the  medical  practitioner,  to  the  witness-box?  '59  In  response  to 
this  situation,  courses  of  medical  jurisprudence  began  to  be  incorporated  into  medical 
teaching.  In  conjunction  with  the  rise  in  taught  courses,  there  was  also  a  burst  of 
literature  on  the  subject  in  the  early  nineteenth-century.  In  their  1823  textbook  of 
medical  jurisprudence,  one  of  the  earliest  in  Britain,  Paris  and  Fonblanque  cite  the 
trial  of  the  Duchess  in  a  section  dealing  with  confidentiality.  The  advice  given  follows 
the  line  of  thought  taken  by  Mansfield  during  the  trial,  and  they  quote  in  full  his 
statement  on  the  matter.  60  This  work  was  further  cited  by  many  other  writers  and 
commentators  in  the  field,  thereby  bringing  the  attention  of  students  and  practitioners 
of  law  and  medicine  to  the  Duchess's  case,  ensuring  its  continued  influence  in  the 
growing  field  of  medical  jurisprudence  61 
However,  not  all  commentators  shared  the  same  view.  John  Gordon  Smith, 
while  recognizing  the  power  which  legal  precedent  contained  on  the  issue  of  medical 
56  AB  Wilkinson,  The  Scottish  Law  of  Evidence  (London  &  Edinburgh,  1986),  105. 
57  Stair  Memorial  Encyclopedia  available  online  at: 
http:  //wilson.  butterworths.  co.  uk/stair/scotslawonline/index_los.  htm 
58  A  Todd  Thomson,  Lecture,  Introductory  to  the  Course  of  Medical  Jurisprudence,  Delivered  in  the 
University  of  London,  on  Friday  January  7`h  1831,  (London,  1831),  9. 
59  JG  Smith,  An  Analysis  of  Medical  Evidence  :  Comprising  Directions  for  Practitioners,  in  View  of 
Becoming  W4nesses  in  Courts  of  Justice  and  an  Appendix  of  Professional  Testimony,  (London,  1825), 
5. 
60  JA  Paris  änd  JSM  Fonblanque,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  (London,  1823),  160. 
61  See  for  example:  Todd  Thomson,  Lecture,  (London,  1831),  9-10;  TS  Traill,  Outlines  ofa  Course  of 
Lectures  on  Medical  Jurisprudence  (Edinburgh,  1840);  R  Lyall,  The  Medical  Evidence  Relative  to  the 
Duration  of  Human  Pregnancy  as  Given  in  the  Gardner  Peerage  Case,  (London,  1826) 
32 confidentiality,  presented  an  alternative  viewpoint,  based  not  on  the  previous  practice 
of  the  courts  or  national  law,  but  rather  on  theories  of  general  right.  62  Moreover, 
dissent  was  not  only  to  be  found  in  textbooks,  but  also  in  the  judgements  of  some 
courts.  In  the  Scottish  case  of  McDonald  v  McDonalds  1881,  in  which  an  insurance 
company  tried  to  claim  privilege  with  regard  to  a  medical  report  they  were  asked  to 
produce  in  evidence,  it  was  stated  that 
although  it  has  been  decided  by  the  English  Courts  that  a  medical  man  who 
acquires  information  from  his  patient....  cannot  refuse  in  a  Court  of  Justice  to 
disclose  the  information  they  possess,  yet  these  decisions  have  been  regretted 
by  later  English  Judges,  and  none  have  been  pronounced  hitherto  by  the 
Scottish  Courts  63 
Possibly  reference  was  being  made  to  the  comments  of  Buller  in  the  case  of  Wilson  v 
Rastall  in  1792  in  which,  citing  the  example  of  Caesar  Hawkins  in  the  Duchess's 
case,  he  lamented  that  the  law  of  privilege  was  not  extended  to  information  gained  by 
medical  practitioners  in  the  practice  of  their  profession.  4  Even  such  a  high  legal 
authority  as  Lord  Chancellor  Brougham  in  his  decision  in  Greenough  v  Gaskell,  1833 
raised  questions  over  the  wisdom  of  the  current  state  of  the  law.  In  his  discussion  of 
the  legal  privilege  enjoyed  by  lawyers,  he  observed:  `it  may  not  be  very  easy  to 
discover  why  a  like  privilege  has  been  refused  to  others,  and  especially  to  medical 
advisers.  '65  While  not  all  commentators  or  judges  agreed  with  the  decision  in  the 
Duchess's  case,  the  law  remained  unchanged.  When,  at  the  outset  of  the  twentieth- 
century,  John  Glaister,  professor  of  medical  jurisprudence  and  toxicology  at  the 
University  of  Glasgow,  came  to  write  his  influential  textbook  of  Medical 
Jurisprudence  and  Toxicology,  he  indicated  that  the  absence  of  any  privilege  for 
medical  witnesses  was  the  established  law  of  the  land.  This,  he  stated,  had  been  first 
62  Smith  treats  breach  of  confidentiality  when  absolutely  required  in  court  as  firmly  established  by  legal 
precedent.  In  a  footnote  relating  to  the  courts  at  Westminster  he  states:  `Perhaps  it  may  not  be 
impertinent  to  call  the  particular  attention  of  the  reader  to  the  nature  of  the  courts  that  sit  there.  In  the 
Appendix,  witl  be  found  illustrations  as  to  what  has  been  ruled  on  this  point:  in  one  instance  in  the 
House  of  Pegs,  which  on  the  occasion  in  question,  sat  in  Westminster  Hall.  '  This  seems  to  be  a 
reference  to  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  Trial.  Smith,  Analysis  of  Medical  Evidence,  92. 
63  McDonald  v  McDonalds  8R  357 
64  Wilson  v  Rastall,  The  English  Reports,  vol.  99,1286. 
651  MY&K98. 
33 laid  down  by  Lord  Mansfield  in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  trial  from  which  he  quoted 
at  some  length.  66 
A  further  indication  of  the  fundamental  importance  of  the  Duchess's  case  is 
the  fact  that  it  resurfaced  in  various  guises  whenever  the  question  of  medical 
confidentiality  was  brought  to  widespread  attention.  In  1896,  at  the  time  of  the 
infamous  Kitson  v  Playfair  case,  when,  as  noted  in  the  last  chapter,  the  Royal 
accoucheur  was  found  guilty  of  slander  and  fined  £12,000,  the  British  Medical 
Journal  for  that  year  contained  two  articles  which  cited  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  Trial 
as  the  benchmark  precedent.  67  When,  in  1899,  the  Russian  ambassador  sought  advice 
on  Britain's  policy  on  medical  confidentiality,  the  Home  Office  referred  the  request  to 
the  General  Medical  Council.  68  The  resultant  memo,  indicating  that  the  absence  of 
any  privilege  of  confidentiality  had  been  established  at  the  Duchess's  trial,  was 
published  in  the  BMJ.  69  Similarly,  in  the  early  1920s  when  there  were  a  number  of 
high  profile  legal  cases  in  which  medical  privilege  was  claimed,  the  Duchess's  case 
was  cited  as  precedent  in  all  manner  of  sources,  ranging  from  the  medical  journals, 
legal  journals,  newspapers  such  as  The  Times  and  the  Evening  Standard  to  the 
minutes  of  the  BMA's  Central  Ethical  Committee.  70  These  citations  brought  the 
importance  of  the  Duchess's  trial  to  the  attention  of  medical  and  legal  professionals  as 
well  as  the  wider  public,  and  their  importance  should  not  be  overlooked.  For  instance, 
the  articles  from  the  Law  Journal  and  the  Solicitor's  Journal  were  picked  up  with 
some  interest  by  the  newly  established  Ministry  of  Health,  and  were  included  in  their 
file  on  medical  confidentiality  in  the  early  1920s.  Similarly,  William  Brend's  article 
in  the  BMJ  in  early  1922,  was  cited  in  a  special  meeting  of  the  BMA  Council,  held  to 
discuss  the  question  of  medical  confidentiality  and  became  required  reading  for 
66  J  Glaister,  A  Textbook  of  Medical  Jurisprudence  and  Toxicology,  2d  ed.  (Edinburgh,  1910),  44.  This 
information  is  replicated  in  the  following  editions  of  Glaister's  book. 
67  BMJ  4th  &  180'  April  1896. 
68  Public  Record  Office,  Kew,  HO  45/9988/X72989,  General  Medical  Council  memorandum  for  Home 
Office  on  question  of  medical  confidentiality,  18  January  1899. 
69  BMJ  11  March  1899. 
70  The  following  is  by  no  means  an  exhaustive  list  of  citations  of  the  Duchess  precedent:  Garner  v 
Garner,  The  Times  Law  Reports  vol.  36,196  ;  Needham  v  Needham,  Daily  Chronicle, 
10  June  192_1;  BMJ  24  April  1920,14  January  1922,9  October  &  13  November  1926;  Lancet  1  April 
1922;  Law  Journal  18  June  1921;  Solicitor's  Journal  24  January  1920;  The  Times  15  January  1920; 
Evening  Standard  26  January  1922;  British  Medical  Association,  Central  Ethical  Committee  minutes 
9  November  1920  &  15  December  1921. 
34 members  of  the  BMA's  professional  secrecy  committee  before  its  first  meeting  in 
March  of  that  year.  71 
Unwitting  as  it  was,  the  lasting  legacy  of  a  Duchess  who  courted  controversy 
was  the  legal  implications  of  her  trial  for  bigamy,  including  its  impact  on  the 
determination  of  medical  privilege.  On  a  fundamental  level  the  case  illustrates  many 
points  relating  to  the  issue  of  medical  confidentiality.  The  conflict  between  private 
life  and  public  interest  is  evident,  as  is  the  controversy  over  the  frontier  that  divides 
them.  Professional  and  personal  interests,  observed  in  the  actions  of  both  Hawkins 
and  Berkley,  are  also  prominent  in  the  trial,  and  it  is  clear  that  confidentiality  was 
firmly  grounded  in  the  concept  of  honour.  Attention  has  also  been  drawn  to 
differences  in  the  method  and  manner  of  the  court's  treatment  of  the  petitions  from 
Hawkins,  Barrington,  and  Berkley,  observing  in  particular  the  leniency  of  the 
approach  to  Barrington  and  the  confirmation  of  the  legal  privilege  with  Berkley.  Yet, 
the  response  of  the  court  to  each  of  the  challenges  must  be  seen  as  only  half  the  story. 
As  Frevert  notes  in  an  examination  of  honour  in  duelling 
Securing  victory  over  their  opponents  was  not  the  main  concern  of  eighteenth- 
century  duellists 
.... 
It  was  not  the  outcome  of  the  duel  which  determined 
whether  or  not  the  duellists  were  men  of  honour,  but  the  fact  that  the  duel  was 
staged  at  all.  72 
By  challenging  such  an  authoritative  court  on  a  point  of  law,  each  of  the  witnesses 
desired  the  recognition  that  they  were  in  a  position  to  do  so,  and  be  taken  seriously. 
The  courtroom  duels  were  fought  for  honour,  prestige,  personal  and  professional 
interest,  all  of  which  could  be  maintained  in  the  act  of  the  challenge  as  much  as  in  the 
outcome  itself.  In  this  sensational  case  of  private  agendas  and  personal  interests,  is  to 
be  found  the  precedent  that  bound  the  whole  of  an  evolving  medical  profession  on  the 
issue  of  medical  confidentiality. 
71  BMJ  14  January  1922,64-66. 
72  U  Frevert,  Men  of  Honour.  A  Social  and  Cultural  History  of  the  Duel,  (Cambridge,  1995),  13. 
35 Chapter  3-  The  Long  Nineteenth  Century 
The  Duchess  of  Kingston's  trial  was  far  from  a  full  discussion  of  the  delineation  of 
medical  confidentiality.  Nonetheless,  it  was  adopted  as  an  important  legal  precedent 
for  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality.  The  authority  of  the  House  of  Lords, 
coupled  with  Hawkins's  elite  status  as  Serjeant-Surgeon  to  the  King,  and  rise  to  the 
ranks  of  the  baronetcy,  were  significant  contributory  factors  in  the  binding  nature  of 
the  precedent  on  the  whole  of  medical  practice.  Yet,  it  is  necessary  to  examine 
further,  why  a  decision  made  in  haste  in  a  court  with  such  a  prominent  bias  towards 
social  prestige  and  honour  should  have  had  as  lasting  an  impact  on  medical 
confidentiality  as  Mansfield's  decision  in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  trial.  For,  while 
little  had  changed  by  the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century  with  regard  to  medical  privilege 
in  court,  other  key  developments  in  the  practice  of  medicine  meant  there  were  new 
strains  being  put  on  the  confidentiality  of  the  doctor-patient  relationship  outwith  the 
witness-box. 
Perhaps  the  most  obvious  of  the  changes  from  the  late  eighteenth  century  was 
the  emergence  of  an  identifiable  medical  profession  during  the  nineteenth  century. 
The  Royal  College  of  Physicians'  attempt  to  re-assert  the  rigidity  of  the  three-tiered 
hierarchy  in  medicine  through  its  intervention  in  the  Apothecaries  Act  of  1815  proved 
an  insufficient  ballast  against  the  tide  of  change  that  was  steadily  washing  away  the 
physician  /  surgeon  /  apothecary  hierarchy  and  replacing  it  with  a  new  distinction 
between  consultant  and  general  practitioner.  )  The  significance  of  this  change  has  been 
drawn  out  by  Ivan  Waddington  in  a  series  of  works  relating  to  the  nineteenth  century 
professionalisation  of  medicine  and  the  development  of  modern  day  medical  ethics. 
The  blurring  of  the  boundaries  between  each  of  the  spheres  of  medical  practice,  in  the 
competitive  context  of  a  largely  unregulated  medical  marketplace  led  to  friction 
between  medical  practitioners.  Waddington  cites  numerous  examples  of  tension, 
confusion  and  outright  hostility  in  the  interaction  of  medical  practitioners  in  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  a  problem  rooted  in  the  confusion  of  far-reaching 
1  See  I  Wadaington,  `General  Practitioners  and  Consultants  in  Early  Nineteenth-Century  England:  The 
Sociology  of  an  Intra-Professional  Conflict',  in  J  Woodward  and  D  Richards  (eds.  ),  Health  Care  and 
Popular  Medicine  in  Nineteenth  Century  England,  (London,  1977),  164-188;  and  I  Waddington,  The 
Medical  Profession  in  the  Industrial  Revolution,  (Dublin,  1984),  part  1,1-49. 
36 change:  an  ongoing  clash  of  old  against  new,  of  those  whose  self-interest  lay  in 
maintaining  the  status  quo  and  those  whose  self-interest  required  change. 
The  importance  of  this  conflict  and  tension  for  the  matter  of  medical 
confidentiality  was  essentially  two-fold.  In  the  first  instance  it  meant  that  the  main 
focus  of  medical  ethics  at  the  time  was  the  relationships  between  medical  practitioners 
themselves  rather  than  between  the  medical  profession  and  its  clients.  In  his  work  on 
the  development  of  modem  day  codes  of  medical  ethics,  Waddington  is  clear  that,  in 
the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  medical  ethics  were  firmly  focussed  on  the 
problem  of  practitioners'  conduct  towards  one  another.  2  The  profession  that  was 
meant  to  be  caring  for  others  was  gaining  a  reputation  for  hostility  amongst  its  own 
members.  It  is  in  this  context  that  writers,  most  notably  Thomas  Percival  in  his 
Medical  Ethics  of  1803,  produced  works  which  sought  to  remedy  the  maladies  so 
evident  within  intra-professional  medical  relationships.  Waddington  notes  that 
Percival's  1803  text,  a  revamped  version  of  a  book  entitled  Medical  jurisprudence 
written  in  1794,  was  a  reaction  to  a  dispute  during  a  typhus/typhoid  outbreak  at  the 
Manchester  Infirmary  in  1789.  The  hospital  had  been  inundated  with  cases  to  such  an 
extent  that  the  trustees  had  doubled  the  medical  staff,  much  to  the  chagrin  of  the 
existing  practitioners.  Seeing  the  action  as  a  reflection  on  their  efforts  the  original 
staff  resigned  their  posts.  Percival's  work  was  therefore  commissioned  to  deal  with 
the  obvious  problem  of  intra-professional  behaviour,  and  gave  only  fleeting 
consideration  to  the  doctor-client  relationship.  Moreover,  Percival's  book  was  not 
unique,  and  Waddington  cites  numerous  other  writers,  as  well  as  articles  which 
regularly  appeared  in  the  medical  journals,  all  of  which  emphasised  the  need  for  more 
cohesion  and  understanding  amongst  medical  practitioners.  3  Thus,  following 
Waddington's  line  of  thought,  it  is  apparent  that  a  partial  explanation  of  the  longevity 
of  Mansfield's  decision  in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  case,  at  least  from  the  medical 
profession's  point  of  view,  is  to  be  found  in  the  primary  need  to  sort  out  the  problem 
of  internal  division  in  practitioners'  relations  before  the  focus  could  be  turned  on 
matters  which  concerned  medicine's  interaction  with  other  parties,  be  they  patients  or 
the  law. 
ZI  Waddington,  `The  Development  of  Medical  Ethics  -A  Sociological  Analysis',  in  Medical  History, 
1975,19,36-51;  I  Waddington,  The  Medical  Profession  in  the  Industrial  Revolution,  chapter  8. 
3  Ibid. 
37 The  second,  and  not  unrelated,  consequence  of  the  internal  tensions  of  early 
nineteenth  century  medicine  was  a  move  towards  greater  regulation  of  medical 
practice.  This  desire  was  largely  born  out  of  a  perception  of  the  medical  marketplace 
as  overcrowded  by  the  1830s,  a  situation  inflamed  by  the  open  and  direct  competition 
between  bona  fide  practitioners  (those  with  education  or  training)  and  the  unqualified. 
This  was  a  key  factor  in  the  prolonged  drive  for  statute  legislation  to  regulate  medical 
practice  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  culminating  initially  in  the  1858  Medical  Act. 
Waddington's  argument,  far  from  seeing  the  regulation  of  medical  practice  as 
motivated  by  practitioners'  desire  to  protect  the  interests  and  well-being  of  the 
unwitting  public,  emphasises  the  economic  benefit  which  would  accrue  to  registered 
practitioners  in  a  marketplace  where  state  regulation  gave  them  a  monopoly  on 
practice.  Thus  self-interest  drove  the  reform  of  medical  practice,  and  the  regulation  of 
medicine  through  fixed  standards  of  professional  entry  qualifications  and  disciplinary 
hearings  for  misconduct  were  essentially  the  guise  which  passed  off  selfishness  as 
altruism.  The  role  of  the  1858  Act  in  defining  the  framework  for  the  modem  day 
medical  profession  has  been  well  documented,  along  with  the  prolonged  battle 
between  general  practitioners  and  the  Royal  Colleges  in  the  lead  up  to  it.  The  resultant 
legislation  may  have  been  more  suited  to  the  old  school  of  thought  advocated  by  the 
elite  amongst  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  and  Royal  College  of  Surgeons,  but  it 
nonetheless  proved  to  be  a  significant  first  step  in  the  complex  evolution  of  the 
modern  day  medical  profession. 
However,  Waddington's  interpretation  of  Percival's  work  as  purely  etiquette 
and  his  discarding  of  19th  century  medical  ethics  as  a  self-interested  scheme  by  which 
qualified  practitioners  could  monopolise  the  overcrowded  marketplace  have  come  in 
for  severe  criticism  by  medical  historians.  On  the  latter  of  these  points,  Robert  Baker 
notes  that  Waddington's  strong  monopolisation  argument  relies  on  l9th  century 
medical  practice  taking  place  in  a  free  market.  However  the  ignorance  of  the 
consumer  (patient)  and  the  fact  that  the  vendor  (medical  practitioner),  in  order  to 
survive  financially,  was  always  forced  to  sell  meant  that  in  reality  the  market  place 
was  not  free.  4  Baker  further  criticises  Waddington  for  engaging  a  discount  rule 
whereby  any  historical  accounts  which  failed  to  fit  in  with  the  theory  of 
professionalisation  which  Waddington  propounded  were  discarded.  Far  from  being  a 
R  Baker,  `Introduction',  The  codification  of  medical  morality  ,  vol.  2,  (Dordrecht,  1995),  11-12. 
38 self-interested  attempt  to  delude  themselves  or  the  public,  Baker  argues  that 
contemporary  accounts  show  evidence  that  medical  practitioners  who  advocated 
legislative  regulation  of  medical  practice  were  aware  of  the  confluence  of 
professional,  societal  and  individual  interest.  5  Thus,  what  Baker  terms  the  `ultra  weak' 
monopolisation  theory  recognises  self-interest  as  a  conjoint  concern  of  the  medical 
profession. 
Waddington's  other  main  concern  with  Percival's  work  was  the  supposed 
absence  of  issues  relating  to  the  interaction  between  the  profession  and  society. 
Chester  Bums,  while  not  denying  the  primacy  of  intra-professional  relationships  in 
Percival's  work,  notes  that  Percival  additionally  drew  out  the  doctor's  social 
obligations  not  only  in  public  health  but  also  his  duty  to  the  law,  including  medical 
testimony  in  court.  6  This  point  was  further  developed  in  the  writings  of  Michael  Ryan 
in  the  1830s,  who  saw  the  need  for  medical  practitioners  to  understand  the  moral  and 
legal  responsibility  which  community  expectations  could  place  on  them  through  the 
embodiment  of  collective  opinion  in  statute  law.  Judicial  decision  could  override  the 
traditions  which  the  profession  promoted  amongst  its  members,  and,  as  Anne 
Crowther  notes,  in  the  absence  of  a  widely  accepted  modern  day  code  of  ethics  the 
medical  profession  looked  to  the  law  for  guidance.  7  The  law  prevailed  over 
professional  ethics.  Yet,  as  the  example  of  Glaister's  writings  on  abortion  (discussed 
later  in  this  chapter)  show,  the  law  was  not  always  consistent.  Practitioners  could  turn 
to  their  textbooks  of  medical  jurisprudence  seeking  ethical  guidance,  but  what  they 
found  there  often  obscured  rather  than  clarified  correct  practice. 
Important  off-shoots  of  the  battle  between  GPs  and  consultants  over  the  terms 
of  the  1858  Medical  Act  were  the  development  of  medical  journals  and  societies 
specifically  designed  to  express  the  views  of  the  majority  of  medical  practitioners 
who  worked  in  general  practice.  Having  been  set  up  as  the  Provincial  Medical  and 
Surgical  Association,  the  British  Medical  Association,  as  it  came  to  be  known  from 
the  mid-1850s  onwards,  was  to  become  an  immensely  powerful  organisation, 
representing  and  protecting  the  main  body  of  the  medical  profession.  Sub-committees- 
such  as  the  central  ethical  committee  were  set  up  to  look  at  specific  issues  of 
Ibid.  17. 
6C  Burns,  `Reciprocity  in  the  development  of  Anglo-American  medical  ethics,  1765-1865',  in  R  Baker 
ýed),  The  codification  of  medical  morality,  vol.  2,  (Dordrecht,  1995),  137. 
MA  Crowther,  `Forensic  medicine  and  medical  ethics  in  nineteenth-century  Britain',  in  R  Baker  (ed), 
The  codification  of  medical  morality,  vol.  2,  (Dordrecht,  1995),  173-190. 
39 controversy  such  as  medical  confidentiality.  Perhaps  the  most  effective  mouthpiece  of 
the  GP's  position  in  the  run-up  to  the  Medical  Act  of  1858  was  Thomas  Wakley's 
medical  journal  the  Lancet.  Wakley,  both  as  a  medical  practitioner  and  as  an  MP,  was 
a  highly  outspoken  advocate  of  medical  reform,  focussing  in  particular  on  the  need  for 
greater  recognition  of  general  practitioners  as  well  as  reform  in  the  education  and 
regulation  of  practice  as  a  whole.  In  Porter's  words,  Wakley 
Battled  to  raise  medicine  into  a  respected  profession,  with  structured, 
regulated  entry  and  lofty  ethical  ideals  -  called  restrictive  practices  by  their 
8  foes. 
The  need  for  general  practitioners  -  the  majority  of  the  profession  -  to  have  an 
effective  voice  in  the  ongoing  debates  on  the  development  of  medicine,  led  to  the 
growth  of,  and  a  growing  influence  for,  medical  journals  and  associations. 
Professional  identity  was  further  fostered  by  the  increased  centralisation  of 
medical  education  throughout  the  nineteenth  century.  Unlike  Scotland  which  already 
had  an  established  tradition  of  university  medical  education,  in  England  the  steady 
shift  away  from  the  personal  educational  relationship  of  master  and  apprentice 
towards  the  more  centralised  hospital  medical  schools,  and  later  universities,  gave 
practitioners  a  growing  sense  of  shared  experience  and  identity.  Large  numbers  of 
students  received  their  education  and  sense  of  professional  values  from  the  same, 
relatively  small  number  of,  medical  school  teachers.  In  Waddington's  words: 
As  a  result  of  these  changes  in  the  structure  of  medical  education  medical 
students  underwent  a  new  and  more  intensive  process  of  professional 
socialisation  that  both  fostered  a  sense  of  professional  community  and  asserted 
the  primacy  of  professional  rather  than  lay  values.  9 
Defining  values  for  a  rapidly  changing  profession  was  not  going  to  be  an  overnight 
process.  The  1858  Act  established  the  General  Council  for  Medical  Education  and 
Registration  with  the  remit  of  establishing  a  register  of  all  qualified  medical 
practitioners.  A  single  register  containing  the  names  of  all  those  qualified  to  practise 
R  Porter,  The  greatest  benefit  to  mankind  (London,  1997),  351.  91  Waddington,  `The  movement  towards  the  professionalisation  of  medicine',  in  BMJ  1990;  690. 
40 medicine  was  a  significant  step  in  the  establishment  of  a  unified  profession,  giving 
bona  fide  practitioners  their  long  sought  after  recognition,  and  competitive  advantage, 
over  the  unqualified  in  the  medical  marketplace. 
Section  29  of  the  1858  Act  provided  the  General  Medical  Council  (as  it  came 
to  be  known)  with  the  power  to  hold  disciplinary  inquiries  into  the  professional 
conduct  of  practitioners  and  to  remove  from  the  register  the  names  of  those  who  were 
judged  to  have  been  guilty  of  infamous  conduct  in  a  professional  respect.  It  therefore 
naturally  lends  itself  as  a  prime  candidate  for  examination  as  a  body  which  set  and 
maintained  guidelines  of  professional  practice  in  medicine,  including  the  issue  of 
medical  confidentiality.  Unfortunately,  as  Russell  Smith's  examination  of  the  GMC 
shows,  the  matter  is  somewhat  more  complex.  1°  After  initial  teething  problems,  the 
GMC  set-up  an  adversarial,  quasi-legal,  system  of  hearings  to  decide  allegations  of 
professional  misconduct.  The  members  of  the  GMC  who  heard  and  decided  cases 
were  all  medically  trained,  though  they  had  recourse  to  legal  opinion.  As  such  the 
body  could  have  represented  a  significant  prescriptive  force  in  the  self-regulation  of 
the  relatively  new  and  still  evolving  medical  profession.  In  the  event,  it  faced  many 
problems  in  getting  beyond  the  role  of  a  reactionary  system  of  discipline  in  individual 
cases. 
Although  its  decisions  were  published  in  the  medical  press  after  1864  (prior  to 
that  decisions  had  only  been  made  known  to  GMC  members),  the  GMC  did  not  give 
reasons  for,  or  explanations  of,  decisions.  Partly  because  of  this,  the  committee  did 
not  adhere  to  the  doctrine  of  precedent  meaning  that  each  new  case  was  decided  in 
isolation.  This,  coupled  with  the  facts  that  decisions  were  given  extempore  and  that 
decision-makers  changed  frequently,  did  not  promote  the  discernment  of  consistent 
rules.  Clearly  the  ad  hoc  reporting  of  ad  hoc  decisions  minus  their  explanatory  basis 
was  not  a  satisfactory  way  to  inform  practitioners  of  how  to  avoid  allegations  of 
professional  misconduct.  The  GMC  did  issue  declarations  of  acceptable  standards  of 
professional  conduct  which  it  arrived  at  by  distilling  what  it  perceived  as  the  relevant 
ethical  principles  from  a  series  of  disciplinary  decisions  in  cases  of  a  similar  nature. 
While  this  sounds  good  in  theory,  the  aforementioned  factors  entailed  problems  for  its 
implementation  in  practice.  As  Smith  indicates: 
10  RG  Smith,  `The  development  of  ethical  guidance  for  medical  practitioners  by  the  General  Medical 
Council',  Medical  History,  1993,37,56-67. 
41 there  was  often  a  considerable  lapse  of  time  between  the  initial  hearing  of 
disciplinary  cases  relating  to  a  particular  matter  and  the  appearance  of  the 
GMC's  Warning  Notice  with  respect  to  any  given  issue.  '' 
Of  the  13  issues  of  conduct  which  Smith  considers,  the  most  pronounced  gap  belongs 
to  `breach  of  confidence'.  The  first  inquiry  about,  and  erasure  from  the  medical 
register  for,  this  transgression  arrived  before  the  GMC  on  the  5  July  1869.  The  GMC 
issued  its  first  guidelines  on  the  question  on  the  24  November  1970,  over  101  years 
later.  12  Clearly  then,  while  the  GMC  may  provide  some  information  on  cases  heard 
for  breach  of  confidence,  it  was  not  a  source  of  guidance  on  the  question  of  medical 
confidentiality  to  which  medical  practitioners  could  readily  turn  in  the  late  nineteenth 
and  early  twentieth  centuries. 
However,  the  GMC  was  not  unique  in  experiencing  difficulty  in  trying  to 
establish  general  guidance  on  the  issue  of  confidentiality.  The  law  courts  themselves 
were  sending  mixed  signals.  As  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  Mansfield's  ruling  in 
the  Duchess's  case  had  drawn  disapproval  from  certain  later  judges,  notably  Buller  in 
Wilson  v  Rastall,  1792  and  Lord  Chancellor  Brougham  in  Greenough  v  Gaskell,  1838. 
Such  dissent  had  not  faded  away  by  the  late  nineteenth  century.  In  his  summing  up  in 
Kitson  v  Playfair,  1896,  Hawkins  belittled  the  relevance  of  the  rules  which  the 
medical  profession  laid  down  for  their  own  guidance  on  medical  confidentiality. 
There  could  be  no  absolute  rule,  even  (taking  into  account  judicial  discretion)  with 
regard  to  giving  evidence  in  court:  `each  case  must  be  considered  by  its  own 
particular  circumstances,  and  by  the  ruling  of  the  judge  who  happened  to  preside  on 
the  occasion.  "3  Clearly  this  left  room  for  divergence  of  judicial  opinion  and 
confusion  for  medical  practitioners  as  to  where  the  law  stood.  Glaister  picked  up  on 
this  point  towards  the  end  of  the  section  on  confidentiality  in  his  early  twentieth 
century  textbook  of  medical  jurisprudence.  Citing  Hawkins's  stated  belief  that  it 
would  be  a  `monstrous  cruelty'  for  a  medical  practitioner  to  report  to  the  public 
prosecutor  a  woman  who  had  sought  medical  attention  as  a  result  of  procuring  an 
abortion,  Glaister  noted  how  this  point  of  view  conflicted  with  that  given  by  Lord 
Justice-Clerk  Inglis  in  the  Pritchard  poisoning  case  of  1865.  Dr  Paterson  was  called  to 
11  Ibid.  62. 
12 
Ibid. 
13  Justice  Hawkins  words  as  summed  up  in:  J  Glaister,  Glaister's  Medical  Jurisprudence  and  Toxicology,  6th  ed.  (Edinburgh,  1938),  51. 
42 attend  the  wife  of  a  colleague,  Dr  Pritchard.  On  examination,  Paterson  felt  it  possible 
that  she  was  being  poisoned,  but  decided  it  was  not  his  professional  duty  to  disclose 
his  suspicions  to  the  police.  Mrs  Pritchard  subsequently  died.  Dr  Pritchard  was  found 
guilty  of  poisoning  his  wife  and  was  executed  on  Glasgow  Green  in  front  of  an 
estimated  crowd  of  100,000  people.  This  was  the  last  public  execution  in  Scotland.  14 
In  reprimanding  Paterson  for  his  failure  to  notify  the  relevant  authorities  of  his 
suspicion  that  Mrs  Pritchard  was  being  poisoned,  Inglis  emphasised  the  primacy  of 
the  doctor's  duty  as  a  citizen  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  human  life  over  the  rules  of 
professional  etiquette  which  frowned  on  breach  of  confidence.  Thus  both  Hawkins 
and  Inglis  had  made  quite  clear  their  belief  in  the  supremacy  of  the  law  over 
professional  ideals  of  correct  conduct,  but  arrived  at  contradictory  conclusions. 
Glaister  was  left  to  surmise: 
These  two  opinions  expressed  by  these  high  criminal  judges  demand  the 
serious  attention  of  the  medical  profession,  although  it  is  difficult,  if  not, 
indeed,  impossible,  to  reconcile  the  two  views.  15 
The  examples  themselves  bring  to  light  another  key  factor  in  the  development  of 
medicine  and  its  relation  to  confidentiality  in  nineteenth  century  Britain:  the 
increasing  role  of  the  state  in  medical  affairs.  Porter  suggests  that  pervasive  state 
intervention  in  medical  activities  did  not  arrive  in  Britain  until  the  twentieth  century, 
but  if  the  nineteenth  century  state  concern  for  public  health  was  somewhat  more  ad 
hoc,  its  influence  on  medical  confidentiality  was  not  inconsiderable.  16  The  Common 
Lodging  Houses  Acts  of  1851  and  1853  compelled  the  proprietor  of  a  lodging  house, 
on  pain  of  a  40s  fine,  to  notify  the  authorities  if  a  resident  showed  signs  of  an 
infectious  disease.  17  Through  the  Contagious  Diseases  Acts  of  1864,1866,  and  1869 
the  state  had  designated  policing  duties  to  the  medical  profession,  giving  them  the 
14  L  Farmer,  `Notable  Trials  and  the  Criminal  Law  in  Scotland  and  England,  1750-1950'  in  Ph 
Chassaigne  and  JP  Genet  (eds.  ),  Droit  et  societe  en  France  et  en  Grande-Bretagne  (12-20  siecles). 
Fonctions,  usages  et  representations,  (Paris,  2003),  149. 
1S  Ibid.  53. 
16  R  Porter,  The  greatest  benefit  to  mankind,  351. 
17  G  Mooney,  `Public  health  versus  private  practice:  the  contested  development  of  compulsory 
infectious  disease  notification  in  late  nineteenth  century  Britain',  Bulletin  of  the  History  of  Medicne, 
1999,73,241. 
43 authority  for  `the  forcible  medical  examination'1S  of  prostitutes  and  the  power  to 
confine  those  with  VD  for  up  to  three  months.  The  Acts  aimed  to  maintain  order  and 
control  at  dockyard  and  garrison  towns,  but  as  Lawrence  notes: 
Although  there  was  a  powerful  medical  lobby  which  viewed  the  Acts  as 
progressive  extensions  of  public  health  legislation,  many  doctors  considered 
them  a  gross  infringement  of  individual  rights.  19 
Medicine,  as  dystopian  writers  of  the  twentieth  century  would  emphasise,  could  be 
used  as  a  powerful  tool  for  social  control,  but  medical  practitioners  were  not  always 
compliant. 
20  The  problem  was  one  of  priorities:  the  doctor's  foremost  duty  had 
traditionally  been  to  the  patient  but  increasingly  the  collective  interest  of  public  health 
was  challenging  for  the  limelight.  As  one  medical  officer  of  health  noted  in  1866,  the 
traditional  ethic  of  the  general  practitioner  which  put  duty  to  the  patient  first,  the 
patient's  family  second  and  public  concern  thereafter,  was  exactly  reversed  in  the 
priorities  of  the  doctors  employed  in  the  newly  prominent  field  of  public  healthy' 
Although  the  Contagious  Disease  Acts,  having  met  with  stiff  opposition,  were 
repealed  a  decade  later,  the  state,  in  recognition  of  the  benefits  of  a  healthy  workforce, 
and,  after  the  panic  surrounding  the  physical  deficiencies  of  conscripts  for  the  Boer 
War,  the  need  for  a  healthy  armed  force,  had  renewed  interest  in  public  health. 
Whereas  public  health  reformers  of  the  mid-nineteenth  century  had  sought  to  improve 
the  environment  of  the  poorer  classes,  by  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth 
century  much  emphasis  was  being  placed  on  theories  of  genetic  inheritance  to 
improve  the  nation's  stock.  Drawing  on  Mendel's  work  on  genetic  characteristics  in 
plants,  Darwin's  theory  of  species  evolution,  and  Galton's  biometrics  (the  application 
of  statistical  techniques  to  biological  phenomena),  the  social  hygiene  movement  and 
later  eugenics  became  significant  forces  advocating  the  application  of  scientific 
'8  G  Savage,  '  'The  willful  communication  of  a  loathsome  disease':  marital  conflict  and  venereal 
disease  in  Victorian  England',  Victorian  Studies,  35,1990. 
19  C  Lawrence,  Medicine  in  the  making  of  modern  Britain,  1700-1920,  (London,  1994),  61. 
20  An  obvious-example  of  the  literary  representation  of  this  point  can  be  found  in  E  Zamiatan,  We,  in  B 
G  Guerney  Led),  An  anthology  of  Russian  literature  in  the  Soviet  period  from  Gorki  to  Pasternak,  (New 
York,  1960)  163-353,  where  medical  men,  as  channels  of  state  control,  use  operations  to  `cure'  fantasy 
in  the  population  (p.  308),  but  a  medical  practitioner  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  resistance  movement 
(?  237-240). 
2  John  Sykes  as  quoted  in  G  Mooney,  `Public  health  versus  private  practice',  256. 
44 principles  to  social  and  political  life  22  Social  hygienists  believed  that  a  greater 
understanding  of  how  positive  characteristics  were  passed  on  from  one  generation  to 
the  next,  and  the  statistical  probabilities  of  characteristic  inheritance  in  humans  would 
lead  to  an  improvement  in  the  well-being  of  the  British  population.  Advocates  of 
eugenics  saw  the  problem  in  more  urgent  terms,  believing  that  national  efficiency  and 
the  purity  of  the  British  race  required,  at  least,  the  promotion  of  childbearing  amongst 
the  better-off  (and  thereby  inherently  superior)  classes  of  society,  a  belief  termed 
`positive'  eugenics.  Their  more  sinister  counterparts,  the  `negative'  eugenicists 
focussed  on  the  need  to  prevent  the  inferior  members  of  society,  the  poor  or  disabled, 
from  diluting  the  purity  of  the  race  with  their  offspring.  Common  to  eugenics  and 
social  hygiene  alike  was  the  need  for  information  about  the  population.  Middle  class 
reformers,  organised  into  voluntary  and  charitable  societies  focussed  on  the  poor,  held 
investigation  and  regulation,  medical  inspection  and  control,  as  the  keys  to  national 
efficiency,  giving  Britain  economic  and  military  competitiveness  with  the  other 
European  powers  in  the  years  prior  to  the  First  World  War.  23  The  collective  was  the 
primary  concern  and  the  submission  of  the  individual,  particularly  the  `poor' 
individual,  to  scrutiny  and  analysis  was  a  necessary  evil.  Eugenics,  while  not  being 
without  considerable  political  influence  on  both  left  and  right  wing  thought,  did  not 
achieve  the  dominance  of  political  life  which  certain  of  its  advocates  predicted.  24 
Nonetheless,  the  importance  of  the  nation's  collective  health  was  not  lost  on  the 
powers  governing  the  state. 
Legislation  such  as  the  Infectious  Disease  (Notification)  Act  1889,  and  the 
Notification  of  Births  Act  1909  (with  an  amending  Act  in  1915)  required  medical 
practitioners  to  override  the  confidentiality  of  their  patients  in  order  to  notify  the 
medical  officer  of  health  for  their  district  in  cases  of  infectious  disease  (a  list  of  those 
diseases  which  qualified  was  issued,  though  there  were  ongoing  debates  about 
whether  VD  and  other  maladies  should  be  added),  or  the  birth  of  a  child.  The 
individual  consciences  of  practitioners  were  to  be  sidelined  by  the  levying  of  fines  in 
cases  where  the  relevant  disease  (or  death  under  the  Births  and  Deaths  Registration 
Act  1874)  was  not  notified,  and  assuaged  by  the  benefit  of  a  small  financial  fee  for 
22  G  Searle,  Eugenics  and  politics  in  Britain,  1900-1914,  (Leyden,  1976),  3-8. 
23  G  Jones,  Social  hygiene  in  twentieth  century  Britain,  (London,  1986),  10  and  17.  24  R  Porter,  The  greatest  benefit  to  mankind,  640;  G  Searle,  Eugenics  and  politics  in  Britain,  67. 
45 every  case  of  birth  notified.  Simple  economics  would  help  circumvent  practitioners' 
moral  reticence  in  overriding  patient  confidentiality. 
The  BMA  did  officially  support  the  principle  of  compulsory  notification  of 
infectious  disease,  primarily  for  its  pivotal  role  in  combating  the  outbreak  of 
epidemics.  Nonetheless,  in  recognition  of  the  long-held  importance  of  confidentiality 
to  the  doctor-patient  relationship,  the  BMA  advocated  that  legislation  should  place  the 
onus  on  the  householder  rather  than  the  medical  attendant  to  notify  the  authorities  of 
infectious  disease.  Mooney  argues  that  accompanying  their  belief  in  the  importance  of 
confidentiality,  general  practitioners  also  wished  to  defend  the  right  of  the  individual 
against  the  state.  25  Moreover,  many  feared  that  notification,  along  with  compulsory 
removal  of  the  diseased  to  hospital,  would  deter  individuals  from  seeking  official 
medical  assistance.  Not  only  would  such  reluctance  to  gain  medical  assistance  be 
detrimental  to  public  health,  but  it  would  also  deprive  medical  practitioners  of  income 
from  call-outs  and  follow-up  visits.  Therefore  notification  was  recognised  as  both 
essential  for  the  checking  of  epidemics,  and  as  a  potential  deterrent  for  patients. 
Practitioners  recognised  the  benefit  that  public  health  accrued  from  early  information 
on  the  spread  of  infection,  but  simultaneously  wished  to  safeguard  their  long-held 
ethic  of  confidentiality  and  the  right  of  the  individual  to  be  free  from  state 
interference.  So,  while  the  state  rattled  practitioners'  pockets  through  the  levying  of 
fines  for  failure  to  notify  or  the  paying  of  small  sums  for  compliance,  the  thought  that 
potential  fees  could  be  lost  through  patients'  reluctance  to  call  in  medical  assistance 
for  fear  of  notification,  and  the  absence  of  follow-up  visits  to  those  isolated  in 
hospital,  meant  even  self-interest  led  to  quandary. 
It  was  not  solely  in  the  motives  for  action  or  the  projected  outcomes  that 
practitioners  were  pulled  in  opposing  directions.  The  laws  themselves  were 
sufficiently  open  to  interpretation  to  envelop  practitioners  in  grey  areas  of  subjective 
judgement.  For  instance,  infectious  disease  did  not  have  to  be  notified  if  the  victims 
could  be  sufficiently  well  isolated  in  their  own  accommodation.  Despite  having  an 
obvious  bias  to  the  better-off  in  society,  the  law  was  open  to  interpretation  as  to  what 
constituted  adequate  accommodation  for  quarantine.  The  law  was  malleable  enough 
to  be  moulded  to  suit  circumstance  and  status  -a  point  perhaps  most  evident  in 
connection-with  the  statutes  relating  to  abortion.  The  only  operation  to  be  decreed 
25  G  Mooney,  `Public  health  versus  private  practice',  256. 
46 criminal  by  statute  law,  abortion  was  a  mosaic  of  public  and  private  opinions  and 
agendas.  In  Barbara  Brookes'  words: 
The  legitimacy  of  abortion  as  a  solution  to  an  unwanted  pregnancy  was  judged 
differently  according  to  the  circumstances  of  conception,  the  age  and  status  of 
the  mother  and  the  eugenic  `value'  of  the  foetus. 
.  . 
It  was  not  then,  abortion 
itself  which  brought  universal  censure,  but  rather  particular  social 
classifications  of  the  act.  26 
From  the  state's  point  of  view  the  decline  in  the  birth  rate  in  the  late  nineteenth 
century  was  a  significant  factor  in  its  policy  on  abortion,  notably  its  increased 
pressure  on  medical  practitioners  to  notify  cases  that  came  to  their  attention.  In  this 
sense  the  doctor's  dilemma  was  similar  to  that  posed  by  infectious  disease  notification 
with  the  conflicting  priorities  of  duty  to  the  individual  and  to  the  state  clearly  evident. 
However,  while  infectious  diseases  put  the  rest  of  the  population  at  immediate  risk, 
abortion  could  and  did  remain  a  far  more  private  affair,  seen  by  many  as  a  crime 
without  a  victim,  carried  out  by  consenting  women.  27 
The  permutations  of  the  act  of  abortion  were  numerous:  the  pregnant  woman 
could  attempt  it  herself  either  using  instruments,  such  as  knitting  needles,  easily  at  her 
disposal  or  purchasing  a  purgative  remedy;  she  could  have  an  operation,  defined  in 
the  loosest  sense  of  the  term,  carried  out  by  almost  anyone  from  a  friend  to  a 
professional  abortionist;  or  she  could  turn  to  mainstream  medicine  which  was 
permitted  to  carry  out  therapeutic  abortions  in  order  to  protect  the  well-being  of  the 
mother,  a  rather  ill-defined  and  easily  exploited  loophole.  It  was  the  law  which, 
unwittingly,  simplified  the  situation  for  medical  practitioners,  distinguishing  which 
cases  of  abortion  they  were  likely  to  notify.  In  attempting  to  deter  women  from 
abortion  by  the  imposition  of  excessively  heavy  penalties  for  those  convicted  of  the 
crime,  the  law  actually  succeeded  in  deterring  medical  practitioners  from  turning-in 
women,  often  perceived  as  having  suffered  sufficiently  already,  to  further  humiliation 
and  ruin  at  the  hands  of  the  law.  The  one  clear  exception  to  this  was  in  cases  where 
the  pregnant  woman  died  as  a  result  of  an  attempted  abortion.  In  such  cases  the 
profession-saw  the  duty  to  notify  in  more  black  and  white  terms,  recognising  the 
26  B  Brookes,  Abortion  in  England  1900-1967  (London,  1988),  7-9. 
27  Ibid.  34. 
47 benefit  of  bringing  the  abortionist  to  justice  in  order  to  protect  others  in  the  future. 
However,  as  the  case  of  Annie  Hodgkiss  (discussed  later  in  this  chapter)  confirmed, 
the  constant  threat  that  a  patient  would  die  suddenly,  left  practitioners  who  followed 
such  a  policy  walking  a  somewhat  precarious  tightrope. 
Legislative  obligations  aside,  the  changing  form  of  medical  employment  was 
having  an  impact  upon  medical  confidentiality.  As  Porter  indicates,  a  cohort  of 
doctors  emerged  whose  primary  interest  in  preventive,  rather  than  curative,  medicine 
entailed  a  concern  for  the  population  in  general  rather  than  for  individual  clients  -a 
situation  that  had  the  potential  to  pull  medical  practitioners  in  opposing  directions: 
The  prison  doctor  was  implicated  in  a  punitive  regime,  but  ethically  his  duty 
lay  with  the  well-being  of  the  individual  convict.  A  similar  predicament  was 
involved  with  workmen's  compensation  schemes  for  industrial  accidents  and 
illness.  28 
Employment  of  medical  practitioners  by  someone  other  than  the  patients  themselves 
naturally  led  to  an  increasingly  complex  moral  maze  of  obligation  and  duty  towards 
employer,  patient,  professional  reputation  and,  particularly  after  the  National 
Insurance  Act  of  1911,  the  State.  The  medical  journals  had  their  columns  filled  with 
practitioner  enquiries  as  to  the  appropriate  procedure  to  be  followed  in  situations 
where  the  right  course  seemed  unclear.  29 
Yet,  as  the  columns  of  the  medical  journals  show,  while  the  question  of 
medical  confidentiality  was  caught  up  in  a  range  of  different  issues,  it  seems  that  the 
most  pressing  by  the  late  nineteenth  century  was  that  of  criminal  abortion.  Beneath  a 
query  as  to  the  best  cycling  saddle  for  a  lady,  the  BMJ  published  a  letter  received 
from  a  young  doctor  in  late  May  1896,  which  sought  advice  as  to  his  duty  in  a  case  of 
criminal  abortion  which  had  come  before  him.  30  The  woman,  who  confessed  that  her 
miscarriage  had  been  induced  by  use  of  an  instrument,  had  been  in  a  critical  condition 
but  was  presently  on  the  mend.  The  practitioner  wished  to  know  if  he  was  obliged  to 
report  the  crime.  The  journal's  response  indicated  that  the  matter  had  already  been 
28  R  Porter, 
. 
The  Greatest  Benefit  to  Mankind,  636. 
29  For  queries  relating  to  practitioners  obligation  vis-a-vis  employers  &  employees  see  for  example: 
BMJ,  1896,  vol.  2,698  `Professional  confidence';  BMJ,  1899,  vol.  1,950  `Professional  secrecy';  BMJ, 
1899,  vol.  2,1652  `Privilege  as  to  medical  certificates.  ' 
30  BMJ,  1896,  vol.  1,1367.  `Professional  secrecy.  ' 
48 discussed,  but  `we  apprehend  that  it  has  not  been  finally  decided,  especially  in  view  of 
the  opinion  stated  to  have  been  given  to  the  College  of  Physicians  by  their  legal 
adviser.  '31 
Unlike  the  best  bicycle  saddle  for  a  lady  (the  Brookes  B.  30),  the  BMJ  was 
experiencing  problems  in  giving  clear  and  definitive  advice  in  response  to  practitioner 
concerns  on  the  notification  of  abortion.  Before  going  on  to  examine  why  the 
questions  surrounding  abortion  were  causing  so  much  concern,  it  is  worth  pausing  to 
note  that  the  individual,  EB  Turner,  assigned  the  task  of  trying  out  ladies'  bicycle 
saddles  in  1896  was  a  solicitor  to  the  BMA.  He  became  heavily  involved  with  the 
question  of  medical  confidentiality,  eventually  becoming  legal  adviser  to  the  BMA 
Professional  Secrecy  Committee  from  its  inception  in  1922. 
Under  the  Offences  Against  the  Person  Act  of  1861,  the  law  of  England  had 
established  severe  penalties  for  women  and  any  accomplice  who  procured  an  illegal 
abortion.  In  Scotland,  the  same  punitive  view,  although  not  endorsed  by  statute,  was 
recognised  in  common  law.  John  Glaister's  examination  of  the  medico-legal  risks 
encountered  by  practitioners  in  the  course  of  their  daily  work  in  the  late  nineteenth 
century  leaves  the  reader  in  no  doubt  of  a  medical  practitioner's  vulnerability  to  legal 
action.  The  ease  with  which  claims  could  be  brought  against  doctors  by  patients  or 
fellow  practitioners  was  a  problem  exacerbated  by  the  difficulty  of  disproving  any 
accusations.  Any  charge  would  almost  certainly  damage  a  practitioner's  reputation 
and  finances,  but  as  Glaister  notes,  it  could  prove  far  more  serious: 
an  old  and  much  respected  practitioner  in  Kensington,  named  Haffenden... 
was  apprehended  and  charged  at  the  police  court  with  criminally  procuring 
abortion...  from  the  mental  anxiety  arising  out  of  the  ruinous  nature  of  the 
charge,  [he]  committed  suicide  by  poison,  although  in  the  last  document  he 
penned  during  his  life  he  declared  his  innocence....  the  jury,  after  an  absence 
of  six  minutes,  gave  a  verdict  of  "not  guilty".  32 
Until  the  time  of  Kitson  v  Playfair,  in  Glaister's  opinion,  the  law  was  generally 
understood-by  medical  practitioners  to  impose  on  them  a  duty  to  notify  the  relevant 
31  Ibid. 
32  J  Glaister,  `Medico-legal  risks  encountered  by  medical  practitioners  in  the  practice  of  their 
profession',  reprinted  from  the  Glasgow  Medical  Journal,  September  1886,1-2. 
49 authorities  of  cases  in  which  abortion  was  suspected  or  had  been  brought  to  their 
attention.  However,  the  statement  by  Hawkins,  noted  above,  had  `traversed  that 
understanding.  '33  As  the  fates  of  Haffenden  and  Playfair  had  so  definitively 
demonstrated,  dubiety  in  the  understanding  and  practice  of  the  law  of  notification 
could  have  serious  consequences.  In  recognition  of  this,  the  whole  question  of 
criminal  abortion  and  its  notification,  including  Hawkins's  remarks,  were  brought  for 
discussion  before  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  of  London.  In  1895-6  the  Royal 
College  of  Physicians  set  up  a  committee  to  investigate  the  medical  practitioner's  duty 
in  relation  to  criminal  abortion.  At  their  instance,  legal  opinion  was  taken  from  Sir 
Edward  Clarke  (1841-1931)  and  Horace  Avory  (1851-1935). 
Clarke  was  a  pre-eminent  common  law  Queen's  Counsel  and  was  MP  for 
Plymouth  from  1880-1900.  He  was  appointed  solicitor-general  in  1886  and  held  the 
post  until  the  fall  of  Lord  Salisbury's  government  in  1892.  When  Salisbury  returned 
to  power  in  1895,  Clarke  turned  down  the  position  of  solicitor-general  in  order  to 
continue  in  private  practice.  In  1897  he  declined  an  offer  to  become  Master  of  the 
Rolls  as  it  would  have  precluded  him  from  taking  any  part  in  politics.  In  contrast  to 
Clarke's  esteemed  position  within  the  law,  Avory  was  still  building  his  legal  career. 
Having  `devilled'  for  Clarke  as  a  junior  counsel,  Avory  rose  through  the  legal  ranks  to 
become  King's  Counsel  in  1901.  By  1910  he  was  a  judge  on  the  King's  Bench 
division  of  the  High  Court  -a  position  he  was  to  use  to  challenge  the  medical 
profession's  traditional  view  of  confidentiality  in  1914. 
The  opinions  of  Clarke  and  Avory  constituted  a  large  part  of  the  report  on  the 
doctor's  duty  to  notify  abortion  presented  to  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  on  30 
April  1896.  The  discussion  focused  on  two  main  areas  where  members  of  the  Royal 
College  of  Physicians  seemed  to  have  felt  the  correct  course  of  action  was  not  clear. 
In  the  first  instance,  they  wished  to  clarify  when  the  act  of  procuring  abortion  was 
lawful.  What,  for  instance,  was  to  be  done  in  a  case  where  a  pregnant  woman's  life 
was  at  risk  unless  her  pregnancy  was  terminated?  Would  abortion  in  this  instance  be 
legal,  and,  if  not,  would  the  doctor  be  held  responsible  for  the  resulting  death  of  the 
mother?  This  point  was  dealt  with  quite  briefly  by  Clarke  and  Avory,  who  stated  that 
in  their  opinion  the  law  did  not  forbid  abortion  during  pregnancy  or  the  destruction  of 
the  child  during  labour  where  it  was  necessary  to  save  the  mother's  life. 
33  J  Glaister,  Glaister's  Medical  Jurisprudence  and  Toxicology,  6m  ed.  (Edinburgh,  1938),  358. 
50 The  second,  and  altogether  more  complex,  matter  requiring  clarification  was 
what  the  medical  practitioner's  duty  was  once  he  suspected,  or  was  made  aware  of  a 
case  of  criminal  abortion.  The  question  could  be  subdivided.  Would  a  medical 
practitioner  lay  himself  open  to  being  charged  as  an  accessory  to  the  crime  if  he  gave 
medical  aid  to  a  post-abortion  woman?  The  crime  tarred  as  felons  both  the  person 
who  carried  out  the  act  and  the  woman  who  solicited  it.  Thus,  by  knowingly  aiding  a 
patient  who  was  unwell  as  a  result  of  a  criminal  abortion,  a  practitioner  could  feasibly 
be  brought  up  on  a  charge  of  being  an  accessory  to  the  crime.  Would  a  doctor  be 
liable  to  indictment  for  misprision  of  felony  if  he  did  not  report  the  crime? 
`Misprision  of  felony'  was  the  concealment  of  a  crime  committed  by  another,  but 
without  such  previous  knowledge  or  subsequent  assistance  of  the  criminal  as  would 
make  the  party  concealing  an  accessory  before  or  after  the  fact.  The  crime  was 
becoming  obsolete  by  the  early  twentieth  century.  Finally,  did  the  doctor  have  any 
privilege  with  regard  to  secrets  confided  in  him  by  patients? 
Taking  the  questions  in  order,  Clarke  and  Avory  stated  that,  in  their  opinion,  a 
medical  practitioner  did  not  render  himself  liable  as  an  accessory  if  he  treated  a 
patient  whom  he  knew,  or  suspected,  had  been  party  to  a  criminal  abortion,  provided 
he  did  nothing  to  assist  the  patient  from  escaping  from  or  defeating  justice.  This 
seems  a  strangely  inadequate  statement,  for  presumably  the  ends  of  justice  required 
that  the  medical  practitioner  notified  the  authorities  that  a  criminal  act  had  taken 
place,  yet  no  mention  of  this  course  of  action  is  made  by  the  two  legal  figures.  The 
physician's  duty  was  simply  to  treat  the  patient  to  the  best  of  his  skill  and  not  assist 
her  from  escaping  or  defeating  justice.  With  regard  to  misprision  of  felony,  the 
medical  practitioner  was  not  liable  merely  because  he  did  not  give  information  in  a 
case  where  he  suspected  criminal  abortion.  In  a  case  where  a  practitioner  was  told  by 
a  patient  the  name  of  someone  she  was  about  to  go  to  in  order  to  have  an  abortion 
carried  out,  Clarke  and  Avory  thought  that  the  medical  practitioner  had  a  duty  to  warn 
the  person,  presumably  meaning  the  named  individual,  that  such  a  statement  had  been 
made. 
These  answers  appear  highly  unsatisfactory  in  clearing  up  the  issues  raised. 
The  question  that  was  put  to  Clarke  and  Avory  asked  specifically  what  duty  lay  on  the 
medical  practitioner  who  suspected  criminal  abortion  had  been  procured.  To  say  that  a 
medical  man  should  tend  to  a  patient  he  believed  to  have  been  party  to  a  criminal 
abortion  seems  entirely  in  keeping  with  a  humane  justice  system.  It  would  be 
51 improper  for  an  ill  woman's  health,  or  life,  to  rest  upon  the  single  opinion  of  a 
medical  practitioner  as  to  whether  or  not  she  had  committed  a  crime.  In  that  scenario 
the  doctor  would  be  simultaneously  judge,  jury  and  executioner.  Rather,  justice 
required  that  the  process  should  be  based  on  evidence  collected  and  discussed  before 
the  legal  system,  whose  obligation  and  purpose  was  to  establish  the  criminality  or 
otherwise  of  the  act.  However,  Clarke  and  Avory  gave  no  indication  that  a  duty  lay 
with  a  doctor  to  notify  the  law  where  abortion  was  suspected.  Rather,  they  suggested 
that  a  doctor  who  treated  a  post-abortion  woman  without  notifying  the  police  would 
not  be  likely  to  face  a  charge  of  misprision  of  felony.  Moreover,  if  a  doctor  became 
aware  that  a  colleague  was  about  to  carry  out  a  criminal  abortion  he  should  inform  the 
colleague  that  he  was  aware  of  the  fact.  The  Royal  College  of  Physicians  could  only 
be  left  with  the  impression  that  their  members  should  carry  out  abortions,  before  or 
during  birth,  where  the  mother's  life  was  at  risk;  medically  treat,  but  in  no  other  way 
assist,  women  who  came  to  them  after  a  criminal  abortion;  and  that  they  were  under 
no  obligation  to  notify  the  law.  34 
To  their  question  on  medical  privilege,  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians 
received  a  straightforward  rejection  of  the  idea  of  an  existing  medical  privilege.  In 
response  to  a  request  as  to  how  to  go  about  getting  a  change  in  the  law  on  privilege, 
Clarke  and  Avory  suggested  that  if  they  were  right  in  the  views  they  had  expressed, 
no  alteration  of  the  law  would  probably  be  desired.  Their  general  advice  was  that 
medical  practitioners  should  exercise  their  own  discretion  as  to  when  information 
should  be  given  in  particular  cases.  The  doctor  should  follow  his  conscience. 
These  opinions  are  important,  not  least  because  they  represent  a  specific 
consultation  of  legal  opinion  by  the  RCP  on  the  question  of  confidentiality  at  the  turn 
of  the  twentieth  century,  but  also  because  they  were  referred  to  by  Professor  Robert 
Saundby  in  his  early  twentieth  century  work  Medical  Ethics:  A  Guide  to  Professional 
Conduct.  Saundby  was  an  ex-chairman  of  both  the  BMA  council  and  of  its  central 
ethical  committee;  in  1912  he  was  elected  to  the  GMC  as  a  direct  representative  of  the 
profession.  In  Medical  Ethics,  Saundby  related  the  opinions  expressed  by  Avory  and 
Clarke  in  their  consultation  with  the  RCP  as  being 
34  This  last  point  was  raised  by  Saundby  in  1915,  during  his  analysis  of  Clarke  and  Avory's  opinions 
expressed  before  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  in  1896. 
52 to  the  effect  that  a  medical  man  should  not  reveal  facts  which  had  come  to  his 
knowledge  in  the  course  of  his  professional  duties,  even  in  so  extreme  a  case 
as  where  there  are  grounds  to  suspect  that  a  criminal  offence  had  been 
committed.  35 
Avory  was  at  the  centre  of  a  controversy  which  brought  the  issue  to  prominence  once 
again  at  the  end  of  1914.36  Sitting  as  judge  at  the  Birmingham  Assizes  on  1  December 
1914  he  was  forced  to  throw  out  a  case  against  Annie  Hodgkiss,  accused  of  the 
manslaughter  of  Ellen  Armstrong  on  whom  Hodgkiss  was  alleged  to  have  performed 
an  illegal  abortion.  Armstrong,  a  young  unmarried  woman  whose  family  had  been 
patients  of  Dr  A  for  some  time,  was  taken  ill  and  admitted  to  the  Birmingham 
Women's  Hospital.  Dr  A  visited  Armstrong  in  hospital.  During  the  visit  Armstrong 
told  Dr  A  that  she  had  had  an  abortion  and  gave  the  name  of  the  woman  who  had 
performed  it.  She  explicitly  asked  Dr  A  not  to  tell  anyone,  a  promise  which  Dr  A 
considered  binding.  Armstrong  subsequently,  and  very  abruptly,  died  of  a 
haemorrhage.  Having  carefully  gone  through  the  papers  connected  with  the  case, 
Avory  was  forced  to  state  that  in  the  absence  of  evidence  the  jury  was  advised  to  find 
no  true  bill.  In  addressing  the  jury,  Avory  made  it  quite  clear  that  he  believed  that  the 
opinion  he  had  expressed  along  with  Clarke  in  1896  had  been  misrepresented  in 
Saundby's  textbook  on  medical  ethics.  The  implication  was  that,  in  the  case  before 
him,  he  felt  that  there  had  been  a  failure  on  the  part  of  Dr  A  to  perform  the  duty  which 
society  had  a  right  to  expect  from  a  medical  practitioner  placed  in  such  circumstances, 
and  notify  the  authorities. 
This  opinion  was  picked  up  by  Sir  Charles  Mathews,  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions  who  wrote  to  Hempson 
,  solicitor  to  the  BMA  on  14  December  1914.37 
He  requested  that  Avory's  views  be  given  wide  circulation  amongst  the  medical 
profession  in  order  that  they  might  correct  the  inaccuracy  of  Saundby's  book.  38  If 
Mathews  expected  his  letter  would  be  met  with  deferential  compliance,  he  was  forced 
to  reconsider.  Hempson's  prompt  reply  noted  that  Avory's  views  were  not  in 
'S  R  Saundby,  Medical  Ethics:  A  Guide  to  Professional  Conduct,  2nd  ed.  (London,  1907),  114. 
36  See  Lancet-December  19th,  1914.  Article  entitled  `Medicine  and  the  law.  A  Judge  on  professional 
secrecy.  ' 
37  Sir  Charles  Mathews  (1850-1920)  was  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  from  1909  until  his  death  in 
1920. 
3'  This  letter  and  the  following  correspondence  between  Mathews  and  Hempson  are  all  contained  in  the 
BMA  CEC  Minutes  for  1914/15. 
53 accordance  with  other  decisions  which  had  been  passed  down  from  the  Bench  at 
various  times,  notably  in  Kitson  v  Playfair.  Hempson  indicated  that  the  general 
question  involved  was  `of  the  highest  importance  to  the  medical  profession  and  is  far- 
reaching  in  point  of  principle.  '  He  suggested  that  authoritative  guidance  was  required 
and  that  the  body  which  held  the  respect  of  the  profession  in  such  matters  was  the 
central  ethical  committee  of  the  BMA,  to  whom  Hempson  was  legal  adviser.  With 
Mathews'  permission  (their  correspondence  having  been  clearly  marked  `Personal') 
he  could  raise  the  matter  for  discussion  by  that  committee. 
Mathews  assented  to  this  suggestion,  with  one  major  proviso.  As  far  as 
possible,  discussion  of  the  question  of  medical  secrecy  in  relation  to  abortion  should 
be  kept  out  of  the  press  in  order  to  avoid  controversy.  39  In  his  own  words: 
what  I  should  deprecate  would  be  a  press  controversy  upon  the  subject  to 
which  men  of  eminence  in  the  medical  profession  might  become  contributors, 
and  in  which  they  might  announce  themselves  as  entirely  differing  from  the 
views  of  Mr  Justice  Avory,  and  as  declining  to  be  bound  by  them.  4° 
It  is  not  surprising  that  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  would  advise  against  the 
sparking  of  a  press  controversy  in  which  eminent  physicians  may  have  been  inclined 
to  lead  a  rebellion  against  the  law.  It  is  also  of  little  surprise  that  Hempson  was  not 
able  to  give  even  an  implied  guarantee  that  the  topic  could  be  entirely  withheld  from 
the  medical  press.  1  Both  sides  foresaw  the  far-reaching  implications  of  the  question 
of  medical  confidentiality  and  the  potential  for  direct  conflict  over  the  issue.  The  law 
wished  to  keep  direct  challenges  to  their  authority  out  of  the  public  gaze,  but  Mathews 
also  recognised  the  difficulty  with  which  the  justice  system  would  be  faced  if  it  lost 
the  ability  to  command  medical  evidence.  Acting  on  behalf  of  the  medical  profession, 
Hempson  was  aware  that  popular  opinion  would  be  a  strong  factor  in  establishing 
their  position,  and  that  public  support  would  be  crucial  if  any  challenge  to  the  law  was 
to  be  contemplated.  After  further  correspondence,  it  was  agreed  that  a  meeting 
between  Hempson  and  Mathews  would  be  held  to  discuss  the  matter.  42 
39  Mathews  to  Hempson,  17  December  1914. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Hempson  to  Mathews,  18  December  1914. 
42  Mathews  to  Hempson 
,  19  December  1914  and  Hempson  to  Mathews  21  December  1914. 
54 This  meeting  took  place  on  22  December  1914  at  Whitehall.  Hempson  made  it 
clear  that  he  did  not  believe  Avory's  views  would  be  met  with  approval  or  compliance 
by  the  medical  profession.  In  response,  Mathews  indicated  that  there  could  be  no 
support  for  practitioners  who  claimed  that  statements  made  to  them  by  patients  should 
be  held  to  be  inviolable.  Simply  put,  doctors  `were  citizens  of  the  State,  [and]  that  as 
such  they  owed  a  higher  duty  to  the  State  in  aid  of  the  suppression  of  crime  than  to 
their  patient'  . 
43  Mathews  conceded  that  solicitors,  barristers  and  ministers  of  religion 
were  not  under  obligation  to  disclose  information,  and  that  they  were  not  subject  to 
the  same  imposed  duty  as  he  contended  attached  to  the  medical  profession.  Hempson 
enquired  whether  the  state  proposed  to  offer  protection  to  medical  men,  who  disclosed 
information  when  required  in  accordance  with  their  proposed  public  duty,  from  any 
civil  proceedings  which  might  be  brought  against  them  by  patients.  Mathews  was 
reluctant  to  commit  himself  on  this  issue,  but  he  `obviously  recognised  that  such 
obligation  of  protection  would  not  be  assumed  by  the  State.  A4  Hempson  suggested 
that  once  the  BMA  had  given  the  matter  its  due  consideration,  a  deputation  could 
meet  with  some  high  state  official,  such  as  the  secretary  of  state  for  the  Home 
Department,  in  order  to  obtain  an  authoritative  ruling  on  the  point.  He  reiterated  that 
Avory's  dictum  did  not  receive  support  from  certain  other  legal  authorities  of  an  equal 
or  higher  standing,  a  challenge  which  Mathews  conceded.  However,  Mathews 
confided  in  Hempson  that  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  (Rufus  Isaacs,  Lord  Reading)  had 
considered  and  approved  the  decision  of  Avory,  and  that,  as  Chief  Coroner  of 
England  and  Wales,  he  proposed  that  a  copy  of  Avory's  views,  bearing  the  mark  of 
his  confirmatory  approval,  should  be  sent  to  every  coroner  in  England  and  Wales  as  `a 
guiding  light  as  to  the  attitude  which  it  was  their  duty  to  adopt  should  similar  cases 
arise  at  any  inquest  before  them.  A5  Hempson  must  have  been  left  with  the  impression 
that,  while  contradictory  decisions  had  been  handed  down  by  judges  in  the  past,  there 
was  a  growing  uniformity  of  opinion  amongst  key  legal  figures  that  medical 
practitioners  should  be  made  aware  of  their  ultimate  duty  to  the  state  and  their 
necessary  contribution  to  the  ends  of  justice. 
Having  been  given  permission  to  bring  the  question  of  medical  confidentiality, 
as  raised 
,y 
Avory,  before  the  central  ethical  committee  of  the  BMA,  Hempson 
43  Taken  from  Mr  Hempson's  note  on  his  meeting  with  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  22nd 
December,  1914.  BMA  CEC  Minutes,  1914/15. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid. 
55 arranged  a  meeting  for  8  January  1915.  In  light  of  the  fact  that  much  of  Avory's 
criticism  of  the  medical  profession  had  focused  on  Saundby's  supposed 
misrepresentation  of  the  views  expressed  during  the  consultation  with  the  Royal 
College  of  Physicians  in  1895,  Saundby  was  invited  to  attend  the  meeting.  This  he 
was  unable  to  do,  but  sent  in  his  place  a  memorandum  he  had  written  on  the  subject, 
which  he  intended  to  submit  for  publication  in  the  BMJ  but  was  currently 
withholding  pending  the  consideration  of  the  matter  by  the  Royal  College  of 
Physicians.  His  memorandum  had  been  read  and  approved  by  both  Dr  A,  the  key 
medical  attendant  in  the  case  over  which  Avory  had  presided,  and  the  honorary 
surgeon  of  the  hospital  in  which  the  patient  had  died. 
Referring  back  to  the  consultation  that  had  taken  place  between  the  Royal 
College  of  Physicians  and  Clarke  and  Avory,  Saundby's  memorandum  reiterated  the 
difficult  position  medical  men  found  themselves  in  with  regard  to  their  duty  in 
relation  to  the  `unfortunately  frequent'  crime  of  abortion.  He  contended  that  the  legal 
opinion  stated  by  Clarke  and  Avory  omitted  all  reference  to  any  obligation  to 
communicate  with  the  police  and  therefore 
they  may  be  said  not  unfairly  to  have  given  ground  for  inference  that  in  their 
opinion  no  such  obligation  exists,  for  otherwise  they  surely  should  have 
included  it  in  their  statement  of  his  duty.  46 
This  seems  a  fair  point  to  make.  As  noted  above,  the  question  which  had  been  put  to 
Clarke  and  Avory  had  explicitly  requested  advice  on  the  duty  of  the  medical 
practitioner,  who  knew  or  believed  he  was  in  attendance  upon  a  case  where  criminal 
abortion  had  been  procured.  To  say  that  a  doctor  should  treat  the  woman  to  the  best  of 
his  skill  and  do  nothing  to  aid  her  from  escaping  justice,  without  explicitly  stating  that 
he  had  a  firm  duty  to  inform  the  authorities  that  a  criminal  act  had  taken  place,  does 
seem  to  have  left  the  door  wide  open  to  the  interpretation  which  Saundby  made. 
Indeed,  if  Clarke  and  Avory's  answer  had  not  conveyed  this  impression  to  its 
audience,  but  rather  intended  being  an  avoidance  of  the  fundamental  question, 
presumably  such  an  obvious  omission  would  have  been  picked-up  by  the  RCP  who 
were  anxies  to  have  greater  clarity  on  this  complex  and  far-reaching  problem. 
46  Saundby's  Memorandum  as  contained  in  the  BMA  CEC  Minutes  8  January  1915. 
56 Saundby's  memorandum  indicated  that  the  medical  profession  was  disposed  to 
draw  a  general  distinction  between  cases  in  which  the  patient  recovered  or  was 
expected  to  do  so;  and  cases  where  death  resulted  or  was  likely  to  do  so  as  a  result  of 
an  illegal  operation.  In  the  former  instance,  the  profession  was  `indisposed  to  break 
the  implied  bond  of  professional  secrecy'47,  whilst,  in  the  latter,  there  was  a 
recognised  duty  to  help  in  securing  that  a  crime  with  such  serious  consequences  did 
not  go  unpunished.  In  acknowledgement  of  the  apparent  lack  of  consistency  in  this 
position,  Saundby  suggested  that  justification  was  found  in  the  medical  practitioner's 
desire  to  avoid  the  scandal  which  would  be  brought  upon  the  patient  and  her  family  if 
he  were  to  report  every  case  of  criminal  abortion  which  came  to  his  attention. 
Significantly,  he  enforced  this  justification  by  stating  his  belief  that  public  opinion  not 
only  supported  such  an  attitude  but  would  be  `shocked  and  outraged'  were  the 
practitioner  to  act  in  another  manner.  Any  change  to  this  view  would  have  to  be 
brought  about  through  fresh  legislation,  sanctioned  by  public  opinion. 
Saundby  acknowledged  that  by  making  such  a  distinction  in  practice  it  was 
inevitable  that  there  would  be  cases  in  which  the  death  of  a  patient  whom  the  doctor 
had  believed  would  recover,  would  occur  so  suddenly  as  to  leave  no  time  for  a  dying 
deposition  to  take  place.  Indeed  these  were  the  circumstances  of  the  case  over  which 
Avory  had  presided,  and  which  sparked  his  tirade  against  the  profession.  Yet, 
Saundby  believed  such  injustice  as  occurred  in  these  cases  could  only  be  seen  as  an 
unfortunate  consequence  which  could  neither  be  blamed  on  the  medical  practitioner 
acting  under  the  existing  circumstances,  nor  be  done  away  with  until  public  opinion 
had  changed.  Those  who  read  Saundby's  memorandum  must  have  been  struck  by  two 
key  points.  The  distinction  between  notifying  cases  of  criminal  abortion  in  cases 
where  the  patient  was  likely  to  die  and  non-notification  where  the  patient  was  likely  to 
recover,  while  acknowledged  as  imperfect,  would  require  legislation  to  change  it. 
Moreover,  such  legislation  would  require  the  backing  of  public  opinion,  which  in 
Saundby's  view  firmly  supported  the  position  adopted  by  medical  practitioners. 
Although  Saundby  was  unable  to  attend  the  meeting  of  the  central  ethical 
committee,  the  `importance  of  the  subject'48  led  the  chairman,  Reginal  Langdon- 
Down,  to  request  the  BMA  solicitor,  Hempson,  to  attend.  His  opinions  were  recorded 
47  Ibid. 
4"  BMA  CEC  Minutes,  1914/15.  Phrase  used  in  a  letter  from  James  Neal,  Deputy  Medical  Secretary  to 
the  BMA  to  members  of  the  Central  Ethical  Committee,  I  January  1915. 
57 in  a  draft  memorandum  prepared  pursuant  to  the  meeting  of  January  8  1915,  by  James 
Neal,  the  BMA  Deputy  Medical  Secretary.  Hempson  explained  that  solicitors  and 
barristers  had  an  absolute  privilege  of  protection  with  regard  to  statements  made  to 
them  in  their  professional  capacity,  and  that,  by  custom,  courts  normally  recognised 
protection  for  ministers  of  religion.  However,  no  other  class  of  persons  was  accorded 
such  protection  by  state  authority  or  Act  of  Parliament.  In  the  case  of  medical 
practitioners,  Hempson  reiterated  the  point  he  had  put  to  Mathews,  namely,  that  there 
was  a  conflict  of  authority  on  the  matter.  Quoting  from  Hawkins'  ruling  in  Kitson  v 
Playfair,  Hempson  noted  that  while  this  decision  had  given  a  clear  indication  that 
medical  men  were  not  to  go  running  to  the  authorities  in  every  case  of  illegal  abortion, 
it  was  contended  in  `certain  quarters'49  that  medical  men,  as  citizens  of  the  state,  owed 
a  higher  duty  to  the  state  in  the  detection  of  crime,  than  to  their  own  patients. 
Presumably  the  `certain  quarters'  was  a  reference  to  Hempson's  prior  meeting  with 
Mathews. 
Neal's  memorandum  made  clear  the  central  ethical  committee's  stance  on  this 
apparent  dichotomy.  In  the  absence  of  state  protection  for  doctors  who  found 
themselves  subjected  to  civil  proceedings  as  a  result  of  notifying  a  case  of  suspected 
illegal  abortion  which  was  subsequently  judged  to  be  untrue,  and  the  prospect  of 
resultant  high  damages  -  the  £  12,000  damages  initially  awarded  against  Playfair  was 
an  ominous  precedent  -  the  committee  felt  that  the  state  could  not  reasonably  claim 
that  a  medical  practitioner  had  an  obligation  to  breach  patient  confidentiality  without 
the  patient's  consent.  Furthermore,  the  committee  drew  attention  to  the  ill 
consequences  that  any  departure  from  the  `usual  custom  of  regarding  the  confidences 
of  a  patient  as  sacred'50  would  have  by  deterring  the  general  public  from  seeking 
medical  aid.  Any  person  who  had  been  involved  in  a  criminal  act  would  not  be  able  to 
seek  medical  attention  for  fear  of  personal  incrimination. 
As  a  result  of  its  discussions,  the  committee  made  three  recommendations  to 
the  BMA  council.  No  information  should  be  given  under  any  circumstances  without 
patient  consent.  In  the  absence  of  protection  for  doctors  from  the  possible  legal 
consequences  of  disclosure,  the  state  had  no  authority  to  claim  that  doctors  were 
obliged  to  disclose  patient  information.  As  well  as  ventilating  the  question  in  the 
49  BMA  CEC  Minutes,  1914/15.  Point  8  of  the  Draft  Memorandum  from  the  Central  Ethical  Committee 
meeting  8  January  1915. 
so  Ibid.  Point  11. 
58 BMJ,  the  final  resolution  proposed  sending  a  copy  of  the  resolutions  to  the  appropriate 
Department  of  State-51  In  light  of  the  committee's  knowledge  of  the  stance  advocated 
by  both  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  and  the  Lord  Chief  Justice,  its  proposals 
were  a  sign  of  defiance.  Any  suggestion  that  the  BMA  council  might  reject  or  dilute 
such  confrontational  recommendations  was  quashed  by  its  adoption  of  them  in  an 
amended  form  on  27  January  1915.  Far  from  acting  in  a  conciliatory  manner,  the 
council's  only  amendment  was  the  removal  of  the  conditional  from  the  second 
resolution.  This  deletion  implied  that  the  BMA  was  not  simply  looking  to  protect  its 
members'  interests  by  seeking  state  protection  from  financial  damages  arising  from 
civil  proceedings  against  them.  It  was  clearly  stating  that  the  medical  profession  took 
very  seriously  the  long  established  duty  of  confidentiality  and  would  not  give  it  up 
without  a  fight.  52 
Not  content  with  internally  focused  sabre-rattling,  the  council  openly 
pronounced  its  position  in  the  final  resolution.  What  could  have  been  more 
confrontational  than  sending  a  copy  of  a  resolution  denying  state  authority  over  the 
medical  profession  with  regard  to  notification  of  illegal  abortion  to  the  relevant  state 
department?  Surely  the  answer  to  that  was  the  deliberate  ventilation  of  the  whole 
question  in  the  medical  journals  against  the  expressed  wishes  of  the  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions.  The  gauntlet  thrown  down,  initially  by  Avory  and  then  by  Mathews, 
had  been  firmly  taken  up  by  the  BMA  central  ethical  committee  and  council  who 
clearly  had  no  intention  of  pulling  their  punches. 
In  addition  to  the  above  decisions,  the  council  passed  a  resolution  empowering 
the  central  ethical  committee  to  take  `any  further  action  considered  desirable  53 
including  sending  a  deputation  to  the  appropriate  state  department.  By  mid  March, 
Hempson  was  able  to  report  that  he  had  had  another  meeting  with  Mathews  in  order 
to  discuss  the  letters  which  had  been  sent  to  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  and  the  Home 
Secretary  by  instruction  of  the  council  at  the  end  of  January.  As  a  result  of  this 
meeting,  it  was  quite  possible  that  the  BMA  would  be  asked  to  send  representatives  to 
51  Ibid.  Point  12.  The  first  two  recommendations  came  to  be  known,  and  are  later  referred  to,  as 
Minutes  542  and  550  respectively. 
52  The  content  that  was  removed  from  the  second  resolution  was  reiterated  in  an  amendment  to  Point  9 
of  the  Draft  Memorandum  of  the  CEC  meeting  8  January  1915.  It  read:  "The  Committee  is  advised  that 
no  obligatio_U  rests  upon  the  medical  practitioner  voluntarily  to  disclose  the  confidence  of  his  patient 
without  the  patient's  consent.  It  suggests  that,  if  the  State  desires  to  set  up  such  an  obligation,  it  should 
at  the  very  least  preface  such  an  endeavour  by  affording  to  the  practitioner  protection  from  any  legal 
consequences  that  may  result  from  his  action.  " 
53  BMA  CEC  Minutes,  1914/15-19  February  1915. 
59 meet  the  Law  Officers  of  the  Crown  and  that  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  and  the 
Royal  College  of  Surgeons  might  also  be  involved  in  such  a  meeting.  Hempson 
indicated  that  he  had  given  Mathews  an  undertaking  that,  for  the  time  being,  no 
correspondence  should  appear  in  the  BMJ  on  the  matter.  It  is  thus  increasingly 
apparent  that  open  discussion  of  the  issue  of  confidentiality  was  being  strongly 
resisted  in  high  legal  quarters.  At  their  first  meeting,  Hempson  had  made  it  quite  clear 
to  Mathews  that  not  even  an  implied  guarantee  could  be  given  that  a  subject  of  such 
magnitude  could  be  kept  out  of  the  press.  Moreover  the  central  ethical  committee  and 
council  had  both  made  it  clear  that  the  matter  required  ventilation  in  the  medical  press 
at  the  very  least.  It  can  only  be  assumed  that  undertaking  not  to  publish 
correspondence  on  professional  secrecy  in  the  BMJ  was  a  prerequisite  to  being 
granted  a  meeting  with  some  high  state  officials  in  order  to  discuss  the  matter.  Again 
it  seems  clear  that  the  law  was  trying  to  keep  the  issue  away  from  the  public  gaze,  and 
was  forcing  the  medical  profession  to  comply  with  its  wishes  by  discussing  it  in 
private. 
54 
The  central  ethical  committee  recommended  that  any  deputation  sent  to  the  Law 
Officers  of  the  Crown  on  this  matter  should  consist  of  the  chairman  of  representative 
meetings,  chairman  of  council,  treasurer,  the  chairman  and  deputy  chairman  of  the 
central  ethical  committee,  the  medical  secretary,  deputy  medical  secretary  and  the 
solicitor.  In  short,  a  high  ranking  slice  of  the  BMA.  It  further  recommended  that  if  the 
two  Royal  Colleges  were  also  invited  to  send  deputations  to  the  Law  Officers,  then  a 
prior  meeting  between  the  Colleges'  representatives  and  the  BMA  deputation  should 
be  arranged.  Consensus  of  opinion  and  unity  of  approach  would  be  significant  assets 
if  any  serious  challenge  to  legal  authority  was  to  be  made. 
In  fact  it  was  a  deputation  from  the  BMA  alone  which  met  with  the  Lord  Chief 
Justice,  the  Attorney-General,  the  Public  Prosecutor  and  other  legal  authorities  on  3 
May  1915.  With  a  defensive  qualification  that  no  observation  made  by  the  Lord  Chief 
Justice  during  the  meeting  could  be  taken  as  a  judicial  pronouncement  of  the  law,  the 
Law  Officers  reiterated  their  assertion  that  doctors  had  a  duty  to  notify  cases  of 
abortion.  This  rule  was  subject  to  three  limitations.  The  doctor  had  to  be  of  the 
opinion,  either  from  examination  of  the  patient  or  because  of  a  communication  from 
74  The  only  article  in  which  the  issue  of  confidentiality  /  professional  secrecy  was  discussed  in  the  BMJ 
of  that  year  was'  Supplementary  Report  of  Council  1914-1915'  in  the  BMJ  3rd  July  1915,  Supplement, 
4. 
60 the  patient,  that  abortion  had  been  attempted  or  procured  by  artificial  intervention;  the 
intervention  had  to  have  been  carried  out  by  someone  other  than  the  patient  herself; 
and  the  doctor  had  to  believe  that  the  woman  was  likely  to  die  as  a  result  of  the 
abortion  and  that  `there  was  no  hope  of  her  ultimate  recovery.  '55 
Anxious  to  have  clarity  on  the  matter,  the  central  ethical  committee  had  the 
wording  of  the  above  three  limitations  approved  by  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  in  a 
meeting  with  Hempson  on  11  May  1915.  Once  again,  there  was  an  explicit  request 
from  the  legal  side  that  no  publication  of  the  matter  in  the  press  or  the  BMJ  should  be 
made,  as  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  did  not  wish  the  question  to  be  openly  discussed  until 
something  definite  had  been  arrived  at  or  until  he  had  given  his  sanction  to  it  being 
publicly  known.  In  fact,  the  Lord  Chief  Justice's  views  were  published  as  part  of  the 
supplementary  report  of  council  in  the  BMJ  supplement  of  3  July  1915.56  The  Lord 
Chief  Justice  was  informed  that  the  BMA  wished  to  include  his  statements  in  their 
report  of  council  and  that  this  would  entail  a  discussion  of  the  subject  at  the 
forthcoming  annual  representatives'  meeting  in  July.  The  central  ethical  committee 
stressed  that  the  BMA  had  no  desire  to  open  any  further  debate  of  the  matter  but  they 
had  to  respond  to  the  remarks  of  Avory  at  the  Birmingham  Assizes.  The  law  could  not 
very  well  provoke  discussion  and  then  demand  that  the  medical  profession  give  no 
open  response. 
In  their  meeting  on  28  May,  the  central  ethical  committee  also  noted  a  letter 
which  had  been  received  from  the  registrar  of  the  GMC,  indicating  that  he  had 
received  a  communication  from  Mathews  relating  to  the  notification,  by  medical  men 
to  the  police,  of  illegal  operations.  Mathews  had  made  reference  to  the  resolutions 
which  had  been  formulated  by  the  BMA,  and  the  president  of  the  GMC  requested  a 
copy  of  these  and  any  other  relevant  information  for  the  GMC  executive  committee's 
consideration.  With  interest  in  the  subject  snowballing,  it  was  again  agreed  that  the 
Royal  College  of  Physicians  and  the  Royal  College  of  Surgeons  should  be  approached 
in  order  that  a  meeting  of  representatives  could  discuss  the  duties  of  medical  men  in 
relation  to  criminal  abortion. 
On  10  June,  the  council  of  the  Royal  College  of  Surgeons  passed  a  resolution 
indicating  that,  as  they  had  already  considered  the  matter  and  sent  a  reply  to  Mathews, 
they  could  see  no  advantage  in  the  proposed  conference.  Their  reply  to  the  BMA 
ss  BMA  CEC  Minutes  1914/15.28`"  May  1915. 
56  Cf.  Footnote  62. 
61 included  a  copy  of  their  letter  to  Mathews.  This  letter  gave  a  clear  indication  that  they 
could  not  concur  with  the  opinions  expressed  by  Avory,  not  least  because  they  were 
not  given  as  the  basis  of  a  judicial  decision.  The  Royal  College  of  Surgeons  had  never 
defined  the  doctor-patient  relationship  but  it  had  always  recognised  that  complete 
confidence  between  doctor  and  patient  was  essential  in  the  treatment  of  disease.  In 
their  opinion,  it  was  fortunate  that  such  confidence  nearly  always  existed  and  was  of 
incalculable  advantage  to  the  patient  and  the  public.  No  written  rules  could  have  any 
binding  effect  in  what  they  termed  a  matter  of  `honour  and  conscience'57  and 
ultimately  the  conduct  of  each  medical  practitioner  had  to  be  decided  by  his  own 
conscience  and  sense  of  duty  to  his  patient  and  to  the  state.  The  letter  concluded  that 
the  rarity  of  complaints  as  to  the  conduct  of  medical  practitioners  in  criminal  cases 
vis-a-vis  the  frequency  with  which  they  were  involved  in  them  indicated  that  there 
was  no  need  to  attempt  to  frame  rules  for  the  guidance  of  fellows  and  members  of  the 
Royal  College  of  Surgeons  on  such  questions.  `The  Council  believe  that  in  the  future, 
as  in  the  past,  the  course  to  be  taken  can  safely  be  left  to  the  medical  practitioner.  '58 
The  honourable  physician  and  his  conscience  were,  usually,  the  best  judge  of  each 
situation. 
On  15  June,  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians,  having  had  the  matter  under 
consideration  by  its  censor's  board  since  the  remarks  of  Avory  had  been  brought  to 
their  attention  by  Mathews  in  early  January,  discussed  the  BMA  proposal  for  a 
meeting.  During  the  meeting  it  passed  five  resolutions.  The  first  iterated  that  each 
medical  practitioner  had  a  moral  obligation  to  secrecy  which  could  not  be  breached 
without  patient  consent.  The  second  and  third  together  stated  that  doctors  should  urge 
a  patient  suffering  the  ill-effects  of  an  illegal  abortion  to  give  evidence  against  the 
abortionist.  This  was  especially  advisable  in  cases  where  the  patient  was  likely  to  die. 
If,  however,  she  refused,  the  doctor  was  `under  no  obligation  (so  the  college  is 
advised)  to  take  further  action.  '  59  This  gives  an  indication  that  Clarke  and  Avory  had 
left  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  with  the  belief  that  they  had  no  absolute 
obligation  to  notify  criminal  abortion.  The  remaining  two  resolutions  recommended 
that  doctors  should  obtain  the  best  possible  medical  and  legal  advice  both  to  ensure 
the  validity  of  any  evidence  a  patient  might  give  but  also  to  protect  the  doctor  from 
57  BMA  CEC  Minutes,  1914/15.  RCS  to  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  2  July  1915.  58  Ibid. 
S9  BMA  CEC  Minutes,  1914/15.  RCP  to  BMA,  2  July  1915. 
62 subsequent  litigation;  and  that,  if  a  patient  should  die  in  circumstances  where  criminal 
abortion  was  suspected,  the  doctor  should  refuse  to  issue  a  death  certificate  but 
communicate  with  the  coroner.  Having  expressed  the  position  as  they  saw  it,  and 
acknowledged  that  they  were  looking  to  obtain  further  legal  advice  on  confidentiality 
in  relation  to  criminal  abortion,  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  did  not  see  any  need 
for  a  meeting  with  the  BMA  and  the  Royal  College  of  Surgeons. 
Thus,  it  was  quite  clear  by  mid-1915,  that  Avory's  remarks  at  the  Birmingham 
Assizes  in  1914  had  sparked  discussion  of  the  question  of  medical  confidentiality 
amongst  key  bodies  of  the  medical  profession,  each  of  which  had  independently  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  they  could  not  concur  with  his  point  of  view.  No  general 
meeting  of  these  medical  bodies  materialised,  although  their  opinions  were  shared 
through  confidential  correspondence.  With  legal  opinion,  in  the  form  of  the  Lord 
Chief  Justice  and  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  firmly  in  support  of  Avory,  and 
pedantically  opposed  to  any  general  discussion  of  the  matter  in  the  lay  or  medical 
press,  the  whole  situation  reached  a  hiatus  in  terms  of  institutional  interaction  by  the 
end  of  July  1915.  To  an  extent  this  is  probably  attributable  to  the  disruption  caused  by 
the  First  World  War  which  engaged  the  full  attention  of  the  BMA  who  undertook  to 
organize  medical  provision  for  the  war  effort.  Andrew  Morrice  suggests  that  the 
medical  profession  were  victorious  in  the  stand-off  over  medical  confidentiality  in 
1915.60  If  so,  it  was  more  by  default  -  throwing  the  last  punch  before  the  bell  sounded 
for  the  end  of  the  round  -  than  because  of  any  convincing  argument  they  made.  While 
medical  confidentiality  was  more  or  less  sidelined  as  an  issue  as  the  war  enveloped 
attention,  the  stated  differences  between  legal  and  medical  opinion  on  the  relative 
merits  of  the  doctor's  duty  to  the  patient  and  to  the  state,  pointed  towards  a 
resumption  of  the  contest  in  the  near  future. 
The  only  other  record  of  the  issue  arising  in  the  BMA  central  ethical 
committee  minutes  for  1915,  was  a  letter  received  from  the  assistant  secretary  of  the 
Renfrewshire  panel  committee  informing  the  BMA  that  a  recent  case  in  the  Inner 
House  of  the  Court  of  Session  (the  supreme  court  of  Scotland)  had  considered  the 
question  of  privileged  communications  made  to  a  Roman  Catholic  priest.  The  case 
concerned  a  paternity  dispute  in  which  one  of  the  parties  had  made  a  statement  to  the 
priest,  and-while  the  sheriff  substitute  (county  court  judge)  who  originally  heard  the 
60  Morrice,  `Should  the  doctor  tell?  Medical  secrecy  in  early  twentieth-century  Britain.  ' 
63 case  had  decided  in  favour  of  a  priestly  privilege,  the  Court  of  Session  reversed  his 
judgement.  This  point  would  have  been  of  great  interest  to  the  CEC,  for  not  only  did  it 
illustrate  that  the  question  of  confidentiality  was  being  more  generally  probed,  but 
also  any  argument  for  medical  privilege  would  be  more  akin  to  that  which  had  been 
customarily  given  to  ministers  of  religion  than  to  the  privilege  accorded  to  solicitors 
and  barristers.  The  committee  requested  that  they  be  informed  when  the  case  was 
published  in  the  law  reports. 
The  publication  of  the  report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  venereal  disease  in 
1916,  brought  new  issues  to  be  contemplated  by  the  central  ethical  committee. 
Paragraph  205  of  the  report  recommended  that  the  law  should  be  amended  to  allow 
that  a  communication  made  bona  fide  by  a  medical  practitioner  to  a  parent,  guardian 
or  other  person  directly  interested  in  the  welfare  of  a  woman,  or  man,  with  the 
intention  of  delaying  or  preventing  them  from  marrying  a  person  with  an  infectious 
form  of  VD,  should  be  treated  as  a  privileged  communication.  Significantly,  this 
proposal  had  the  support  of  the  President  of  the  Probate  Division 
. 
61  The  parliamentary 
subcommittee  of  the  BMA  medico-political  committee  asked  the  central  ethical 
committee  to  consider  the  implications  of  paragraph  205  in  relation  to  their  previous 
consideration  of  the  question  of  medical  confidentiality.  The  central  ethical  committee 
concluded  that  in  light  of  council  minutes  542  and  550  of  January  27  1915,  it  was 
`very  strongly'  of  the  opinion  that  medical  practitioners  could  not  make  such 
disclosures  as  were  contemplated  in  paragraph  205  of  the  royal  commission  report 
without  the  consent  of  the  patient.  2  Furthermore,  no  amendment  to  the  law  which 
would  allow  such  a  communication  to  be  privileged  was  required  `unless  and  until  the 
duty  of  making  such  communications  is  imposed  on  medical  practitioners  as  a 
statutory  obligation.  '63  The  council  adopted  the  central  ethical  committee's 
recommendations  on  this  matter  and  passed  a  resolution  indicating  that  it  would  be 
left  to  the  chairman  of  the  council  to  include  a  reference  to  the  decision  in  the  report 
which  was  to  be  submitted  to  the  annual  representatives  meeting  for  1916.  This  he 
61  Royal  Commission  on  Venereal  Diseases.  Final  Report  of  the  Commissioners,  (London:  His 
Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1916),  para.  205. 
62  BMA  CEC  Minutes,  1914/15.6  June  1916. 
63  Ibid. 
64 did,  and  an  amended  version  of  the  recommendation  was  put  as  a  substantive  motion 
to  the  1916  meeting.  64  The  resolution  was  lost. 
Not  all  matters  that  were  brought  before  the  attention  of  the  central  ethical 
committee  required  such  careful  deliberation.  A  letter  received  from  the  general 
secretary  of  the  order  "Achei  Birth"  and  "Shield  of  Abraham"  Grand  Lodge  on  the  22 
November  1916  asked  the  committee  for  clarification  regarding  the  confidentiality  of 
communications  made  between  the  secretary  of  a  society  and  a  doctor.  Though  not 
explicitly  marked  so,  letters  sent  by  the  general  secretary  to  a  doctor  regarding  a 
member  of  the  Society,  had  always  been  treated  as  confidential,  in  keeping  with  the 
relationship  of  doctor  and  patient.  However,  one  doctor  had  not  taken  this  view  of 
matters,  much  to  the  chagrin  of  the  society  who  requested  the  opinion  of  the  central 
ethical  committee.  Their  reply  was  abrupt.  The  matter  could  hardly  be  considered  a 
question  of  medical  ethics,  and  any  difficulty  could  be  circumvented  by  marking  the 
letters  "Private  and  Confidential".  65 
An  interesting  letter  was  received  on  4  June  1918.66  Captain  GH  Grant  Davie 
wished  to  have  verified  his  contention  that  a  patient  had  a  right  to  consult  her  medical 
adviser  as  to  whether  or  not  she  was  suffering  from  VD,  and,  if  found  to  be  clean,  was 
entitled  to  request  a  medical  certificate  to  that  effect.  The  doctor  could  not  reasonably 
refuse  to  issue  the  certificate  and  no  question  of  the  moral  or  immoral  use  to  which 
any  such  certificate  might  be  put  entered  into  the  relationship  between  a  patient 
seeking  confirmation  of  her  physical  state  and  her  medical  adviser.  The  central  ethical 
committee  agreed  entirely  with  the  contentions  made  by  Davie.  The  significance  of 
this  example  is  to  be  found  in  the  committee's  desire  to  distance  the  medical 
practitioner  from  the  question  of  morality.  By  confirming  Davie's  viewpoint,  they 
were  drawing  a  clear  line  between  the  strictly  functional  role  of  the  medic  in 
examining  and  issuing  a  certificate,  and  any  role  he  may  adopt,  or  be  assigned,  as  a 
moral  guardian  in  society.  This  distinction  was  to  be  repeatedly  challenged  over  the 
coming  years  by  the  increasing  prevalence  of  VD,  and  the  accompanying  debate  over 
the  priority  of  preventive  or  curative  measures  to  combat  it. 
6a  The  amended  version  read  as  follows:  "That  in  the  opinion  of  the  RB  no  amendment  of  the  law  to 
provide  that  a  communication  such  as  is  contemplated  in  Recommendation  25  of  the  Royal 
Commission  on  Venereal  Disease  shall  be  privileged  is  called  for.  " 
65  BMA  CEC  Minutes  1914/15.24  November  1916. 
66  BMA  CEC  Minutes,  1914/15.8  October  1918. 
65 The  following  month,  the  issue  of  medical  confidentiality  was  raised  in 
connection  with  farm  labourers'  wages.  Dr  X  from  the  Oxford  division  of  the  BMA 
wrote  explaining  that  he  had  been  requested  by  a  local  farmer  to  provide  medical 
certificates  for  two  labourers  on  his  farm  67  One  was  aged  72  and  had  atheromatous 
arteries  and  was  getting  infirm,  while  the  other  was  54  and  suffered  from  mitral 
disease.  For  these  reasons  the  farmer  wanted  medical  certificates  in  order  to  justify 
him  not  paying  them  the  minimum  weekly  wage  of  30s.  The  committee's  response 
stated  that  the  certificates  could  only  be  passed  on  if  the  labourers,  with  full 
knowledge  of  the  purpose  for  which  they  would  be  used,  gave  their  consent.  This 
opinion  was  firmly  in  keeping  with  Council  Minute  542,  passed  at  the  start  of  1915, 
but  it  also  inherently  extended  it.  Whereas  Minute  542  placed  the  emphasis  on  no 
communication  without  the  patient's  consent,  the  committee's  reply  to  Dr  X  clearly 
accentuated  the  need  for  informed  consent. 
The  question  of  abortion  had  by  no  means  gone  away.  The  Honorary  Secretary 
of  the  Sheffield  division  wrote  to  the  BMA  in  June  1918,  seeking  advice  relative  to 
her  being  summoned  to  give  evidence  in  Court.  68  In  1917,  she  attended  a  woman  who 
had  suffered  a  miscarriage  in  the  seventh  month  of  her  pregnancy,  and  had  returned  to 
see  her  earlier  in  1918  when  she  was  again  ill  as  a  result  of  miscarriage,  this  time  in 
the  3`d  or  4`"  month.  Criminal  abortion  was  suspected  in  both  cases.  The  CEC 
suggested  that  when  she  was  asked  by  the  court  to  disclose  information  which  she  had 
obtained  in  the  exercise  of  her  professional  duties  she  should  protest  that  she  could 
not  betray  the  professional  confidence  of  her  patient.  She  should  then  be  guided  by 
the  directions  of  the  magistrate  or  judge.  In  light  of  the  frequency  with  which  such 
queries,  cases  and  almost  identical  advice  would  arise  over  subsequent  years,  this 
short  paragraph  in  the  CEC  minutes  assumes  an  altogether  more  pivotal  importance 
than  the  committee  could  ever  have  suspected. 
In  summary  then,  the  nineteenth  century  was  a  period  of  far-reaching  change 
for  medical  practitioners.  The  professionalisation  of  medicine  through  developments 
in  centralised  education,  the  founding  of  medical  journals  and  the  BMA  and  the 
establishment,  under  the  1858  Medical  Act,  of  the  GMC  with  its  authority  to  maintain 
a  single  register  of  qualified  practitioners,  meant  that  by  the  early  twentieth  century 
the  issue.  -of  medical  confidentiality  could  be  addressed  by  a  more  unified  and 
67  Ibid. 
68 
Ibid. 
66 cohesive  body  of  practitioners.  Medical  ethics  had  evolved,  in  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  predominantly,  though  not  exclusively,  as  a  means  to  regulate 
intra-professional  conflict  in  the  confusion  and  tension  of  rapid  changes  in  practice  in 
an  unregulated  marketplace.  After  the  establishment  of  the  GMC  with  its  power  to 
hold  disciplinary  hearings  and  remove  practitioners  from  the  Medical  Register, 
medicine  had  the  beginnings  of  a  system  of  effective  professional  self-regulation  and 
prescriptive  advice  on  professional  conduct.  As  noted,  for  medical  confidentiality  at 
least,  the  GMC's  approach  was  far  from  perfect  and  practitioners  were  still  faced  with 
contradiction  and  confusion  on  the  correct  action  to  be  taken  with  regard  to  many 
ethical  dilemmas.  This  point  was  equally  true  when  it  came  to  judicial  interpretations 
of  the  law.  The  decisions  of  Hawkins  and  Inglis  sent  conflicting  signals  to 
practitioners  about  their  duty  as  citizens  of  the  state  and  their  actions  as  human 
beings.  The  uncertainty  of  leaving  decisions  up  to  the  individual  doctor  meant  that  on 
the  one  hand  practitioners  were  left  unprotected  from  proceedings  against  them  in 
cases  where  someone  they  had  accused  of  performing  an  illegal  operation  was  found 
not  guilty,  while  on  the  other,  they  received  condemnation  from  legal  authorities  for 
their  perceived  failure  to  do  their  duty  as  citizens  when  they  did  not  notify  the 
authorities.  Failure  to  notify  deaths  could  cost  practitioners  relatively  small  fines; 
questioning  the  honour  of  a  middle  class  lady,  as  William  Smoult  Playfair  discovered, 
could  cost  £12,000;  and  a  false  allegation  of  procuring  abortion  could  cost  a 
practitioner  his  reputation,  his  income  or,  in  the  case  of  Haffenden,  his  life. 
State  intervention  in  medicine  had  placed  medical  men  in  a  pivotal  role  in 
public  health  through  notification  acts  and,  post  1911,  partially  state-funded  health 
care.  The  rise  in  the  number  of  situations  in  which  medical  men  were  employed  by 
someone  other  than  the  patient  they  were  directly  treating  led  to  confusion  for 
practitioners  as  to  where  their  obligation  lay.  The  medical  journals  attempted  to 
respond  to  questions  about  the  disclosing  of  medical  information  about  employees  to 
their  employers;  whether  a  prospective  bride  should  be  forewarned  of  her  fiance's 
contagious  VD;  or  what  to  do  in  cases  of  suspected  abortion.  Such  complex  problems, 
by  dint  of  the  recognized  importance  of  the  particulars  of  each  case,  did  not  easily 
permit  of  standardized  advice.  As  with  the  GMC  rulings  and  the  legal  opinions,  the 
effect  produced  was  uncertainty  for  medical  practitioners. 
Lord  Mansfield's  decision  in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  case  distinguished 
between  information  demanded  in  court  and  breach  of  confidence  outwith  the  witness 
67 box.  While  there  was  no  change  in  the  practitioner's  duty  to  give  evidence  in  court, 
the  nineteenth  century  saw  an  extension  of  the  law's  demands  on  doctors  as  the  state 
tightened  its  grip  on  them  as  public  servants  of  general  welfare  and  justice.  However, 
practitioners  still  largely  remained  individual  competitors  in  a  challenging 
marketplace.  Herein  lay  the  crux  of  the  conflict.  While  the  state  and  the  desired 
elevation  of  medicine  into  a  lofty  profession  pulled  practitioners  towards  the  general 
good;  tradition  and  the  competitive  marketplace  clung  on  to  them  and  held  their  focus 
on  the  individual  interests  of  both  patient  and  practitioner.  State  interest  in  the 
collective  would  need  more  than  fines  and  small  fees  to  change  doctors'  long-held 
belief  in  the  primacy  of  their  duty  to  the  patient.  As  the  law  so  frequently  reminded, 
doctors  had  duties  as  citizens  of  the  state,  but  as  many  practitioners  were  all  too 
aware:  citizens  they  may  be,  employees  they  were  not. 
It  is  clear  from  the  above  that  the  question  of  medical  confidentiality  was  an 
important  one  in  the  early  twentieth  century,  involving  high  status  individuals  and 
interest  groups.  Avory  who  triggered  debate  in  late  1914,  had  been  involved  in  the 
consultation  with  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  in  1895-6.  The  interpretation  of  his 
remarks  by  Saundby's  textbook  drew  severe  criticism  from  legal  quarters.  The 
attempts  by  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  with  the  informal  support  of  the  Lord 
Chief  Justice,  to  cajole  the  medical  profession  into  putting  duty  to  the  state  above  duty 
to  the  patient,  were  met  with  opposition  by  each  of  the  medical  bodies  approached: 
the  BMA,  the  Royal  College  of  Surgeons,  and  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians. 
Although  no  meeting  took  place  between  these  three  bodies,  it  is.  clear  that  they  did 
communicate  their  relative  opinions  to  each  other,  and  there  was  further  institutional 
interaction  when  BMA  representatives  met  with  the  Lord  Chief  Justice,  Attorney- 
General,  Public  Prosecutor  and  other  legal  authorities  to  discuss  the  question  in  May 
1915.  The  strong  desire  by  the  legal  side  of  the  debate  to  keep  the  matter  out  of  the 
press,  and  the  initial  disregard  with  which  the  BMA  treated  this,  is  worthy  of  note, 
when  it  is  considered  that  both  sides  claimed  to  be  acting  in  the  interests,  or  with  the 
support,  of  the  public. 
The  hiatus  in  institutional  interaction  on  the  question  by  mid-1915  did  not 
equate  to  a  definitive  resolution  of  the  question.  The  CEC  minutes  record  that  the 
question  continued  to  arise  in  subsequent  months  and  years.  Although  professional 
secrecy  was  involved  in  matters  ranging  from  the  payment  of  farm  labourers'  wages 
to  the  admission  of  individuals  to  mother  and  child  homes,  the  issues  of  criminal 
68 abortion  and  VD  recurred  time  and  again.  While  abortion  had  been  most  prominent  in 
the  1895-6  and  1914-15  discussions,  the  early  interwar  years,  examined  in  the  next 
chapter,  was  the  period  when  medical  confidentiality  in  connection  with  VD  started  to 
dominate. 
69 Introduction  to  the  Early  Interwar  Years  Section 
The  early  interwar  years  provide  the  highpoint  in  the  debate  over  medical 
confidentiality.  This  is  largely  due  to  the  involvement  of  three  powerful  interest 
groups:  the  Ministry  of  Health,  the  British  Medical  Association  and  the  judiciary 
(represented  by  Lord  Chancellor  Birkenhead).  Each  group's  involvement  stemmed 
from  one  key  problem  -  the  judiciary's  demand  that  doctors  from  VD  clinics  give 
evidence  in  divorce  hearings.  The  Ministry  of  Health  was  responsible  for  these  clinics 
and  had  pledged  that  all  treatment  would  be  confidential.  However,  the  judicial 
system  was  inundated  with  divorce  petitions  in  the  immediate  post-war  years,  and  the 
Lord  Chancellor  was  reluctant  to  relinquish  the  courts'  right  to  demand  medical 
evidence.  The  two  central  figures  -  Christopher  Addison  (Minister  for  Health)  and 
Birkenhead  (Lord  Chancellor)  -  came  from  opposite  sides  of  the  coalition 
government.  Addison  was  a  Liberal  intent  on  promoting  social  welfare  legislation, 
while  Birkenhead  was  a  staunch  Conservative.  The  British  Medical  Association, 
having  established  itself  as  a  key  voice  of  the  medical  profession,  sought  to  use  the 
interest  in  the  question  to  challenge  the  law  on  medical  privilege.  The  following  three 
chapters  are  intended  to  show  how  the  question  developed  within  each  group. 
70 Chapter  4-  The  Ministry  of  Health 
"Truth,  like  all  other  good  things,  may  be  loved  unwisely,  may  be  pursued  too 
keenly,  may  cost  too  much.  "' 
The  Ministry  of  Health,  established  in  1919,  was  a  symbol  of  state  interest  in  the 
welfare  of  the  post-war  population.  2  Dr  Christopher  Addison,  the  first  Minister  of 
Health  was  a  staunch  promoter  of  a  social  welfare  agenda  within  Lloyd  George's 
coalition  government,  including  a  highly  ambitious  scheme  of  slum  clearance  and 
house  construction.  Addison  owed  much  of  his  political  progress  to  his  close  links 
with  Lloyd  George  whom  he  had  helped  out  by  using  his  medical  background  to 
secure  sufficient  medical  support  to  allow  Lloyd  George  to  implement  his  National 
Insurance  scheme  prior  to  the  First  World  War.  In  addition  to  Addison's  wartime 
experience  at  the  Ministries  of  Munitions  and  Reconstruction,  the  nascent  Ministry  of 
Health  had  the  `formidable  administrative  team'3  of  Sir  Robert  Morant  as  permanent 
secretary  and  Sir  George  Newman  as  chief  medical  officer;  as  well  as  the  `outstanding 
civil  servant'4  Sir  John  Anderson  as  second  secretary. 
Medically  trained,  Newman  took  the  M.  D.  at  Edinburgh  in  1895  the  same  year 
in  which  he  received  a  diploma  in  public  health  from  Cambridge.  His  keen  interest  in 
public  health  resulted  in  his  appointment  as  chief  medical  officer  to  the  Board  of 
Education's  newly  established  school  medical  service  in  1907.  Here  he  developed  an 
early  working  relationship  with  Morant  whilst  drawing  up  plans  for  the  medical 
inspection  of  schoolchildren.  Newman  also  served  on  a  number  of  health-related 
committees  during  the  war  before  becoming  chief  medical  officer  of  health  in  1919  - 
a  post  he  held  until  1935.  Robert  Morant  had  been  permanent  secretary  of  the  Board 
of  Education  from  1903  until  leaving  to  become  chairman  of  the  National  Health 
Insurance  Commission  in  1911.  Therefore,  he  had  considerable  experience  in 
government  interaction  with  the  medical  profession  prior  to  his  appointment  as 
permanent  secretary  at  the  Ministry  of  Health  in  1919.  The  same  can  be  said  for 
'  Knight  Bruce  in  Pearse  v  Pearse  I  De  Gex  &  Sm,  28  29  as  quoted  in  PRO  MH78/  253  Addison  to 
Birkenhead  June  1920. 
2  The  Ministry  of  Health  will  hereafter  be  referred  to  as  the  `Ministry'. 
3K  Morgan  and  J  Morgan,  Portrait  of  a  Progressive.  The  Political  Career  of  Christopher,  Viscount 
Addison,  (Oxford,  1980),  94. 
4 
Ibid.  102. 
71 Anderson  who  was  secretary  of  the  National  Health  Insurance  Commission  from  1913 
until  he  moved  to  the  Ministry  of  Shipping  in  1917.  He  became  additional  secretary  to 
the  Local  Government  Board  in  March  1919  and  to  the  Ministry  of  Health  when  it 
took  over  the  responsibilities  of  the  Local  Government  Board  in  July  1919.  Though 
formidable,  Addison,  Newman,  Morant  and  Anderson  did  not  last  long  as  an 
administrative  unit.  In  October  1919,  Anderson  moved  to  become  chairman  of  the 
Inland  Revenue.  His  absence  was  heightened  by  the  death  of  Morant  in  March  1920. 
Almost  exactly  a  year  later,  Addison  himself  was  moved  to  become  Minister  without 
Portfolio.  Obviously,  the  loss  of  such  experienced  personnel  did  not  help  the  nascent 
Ministry  of  Health  in  its  attempts  to  challenge  the  law  over  medical  privilege. 
In  taking  over  the  Local  Government  Board's  responsibilities,  the  Ministry 
inherited  the  VD  treatment  scheme  complete  with  the  pledge  of  confidentiality  given 
in  the  1916  VD  regulations.  Thus,  while  the  Ministry's  concern  for  public  health 
normally  entailed  the  breach  of  confidentiality  in  order  to  gather  statistics  or  isolate 
cases  of  infectious  disease,  in  the  case  of  VD  it  had  a  vested  interest  in  protecting 
medical  confidentiality.  It  was  this  which  made  it  liable  to  be  sucked  into  the  debate 
over  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality. 
The  Ministry's  attention  was  first  drawn  to  the  question  of  medical 
confidentiality  by  a  series  of  letters  querying  the  legal  position  of  doctors  when  asked 
to  disclose  information  at  a  patient's  request.  This  situation  most  frequently  arose 
with  VD  medical  officers,  whose  testimony  regarding  the  presence  or  transmission  of 
VD  could  benefit  their  patients  in  divorce  proceedings.  In  late  October  1919,  Colonel 
Bolam  from  the  VD  treatment  centre  at  Newcastle-upon-Tyne  Royal  Victoria 
Infirmary.  Bolam  was  also  chairman  of  the  BMA  council,  a  direct  representative  on 
the  GMC  and  a  member  of  the  consultative  council  of  the  Ministry,  but  does  not  give 
any  indication  that  he  was  writing  in  any  of  these  official  capacities.  He  indicated  that 
a  number  of  awkward  medico-legal  questions  were  arising  relative  to  the  disclosure  of 
information  about  patients  attending  VD  clinics,  and  suggested  that  a  definite  plan 
was  needed  for  dealing  with  such  cases.  5  The  policy  adopted  by  staff  at  the  Newcastle 
hospital  was  not  to  disclose  to  any  third  party,  either  in  writing  or  verbally, 
information  relative  to  the  patient. 
5  PRO  MH78/253  Bolam  to  Ministry  of  Health  28  Oct  1919. 
72 Bolam's  question  related  to  the  importance  of  confidentiality  in  the  effort  to 
combat  VD  as  laid-out  in  the  Public  Health  (Venereal  Disease)  Regulations  1916. 
Article  II  (2)  of  these  regulations  clearly  stated  that  all  proceedings  at  VD  clinics  were 
to  be  kept  confidential.  Dr.  FJH  Coutts,  a  senior  medical  officer  in  charge  of  the 
Ministry's  work  on  tuberculosis  and  VD,  referred  Bolam's  letter  to  Machlachlan, 
assistant  secretary  to  the  Ministry.  6  The  latter  suggested  that,  although  the  breaking  of 
confidence  was  to  be  done  at  the  patient's  request,  this  should  not  impact  upon  the 
doctor's  duty  under  the  1916  regulations.  Having  drafted  a  letter  along  these  lines, 
Machlachlan  requested  that  the  Ministry's  legal  adviser,  Gwyer,  review  the  position.  7 
Gwyer  took  the  opposite  view,  interpreting  the  1916  regulations  as  simply  restating 
medical  etiquette  on  the  point.  Etiquette  would  not  impose  any  obligation  upon  the 
doctor  to  refrain  from  disclosing  relevant  medical  information  at  the  patient's  request, 
indeed  he  noted  that  moral  and  social  duty  may  require  it  of  him. 
Gwyer  noted  that  the  regulations  could  not  override  the  law,  which  stated  that 
any  doctor  subpoenaed  to  give  evidence  in  court  must  answer  all  questions  put  to  him, 
though  he  may  appeal  to  the  judge  for  exemption.  He  believed  that  `most  judges  will 
take  a  reasonable  line  in  such  a  case  and  not  adhere  too  rigidly  to  the  strict  letter  of  the 
law.  '8  This  viewpoint  would  be  subject  to  significant  re-evaluation  as  test  cases  arose 
over  the  course  of  subsequent  months.  Gwyer  suggested  that  ultimately  there  could  be 
no  hard  and  fast  rule  as  to  when  confidentiality  should  be  held  inviolate.  It  was  these 
opinions  that  formed  the  basis  of  Coutts'  reply  to  Bolam  in  Newcastle.  Recognising 
the  growing  importance  of  the  interpretation  of  confidentiality  under  the  VD 
regulations,  Slator  requested  a  further  50  copies  of  Coutts'  letter  be  made  and  this 
essentially  became  the  Ministry's  panacea  for  queries  on  confidentiality  in  the  months 
that  followed.  It  was  sent  in  response  to  a  request,  similar  to  Bolam's,  from  Arthur 
Griffiths,  secretary  to  the  East  Suffolk  and  Ipswich  Hospital  on  17  November  1919; 
and  again  to  Hubert  Sumner,  secretary  to  the  Birmingham  and  Midland  Hospital  for 
skin  and  urinary  diseases  on  9  December  1919.  In  recognition  of  this  it  is  worth 
quoting  in  full. 
6  There  were  six  Senior  Medical  Officers,  each  with  responsibility  for  a  sub-section  of  the  Ministry's 
portfolio. 
Maurice  Linford  Gwyer  (1878-1952). 
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73 I  have  referred  your  letter  of  the  28`h  October  to  our  legal  adviser  who  is  of  the 
opinion  that  it  is  difficult  to  lay  down  any  general  rule  for  the  guidance  of  the 
medical  staff  of  Venereal  Diseases  Clinics.  You  are  of  course  aware  that  the 
Public  Health  (Venereal  Diseases)  Regulations,  1916,  provide  that  all 
information  obtained  in  regard  to  any  person  treated  under  a  scheme  approved 
in  pursuance  of  the  regulations  shall  be  regarded  as  confidential.  This 
provision  imposes  an  obligation  on  the  medical  officer  not  to  disclose  to  third 
parties  any  facts  which  his  examination  of  a  patient  brings  to  light,  but  a 
disclosure  at  the  request  of  a  patient  would  not  constitute  a  breach  of  the 
regulations. 
The  question  whether  such  a  disclosure  should  be  made  in  any  particular  case 
must  depend  on  circumstances.  Where  a  patient  bona  fide  contemplates  legal 
proceedings,  or  where  legal  proceedings  have  actually  been  begun,  it  would 
not  be  unreasonable  for  the  doctor,  when  so  requested  by  the  patient,  to 
indicate  the  nature  of  the  evidence  which  he  would  be  prepared  to  give,  if 
subpoenaed  for  that  purpose.  He  should  always  insist  upon  a  subpoena  for  his 
own  protection,  and  his  evidence  should  be  strictly  confined  to  matters  of  fact, 
including  such  inferences  as  may  legitimately  be  drawn  from  those  facts. 
The  question  whether  the  doctor  should  give  a  written  statement  to  the 
patient's  solicitors  must  depend  on  the  facts  of  the  case.  Where  these  are 
complicated  or  obscure,  it  may  not  be  unreasonable  that  the  solicitors  should 
be  made  aware  what  evidence  the  witness  is  prepared  to  give;  and  if  they  are 
not  prepared  to  take  the  risk  of  calling  a  witness  who  has  given  them  no  proof 
of  his  evidence,  a  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  doctor  might  lead  to  a  denial  of 
justice  to  the  patient.  But  written  statements  by  the  doctor  should  be  the 
exception  rather  than  the  rule,  and  certificates  should  not  be  given  in  any  case. 
They  are  inadmissible  as  evidence  in  legal  proceedings  and  are  clearly  capable 
of  abuse. 
Our  legal  adviser  is  further  of  the  opinion  that  the  medical  officer  would  be 
well  advised  to  confine  his  disclosure  of  information,  even  though  he  has  the 
patient's  consent,  to  the  patient's  solicitors  where  proceedings  have  begun  or 
are-bona  fide  in  contemplation,  and  to  the  parent  or  guardian  in  the  case  of  a 
minor.  The  responsibility  for  making  use  of  the  information  will  then  be  on  the 
person  to  whom  it  is  communicated,  and  the  doctor  would  of  course  in  every 
74 case  take  all  reasonable  precautions  to  satisfy  himself  that  it  is  not  required  for 
any  but  proper  and  legitimate  purposes. 
If  a  medical  officer  is  subpoenaed  to  give  evidence  against  the  interest  of  his 
patient  he  must  of  course  answer  all  relevant  questions  put  to  him,  but  he  may 
properly  appeal  to  the  court  for  protection  if  a  question  involves  him  in  a 
conflict  of  duties. 
I  hope  that  the  above  may  be  of  some  assistance  to  you.  9 
While  medical  confidentiality  had  come  to  the  Ministry's  attention  as  an  area  of 
dubiety  in  1919,  the  widespread  reporting  of  the  case  of  Garner  v  Garner  in  early 
1920  pushed  it  into  prominence  on  the  Ministry's  agenda.  10  Articles  in  The  Times,  on 
14  and  15  January,  and  in  the  Morning  Post  of  16  January,  sparked  activity  at  the 
Ministry.  Clara  Garner  was  seeking  a  divorce  on  grounds  of  adultery  and  cruelty.  The 
transmission  of  VD  from  husband  to  wife  could  provide  evidence  for  both  these 
clauses  if  it  could  be  shown  that  the  husband  had  contracted  VD  from  another  woman 
(adultery)  and  then  infected  his  wife  (cruelty).  With  this  in  mind,  Clara  Garner  had 
subpoenaed  Dr  Salomon  Kadinsky  of  the  Westminster  hospital  to  give  evidence  on 
her  behalf.  Appearing  in  court,  Kadinsky  was  reluctant  to  breach  the  government 
pledge  of  secrecy  which  stated  that  all  VD  treatment  was  to  be  regarded  as  strictly 
confidential.  Before  being  sworn  as  a  witness,  he  produced  a  note  from  the  chairman 
of  the  house  committee  of  the  Westminster  Hospital  which  cited  the  emphasis  placed 
on  secrecy  by  the  government  regulations  on  VD.  The  judge,  Alfred  McCardie, 
refused  the  protest,  stating  that  `in  a  Court  of  Justice  there  were  "even  higher 
considerations  than  those  which  prevailed  with  regard  to  the  position  of  medical 
men.  ""'  Kadinsky  took  the  oath  and  testified  that  Clara  Garner  suffered  from 
syphilis. 
Gwyer  seems  to  have  been  the  first  to  grasp  the  importance  of  the  reporting 
of  the  case  in  The  Times.  Consistent  with  his  earlier  stance  on  the  subject,  he  noted 
that  the  doctor  had  been  summoned  in  order  to  give  evidence  on  his  patient's  behalf. 
The  question  of  confidentiality,  therefore,  arose  along  the  same  lines  as  before  i.  e. 
whether  the  VD  regulations  imposed  an  obligation  on  doctors  not  to  disclose  patient 
9  PRO  MH78/253  Coutts  to  Bolam  15  November  1919 
10  Garner  v  Garner  in  The  Times  Law  Reports  vol.  36,196.  11  The  Times  14  January  1920. 
75 information  even  at  the  patient's  request.  As  Coutts'  letter  to  Bolam  made  clear,  the 
Ministry's  interpretation  of  the  regulations  permitted  disclosure  at  the  patient's 
request.  Sir  George  Newman,  Chief  Medical  Officer  at  the  Ministry,  concurred  with 
this  view.  He  suggested  that  the  leader  in  The  Times  had  completely  missed  this  point 
thereby  wrongly  stating  that  the  government's  VD  treatment  scheme  was  futile.  In  the 
paper's  own  words:  `the  endeavours  which  have  long  been  made  to  root  out  a  hidden 
plague  in  the  community  must  be  allowed  to  rank  among  the  pious  futilities  of  the 
Government.  '  12  Newman  did  note,  however,  that  cases  could  arise  in  which  a  doctor 
was  subpoenaed  and  compelled  to  give  evidence  contrary  to  the  wishes  or  interests  of 
his  patient.  No  scheme  for  the  treatment  of  VD  could  avoid  this  legal  requirement. 
While  the  line  taken  by  the  Ministry  was  consistent  with  McCardie's  ruling  in 
the  Garner  v  Garner  case,  condemnation  of  the  decision  to  compel  the  medical 
witness  to  disclose  patient  information  came  from  legal  quarters.  In  an  article  entitled 
`Doctors  and  professional  privilege',  the  Solicitor's  Journal  questioned  whether 
McCardie  should  not  have  had  the  courage  to  override  the  many  legal  precedents  of 
rejecting  medical  privilege  in  court.  Not  only,  it  argued,  did  the  lack  of  privilege  place 
medical  practitioners  in  a  very  awkward  position,  but  on  grounds  of  public  policy 
it  seems  very  undesirable  that  a  doctor  should  be  compelled  to  disclose  facts 
about  the  health  of  a  patient  when  the  State  has  itself  invited  such  patients  to 
undergo  treatment  in  one  of  its  venereal  hospitals  under  a  solemn  and  well- 
advertised  pledge  of  absolute  secrecy.  13 
The  article  cited  many  cases  in  which  privilege  had  been  claimed,  including  the 
Duchess  of  Kingston's  trial,  and  drew  analogy  with  other  professions  whose  members 
regularly  received  confidential  information,  notably  lawyers  and  clergymen. 
Instances,  in  which  the  latter  were  not  compelled  to  give  evidence  by  dint  of  judicial 
discretion,  were  highlighted  as  being  closely  analogous  to  the  treatment  that  doctors 
should  receive.  The  piece  ended  with  an  indication  that  `now  wider  safeguards  than 
that  seem  desirable.  '  14 
12  Ibid. 
13  Solicitor's  Journal  24  January  1920. 
14  Ibid. 
76 In  the  aftermath  of  The  Times'  controversial  slant  on  the  McCardie  ruling  and 
its  impact  on  the  efficacy  of  the  government's  VD  treatment  scheme,  it  was  Gwyer 
who  was  first  to  suggest  a  solution.  He  proposed  that  a  letter,  intended  to  clear  up  the 
`misapprehension'  of  McCardie's  decision,  should  be  circulated  to  the  VD  clinics  and 
treatment  centres.  Newman  agreed,  and  recommended  that  copies  should  be  sent  to  all 
county  and  county  borough  councils  and  inserted  in  the  press.  A  letter  was  drafted  for 
this  purpose,  predominantly  by  Gwyer,  and  a  copy  of  it  was  sent  to  Alfred  Cox, 
Medical  Secretary  to  the  BMA,  for  comment.  The  accompanying  note,  signed  by  Sir 
Robert  Morant,  iterated  the  Ministry's  belief  that  such  a  letter  was  required  to  counter 
the  potential  harm  that  the  press  coverage  of  Garner  v  Garner  had  caused.  He 
suggested  that  the  BMA,  with  whom  `I  am  most  anxious  that  this  Ministry  should 
always  work  in  touch,  '  15  would  probably  have  a  committee  already  looking  into  the 
issue,  and  any  comments  they  had  would  be  welcomed. 
Cox's  reply  indicated  that  the  BMA  had  already  had  the  matter  under 
consideration  on  a  number  of  occasions,  notably  when  a  deputation  met  with  the  Lord 
Chief  Justice,  Home  Secretary,  Solicitor-General  and  Public  Prosecutor  in  1915.  This 
collective  of  legal  and  political  opinion  had  tried  to  convince  the  BMA  deputation  of 
the  important  duty  upon  medical  men,  as  citizens,  to  disclose  information  about 
suspected  criminal  practices.  However,  the  deputation  had  `stoutly  resisted'  the 
proposal  to  use  doctors  as  private  detectives,  arguing  instead  for  a  form  of  medical 
privilege  to  be  granted.  Cox  indicated  the  general  support  of  the  BMA,  and  the 
specific  backing  of  Dr  Langdon-Down,  chairman  of  its  Central  Ethical  Committee,  to 
the  Ministry's  proposed  letter  being  inserted  in  the  medical  press.  Cox  was  also 
supportive  of  the  suggestion  that  Addison  might  bring  the  matter  to  the  broader 
attention  of  the  government.  16 
The  time  delay  involved  in  this  correspondence  raised  a  question  as  to  whether 
the  insertion  of  a  letter  in  the  press  would  unnecessarily  re-open  and  publicise  the 
matter.  Morant  believed  that  the  ill-effects  of  the  press  reports  may  have  had  a  lasting 
impact  upon  the  efficacy  of  the  VD  treatment  campaign  across  the  country,  and  that 
while  the  true  facts  of  the  Garner  v  Garner  case  were  in  favour  of  the  Ministry's 
stance,  another  case  could  easily  arise  in  which  the  circumstances  posed  a  more 
genuine  threat  to  the  confidentiality  of  patient  information.  Thus,  by  clearing  up  the 
15  PRO  MH78/253  Morant  to  Cox  21  February  1920. 
16  PRO  MH78/253  Cox  to  Morant  26  February  1920. 
77 present  misapprehension  of  the  regulations  for  doctors,  by  way  of  inserting  a  letter  in 
the  medical  press  alone,  greater  clarity  could  be  maintained  for  the  future. 
An  edited  version  of  the  draft  letter,  signed  by  Newman,  and  dated  31  March 
1920,  was  subsequently  circulated  to  medical  officers  of  VD  treatment  centres  and 
medical  officers  of  health  counties  and  county  boroughs.  A  copy  of  the  letter  was  also 
included  in  Newman's  first  annual  report  as  Chief  Medical  Officer.  '7  The  report 
contained  a  section  devoted  to  the  question  of  professional  privilege  in  relation  to  the 
work  of  VD  clinics,  in  which  it  was  again  stressed  that  while  there  was  an  obligation 
of  secrecy  this  could  not  override  the  law.  Echoing  Gwyer's  earlier  optimism  the 
section  concluded:  `If  called  upon  to  give  evidence  which  violates  the  rule  of 
professional  confidence  the  doctor  may  properly  appeal  to  the  court  for  protection  and 
to  such  an  appeal  the  Court  would,  no  doubt,  so  far  as  the  law  permits,  give  full  and 
sympathetic  consideration.  "8 
Three  weeks  after  Newman's  circular,  the  Ministry  received  another  letter 
requesting  advice  on  what  course  should  be  adopted  when  a  medical  officer  was 
subpoenaed  and  compelled  to  give  evidence  in  court.  The  sender,  Hugh  Woods  of  the 
London  &  Counties  Medical  Protection  Society,  requested  that  the  Ministry  receive  a 
deputation  of  members  to  discuss  the  matter  and  its  clear  importance  to  the  overall 
success  of  the  VD  treatment  campaign.  Gwyer  advised  that  a  deputation  should  be 
received  as  the  question's  growing  importance  indicated  that  it  might  be  worthwhile 
to  `guide'  medical  opinion  into  `moderate  and  reasonable  channels  from  the  outset.  '19 
Accordingly,  on  6  May,  Addison,  accompanied  by  Sir  ArthurRobinson, 
Newman  and  Gwyer,  received  the  deputation  from  the  London  &  Counties  Medical 
Protection  Society.  Robinson  had  joined  the  Ministry  following  the  death  of  Morant 
the  previous  month.  The  deputation  stressed  their  belief  that  a  privilege,  akin  to  that  of 
the  legal  profession,  was  now  required  for  medical  practitioners.  They  made  clear  that 
any  such  privilege  should  only  be  applicable  to  evidence  in  civil  cases  and  would  not 
impact  upon  their  standing  in  criminal  proceedings.  Addison  expressed  his  agreement 
with  their  views  suggesting  that  in  order  to  achieve  their  mutual  goal,  legislation 
would  be  required.  He  assured  them  that  he  would  give  the  matter  his  consideration, 
and  the  meeting's  minutes  record  that,  after  the  deputation  had  left,  he  instructed 
1, 
"  Annual  Report  of  the  Chief  Medical  Officer  1919-1920  (London:  His  Majesty's  Stationery  Office, 
1920),  163. 
18 
Ibid. 
19  PRO  MH78/253  Gwyer  to  Newman  26  April  1920 
78 Gwyer  to  draw  up  a  note  on  which  he  could  see  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  (Rufus  Isaacs, 
Lord  Reading).  20 
Gwyer  drew  up  a  memorandum  and  it  was  sent  along  with  a  copy  of  the  VD 
regulations  and  Newman's  circular,  to  Sir  Claud  Schuster,  Permanent  Secretary  to  the 
Lord  Chancellor,  on  3  June.  The  accompanying  letter  asked  for  the  memo  to  be 
passed  on  to  the  Lord  Chancellor  (F  E  Smith,  Lord  Birkenhead),  and  requested  that  he 
advise  Addison  on  what  action  should  be  taken  to  secure  a  form  of  privilege  for 
medical  practitioners  in  court  which  would  ensure  the  confidentiality  of  VD  patients. 
Gwyer  put  forward  a  number  of  arguments  for  the  extension  of  privilege  to  medical 
practitioners  in  civil  proceedings,  citing  the  importance  of  confidentiality  to  the  VD 
treatment  scheme  and  the  lenient  treatment  received  on  numerous  occasions  by 
members  of  the  clergy  appearing  as  witnesses  in  court.  He  argued  that  the  basis  for 
legal  privilege  as  stated  by  Knight  Bruce  in  Pearse  v  Pearse  provided  just  as  much 
justification  for  medical  privilege: 
Truth,  like  all  other  good  things,  may  be  loved  unwisely,  may  be  pursued  too 
keenly,  may  cost  too  much.  And  surely  the  meanness  and  the  mischief  of 
prying  into  man's  confidential  consultations  with  his  legal  adviser,  the  general 
evil  of  infusing  reserve  and  dissimulation,  uneasiness,  suspicion,  and  fear,  into 
these  communications  which  must  take  place,  and  which,  unless  in  a  condition 
of  perfect  security,  must  take  place  uselessly  or  worse,  are  too  great  a  price  to 
pay  for  truth  itself 
. 
21 
There  followed  some  brief  correspondence  between  Schuster  and  the  Ministry 
regarding  further  copies  of  the  memo  being  sent,  at  Birkenhead's  request,  to  the  Lord 
Chief  Justice  (Lord  Reading),  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  (Lord  Sterndale)  and  the 
President  of  the  Probate,  Divorce  and  Admiralty  Division  (Sir  Henry  Duke),  for  their 
consideration  and  comment,  and  to  ask  Reading  to  raise  the  matter  at  a  judges 
meeting.  22 
20  PRO  MH78/253  Minutes  of  meeting  with  deputation  from  London  &  Counties  Medical  Protection 
Society  6  May  1920. 
21  Pearse  v  Pearse  I  De  Gex  &  Sm,  28  29  as  quoted  in  PRO  MH78/  253  Addison  to  Birkenhead  3  June  1920 
22  PRO  MH78/253  Schuster  to  Barter  9  June  1920;  Barter  to  Schuster  11  June  1920. 
79 Having  initially  written  to  the  Lord  Chancellor  at  the  beginning  of  June  1920, 
Birkenhead's  failure  to  furnish  the  Ministry  with  the  requested  opinions  prompted 
Barter  to  write  again  in  early  December.  23  Still  there  was  no  response.  It  took  a  letter 
from  the  ever  dependable  Gwyer  in  late  January  to  obtain  a  long  overdue  and  highly 
unsatisfactory  response.  4  Writing  the  following  day,  Schuster  indicated  that  he  had, 
as  yet,  only  received  a  written  reply  on  the  question  of  medical  confidentiality  from 
Sir  Henry  Duke.  In  addition  to  this,  he  had  had  several  discussions  of  the  matter  with 
Lord  Reading.  Neither  had  been  particularly  favourable  to  the  proposal  and  the  matter 
had  been  postponed  until  a  meeting  of  the  chief  judges  could  be  arranged  to  discuss  it. 
Additional  delays  were  foreseen  in  relation  to  the  imminent  change  of  Lord  Chief 
Justice  as  Reading  was  vacating  the  post  in  order  to  become  Viceroy  of  India. 
This  reply,  while  breaking  the  silence  from  legal  quarters  on  the  subject, 
proved  unsatisfactory  to  the  Ministry.  They  were  keen  to  proceed  in  promoting  the 
cause  of  medical  privilege  amidst  mounting  controversy  and  pressure.  In  a  written 
response  to  Birkenhead,  emphasis  was  again  put  on  the  prejudicial  effect  that  the 
perceived  lack  of  confidentiality  was  having  on  public  health  measures.  25  Adverse 
reports  in  The  Times  of  the  Ministry's  medical  record  card  system  seemed  to  have 
failed,  once  again,  to  take  note  of  the  facts.  The  system  of  record  cards,  introduced  as 
an  integral  part  of  the  National  Insurance  scheme,  had  been  put  on  hold  in  1917  due  to 
`the  great  pressure  upon  the  time  of  practitioners,  occasioned  by  the  withdrawal  of  so 
many  of  their  number  for  military  service.  '26  Before  recommencing  with  the  system, 
Addison  had  engaged  an  interdepartmental  committee  to  advise  on  ways  in  which  the 
forms  used  for  the  reports  could  be  improved.  27  The  new  record  card  system  was 
implemented  along  the  exact  lines  of  the  recommendations  contained  in  that 
interdepartmental  committee  report,  including  one  that  received  a  lot  of  negative  press 
attention. 
A  practitioner  is  required  to  afford  to  the  Medical  Officer 
...  or  to  such  other 
person  as  he  may  appoint  for  the  purpose,  access  at  all  reasonable  times  to  any 
records  kept  by  the  practitioner  under  these  terms  of  service  and  to  furnish  the 
23  PRO  MH78/253  Barter  to  Schuster  3  December  1920. 
24  PRO  MH78/253  Gwyer  to  Schuster  25  January  1921. 
25  PRO  M14778/253  Addison  to  Birkenhead  4  February  1921. 
26  Interdepartmental  Committee  on  Insurance  Medical  Records  (London:  His  Majesty's  Stationery 
Office,  1920),  5. 
27  The  Times  13  March  1920. 
80 Medical  Officer  with  any  such  records  or  with  any  necessary  information  with 
regard  to  any  entry  therein  as  he  may  require.  28 
The  scheme  was  designed  to  allow  the  Ministry  of  Health  to  collect  more  accurate 
statistics  on  the  health  of  insured  patients.  The  medical  records  of  a  patient  would  be 
put  inside  an  envelope  with  their  details  on  the  outside  for  identification  purposes.  In 
the  event  of  the  records  having  to  be  sent  to  a  Medical  Officer,  the  patient's  file  would 
be  placed  within  a  windowed  envelope  for  transit  -a  point  of  grave  concern  for  The 
Times:  `thus  a  messenger  who  handles  these  cards  may  find  it  difficult  not  to  see 
whom  they  concern.  The  whole  thing  is  public  and  open  to  the  last  degree.  '29  In  an 
attempt  to  awaken  the  public  to  the  threat  that  the  new  scheme  posed  to  the 
confidentiality  of  insured  persons'  health  records,  The  Times  published  a  series  of 
articles  related  to  this  `medical  inquisition.  '  30  Amidst  genuine  points  that  the  scheme 
discriminated  against  the  confidentiality  of  panel  patients  and  fine  rhetoric  about 
confidentiality  being  `the  breath  of  medical  practice'31,  The  Times  strayed  into 
scaremongering.  Referring  to  the  fact  that  a  Medical  Officer  could  appoint  someone 
to  act  on  his  behalf  The  Times  suggested  `there  is  absolutely  nothing  in  the  regulation 
so  far  as  can  be  seen  to  prevent  one  of  the  new  advisers  nominating,  say,  his  wife  to 
scrutinise  these  most  private  and  confidential  documents.  '32 
Addison's  letter  to  Birkenhead  pointed  out  that  the  newspaper  campaigns, 
`inspired  by  motives  which  have  very  little  connection  with  a  desire  to  promote  the 
efficiency  of  our  medical  services,  '33  were  creating  a  deal  of  uneasiness  amongst  the 
more  `ignorant'  of  insured  individuals  and  were  an  encouragement  to  those  doctors 
`who  never  lose  an  opportunity  of  vilifying  the  panel  system.  '34  All  this  was  simply 
adding  to  the  importance  of  the  question  of  medical  confidentiality  and  Addison 
concluded  by  stating: 
28  The  Times  26  November  1920. 
29  Ibid. 
30  The  Times-26  November  1920;  24  December  1920;  26  December  1920;  30  December  1920;  31 
December  1920;  1  January  1920;  3  January  1920. 
31  The  Times  18  February  1920. 
32  The  Times  26  November  1920. 
33  PRO  MH78/253  Addison  to  Birkenhead  4  February  1921.  34  Ibid. 
81 I  entertain  no  doubt  that  if  the  Cabinet  should  agree  to  the  introduction  of 
legislation  amending  the  present  law  public  opinion  would  be  wholly  with  us, 
but  in  a  matter  so  nearly  affecting  the  practice  and  procedure  of  the  Courts,  I 
should  be  glad  to  know  that  I  am  assured  of  your  support.  35 
The  Ministry's  anxiety  that  the  question  should  be  dealt  with  as  early  as  possible  did 
nothing  to  change  Birkenhead's  measured  approach.  Replying  on  his  behalf,  Schuster 
restated  that  circumstances,  primarily  the  change  of  Lord  Chief  Justice,  could  not 
permit  the  reporting  of  a  consensus  of  legal  opinion  on  the  matter.  36  It  would,  after  all, 
be  highly  improper  to  proceed  without  consulting  the  principal  judicial  officers  who 
would  be  most  materially  affected  by  any  change  in  the  law.  In  fact,  Birkenhead  was 
debating  with  the  Prime  Minister,  Lloyd  George,  about  who  should  be  appointed  Lord 
Chief  Justice.  On  the  day  that  Schuster  wrote  to  Addison  on  behalf  of  the  Lord 
Chancellor,  Birkenhead  was  himself  preparing  a  `lengthy  typewritten  document'  to 
try  and  dissuade  Lloyd  George  from  appointing  A.  T.  Lawrence  to  the  vacant 
position. 
37  His  protestations  failed  and,  in  order  to  keep  his  Liberal  ally  Sir  Gordon 
Hewart  (the  Attorney-General)  in  the  Cabinet,  Lloyd  George  appointed  the  77  year- 
old  Lawrence  to  the  position  on  the  understanding  that  he  would  be  replaced  by 
Hewart  before  the  next  change  in  government.  38 
Schuster's  response  had  clearly  stretched  Addison's  patience.  He  wrote  to 
Birkenhead  on  Valentine's  Day  1921  expressing  his  keen  disappointment  and 
emphasising,  once  again,  the  pressing  nature  of  the  matter,  which  was,  he  stated, 
certain  to  be  raised  in  Parliament  very  soon.  But  any  attempt  to  pressurise  the  Lord 
Chancellor  into  support  of  the  Ministry's  proposed  alterations  to  existing  legislation 
was  dealt  a  severe  blow  by  Birkenhead's  response: 
Dear  Minister  of  Health, 
You  must  allow  me  to  point  out  that  it  is  perfectly  futile  of  you  to  write  me  such 
letter  on  grave  legal  matters  as  that  which  I  received  from  you  this  morning.  The 
changes  which  you  desire  are  far-reaching  and  highly  disputable.  I  am  myself  at 
"  Ibid. 
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37  P  Rowland,  Lloyd  George  (London,  1975),  533. 
38  The  Second  Earl  of  Birkenhead,  The  life  of  F.  E.  Smith.  First  Earl  of  Birkenhead,  (London,  1959), 
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82 present  opposed  to  them.  The  President  of  the  Probate,  Divorce  and  Admiralty 
Division  is  very  strongly  opposed  to  them.  The  delay,  therefore,  to  which  you 
make  such  querulous  reference,  until  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  is  appointed  and 
possibly  the  new  Attorney  General,  is  entirely  in  your  favour,  as  it  may 
conceivably,  however  improbably,  supply  you  with  two  Judges  who  agree  with 
your  views. 
Nothing  in  the  meantime  is  to  be  gained  by  concealing  you  from  my  own  view  - 
1)  that  it  is  highly  doubtful  whether  you  will  ever  obtain  the  modification  of  the 
existing  law  which  you  desire,  and 
2)  that  it  is  even  more  doubtful  whether  such  a  modification,  if  admitted,  would 
not  be  extremely  pernicious. 
In  conclusion,  I  have  only  to  add  that  there  will  be  no  avoidable  delay  in 
consulting  the  new  official,  or  officials  and  that  you  will  be  immediately  informed 
of  the  result. 
Yours  very  truly, 
39  Birkenhead. 
Unperturbed  by  what  Gwyer  termed  the  `very  strange'  reply  from  the  Lord 
Chancellor,  Addison  subsequently  met  with  Birkenhead  who  undertook  to  raise  the 
matter  within  two  weeks  of  the  appointment  of  the  new  Lord  Chief  Justice,  discuss  it 
with  the  other  judges,  and  report  back  to  the  Minister.  Gwyer,  ever  the  optimist, 
suggested  that  Addison  should  not  read  too  much  into  Birkenhead's  unfavourable 
stance  on  the  Minister's  proposal  since  `the  letter  scarcely  represented  his  considered 
judgement,  and  indeed  bore  the  appearance  of  having  been  written  in  a  moment  of 
pique.  940  Obviously,  the  Ministry  had  not  given  up  hope  of  convincing  the  judiciary  of 
the  benefits  of  medical  privilege.  One  month  later,  a  communication  from  Schuster 
indicated  an  imminent  meeting  between  Birkenhead  and  Lawrence.  In  light  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  elderly  Lawrence's  appointment,  there  was,  perhaps,  not  much 
ground  for  hope.  Shortly  afterwards,  Schuster  confirmed  that  Lawrence  was  in  full 
agreement  with  the  informally  expressed  views  of  his  predecessor,  of  Sir  Henry  Duke 
(President-of  the  Probate,  Divorce  and  Admiralty  Division)  and  of  Birkenhead. 
39  PRO  LCO  2/624  Birkenhead's  reply  to  Addison's  letter  of  14  February  1921. 
40  PRO  MH78/253  Gwyer  to  Machlachlan  5  April  1921. 
83 Clearly,  this  did  represent  the  considered  judgement  of  the  judiciary  and  its 
foundation  could  not  be  as  easily  belittled  as  Birkenhead's  previous  response.  To 
Birkenhead,  the  unanimous  legal  opinion  meant  Addison's  proposal  could  be  taken  no 
further. 
The  attempt  to  state  that  the  question  was  closed  seems  to  have  spurred  the 
Ministry  -  not  content  to  have  what  they  could  and  could  not  achieve  dictated  to  them 
by  the  judiciary  -  into  greater  action.  Besides,  not  all  avenues  had  been  exhausted.  In  a 
note  on  the  back  of  the  letter,  Sir  Arthur  Robinson  suggested  that  the  only  way  to  take 
the  matter  forward  would  be  by  referring  the  question  formally  to  the  Cabinet  as  a 
matter  of  difference  between  the  Ministry  and  Lord  Chancellor's  Office.  He  requested 
that,  before  suggesting  this  to  Addison,  information  on  medical  privilege  in  other 
countries  should  be  obtained. 
In  late  May,  Gwyer  set  out  his  reasons  for  believing  the  matter  should  be 
pursued 
41  He  argued  that  the  question  of  medical  privilege  was  ultimately  one  of 
policy  and,  consequently,  legal  opinion,  while  carrying  great  weight,  could  not  be 
regarded  as  conclusive.  Furthermore,  the  Lord  Chancellor's  Office  had  not  given 
detailed  reasons  for  their  decision.  Gwyer  suggested  that  the  Society  for  Comparative 
Legislation  should  be  consulted  in  order  to  furnish  the  Minister  with  the  information 
on  the  standing  of  medical  privilege  in  other  countries,  before  any  approach  was  made 
to  the  Cabinet.  On  the  question  of  raising  the  matter  with  Cabinet,  he  noted  a  positive 
precedent  occurred  when  proposals  to  make  housing  bonds  a  trustee  security  under 
the  Housing  (Additional  Powers)  Act,  1919,  were  met  with  unanimous  opposition 
from  the  judges  of  the  chancery  division.  In  that  instance,  the  Cabinet  did  not  accept 
the  judges'  opinion  as  final  and  the  proposal  went  on  to  become  a  statute.  Newman 
agreed  with  Gwyer's  view  that  the  question  should  not  be  left,  believing  there  were 
`strong  medical  grounds  for  the  course  proposed.  '42 
The  Society  for  Comparative  Legislation  was  contacted  and  Mr  Bedwell  from 
the  Society  replied  to  the  Ministry  on  13  June  1921.  He  opined  that  the  dominant 
influence  of  Roman  Catholicism  in  the  European  countries  made  them  ill-suited  for 
current  purposes  but  he  believed  that  the  United  States  might  prove  more  fruitful.  He 
was  not  aware  of  a  collected  work  that  contained  information  on  the  policy  adopted  in 
other  countries,  but  he  suggested  that  it  would  not  take  long  for  someone  from  the 
41  PRO  MH78/253  Gwyer  to  Newman  and  Robinson  31  May  1921.  42  PRO  MH78/253  Newman  handwritten  comment  on  Gwyer's  memo  3  June  1921. 
84 Ministry  to  research  the  matter  in  the  Middle  Temple  library,  where  he  himself  was 
the  librarian.  Bedwell's  advice  seems  to  have  been  taken  as  the  Ministry's  file 
contains  several  pages  of  notes  on  legislation  regarding  medical  confidentiality  in 
countries  ranging  from  New  Zealand  and  Canada  to  many  of  the  American  states. 
Gwyer  used  this  information  in  a  memo  he  drew  up  for  the  Cabinet.  43  In  relaying  it  to 
Robinson,  Gwyer  noted  that  he  had  been  in  touch  with  Mr  Miller-Gray  of  the  Scottish 
Office  who  had  informed  him  that  while  there  was  no  privilege  for  medical  men  in 
Scotland,  it  was  felt  that  `Doctors  should  not  be  pressed  to  give  evidence  about  their 
patients  unless  absolutely  necessary.  '44 
While  the  Ministry  sought  out  ways  to  develop  their  case  at  the  highest  levels 
of  government,  the  growing  problems  for  Lloyd  George's  coalition  saw  the  Prime 
Minister  take  Addison  away  from  Health  to  become  Minister  without  portfolio. 
Having  waited  for  the  appointment  of  the  new  Lord  Chief  Justice  only  to  see  the 
position  filled  by  the  elderly  Lawrence,  whose  primary  function  was  to  keep  the  seat 
warm  for  Hewart  (who  succeeded  him  twelve  months  later),  the  Ministry  was  by 
April  adjusting  to  a  new  Minister  of  Health.  Lloyd  George's  removal  of  Addison, 
ostensibly  because  of  the  difficulties  connected  with  the  cost  to  the  public  purse  of  his 
ambitious  housing  program,  came  at  a  bad  time  for  the  Ministry.  The  founder  of 
Imperial  Chemical  Industries,  Sir  Alfred  Mond,  took  over  as  Minister  when  the 
department  was  gearing-up  to  persuade  cabinet  of  the  case  for  medical  privilege.  A 
delay  in  making  the  approach  to  cabinet  was  out  of  the  question  as  the  issue  gathered 
an  increased  urgency  after  it  became  apparent,  towards  the  end  of  July,  that  Lord 
Dawson  of  Penn  was  to  raise  the  matter  for  debate  in  the  House  of  Lords  and  suggest 
that  a  select  committee  of  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament  should  analyse  the  question. 
Dawson  had  chaired  the  31st  meeting  of  the  Consultative  Committee  on  Medical  and 
Allied  Services  at  the  beginning  of  July,  in  which  the  question  of  medical  privilege 
had  been  prominent  amongst  a  number  of  issues  the  Ministry  had  requested  the 
committee  to  examine  and  report  back.  The  minutes  of  the  meeting  express  at  some 
length  the  discussion  that  took  place,  including  the  appearance  and  advice  of  Gwyer 
midway  through  the  meeting.  Going  against  Gwyer's  advice,  the  committee  finally 
passed  the  following  resolution:  `In  the  opinion  of  the  Council  it  is  in  the  public 
interest  that  medical  practitioners  should  not  be  compelled  in  proceedings  in  courts  of 
43  PRO  MH78/253  Ministry  memorandum  for  Cabinet  meeting  June  1921.  44  PRO  MH78/253  Gwyer  to  Robinson  17  June  1921. 
85 law  to  disclose  communications  made  to  them  by  their  patients'45  by  majority  of  11 
votes  to  3.  The  three  dissenters  on  the  committee  agreed  with  Gwyer's  opinion  that 
the  protection  afforded  to  medical  men  should  be  limited  to  civil  cases. 
Dawson's  belief  that  medical  privilege  should  extend  to  both  civil  and 
criminal  proceedings  went  against  the  Ministry's  view  of  the  issue  and  the  prospect  of 
his  raising  the  issue  in  Parliament  threatened  to  jeopardise  their  proposal  relating 
solely  to  civil  cases.  Mond  wrote  to  Birkenhead  later  the  same  month.  6  He  noted  the 
correspondence  that  the  Lord  Chancellor  had  entered  into  with  Addison  and  indicated 
that  he  had  been  keen  to  arrange  a  meeting  to  discuss  the  matter.  Mond  made  clear 
that,  while  Dawson's  proposal  was  not  in  keeping  with  the  Ministry's  views  on  the 
question,  the  perceived  absence  of  a  complete  guarantee  of  secrecy  under  the 
government's  VD  treatment  schemes  had  led  to  something  approaching  a  crisis.  In 
contrast  to  Dawson,  the  Ministry  sought  to  gain  legislation  that  would  permit  a  level 
of  privilege  to  medical  practitioners  in  civil  cases  alone,  for  which  there  were  a 
number  of  respectable  precedents.  Indeed,  Mond  suggested,  a  short  bill  could  be 
passed  along  the  lines  of  legislation  in  force  in  New  Zealand,  which  stated 
A  physician  or  surgeon  shall  not,  without  the  consent  of  his  patient,  divulge  in  any 
civil  proceeding  (unless  the  sanity  of  the  patient  is  the  matter  in  dispute)  any 
communication  made  to  him  in  his  professional  character  by  such  patient,  and 
necessary  to  enable  him  to  prescribe  or  act  for  such  patient. 
Nothing  in  this  section  shall  protect  any  communication  made  for  any  criminal 
purpose,  or  prejudice  the  right  to  give  in  evidence  any  statement  or  representation 
at  any  time  made  to  or  by  a  physician  or  surgeon  in  or  about  the  effecting  by  any 
person  of  an  insurance  on  the  life  of  himself  or  any  other  person.  7 
If  Birkenhead  concurred,  there  would  be  no  need  for  a  joint  committee  to  discuss  the 
matter  and  the  Ministry  could  explain  the  situation  to  Dawson.  If  Birkenhead  was  of 
another  mind,  then  Mond  was  keen  to  discuss  the  situation  with  him.  Clearly  Mond 
was  trying  to  use  Dawson's  extreme  position  with  talk  of  select  committee 
43  PRO  MH78/253  Consultative  Council  on  Medical  and  allied  Services  1  July  1921.  46  PRO  MH78/253  Mond  to  Birkenhead  21  July  1921. 
47  Extract  (sections  2  and  3)  from  the  Evidence  Act,  1908  (New  Zealand). 
86 investigations  and  a  universal  medical  privilege  to  contrast  the  Ministry's  more 
moderate  and  reasonable  position. 
In  the  end,  the  Ministry  persuaded  Dawson  to  withdraw  temporarily  his 
motion  48  Robinson  claimed  Dawson  had  been  `made  to  see  the  difficulties'  at  various 
discussions  at  the  Ministry.  49  Nonetheless,  the  Ministry  still  faced  mounting  pressure 
to  clarify  the  position  of  medical  confidentiality  in  connection  with  VD  treatment. 
Two  letters  on  the  subject  were  received  in  the  autumn  of  1921,  the  first  from  the 
Monmouthshire  County  Council  Association  and  the  second  from  the  County 
Councils  Association.  Both  referred  to  the  inconsistency  between  the  Ministry's 
advertisement  posters  for  VD  treatment  centres,  which  clearly  stated  that  all 
proceedings  would  be  strictly  confidential,  and  the  recent  string  of  highly  publicised 
legal  rulings  which  falsified  that  claim.  50  Either,  the  letters  demanded,  the  Ministry 
must  have  secrecy  recognised  by  the  courts,  or  the  literature  would  have  to  be 
withdrawn.  The  second  letter  had  been  forwarded  on  from  the  Ministry  of  Health  in 
Cardiff,  who,  believing  the  issues  raised  to  be  of  widespread  concern,  suggested  that  a 
reply  would  be  better  to  come  from  Whitehall.  51  The  Ministry  at  Whitehall's  reply 
simply  stated  that  they  had  the  matter  under  consideration.  52 
The  delay  in  tabling  his  motion  for  discussion  did  not  deter  Dawson  from 
continuing  his  campaign  for  medical  privilege.  Consecutive  issues  of  the  Law  Times 
on  25  March  and  1  April  1922  covered  at  length  a  debate  on  professional  secrecy 
opened  by  Dawson  at  the  Medico-Legal  Society.  The  report  of  the  debate  can  be 
extended  to  sum  up  quite  effectively  the  central  tension  involved  in  the  discussion  of 
medical  confidentiality.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Ministry  and  the  BMA  were  arguing 
that  medical  privilege,  of  a  form  and  size  that  could  be  debated,  was  necessary  for 
practitioners  to  carry  out  their  professional  duty  and  promote  the  health  of  the  public. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Judiciary  emphasised  the  doctor's  duty  as  a  citizen  to  aid  in  the 
administration  of  justice.  Both  sides  claimed  the  justification  that  their  course  of 
action  best  served  the  public  interest.  The  case  became,  therefore:  doctor's  duty  as 
citizen  versus  doctor's  duty  as  professional.  If  the  complexities  involved  in  weighing 
up  the  two  duties  against  each  other  could  not  provide  a  satisfactory  resolution,  no 
4E 
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87 simpler  solution  would  be  found  by  focussing  on  the  consequences.  After  all,  who 
could  definitively  state  that  the  end  of  public  justice  was  more  important  than  that  of 
public  health,  or  vice  versa?  Nonetheless,  despite  differing  standpoints,  all  those 
attending  the  Medico-Legal  Society's  debate  were  agreed  that  answers  to  this 
complex  question  were  urgently  required.  Lord  Justice  Atkin  suggested  that  the  topic 
was  `on  the  whole  the  most  important  that  had  ever  engaged  the  attention  of  the 
society,  because  it  was  one  that  intimately  concerned  not  merely  medical  men,  and 
not  merely  lawyers  in  their  capacity  as  ministers  of  justice,  but  the  public  at  large.  ' 
Medical  confidentiality  was  to  continue  to  engage  Atkin's  attention  as  he  lent  the 
weight  of  his  support  behind  attempts  to  gain  medical  privilege  through  private 
members'  legislation  in  1927  and  1936. 
Dr  Elliot:  The  Ministry's  Medical  Martyr 
Andrew  Morrice  bemoans  the  absence  of  a  dramatic  courtroom  showdown  in  the 
early  interwar  debate.  53  In  fact,  such  a  showdown  was  on  the  verge  of  taking  place  in 
1921.  In  early  June  1921,  Dr  John  Elliot,  medical  officer  to  a  VD  clinic  in  Chester, 
wrote  to  the  Ministry,  in  urgent  need  of  advice.  54  He  had  been  subpoenaed  to  appear 
as  a  witness  in  the  divorce  court  and  give  evidence  against  a  patient,  thereby 
breaching  medical  confidence.  The  patient  had  attended  the  VD  clinic  with  her  child 
who  suffered  from  the  gonorrhoeal  eye  infection  opthalmia  neonatorum.  Her 
husband,  claiming  to  be  disease  free  himself,  took  the  presence  of  disease  in  the  child 
as  evidence  that  his  wife  had  contracted  the  disease  during  an  adulterous  relationship. 
Consequently  he  petitioned  for  divorce  and  subpoenaed  Dr  Elliot  to  give  evidence  on 
the  presence  of  the  disease.  In  writing  to  the  Ministry,  Elliot  was  keen  to  know  if  he 
had  no  other  choice  but  to  give  evidence  in  the  pending  trial.  Replying  the  following 
day,  Coutts  explained  the  position  as  the  Ministry  currently  understood  it.  Having 
been  subpoenaed,  Elliot  must  attend  the  court  but  could  protest  against  being  required 
to  disclose  confidential  information  received  during  his  work  at  the  VD  treatment 
centre,  making  clear  that  it  was  in  the  public  interest  that  such  matters  should  remain 
confidential.  If  the  appeal  for  exemption  was  not  granted,  Elliot  was  left  with  only 
two  options:  have  the  protest  recorded  and  then  answer  the  questions,  or,  refuse  to 
give  evidoice.  If  the  latter  course  was  adopted,  the  witness  ran  the  risk  of 
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88 imprisonment  for  contempt  of  court,  which,  while  being  of  personal  discomfort, 
would  `no  doubt  very  effectively  draw  attention  to  the  hardship  of  the  position.  '55 
Perhaps,  Coutts  continued,  Elliot  could  furnish  the  Ministry  with  details  of  when  the 
trial  was  to  take  place  in  order  that  they  could  send  a  shorthand  writer  to  take  notes  on 
the  court's  actions,  and  Elliot  himself  could  drop  by  the  Ministry  to  discuss  the  best 
way  to  put  any  protest  he  wished  to  make.  Coutts  also  suggested  that  Elliot  might 
wish  to  get  in  touch  with  legal  counsel,  though  it  was  unlikely  he  would  be  permitted 
to  use  them  in  court. 
Elliot's  next  letter  stated  that  the  importance  of  the  case  was  such  that  he  felt 
he  might  not  have  the  confidence  to  put  the  protest  effectively  so  he  had  corresponded 
with  Honaratus  Lloyd  K.  C.  56  Clearly  passionate  about  the  issue,  Elliot  claimed  to  be 
of  a  mind  to  decline  to  answer  any  questions  and  face  the  consequences,  though  he 
reserved  any  final  judgement  until  he  had  talked  the  matter  over  with  Lloyd.  The  case 
was  Needham  v  Needham  and  while  he  felt  sure  he  would  have  the  support  of  the 
whole  profession,  he  hoped  he  would  also  have  the  support  of  the  Ministry,  as  far  as  it 
was  possible  for  them  to  give  it.  The  latter,  it  turned  out,  was  an  important 
qualification. 
On  receiving  this  letter,  Coutts  sent  a  note  to  Gwyer  indicating  that,  although 
Elliot  had  engaged  the  services  of  a  lawyer,  it  appeared  he  might  be  a  willing  -  and 
timely  -  martyr  in  the  Ministry's  cause  of  medical  privilege.  57  Coutts  suggested 
I  think  it  is  very  probable  that  if  we  gave  him  direct  encouragement  he  would 
decide  to  decline  to  give  evidence  and  thus  make  it  a  test  case.  I  recognise 
however,  that  we  could  not  well  do  this  officially,  and  it  is  a  great 
responsibility  to  advise  him  unofficially  in  this  direction.  58 
A  great  responsibility,  indeed,  but  also  a  great  opportunity.  Having  received  a 
negative  response  from  Birkenhead  on  their  proposal  to  extend  a  form  of  legal 
privilege  to  doctors,  the  senior  members  of  the  Ministry  were  keen  to  continue  their 
promotion  of  what  they  believed  was  a  justified  and  necessary  cause.  The  coincidental 
arrival  of  Elliot's  plea  for  help  knocked  the  door,  so  firmly  closed  by  the  consulted 
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89 legal  opinion,  once  again  ajar.  The  circumstances  seemed  ideal.  In  the  course  of 
researching  the  matter  over  the  previous  months,  the  Ministry  had  frequently  come 
across  references  to  the  informally  recognised  privilege  granted  to  clergymen  when 
appearing  as  witnesses  in  court.  Memoranda  in  the  Ministry's  file  noted  precedents  in 
which  the  judge  ruled  against  the  disclosure  of  confidential  information  by  a 
clergyman.  59  The  assumption  was  that  judges  were  reluctant  to  imprison  clergymen 
for  refusing  to  disclose  information  confided  in  them,  recognising  that  no  form  of 
punishment  the  court  could  impose  would  be  sufficient  to  counter  their  sense  of 
higher  duty.  The  Ministry  now  seemed  keen  to  test  whether  the  same  leniency  would 
be  shown  to  a  doctor  who,  in  face  of  dire  consequences,  resolutely  stood  by  his  belief 
in  the  ancient  and  venerable  principle  of  medical  confidentiality.  Elliot  could  provide 
them  with  their  test  case,  but  first  he  had  to  be  persuaded  of  the  contribution  his 
potential,  even  likely,  sacrifice  would  make  to  the  greater  good  of  the  cause.  Yet  the 
matter  was  more  delicate.  The  guiding  hand  of  the  Ministry  must  leave  no  obvious 
fingerprints  on  the  wary  Dr  Elliot's  back  as  it  pushed  him  through  the  door  and  into 
the  spotlight  of  public  attention,  or,  prison. 
However,  the  Ministry  were  not  the  only  ones  advising  Elliot.  Lloyd's  counsel 
to  him,  as  stated  in  Elliot's  next  communication  with  the  Ministry,  was  that,  while 
initially  refusing  to  give  evidence,  if  the  court  maintained  its  demand,  Elliot  should 
comply.  60  In  addition  to  appearing  as  a  witness,  Elliot  was  required  to  bring  the 
hospital  records  with  him  and  the  secretary  to  the  infirmary  was  also  likely  to  be 
subpoenaed.  Writing  on  a  Tuesday,  Elliot  was  to  meet  with  the  Infirmary's  chairman, 
secretary  and  solicitor  on  the  following  day  before  travelling  to  London  on  Thursday 
to  meet  with  the  London  &  Counties  Medical  Protection  Society,  from  whom  he  had 
requested  counsel.  He  understood  the  trial  could  be  called  on  Friday.  With  so  many 
demands  upon  him  it  is  little  wonder  Elliot  concluded  by  stating  `I  don't  quite  know 
what  to  do.  '61  The  only  other  communication  the  Ministry  received  from  Elliot,  before 
his  appearance  in  court  was  a  telegram  from  Chester  simply  stating  `Trial  Tomorrow 
Coming  to  town  will  call  Ministry  Seven  Ock.  '62 
The  Daily  Chronicle,  which  ran  two  stories  relating  to  the  Needham  v 
Needham  trial  on  10  June  1921,  and  a  follow-up  article  gauging  the  medical 
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90 profession's  reaction  on  the  11th  eagerly  recounted  Elliot's  performance  in  court.  The 
reports  noted  his  prolonged  attempt  to  have  medical  privilege  recognised  by  the  court, 
arguing  that  the  1916  VD  regulations  were  statutory  authority  for  him  not  to  disclose, 
and  that  it  was  on  this  understanding  that  he  and  others  had  taken  up  posts  as  medical 
officers  at  VD  clinics.  The  judge,  Justice  Horridge,  flatly  stated  that  such  regulations 
held  no  jurisdiction  in  the  King's  courts.  Despite  further  protests  that  the  privilege 
between  doctor  and  patient  was  one  of  the  principles  held  dearest  by  the  medical 
profession  and  that  it  was  essential  to  public  health  measures  to  combat  VD,  Horridge 
ordered  Elliot  to  assist  in  the  administration  of  justice  and  answer  all  questions.  Elliot 
acquiesced.  In  sweeping  style  the  Daily  Chronicle  announced  to  its  readers 
It  is  clear  that  if  there  is  no  guarantee  of  professional  secrecy  in  certain  kinds 
of  clinic  the  whole  object  of  the  Ministry  of  Health  acting  in  the  interests  of 
the  public  is  likely  to  be  defeated.  The  matter  requires  legislation  63 
As  had  been  the  case  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Garner  v  Garner  trial,  it  was  the  legal 
journals  that  seemed  to  take  the  dimmest  view  of  the  judge's  ruling.  In  the  Law 
Journal  of  18  June  1921,  criticism  was  made  of  Horridge's  demand  for  the  medical 
witness  to  provide  a  statutory  basis  for  medical  privilege.  No  such  statutory  proof 
could  be  had  for  the  privilege  enjoyed  by  the  lawyer  or  the  minister  of  religion, 
though  both  were  customarily  recognised.  The  grounds  for  both  were  the  interests  of 
public  policy  in  carrying  out  the  administration  of  justice.  But,  public  policy  clearly 
emphasised  the  need  for  unfettered  communications  between  patient  and  doctor  under 
the  advertised  pledge  of  secrecy  for  the  VD  treatment  scheme.  These  adverse  legal 
decisions  could  deter  individuals  from  seeking  treatment  under  the  government's 
scheme  and,  clearly,  this  was  not  in  the  public  interest.  The  article  concluded:  `A 
strong  judge  is  required  to  create  a  precedent  that  would  be  beneficial  to  the  public  as 
well  as  fair  to  medical  men.  '64 
This  point  was  not  lost  on  the  Ministry.  A  memo  from  Coutts  to  Newman 
indicated  that  he,  along  with  Gwyer,  had  met  with  Elliot  on  9  June  to  discuss  the  line 
of  argument  that  should  be  taken.  They  had  decided  that  counsel  from  the  London  & 
Counties  Medical  Protection  Society  should  be  used,  if  possible,  to  put  forward 
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91 Elliot's  case.  This  request  had  not  been  granted  by  Horridge,  though  Coutts  clearly 
believed  that  Elliot  had  presented  their  case  well.  In  acceding  eventually  to  give 
evidence,  after  entering  his  protest,  Elliot  acknowledged  that  he  would  have  been 
willing  to  go  to  jail  if  it  had  only  been  for  a  few  days  but  the  risk  of  imprisonment 
lasting  six  months  was  too  great.  The  Ministry's  problems  were  clearly  mounting. 
Elliot,  their  spokesman  in  the  case,  had  failed  to  convince  the  judge  of  the  need  for 
medical  privilege.  Moreover,  he  had  flinched  in  court  at  the  prospect  of  a  prolonged 
imprisonment.  But  losing  their  medical  martyr  was  only  the  beginning  of  the 
Ministry's  predicament.  The  detrimental  impact  that  the  ruling,  and  particularly  the 
press  reports  of  it,  could  have  on  VD  sufferers  seeking  treatment  from  the 
Government's  scheme  of  confidential  clinics  were  exacerbated  by  the  possibility  that 
VD  medical  officers  were  themselves  disillusioned  with  the  system.  Coutts  noted  that 
Elliot  was  seriously  contemplating  giving  up  his  position  at  the  VD  clinic,  and  another 
letter  received  from  Dr  Gibson,  a  VD  medical  officer  in  Oxford,  made  clear  the  strong 
feeling  that  `this  ruling  of  Mr  Justice  Horridge  puts  us  in  an  altogether  false  position 
with  our  patients.  '65 
The  prospect  of  losing  medical  officers  from  VD  clinics,  on  top  of  everything 
else,  was  potentially  catastrophic  for  the  Ministry.  Coutts  proposed  that  the  issue 
should  be  pressed,  that  strong  leading  articles  on  the  subject  should  appear  in  the 
medical  journals,  and  that  the  Ministry  should  meet  for  discussions  with  the  Royal 
College  of  Physicians,  Royal  College  of  Surgeons  and  the  BMA.  66  He  suggested  some 
of  the  daily  newspapers  might  also  be  willing  to  take  the  matter  up.  Concurring  with 
Coutts'  assessment  of  the  seriousness  of  the  situation,  Newman  forwarded  the  memo 
on  to  Gwyer  with  a  note  stating:  `You  will  wish  to  see  this  in  view  of  your  memo  for 
the  minister.  I  think  we  ought  to  try  and  act  at  once.  It  is  important  we  should  not  lose 
our  VD  officers.  '67 
On  20  June,  Hugh  Woods,  secretary  to  the  London  &  Counties  Medical 
Protection  Society  wrote  to  the  Ministry,  inviting  them  to  meet  the  costs  which  the 
Society  had  incurred  in  their  support  for  Elliot.  68  He  insisted  that  the  Ministry  must 
act  in  order  to  ensure  that  medical  officers  who  took  up  their  posts  believing  that 
confidentiality  would  be  observed  would  see  the  regulation  protected  and  enforced.  It 
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92 could  not  be  expected  that  busy  practitioners  would  risk  prolonged  imprisonment  for 
carrying  out  what  they  believed  was  their  recognised  duty.  If  the  legislature  failed  to 
deliver  such  protection  then  `it  may  be  necessary  for  some  members  of  our  profession 
to  incur  martyrdom  of  the  kind  with  a  view  to  awakening  the  consciousness  of  the 
public.  '69  The  onus  was  on  the  Ministry  to  provide  the  circumstances  in  which  the 
medical  officers  could  maintain  their  duty  of  secrecy,  which  the  Ministry's 
regulations  rightly  imposed  upon  them.  A  further  letter  on  the  5  July  indicated  that  Dr 
Hallam  from  the  syphilis  and  skin  clinic  at  the  Royal  Infirmary,  Sheffield,  had  been 
subpoenaed  to  produce  all  records,  notes  and  memoranda  relating  to  a  patient  from  his 
clinic.  Hallam  was  responsible  to  the  Ministry  for  these  records  and  so  their  advice 
was  being  sought  on  whether  he  should  produce  them.  Woods  ended  on  an  ominous 
note,  stating  that  the  very  existence  of  these  types  of  clinics  was  involved  in  the 
question.  The  Ministry  sent  a  negative  reply  with  regard  to  the  request  for  expenses. 
They  claimed  they  had  no  funds  for  this  purpose,  and  it  had  been  made  clear  to  Elliot 
in  the  meeting  before  the  case  that  while  the  Ministry  sympathised  with  his  position 
they  could  offer  him  no  financial  assistance.  As  for  Hallam,  if  he  had  been 
subpoenaed  he  must  attend.  70 
In  fact,  Hallam  was  exempted  from  attending  in  court.  In  a  series  of  letters  in 
early  June,  Hallam  and  his  colleague,  Dr  Mouat,  both  of  whom  had  been  subpoenaed 
to  appear  in  the  case  of  Atwood  v  Atwood  in  the  divorce  court,  requested  advice  from 
the  Ministry  to  whom,  they  felt,  they  were  responsible  for  the  medical  records  of 
patients.  71  The  information  required  by  the  court  related  to  a  patient  who  had  been 
treated  for  gonorrhoea  at  the  VD  clinic  in  Sheffield.  Mouat  was  in  charge  of  the 
treatment  of  this  particular  disease  while  Hallam  specialised  in  treatment  of  cases  of 
syphilis.  Consequently  Hallam  had  not  been  in  contact  with  the  patient  concerned. 
The  Ministry  advised  Hallam  to  write  to  the  solicitor  in  charge  of  the  case  and  explain 
these  circumstances  to  him,  and  in  a  brief  note  to  the  Ministry  from  the  London  & 
Counties  Medical  Protection  Society,  it  was  declared  that  Hallam's  subpoena  had 
been  withdrawn.  Mouat,  however,  could  only  be  given  the,  somewhat  worn  and 
hollow,  advice  that  he  must  attend  as  a  witness  under  subpoena  but  could  attempt  to 
claim  that  the  information  requested  was  privileged.  If  the  judge  refused,  he  must  give 
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93 evidence  unless  he  was  willing  to  risk  imprisonment  for  contempt  of  court.  It  was  a 
sign  of  how  little  progress  had  been  made  on  the  issue  by  the  Ministry  that  they 
included  a  copy  of  Newman's  letter  circulated  to  medical  officers  at  VD  clinics, 
which  had  been  written  in  February  1920. 
Alfred  Cox  wrote  to  the  Ministry  on  the  23  June  to  say  that,  in  light  of 
Horridge's  ruling  in  Needham  v  Needham,  the  BMA  council  had  passed  the  following 
resolution: 
That  the  Council  of  the  British  Medical  Association  has  learnt  with  great 
concern  of  the  position  created  by  the  recent  decision  of  a  Judge  that  the 
medical  officer  of  a  venereal  disease  clinic  must  give  evidence  in  a  civil  case 
as  to  the  medical  condition  of  a  patient  under  his  care  at  a  venereal  disease 
clinic,  thus  violating  the  confidence  between  doctor  and  patient  and  the  direct 
undertaking  given  by  the  Local  Government  Board  that  all  proceedings  at  such 
clinics  should  be  absolutely  secret  and  confidential.  In  drawing  the  attention  of 
the  Ministry  of  Health  to  these  facts  the  Council  of  the  Association  would  urge 
that  such  legislative  steps  should  be  taken  as  would  render  such  an  occurrence 
impossible  in  the  future. 
The  Association  further  requested  that  Mond  receive  a  deputation  from  the  BMA 
council  to  discuss  the  matter  in  the  hope  of  inducing  him  to  take  steps  towards 
securing  the  required  legislation.  The  proposed  meeting  did  not  take  place,  due  to  the 
proximity  of  the  BMA  annual  general  meeting.  However,  the  Association  was  able  to 
report  that  another  resolution  of  relevance  had  been  adopted  amidst  overwhelming 
support: 
Resolved:  That  the  Association  use  all  its  power  to  support  a  Member  of  the 
British  Medical  Association  who  refuses  to  divulge,  without  the  patient's 
consent,  information  obtained  in  the  exercise  of  his  professional  duties,  except 
where  it  is  already  provided  by  Act  of  Parliament  that  he  must  do  so. 
John  Elliot-may  not  have  provided  the  Ministry  with  the  martyr  they  secretly  wanted 
but  he  did  bring  the  question  of  medical  privilege  in  civil  proceedings  back  into  the 
spotlight,  sparking  debates  in  the  popular  press,  medical  and  legal  journals.  The 
94 recurring  references  to  him  and  the  Needham  v  Needham  case  ensured  that  his 
prolonged  protest  had  secured  publicity  for  the  cause.  In  an  article  titled  `Should 
doctors  tell?  '  in  the  Daily  Chronicle  of  19  November  1921,  Elliot  received  a  number 
of  tributes  for  his  role  in  bringing  the  matter  to  greater  public  attention.  The  Ministry, 
while  still  suffering  in  the  aftermath  of  failing  to  gain  ground  towards  securing 
medical  privilege,  could  be  pleased  by  Elliot's  performance.  Furthermore,  they  need 
not  give  up  all  hope  of  a  martyr.  In  the  same  article  that  praised  the  efforts  of  Elliot, 
Dr  HW  Baley  of  Harley  Street  was  quoted  as  stating: 
I  regard  the  confidence  between  patient  and  doctor  of  so  much  importance  that 
if  I  were  put  into  the  witness  box  I  would  go  to  prison  rather  than  give  away 
my  patient.  A  doctor  should  not  be  obliged  by  the  law  to  give  away  his  patient 
except  in  cases  of  crime. 
It  is  probable  that,  just  like  Hawkins  in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  trial  150  years 
before,  Baley  was  utilising  the  press  attention  to  advertise  his  high  ethical  beliefs  - 
and  thereby  attract  paying  patients.  He  adopted  the  same  tactics  in  the  aftermath  of  a 
similar  case  in  1927.72  Nonetheless,  with  both  the  BMA  and  the  London  &  Counties 
Medical  Protection  Society  starting  to  echo  their  thoughts  on  the  merits  of  martyrdom, 
the  possibility  of  a  Harley-Street  martyr  must  have  been  a  pleasing  prospect  for  the 
Ministry. 
72  For  a  detailed  account  of  this  see  chapter  7. 
95 Chapter  5-  The  British  Medical  Association 
Introduction 
While  no  single  organisation  could  claim  to  represent  the  opinions  of  the  whole  of  the 
medical  profession,  there  are  a  number  of  reasons  for  examining  the  BMA's  position 
on  medical  confidentiality.  Although  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  and  the  Royal 
College  of  Surgeons  were  both  involved  in  the  question,  it  was  the  BMA  which  was  at 
the  forefront,  both  in  1915  and  in  the  early  interwar  years  -  sending  delegations  to 
meet  with  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown.  This  was,  in  part, 
because  the  issues  which  were  raising  difficulty,  in  particular  the  government 
sponsored  VD  treatment  scheme,  were  more  likely  to  affect  general  practitioners  and 
medical  officers  engaged  at  public  treatment  centres  than  high-ranking  private 
practitioners.  While  the  specific  issues  would  more  readily  engage  the  attention  of  the 
BMA  membership,  there  are  strong  grounds  for  seeing  the  BMA  as  the  body  which 
represented  general  medical  interest  by  the  interwar  years. 
The  BMA  gained  much  valuable  experience  in  the  debate  over  the 
implementation  of  the  national  insurance  measures  before  the  war.  This  experience  of 
negotiating  with  government  and  attempting  to  represent  the  medical  profession  at 
large  was  an  important  learning  curve.  As  Peter  Bartrip  points  out: 
Even  if  the  BMA  is  deemed  to  have  lost  the  national  insurance  contest  in 
terms  of  not  achieving  everything  it  desired  and  of  having  to  make  a 
humiliating  climbdown,  it  won  in  terms  of  acquiring  recognition  as  the  voice 
of  the  profession.  It  thereby  ensured  that  no  future  government  would  be  able 
to  ignore  it....  It  had  won  a  place  at  the  top  table  for  all  future  negotiations 
relating  to  the  health  of  the  nation.  ' 
Recognised  as  a  key  medical  body  with  which  government  would  negotiate,  the 
BMA's  major  contribution  in  organising  the  medical  profession  in  support  of  the  war 
effort  further  improved  its  status  by  the  early  interwar  years:  `it  emerged  from  the  war 
with  a  much  enhanced  reputation  both  in  the  eyes  of  the  authorities  and  of  the 
profession..  at  large.  '2  Thus,  heavily  involved  in  the  debate  over  confidentiality  both 
P  Bartrip,  Themselves  Writ  Large.  The  British  Medical  Association  1832-1966  (London,  1996),  163.  2Ibid.,  181. 
96 before  and  into  the  interwar  years,  the  BMA  was  well  placed  to  provide  an  important 
medical  perspective. 
However,  the  BMA  was  not  a  homogenous  mass  with  a  single  opinion. 
Consultants  and  GPs,  both  of  whom  were  represented  in  the  organisation,  often 
appeared  to  be  at  loggerheads,  a  point  highlighted  by  the  rise  of  medical  guilds  around 
the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century.  3  Moreover,  as  the  BMA  of  the  early  twentieth 
century  reformed  to  become  a  more  democratic  organisation  -  instituting  an  annual 
meeting  of  representatives  from  around  Britain  to  discuss  and  vote  on  policy 
resolutions  -  it  became  clear  that  the  opinions  of  the  membership  were  not  always  in 
agreement  with  those  of  its  governing  council.  4  Thus,  while  the  BMA  appeared 
relatively  unified  in  its  resistance  of  the  legal  challenge  to  confidentiality  in  1915,  as 
an  organisation  it  has  the  potential  to  provide  a  range  of  medical  opinions  on  the 
debate  over  medical  confidentiality. 
In  broad  terms,  the  BMA's  internal  debate  was  dictated  by  the  calendar  with 
the  focal  point  being  the  annual  representatives'  meeting  held  each  spring.  At  these 
meetings  the  representative  body  of  members  from  around  the  country  would  examine 
policy  resolutions  brought  before  them  by  the  BMA  council.  For  the  question  of 
confidentiality,  the  council  relied  on  the  central  ethical  committee  (CEC)  to  clarify  the 
issues  and  recommend  resolutions  which  the  council  could  approve  and  deliver  to  the 
annual  representatives'  meeting  for  ratification  by  the  representative  body.  At  the  best 
of  times,  the  sheer  range  and  complexity  of  issues  that  the  CEC  had  to  consider  and 
take  into  account  on  the  question  of  confidentiality  made  their  task  of  developing 
policy  resolutions  difficult.  The  intensity  of  the  debate  over  confidentiality  in  the 
early  interwar  years  was  to  make  it  more  difficult  yet. 
With  cries  of  "Yes!  "  and  "No!  ",  The  Central  Ethical  Committee  re-evaluates  the 
BMA's  position  on  confidentiality. 
1920 
Having  taken  a  stand  on  the  question  of  confidentiality  in  1915,  the  BMA  were  by 
1920  having  to  think  seriously  about  the  practical  implications  of  their  position.  What 
support  would  the  Association  be  willing  to  give  a  member  who  got  into  difficulty  as 
a  result  o¬-challenging  the  courts  on  medical  confidentiality?  As  noted  in  the  last 
3  [bid.,  142. 
4Ibid.,  158-9. 
97 chapter,  the  focus  of  the  debate  was  shifting  from  abortion  to  VD.  In  some  respects 
this  strengthened  the  BMA's  position.  VD  was  a  disorder  for  which  the  medical 
profession  had  a  monopoly  of  treatment.  By  the  terms  of  the  Venereal  Diseases  Act  of 
1917  all  but  registered  medical  practitioners  were  prohibited  from  treating  VD.  It  was, 
thus,  easier  for  the  BMA  to  make  a  case  for  confidentiality  of  treatment  based  on  a 
professional  code  of  ethics  which  bound  all  those  legally  permitted  to  carry  out  such 
treatment. 
In  1920  the  BMA  council  engaged  a  standing  sub-committee  of  the  CEC  to 
examine  the  question  of  confidentiality  with  specific  regard  to  VD.  This  resulted  in  a 
draft  memorandum  drawn  up  by  the  deputy  medical  secretary,  George  Anderson.  5 
Opening  with  a  re-iteration  of  the  BMA's  previous  resolutions  on  medical 
confidentiality,  it  quickly  became  evident  that  the  siege  mentality  of  1915  had  not 
diminished: 
The  main  attack  on  professional  secrecy  appears  likely  to  come  from  the 
bureaucratic  side  of  Government  especially  from  that  concerned  with  the 
administration  of  the  law.  6 
The  law's  steady  encroachment  into  the  doctor's  position  of  confidence,  partly  by 
legislation  and  partly  by  judicial  decision,  defined  it  as  the  opposition.  Previous 
attacks,  notably  by  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  in  1915,  had  been  successfully  resisted  but 
could  be  renewed  at  any  time.  The  publicity  caused  by  Justice  MacCardie's  decision 
in  Garner  v  Garner  in  January  1920  suggested  that  resumption  would  come  sooner 
rather  than  later.  However,  allies  were  at  hand  in  the  form  of  `certain  departments  of 
the  Government'7  -  presumably  a  reference  to  the  Ministry  of  Health.  Their  support 
would  be  expected  in  any  stand  which  the  BMA  made  against  further  encroachment 
into  medical  confidentiality. 
Anderson  recognised  that  the  doctor's  duty  of  confidentiality  was  not  absolute. 
Three  main  exceptions  had  been  insisted  upon  by  the  state.  Firstly,  in  a  court  of  law 
when  the  court  had  ruled  that  information  of  a  confidential  nature  had  to  be  disclosed. 
Secondly,  under  the  provision  of  an  Act  of  parliament  such  as  in  notification  of 
s  BMA  CEC  SSC  minutes  9  November  1920. 
6  BMA  CEC  minutes  9  November  1920. 
7  Memorandum  from  Deputy  Medical  Secretary  BMA  CEC  minutes  9  November  1920. 
98 infectious  diseases.  Thirdly,  where  a  doctor's  duty  as  citizen  over-rode  his 
professional  duty  e.  g.  where  he  was  made  aware  of  information  which  could  prevent  a 
crime,  or  grave  danger  to  another  person,  or  where  disclosure  would  safeguard  the 
interests  of  the  patient  -  as  in  cases  of  mental  disorder. 
The  first  two  exceptions  were  sufficient  justification  for  a  doctor  to  breach 
confidentiality.  However,  it  was  recognised  that  some  practitioners  might  choose  to 
disobey  an  order  of  the  court  and  face  the  consequences.  The  CEC  felt  it  would  be 
impossible  for  the  BMA  to  lay  down  any  general  rule  as  to  what  action  should  be 
taken  in  such  cases.  Each  would  have  to  be  decided  upon  its  own  merits.  The  third 
exception  appeared  to  pose  more  problems  as  there  was  a  greater  likelihood  of 
differing  opinions  about  the  doctor's  duty  in  individual  cases.  Again,  no  general  rule 
could  be  stated  but  it  was  suggested  that  the  doctor  should  try  and  persuade  the  patient 
to  consent  to  the  disclosure.  If  unsuccessful,  the  doctor  should  revert  to  his  conscience 
and,  if  time  permitted,  he  could  appeal  to  a  judicial  committee  such  as  the  CEC.  The 
BMA  would  then  have  to  back  any  action  taken  by  a  practitioner  who  had  exactly 
followed  the  advice  given  by  the  CEC. 
With  regard  to  the  question  of  VD,  the  annual  representatives  meeting  of  1920 
had  passed  a  resolution  which  bound  doctors  not  to  disclose  information  without 
patient  consent  but  it  was  qualified  by  the  first  of  the  exceptions  above.  8  This  meant  a 
practitioner  was  absolved  if  he  disclosed  information  at  the  demand  of  a  court.  Cause 
for  greater  concern  were  cases  in  which  the  onus  lay  with  the  practitioner  himself  to 
make  the  decision  e.  g.  in  cases  of  proposed  marriage  where  syphilis  was  likely  to  be 
transmitted  from  one  party  to  another  and  to  any  children  which  resulted  from  the 
marriage.  9  A  common  theme  in  the  debate,  the  case  of  the  syphilitic  fiance  was  cited 
by  Hempson  in  a  speech  to  the  annual  representatives  meeting  in  1920,  by  Birkenhead 
in  his  published  essay  `Should  a  Doctor  Tell?  '10  in  1922,  and  matches  the  synopsis 
plot  of  the  contemporary  film  `Should  the  doctor  tell?  "'  Anderson  suggested  that 
generalisation  on  the  best  course  of  action  for  the  doctor  was  impossible.  The  BMA, 
more  than  either  the  Ministry  of  Health  or  the  Lord  Chancellor,  had  difficulty  in 
8  Minute  74  of  the  BMA  annual  representatives  meeting,  1920.  9  Morrice  terms  this  the  case  of  the  syphilitic  fiancee',  a  designation  maintained  here.  A  Morrice, 
`Should  the-doctor  tell?  Medical  secrecy  in  early  twentieth-century  Britain',  68.  10  FE  Smith,  `Should  a  Doctor  Tell?  ',  in  Points  of  View  (London,  1922).  11  Two  versions  of  the  film  were  made  i)  a  silent  movie  in  1923  written  by  GB  Samuelson  and  PJ 
Ramster  ii)  a  sound  and  picture  version  in  1930  written  by  Samuelson  and  Edgar  Wallace.  For  more  details  see  the  film's  entry  at:  http:  //uk.  imdb.  com 
99 looking  at  the  problem  of  the  confidentiality  issues  involved  with  VD  in  isolation 
from  the  rest  of  medical  practice  and  Anderson's  memo  referred  to  other  issues  which 
had  raised  questions  of  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality  in  recent  meetings  of 
the  CEC.  But  while  queries  about  confidentiality  arose  in  many  different  contexts,  it 
was  clear  that  VD  was  becoming  the  most  acute  difficulty. 
The  general  advice  given  by  the  CEC  emphasised  the  duty  of  members  to 
maintain  the  confidences  of  their  patients,  and  the  committee  searched  for  ways  to 
obviate  the  practitioner  from  making  the  ultimate  decision  to  breach  secrecy.  Doctors 
were  absolved  of  their  duty  if  their  medical  evidence  was  demanded  by  a  judge  in 
court,  though  they  were  still  advised  to  begin  by  attempting  to  plead  privilege. 
Similarly  they  were  not  accountable  if  medical  information  was  required  under  statute 
law.  In  both  situations,  the  consent  of  the  patient  was  taken  to  be  implicit  on  the  basis 
that  individuals  knew  of  these  exceptions  to  confidentiality  when  they  consulted  the 
practitioner.  Greater  complexity  arose  in  areas  where  a  breach  of  confidentiality  was 
requested  or  seemed  necessary  outwith  a  legal  context.  The  tendency  was  again  to 
emphasise  a  passive  role  for  the  practitioner  in  the  decision-making  process.  If 
information  was  required  by  an  insurance  company,  or  similar  body,  the  practitioner 
should  always  first  gain  the  patient's  explicit  consent;  or  if  a  health  certificate  was 
being  issued,  this  could  be  given  to  the  patient,  thereby  placing  the  responsibility 
firmly  away  from  the  practitioner. 
Yet,  what  was  the  doctor  to  do  if  the  patient  did  not  take  the  responsibility  of 
making  the  decision,  or  acted  in  an  irresponsible  manner?  If  it  was,  as  the  CEC  so 
persistently  inferred,  impossible  to  lay  down  general  rules  of  practice  in  such 
situations,  then  their  belief  that  practitioners  should  proceed  according  to  their 
conscience  was  unlikely  to  produce  uniformity  of  practice.  Practitioners  had  not  all 
been  carved  from  the  same  block  of  wood.  Confirmation  of  this  came  during 
Hempson's  speech  to  the  annual  representative  meeting  in  1920.12  Reciting  the 
hypothetical  case  of  the  syphilitic  fiance,  Hempson  asked  whether  his  audience  would 
not  ensure  that  the  father  of  the  innocent  girl  was  informed  of  the  health  threat  from 
her  fiance.  The  members  of  the  representative  body  replied  with  cries  of  "No"  and 
"Yes".  Clearly  doctors  were  not  of  one  mind  and  this  dichotomous  response  was  later 
12 
BMJ24  April  1920. 
100 picked  up  and  used  by  the  judiciary  as  evidence  of  the  practical  difficulties  in 
legislating  on  medical  confidentiality. 
Beyond  their  faith  in  conscience  as  a  guide,  there  seemed  to  be  an  underlying 
inconsistency  in  the  CEC's  approach.  If  the  practitioner  was  best  placed  to  be  the 
judge  of  when  to  disclose  information  in  cases  too  complex  for  fixed  guidelines,  it  is 
unclear  why  he  should  be  attempting  to  minimise  his  role  in  other  cases.  The  whole 
approach  inferred  a  reluctance  to  take  responsibility  for  disclosure  decisions  wherever 
possible,  and  where  it  was  not  possible  to  defer  to  another  decision-maker,  the  onus 
was  on  individual  rather  than  collective  responsibility  within  the  profession. 
This  was  further  emphasised  by  the  CEC's  decision  that  the  BMA  could  not  be 
prepared  to  support  its  members  in  maintaining  medical  confidentiality  until  a  general 
guiding  policy  had  been  laid  down.  This  was  a  rather  empty  statement  since 
Anderson's  memo,  summarising  the  committee's  deliberations  on  the  question,  had 
given  a  clear  indication  that  no  general  rules  could  be  laid  down  for  members.  Driving 
home  the  CEC's  reluctance  to  commit  BMA  resources,  Anderson  indicated  that,  even 
if  guiding  principles  were  arrived  at,  and  all  members  made  aware  of  them,  it  would 
still  be  extremely  doubtful  whether  the  BMA  could  in  any  way  support  its  members  in 
challenging  the  law.  The  facts  relative  to  each  particular  case  would  have  to  be 
considered  before  it  could  even  contemplate  giving  any  support.  The  CEC  did  endorse 
some  general  measures.  It  was  deemed  desirable  that  publicity  should  be  given,  in  the 
columns  of  the  BMJ,  to  the  CEC  resolutions  on  the  subject  and  that  an  article  should 
appear  annually  in  order  to  guide  the  BMA  membership.  Thus,  having  been  strong  in 
its  vocal  defiance  of  the  law's  attempts  to  encroach  into  medical  confidentiality  in  the 
years  prior  to  the  First  World  War,  when  faced  with  the  practicalities  of  their  adopted 
position,  the  BMA  seemed  considerably  less  sure  of  itself. 
1921 
`For  they  did  not  wish  to  be  anarchists.  '  13  Rebellion  in  the  British  Medical 
Association! 
Having  hinted  in  1920  that  a  renewal  of  the  legal  assault  on  medical  confidentiality 
was  immingnt,  the  BMA  council  was,  by  October  1921,  having  its  attention  drawn  by 
Hempson-4e  the  cases  of  Needham  v  Needham  and  Devonshire  v  Devonshire  and  Eve. 
13  Reported  statement  of  EB  Turner  at  a  special  meeting  of  the  BMA  Council  held  to  discuss  the 
question  of  professional  secrecy.  BMA  CEC  Minutes  31  March  1922. 
101 The  latter  case  involved  a  married  couple  in  Ilford  who  were  now  estranged.  The  wife 
had  a  still-born  child  and  the  husband  denied  paternity.  The  medical  officer  of  health 
for  Ilford,  Dr  Burton,  notified  the  birth  including  details  of  paternity  according  to 
statute  law.  Subsequently  the  husband  filed  for  divorce  on  grounds  of  adultery  and  the 
judge  demanded  Burton's  information  as  evidence  -  overruling  protests  from  both 
Burton  and  the  Ilford  Urban  District  Council.  In  both  cases  medical  practitioners  had 
been  called  upon  by  judges  to  divulge  patient  information  in  court,  but  it  was  the 
Needham  v  Needham  case  which  formed  the  basis  of  a  council  resolution  sent  to  the 
Ministry  of  Health  expressing  the  Association's  concerns. 
the  Council  of  the  BMA  has  learned  with  great  concern  of  the  position  created 
by  the  recent  decision  of  a  judge  that  the  medical  officer  of  a  VD  clinic  must 
give  evidence  in  a  civil  case  as  to  the  medical  condition  of  a  patient  under  his 
care  at  a  VD  clinic,  thus  violating  the  confidence  between  doctor  and  patient 
and  the  direct  undertaking  given  by  the  Local  Government  Board  that  all 
proceedings  at  such  clinics  should  be  absolutely  secret  and  confidential.  In 
drawing  the  attention  of  the  Ministry  of  Health  to  these  facts  the  Council  of 
the  Association  would  urge  that  such  legislative  steps  should  be  taken  as 
would  render  such  an  occurrence  impossible  in  the  future.  '4 
Accompanying  the  resolution  was  a  request  that  Mond  receive  a  deputation  from  the 
Association  at  an  early  date.  15  In  referring  to  Needham  v  Needham,  it  was  made 
explicit  that  doctors  were  not  the  only  ones  under  the  impression  that  the  treatment  of 
patients  within  the  government  VD  scheme  was  to  be  strictly  private  and  confidential, 
`every  member  of  the  public'  16  was  under  the  same  belief. 
While  John  Elliot's  appearance  in  Needham  v  Needham  in  early  June  1921  had 
clearly  made  an  impact  upon  the  Ministry  and  the  BMA  council,  it  was  the  reaction  of 
the  membership  of  the  BMA  that  caused  the  greatest  problems.  Coming  just  a  few 
weeks  before  the  annual  representatives'  meeting  at  Newcastle  in  1921,  Elliot's  ordeal 
became  a  significant  point  in  the  Association's  policy  development.  Following  the 
14  BMA  CEC  minutes  25  October  1921. 
15  It  was  further  resolved  that  the  deputation  should  consist  of  the  Officers  of  the  Association,  together 
with  the  Chairmen  of  the  Medico-Political,  Insurance  Acts,  Central  Ethical,  Hospitals  and  Scottish 
Committees.  Dr  Dain  and  Dr  Garstang  were  subsequently  added  to  this  list. 
16  BMA  CEC  minutes  25  October  1921.  BMA  council  to  Ministry  of  Health,  23  June  1921. 
102 more  moderate  recommendations  developed  by  the  CEC  in  1920,  the  council  put 
forward  a  motion  with  two  distinct  elements  to  the  representative  body  at  Newcastle. 
Firstly,  members  should  not  voluntarily  disclose  patient  information,  but  if  they  chose 
to  claim  privilege  in  court,  or  failed  to  comply  with  existing  legislation,  they  could  not 
expect  support  from  the  BMA.  Secondly,  all  attempts  to  add  new  exceptions  to  the 
general  rule  of  confidentiality  held  by  the  profession,  would  be  resisted  by  all  lawful 
methods,  and  the  BMA  would  support,  by  all  means  in  its  power,  any  practitioner 
who  was  penalized  through  such  encroachment.  The  CEC  and  council  were  therefore 
advocating  a  staunch  protection  of  the  status  quo. 
The  representative  body  were  of  an  altogether  different  mind.  Rejecting  the 
council's  motion,  they  voted  to  replace  it  with  minute  45.  This  stated  that  practitioners 
who  refused  to  divulge  information  without  patient  consent,  except  where  required  by 
statute  law,  should  receive  the  support  of  the  full  power  of  the  BMA.  Such  a  policy 
would  allow  challenges  to  the  absence  of  the  privilege  to  protect  medical 
confidentiality  in  the  witness-box  which,  as  previously  noted,  was  a  common  law 
precedent  dating  back  to  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  trial.  Elliot's  court  appearance 
had  raised  the  hackles  of  the  BMA  membership  who  were  of  opinion  that  doctors 
should  not  be  forced  to  divulge  in  court.  A  resolution  was  passed  making  clear  the 
extension  of  the  position.  17  However,  as  the  resolution  had  not  been  published  in  the 
BMJ  two  months  prior  to  the  meeting,  Hempson  indicated  that  it  could  not  be  adopted 
as  BMA  policy.  A  further  resolution  was  duly  passed  urging  that  the  council  should 
act  upon  minute  45  as  a  resolution  of  the  representative  body  and  submit  it  to  the  next 
representative  meeting  with  the  view  to  it  becoming  fixed  as  BMA  policy.  18  The 
council  had  no  option  but  to  refer  the  whole  question  back  to  the  CEC. 
With  the  prospect  of  a  more  confrontational  policy  than  they  had  intended 
prior  to  the  Newcastle  ARM,  the  CEC  had  to  consider  the  consequences  of  the  post- 
Newcastle  position.  While  doing  so  they  received  a  relevant  enquiry  from  Dr  Burton, 
the  medical  officer  of  health  for  the  Ilford  Urban  District  Council  who  had  been 
forced  to  produce  the  notification  of  birth  card  in  the  Devonshire  v  Devonshire  and 
Eve  case  in  February  1921.19  In  June  the  Ilford  Council  had  sought  advice  from  the 
Ministry  of  Health  on  how  to  address  the  confidentiality  issue  involved  in  local 
17  Minute  48  of  the  ARM  Newcastle  1921 
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103 authority  officials  being  subpoenaed  to  give  information  in  court.  Initially  the 
Ministry  had  reiterated  their  standard  advice  to  plead  privilege  and  be  directed  by  the 
judge.  When  further  prompted  by  Ilford  Council,  the  Ministry  had  stated  that  any 
further  protection  would  require  legislation.  This  was  unlikely  to  be  forthcoming  and 
they  were  unable  to  agree  with  Ilford  Council's  proposal  that  all  local  authority 
documents  should  be  protected  on  grounds  of  secrecy.  Burton's  letter  to  the  BMA 
included  correspondence  showing  he  had  taken  the  matter  as  far  as  was  possible  in  a 
local  context,  and  he  was  keen  to  know  if  the  BMA  could  suggest  any  other  method 
for  dealing  with  such  a  problem  in  future. 
The  CEC's  reply,  reiterating  the  complexity  and  difficulty  of  the  question  -a 
standard  addendum  for  both  the  BMA  and  the  Ministry  at  this  time  -  stated  that,  with 
the  whole  matter  under  consideration,  the  BMA  was  currently  being  guided  by  the 
representative  body's  resolution  from  the  annual  representative  meeting  in  1921  20 
Burton  was  incensed  by  this  reply.  He  felt  that  the  CEC  had  no  understanding  of  the 
question  from  the  medical  officer  of  health's  point  of  view.  The  simple  requirement 
was  that  official  documents  in  their  possession  were  given  the  same  recognition  of 
privilege  as  was  given  to  documents  held  by  other  government  offices.  The  CEC  were 
going  about  things  in  the  wrong  way.  If  documents  which  were  compulsorily  given  to 
a  medical  officer  were  not  awarded  a  privilege  of  confidentiality,  then  it  was  unlikely 
that  general  practitioners  would  be  given  concessions  regarding  the  production  of 
other,  non-compulsory,  documents.  Burton  pointed  to  Dawson's  proposed  motion  to 
the  House  of  Lords  which  the  government  had  persuaded  him  to  drop  temporarily, 
leading  to  fears  that  the  whole  question  would  be  `conveniently  shelved'  21  Burton 
hoped  that  there  were  enough  medical  men  in  the  House  of  Commons  to  ensure  that 
this  would  not  happen.  Thus,  it  is  clear  that  Burton  was  keen  on  the  possibility  of 
legislation  being  debated  in  parliament,  a  point  of  view  that  was  certainly  not  in  line 
with  the  thoughts  of  either  the  Ministry  of  Health  or  the  CEC  by  mid-1921. 
With  pressure  clearly  mounting,  the  CEC  sub-committee  met  in  early 
December  1921.  The  meeting  examined  a  memorandum  written  by  Langdon-Down 
aimed  at  providing  focal  points  for  discussion,  and  clarifying  the  post-Newcastle 
position.  The  intention  behind  resolution  48  differed  from  that  behind  the  council's 
proposed  position  inasmuch  as  it  aimed  to  establish  a  new  principle  which: 
20T11. 
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104 if  the  speeches  and  feelings  manifested  at  the  Representatives  Meeting  may  be 
taken  as  a  guide,  is,  that  absolute  inviolability  shall  be  accorded  to 
professional  confidences,  whereas  no  such  intention  was  in  the  mind  of  the 
Council  in  the  early  part  of  this  year.  22 
Despite  disagreeing  with  resolution  48,  Langdon-Down  recognised  that  the 
Association  would  be  bound  by  it  for  the  year.  Moreover,  council  was  obliged  to 
resubmit  the  same  resolution  to  the  following  annual  representatives'  meeting  with  a 
view  to  it  becoming  the  established  BMA  policy.  Needham  v  Needham  had  ended 
with  Elliot  caving  under  pressure  from  the  court  to  break  confidentiality  because  he 
was  not  guaranteed  support  for  himself  and  his  practice.  If  a  similar  case  were  to  arise 
under  the  position  adopted  by  the  representative  body  in  1921,  the  member  involved 
would  be  guaranteed  the  full  support  of  the  BMA,  presumably  making  a  test  case  a 
more  feasible  possibility.  However,  simultaneously  the  whole  question  of 
confidentiality  was  being  politically  sidelined  by  the  withdrawal  of  Dawson's  motion 
in  the  House  of  Lords.  While  resolution  48  was  to  be  resubmitted  to  the  1922  annual 
representative  meeting,  it  was  possible  for  the  council  to  offer  alternative  resolutions. 
Having  seen  their  proposals  thrown  out  in  Newcastle,  and  given  the  practical 
implications  of  resolution  48,  the  CEC  felt  it  wise,  yet  again,  to  reconsider  the  whole 
question  as  a  matter  of  principle. 
Fundamentally,  all  were  agreed  that  patient  information  should  not  be 
divulged.  The  professional  position  of  the  medical  practitioner  placed  him  in 
circumstances  where  he  obtained  private  and  intimate  information  about  patients  in 
order  to  provide  them  with  the  best  advice  and  treatment.  Such  information  was  given 
on  the  tacit,  or  expressed,  trust  that  it  would  not  be  further  broadcast  by  the  doctor, 
which  in  Langdon-Down's  opinion  was  the  reason  that  any  breach  of  confidentiality 
met  with  fierce  opposition.  In  his  own  words: 
22  BMA  CEC  minutes  5  December  1921. 
105 the  strong  feeling  that  the  doctors  hold  about  this  is  just  due  to  this,  that  it 
hurts  the  deepest  feelings  of  decent  honourable  men  that  they  should  divulge 
information  received  under  such  circumstances.  23 
Such  obvious  reference  to  the  medical  man  as  a  decent  and  honourable  individual 
mirrors  the  picture  so  vividly  painted  by  Caesar  Hawkins  in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston 
Trial  1776.  Furthermore  it  confirms  that  doctors'  still  saw  the  question  primarily  as 
one  of  duty.  The  potential  detriment  that  any  perceived  breach  of  confidence  would 
have  on  the  willingness  of  people  to  seek  treatment  and  the  implications  for  public 
health  were,  in  Langdon-Down's  eyes,  subsidiary  claims.  He  cited  the  relevant  section 
of  the  Hippocratic  Oath,  concluding  that  these  guiding  principles  were  so  much  a  part 
of  daily  practice  that  it  was  a  shock  to  the  practitioner  to  find  that  there  were 
exceptions  to  it.  But  exceptions  there  were,  both  by  act  of  parliament  and  also  `as  a 
matter  of  history  the  demands  of  the  Court  have  been  greatly  acceded  to  for  150  years 
past  in  the  public  interest  and  without  a  sense  of  dishonour  to  the  profession  24 
_ 
another  clear  reference  to  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  Trial,  with  the  emphasis  firmly 
placed  on  honour. 
It  was  generally  recognised  that  no  change  could  be  brought  about  in  statute, 
and  Langdon-Down  believed  that  the  representative  body's  desire  to  make 
professional  privilege  absolute  would  have  to  be  sought  through  public  support  for  the 
position  leading  to  a  change  in  custom.  In  other  words  they  would  have  to  set  a  new 
common  law  precedent.  While  recognising  the  power  of  custom,  he  pointed  out  that 
the  profession  had  been  against  the  notification  of  infectious  diseases  when  it  was  first 
introduced  but  had  changed  its  attitude  over  time.  In  the  same  vein,  the  question  of 
professional  secrecy  had  been  reopened  by  another  infectious  disease,  VD,  the  dire 
consequences  of  which  had  led  a  section  of  medical  opinion  to  believe  that  it,  too, 
should  be  notifiable  in  the  interests  of  public  health.  But  the  outrage  which  had  been 
sparked  amongst  the  profession  by  the  legal  cases  earlier  in  1921,  was  caused  by  the 
stark  realization  that  the  rules  laid  down  by  a  government  department,  for  the  working 
of  a  VD  clinic,  had  no  more  legal  authority,  without  an  act  of  parliament  to  back 
them,  than  the  rules  of  professional  secrecy  which  generally  guided  the  medical 
profession 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid. 
106 Langdon-Down  recognised  that  the  question  boiled  down  to  a  conflict  of  duty 
to  the  patient  and  to  third  parties,  notably  the  state.  In  court,  the  practitioner  should 
follow  his  own  belief  and  convictions  in  deciding  what  action  to  take.  If  he  disclosed 
at  the  demand  of  the  court,  he  would  do  no  dishonour  to  himself  or  his  profession.  If 
he  chose  not  to  disclose,  he  should  explain  his  reasons  to  the  court.  Recognising  that 
there  were  exceptions  to  the  rule  of  professional  secrecy,  Langdon-Down  believed 
that  the  judge,  rather  than  an  outside  body  like  the  BMA,  was  best-placed  to  decide 
when  medical  evidence  was  material  to  a  case. 
The  idea  that  patients  would  boycott  treatment  en  masse  unless  the  state 
granted  the  medical  profession  absolute  privilege  was,  in  Langdon-Down's  view, 
unfounded.  If  doctors  gossiped  about  patients  it  would  undermine  trust.  But  to  see 
confidentiality  broken  for  the  purposes  of  giving  evidence  in  a  small  number  of  cases 
in  court  would  have  a  negligible  impact  on  the  number  of  patients  seeking  treatment. 
If  legislation  protected  the  proceedings  at  VD  clinics,  there  would  be  growing 
pressure  to  extend  its  application  beyond  this  group  of  patients,  and  a  law  advocating 
absolute  confidentiality  could  have  dire  consequences  for  the  profession.  Such  a  law 
was  in  force  in  France  and,  Langdon-Down  believed,  medical  practitioners  objected 
strongly  to  it,  fearing  that  wrong-doers  could  use  a  medical  man  as  shield  and 
accomplice.  It  would  be  much  more  sensible  to  make  clear  to  the  public  that 
proceedings  at  VD  clinics  were  no  more  confidential  than  normal  doctor  -  patient 
consultations. 
The  medical  profession  should  not  seek  privilege  in  order  to  be  perceived  as 
having  equal  status  with  lawyers  or  the  clergy.  Medical  evidence  was  of  undoubted 
value  in  court,  and  any  claim  should  be  based  on  much  more  `public  spirited 
motives'.  25  Referring  to  the  Kitson  v  Playfair  trial,  he  suggested  that,  rather  than  being 
a  legal  endorsement  of  medical  secrecy,  the  high  damages  which  had  been  levied 
against  William  Smoult  Playfair  had  been  a  result  of  the  injuries  which  he  had  caused 
to  Linda  Kitson,  not  punishment  for  a  breach  of  professional  confidence.  This  view  of 
the  decision  was  contradictory  to  the  interpretation  that  would  be  adopted  by  the 
BMA  professional  secrecy  committee  in  1922. 
The  chairman  of  the  BMA  council,  Robert  Alfred  Bolam,  believed  medical 
practitioners  should  not  be  compelled  to  divulge  patient  information  in  court.  For 
25  Ibid. 
107 Langdon-Down,  this  position  would  not  only  be  largely  against  the  public  interest,  but 
would  also  be  the  most  invidious  one  for  the  medical  practitioner.  As  the  law 
currently  stood,  a  practitioner  contravened  the  law  if  he  chose  not  to  disclose  patient 
information  in  court.  Such  action  demonstrated  a  courage  of  conviction,  even  if  found 
to  be  wrong.  However,  if  the  position  was  reversed  and  the  practitioner  had  actively  to 
contravene  the  law  in  order  to  make  a  disclosure,  then  mistakes  would  prove  much 
more  costly  for  the  doctor  who  could  have  kept  his  patient's  confidences  at  no  risk  to 
himself.  In  addition  to  this  Bolam's  position  would  take  the  decision  as  to  what  was  in 
the  public  interest  away  from  the  public  figure  of  the  judge,  and  place  it  on  the 
individual  private  practitioner. 
Langdon-Down  advocated  that  the  public  should  be  more  clearly  informed 
that  while  medical  practitioners  were  bound  by  a  strict  rule  of  confidentiality,  it  was 
not  absolute.  If  the  widespread  coverage  of  controversial  cases  in  the  press  was  not 
enough  to  draw  the  public's  attention  to  this  fact,  then  the  BMA's  discussion,  and 
publication,  of  resolutions  which  emphasised  that  no  voluntary  disclosures  should  be 
made,  would  alert  them  to  the  exceptions.  By  proceeding  along  these  lines  the  public 
would  become  aware  of  the  limitations  to  the  rule  of  medical  secrecy,  and  when 
doctors  were  forced  to  divulge  information,  there  would  be  no  dishonour  to 
themselves  or  their  profession.  Those  who  wished  to  challenge  the  common  law 
hoped  to  be  seen  as  martyrs  for  the  cause: 
the  public  which  might  be  moved  to  sympathy  by  spontaneous  individual  self- 
sacrifice  on  the  altar  of  principle  would  be  equally  moved  by  organised 
martyrdom  with  the  support  of  the  Association.  26 
Public  opinion  was  a  powerful  weapon  and  if  the  public  was  anxious  to  support  the 
profession  on  the  subject  of  confidentiality  it  could  make  its  voice  heard.  But,  in 
Langdon-Down's  view,  it  was  not  just  the  public's  support  that  seemed  lacking: 
`Ministers  who  were  so  eager  to  act,  draw  back  and  common  sense  asserts  its  way.  '27 
Langdon-Down  suggested  the  CEC  should  prepare  a  report  for  the  council 
stating  that  while  it  firmly  upheld  the  traditional  rule  of  professional  secrecy  it 
recognised-that  there  had  to  remain  exceptions  to  it.  In  other  words,  Langdon-Down 
26  Ibid. 
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108 was  aiming  at  a  compromise  which  stressed  both  the  importance  of  the  doctor's  duty 
of  confidence  and  the  need  to  take  account  of  the  consequences  of  maintaining  or 
breaching  confidentiality.  The  CEC  would  suggest  that  the  BMA  should  not  pre- 
emptively  ban  or  oppose  all  future  legislation,  as  was  implied  by  minute  48,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  such  measures  may  be  in  the  public  interest.  Rather  than  seeking  to 
set  a  new  common  law  precedent  on  medical  privilege,  the  BMA  should  aim  to  assert, 
to  the  public  and  the  authorities,  the  importance  of  medical  confidentiality  and 
emphasise  that  breach  of  confidence  should  only  be  required  in  extreme 
circumstances.  This  could  be  done  by  giving  BMA  support  to  practitioners  believed  to 
have  been  unreasonably  dealt  with,  regardless  of  whether  in  a  civil  or  criminal  case, 
after  due  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances.  As  a  start  in  clarifying  the  position, 
and  consistent  with  the  demands  that  were  coming  in  to  the  Ministry  of  Health,  the 
pledge  of  secrecy  in  the  advertisements  for  VD  clinics  should  either  be  withdrawn  or 
have  its  limitations  clarified.  In  accordance  with  all  the  above  points,  Langdon-Down 
believed  that  minute  48  should  be  amended. 
Langdon-Down's  memorandum  resulted  in  five  proposed  resolutions.  The  first 
acknowledged  that  from  the  widest  view  of  the  public  interest,  both  social  and 
medical,  there  had  to  be  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  of  professional  secrecy.  In 
order  to  safeguard  the  honour  of  the  profession,  the  existence  of  exceptions  to  medical 
confidentiality  had  to  be  made  clear  to  the  public  by  giving,  where  possible, 
definitions  of  the  exceptions.  In  recognition  that  there  were  exceptions  to  the  rule  of 
secrecy,  the  second  resolution  stated  that  the  BMA  should  not  adopt  a  policy  which 
promised  undiscriminating  and  unquestioning  support  to  any  member  who  disobeyed 
the  order  of  a  court.  Consequently,  minute  48  should  not  be  confirmed.  The  third 
proposal  indicated  that  the  principle  of  professional  secrecy  should  be  maintained  on 
the  highest  possible  level  with  the  widest  view  of  public  interest.  If  a  case  arose  in 
which  a  member  was  called  upon  to  disclose  information  obtained  in  the  exercise  of 
his  professional  duties,  which  was,  in  the  opinion  of  the  council  or  the  CEC,  contrary 
to  the  highest  public  interest,  the  BMA  should  support  that  member  with  its  full 
power.  Such  support  would  take  the  form  of  awakening  public  opinion  to  the  injury 
that  was  threatened  to  the  public  interest,  and  organising  it  in  defence  of  the  doctor. 
Resolution  four  stated  that  it  was  undesirable  to  move  in  a  direction  which 
might  result  in  an  absolute  imposition  of  medical  confidentiality  on  doctors.  It  was 
109 also  undesirable  that  rules  on  confidentiality,  such  as  those  governing  VD  clinics, 
should  be  given  legal  backing.  Rather,  if  retained,  such  rules  should  be  accompanied 
by  an  explanation  that  they  were  subject  to  the  exceptions  which  applied  to  other 
medical  secrets.  The  last  resolution  simply  stated  that  if  resolution  two  was  rejected, 
then  minute  48  should  be  amended  by  deleting  the  word  "already".  Essentially,  this 
would  leave  the  acceptability  of  future  legislation,  which  challenged  the  boundaries  of 
medical  confidentiality,  still  open  to  debate  by  the  BMA,  as  and  when  it  arose. 
A  second  meeting  of  the  SSC  took  place  in  December  1921  at  which  a 
memorandum  by  Francis  Crookshank  was  received.  In  addition  to  his  role  as  a 
member  of  the  CEC  and  later  the  BMA  professional  secrecy  committee,  Crookshank 
was  vice-president  of  the  medico-legal  society.  No  doubt  with  Burton's  query  after 
the  Devonshire  v  Devonshire  case  in  mind,  Crookshank  raised  a  key  point  which  had 
not  been  sufficiently  dealt  with  by  Langdon-Down.  It  noted  that  new  forms  of 
information  gathering  were  challenging  the  established  practice  of  the  courts.  By 
statute,  and  on  threat  of  penalty,  individual  members  of  the  public  were  compelled  to 
give  information,  affecting  their  private  interests,  to  public  officials.  According  to  the 
developed  pattern  of  legal  practice,  such  information  could  then  be  demanded  in 
court,  and  medical  practitioners  be  compelled  to  give  it,  even  for  only  private 
interests.  Whether  this  position  was  in  the  public  interest  was  a  matter  for  debate.  In 
Crookshank's  view,  a  distinction  should  be  drawn  between  information  voluntarily 
given  to  a  private  practitioner  and  information  imparted,  either  by  statutory 
compulsion  or  under  a  pledge  of  secrecy  from  a  public  body,  to  a  doctor  acting  as  a 
public  official.  Crookshank  was  keen  to  point  out  that  the  problems  raised  were  not 
simply  narrow  questions  of  professional  privilege  but  rather  wide  questions  of  public 
policy  and  public  right.  This  was  an  important  point,  noting,  as  it  did,  the  growing 
influence  of  state  interest  in  medical  information.  Since  the  introduction  of  National 
Insurance,  doctors  were  finding  it  increasingly  difficult  to  maintain  complete 
independence  from  state  concern.  The  early  twentieth  century  doctor  had  a  duty  to 
pass  on  information  about  births,  deaths,  infectious  diseases,  criminal  abortions,  the 
incapacity  of  insured  workers  and  the  medical  records  of  insured  patients  for 
statistical  purposes.  Thus,  Crookshank  was  indicating  that  the  question  of  medical 
confidentiality  went  right  to  the  heart  of  the  medical  profession's  role  in  twentieth 
century  medicine. 
110 The  CEC  subcommittee  accepted  both  Langdon-Down  and  Crookshank's 
memoranda  with  a  few  amendments  28  The  most  significant  change  to  the  Langdon- 
Down's  proposals  was  the  complete  omission  of  one  of  the  proposed  resolutions.  The 
standing  subcommittee  had  backed  away  from  resolution  four: 
That  it  is  undesirable  that  steps  should  be  taken  that  might  lead  to  the 
imposition  of  the  duty  of  secrecy  on  the  profession  by  law  and  that 
consequently  it  is  undesirable  that  rules  such  as  those  governing  the  procedure 
at  VD  clinics  in  this  matter  should  be  given  the  force  of  law  and  if  they  are 
retained  it  is  desirable  that  they  should  be  accompanied  by  an  explanation  that 
they  are  subject  to  the  exceptions  which  apply  to  other  medical  secrets.  29 
This  was  a  significant  omission  and  there  was  no  explicit  explanation  given  as  to  why 
it  was  left  out.  It  is  probable  that,  having  found  the  recommendations  put  forward  by 
the  council  to  the  ARM  of  1921  so  out  of  touch  with  members'  thoughts  on  the 
matter,  the  CEC  subcommittee  were  reluctant  to  fly  in  the  face  of  the  stated  opinion  of 
the  masses.  The  four  resolutions  they  were  recommending  clearly  advocated  a  more 
moderate  position  than  that  proposed  by  resolution  48.  They  noted  a  general  rule  of 
secrecy  which  had  necessary  exceptions,  which  in  itself  entailed  that  the  BMA  could 
not,  indiscriminately,  give  its  support  to  members  who  disobeyed  a  court's  ruling  to 
disclose  information.  Support  would  be  given,  where  considered  appropriate,  to  aid  a 
practitioner  who  had  acted  in  the  best  interests  of  the  public.  These  were  general 
resolutions  backed  up  by  claims  of  best  interest  to  the  public.  But,  proposed  resolution 
four  had  gone  right  to  the  crux  of  the  controversy  of  medical  confidentiality  in  1921. 
It  dealt  not  only  with  the  question  of  gaining  recognition  for  medical  privilege  in  court 
-  the  topic  of  Dawson's  sidelined  motion  in  parliament  and  the  demand  of  the  1921 
annual  representative  meeting  -  but  also  with  the  controversy  surrounding  the  rules  of 
confidentiality  governing  VD  clinics.  This  was  the  very  issue  that  had  triggered  the 
early  interwar  debate  on  medical  confidentiality. 
The  CEC  passed  its  recommendations  on  to  the  BMA  council  and,  in  early 
March  1922,  a  special  meeting  of  the  council  was  held.  The  key  points  for  discussion 
2s  The  key  points  of  Crookshank's  memo  were  included  as  qualificatory  notes  to  the  proposed 
resolutions. 
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111 centred  on  the  divergence  between  the  resolutions  passed  at  the  annual 
representatives'  meeting  in  Cambridge,  1920  and  that  in  Newcastle,  1921.  Such 
differences  had  to  be  cleared  up  and  a  clear  notion  of  the  BMA's  position,  particularly 
with  regard  to  the  conditions  and  extent  of  the  support  it  would  give  its  members,  had 
to  be  agreed  before  the  ARM  in  Glasgow  1922.  Two  distinct  sides  emerged  during  the 
meeting.  Langdon-Down  put  forward  the  views  of  the  CEC,  summarizing  the 
arguments  developed  in  their  December  meetings.  He  placed  particular  emphasis  on 
the  need  to  make  patients  aware  of  the  limits  to  confidentiality  and  to  remind  doctors 
that  secrecy  was  claimed  in  the  public's  interest  not  the  profession's.  The  French 
penal  code  prevented  doctors  from  disclosing  information,  a  system  which  many 
French  doctors  found  'irksome.  '  30  He  concluded  by  reiterating  his  opinion  that  the 
judge  was  best  placed  to  decide  whether  or  not  a  doctor's  evidence  was  necessary. 
However,  he  recognised  that  judges  were  not  infallible,  and  that  provision  would  have 
to  be  made  for  cases  where  `judges  misunderstood  their  function.  31 
The  members  of  council  present  were  not  enthused  by  the  CEC's  proposals. 
Ernest  Fothergill  saw  no  dissonance  between  the  1921  and  1922  resolutions. 
Fothergill  was  a  long-serving  member  of  council  and  a  constant  thorn  in  the  side  of 
the  CEC.  His  proposals  on  confidentiality  had  a  tendency  to  conflict  with  CEC 
recommendations.  He  regarded  resolution  48  as  little  more  than  a  rider  to  the 
resolution  passed  by  the  1920  annual  representative  meeting.  Nobody  would  expect 
the  BMA  to  give  its  support  to  anyone  who  flippantly  refused  to  give  evidence,  but 
only  in  circumstances  where  it  was  a  clear  matter  of  conscience.  If  this  was  accepted, 
the  question  was  the  extent  to  which  the  Association  would  be  willing  to  support  such 
a  practitioner.  Naturally,  in  Fothergill's  opinion,  such  support  would  have  to  be 
financial  -  providing  for  the  practitioner's  family,  maintaining  his  practice,  and 
enlisting  public  support  for  his  cause. 
This  motion  was  seconded  by  Guy  Dain.  Dain  was,  in  1922,  at  the  outset  of  a 
long  and  successful  career  in  the  BMA.  Serving  on  many  committees,  he  went  on  to 
chair  both  the  representative  body  and  council,  and  was  a  direct  representative  to  the 
GMC  from  1934  -  1961.  He  was  also  a  member  of  the  Council  on  Medical  and  Allied 
Services  and  had  supported  their  majority  resolution,  given  to  the  Ministry  of  Health 
in  July  192.1,  that  doctors  should  not  be  compelled  to  disclose  patient  information  in 
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112 court  (c.  f.  chapter  4).  Dain  drew  a  clear  distinction  between  medical  confidentiality 
and  medical  privilege.  The  former  was  a  general  rule  not  to  disclose,  while  the  latter 
only  had  relevance  in  a  court  of  law.  If  a  doctor  was  to  claim  privilege  it  should  be  for 
his  patient,  just  as  the  lawyer's  privilege  was  for  his  client.  The  doctor's  evidence  was 
more  important  because  it  related  not  only  to  what  he  had  been  told,  but  also  to  facts 
he  had  learned  by  virtue  of  his  skill  i.  e.  that  a  person  was  suffering  from  a  particular 
disease.  He  disagreed  with  Langdon-Down's  opinion  that  the  judge  was  best  place  to 
decide  whether  medical  evidence  should  be  disclosed.  Dain  felt,  in  many  cases,  the 
doctor  was  best  placed  to  weigh  up  the  potential  benefit  the  evidence  would  have 
relative  to  the  detriment  it  would  cause  the  patient.  While  agreeing  that  the  BMA 
should  not  advocate  absolute  privilege  on  all  occasions,  Dain  felt  there  were  cases 
where  the  evidence  practitioners  were  called  on  to  give  was  of  relatively  minor 
importance.  In  such  cases,  the  doctor's  refusal  to  disclose  should  be  upheld. 
Dawson  was  a  further  supporter  of  Fothergill's  motion.  He  believed  that  there 
had  been  some  confusion  between  confidentiality  and  privilege.  The  question  was 
whether  the  medical  profession  was  going  to  insist  upon  a  form  of  privilege  over  and 
above  that  accorded  to  a  member  of  the  public.  Dawson  believed  that  doctors  should 
demand  a  measure  of  special  privilege,  though  in  the  interests  of  the  state,  this  should 
not  extend  to  absolute  privilege.  He  suggested  that  the  limits  and  applications  of  the 
privilege  should  be  discussed  by  medical  and  legal  representatives,  but  noted  that, 
while  his  legal  friends  tended  to  favour  a  privilege  which  was  only  applicable  in  civil 
cases,  Dawson  himself  did  not  favour  such  a  clearly  drawn  distinction.  He  had  no 
qualm  in  stating,  quite  frankly,  his  opinion  that  lawyers  had  carved  out  for  themselves 
an  `astonishing  measure  of  privilege'32  which  had  smoothed  the  legal  profession's 
procedure  and  secured  its  place.  The  priestly  privilege  derived  from  the  distinction 
that  was  maintained  between  the  priest  in  his  religious  capacity  and  as  an  ordinary 
man.  What  he  learned  in  the  former  he  felt  justified  in  asserting  he  did  not  know  in  his 
latter  capacity.  No  judge  would  run  counter  to  such  a  claim.  Yet,  by  virtue  of  their 
work,  doctors  were  even  more  involved  with  the  intimacies  of  human  life,  receiving 
secrets  relative  to  a  patient's  health  and  otherwise.  Dawson  painted  a  vivid  picture  of 
a  patient  ling  on  his  sickbed,  unburdening  his  mind  by  confessing  certain  secrets  to 
his  medical  attendant.  These,  not  infrequent,  confessions  were  made  in  moments  of 
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113 weakness  and  they  should  be  protected  by  a  special  privilege  granted  to  medical 
practitioners  in  courts  of  law.  Dawson  requested  a  `strong,  unequivocal'33  statement 
on  these  lines  from  the  BMA. 
Dawson's  remarks  found  support  from  James  MacDonald.  MacDonald  had 
been  chairman  of  the  BMA  council  from  1911  until  1920  when  he  was  succeeded  by 
Bolam.  Like  Dawson  and  Dain,  he  was  a  member  of  the  Council  on  Medical  and 
Allied  Services  and  had  supported  their  majority  resolution  in  July  1921.  MacDonald 
explained  that  he  would  be  prepared  to  go  further  than  most  in  exalting  the  interest  of 
the  individual  patient,  even  above  public  interest,  in  the  cause  of  medical 
confidentiality.  Henry  Brackenbury,  a  future  chairman  of  both  the  representative  body 
and  council,  was  somewhat  more  reserved.  He  indicated  that  the  Newcastle 
resolution's  call  for  a  guarantee  of  unlimited  support  for  a  practitioner  who  refused  to 
disclose  in  court  was  excessive.  He  wished  the  circumstances  and  extent  of  support  to 
be  clarified,  as  well  as  a  more  exact  definition  of  when  it  was  correct  to  disclose.  This 
latter  point  was  perceived,  by  Sir  Thomas  Jenner  Verrall,  as  being  an  exceptionally 
hazardous  route  to  take.  Verrall,  who  served  on  the  BMA  council  from  1893  until  his 
death  in  1929,  felt  that  the  decision  had  to  be  left,  to  some  extent,  to  the  circumstances 
of  each  case  as  it  arose. 
Carrying  on  the  theme  of  circumstances,  Charles  Buttar,  the  representative 
member  for  Kensington,  reiterated  those  in  which  the  ARM  in  Newcastle  had  arrived 
at  the  controversial  approval  of  resolution  48.  Stimulated  by  the  very  recent  events  of 
the  Needham  v  Needham  case,  the  RB  had  passed  a  strong  resolution  which  might, 
now  that  more  consideration  had  been  given  to  it,  require  some  modification.  Buttar 
believed  that  there  was  no  middle  course  to  be  followed:  either  the  profession 
contended  for  an  absolute  principle  of  professional  secrecy  or  they  ceded  the  question 
by  default.  He  pleaded  that  the  BMA  stand  by  the  principle  of  absolute  inviolable 
secrecy,  suggesting  that  if  it  were  necessary  for  medical  men  to  stand  in  contempt  of 
court  in  nine  out  of  ten  cases,  the  resultant  protest  would  be  so  great  as  to  ensure  they 
did  not  remain  under  duress  for  long. 
Bolam,  the  chairman  of  council,  indicated  that  a  committee  might  be  set  up  to 
consider  the  matter.  This  view  was  supported  by  Edward  Turner  (of  bicycle  seat 
fame)  who-suggested  that  a  small  committee  would  have  a  better  chance  of  arriving 
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114 quickly  at  one  clear-cut  and  decisive  recommendation.  As  far  as  the  general  law  of 
evidence  went,  he  believed  that  conscience  should  be  the  guide  as  to  whether  or  not 
disclosures  were  made.  However,  doctors  should  still  respect  statutory  obligations  to 
disclose  information  `for  they  did  not  wish  to  be  anarchists.  '34  The  council 
unanimously  agreed  to  refer  the  matter  back  to  the  CEC  for  further  discussion  and  a 
more  exact  formulation  of  the  `conditions  under  which,  the  extent  to  which,  and  the 
ways  in  which  the  Association  would  be  willing  to  support  any  of  its  members  who 
refused  to  divulge.  '35  The  CEC  was  to  be  bolstered  for  this  purpose  by  the  co- 
operation  of  the  aforementioned  speakers  (Dawson,  Turner,  Verrall,  Dain,  Fothergill, 
MacDonald).  Bishop  Harman36  suggested  that  the  extended  CEC  should  carefully 
consider  a  recent  article  by  William  Brend  in  the  BMJ.  37  In  this  manner,  the  CEC  was 
augmented  and  evolved  into  the  BMA  Professional  Secrecy  Committee  which  met  for 
the  first  time  in  April  1922. 
Summary  of  position  in  1921 
Clearly  then,  1921  was  a  trying  year  for  the  BMA  and  its  policy  on  the  question  of 
professional  secrecy.  The  case  of  Needham  v  Needham  had  brought  a  huge  amount  of 
publicity  to  the  question  of  confidentiality,  or  rather  the  obvious  lack  of  it  for  patient 
information  when  demanded  as  evidence  in  court  -  even  when  such  information  had 
been  given  under  an  expressed,  and  widely  advertised,  pledge  of  secrecy.  Its  timing, 
falling  as  it  did  just  before  the  ARM  at  Newcastle,  brought  a  backlash  of  opinion.  The 
RB  voted  to  disregard  the  considered  advice  of  the  CEC  and  the  Council,  and  adopt  a 
far  more  extreme  position  which  called  for  the  recognition  of  an  absolute  privilege  of 
confidentiality,  except  in  matters  already  covered  by  statute.  They  further  demanded 
the  full,  unquestioning,  support  of  the  BMA  for  any  member  who  fell  foul  of  the 
system  as  a  consequence  of  maintaining  this  position.  The  result,  resolution  48,  was 
referred  back  to  the  CEC  for  debate,  on  the  understanding  that  it  was  to  be 
resubmitted  to  the  ARM  in  Glasgow  1922,  where  its  acceptance  would  result  in  it 
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36  Nathaniel-aishop  Harman  went  on  to  become  Treasurer  of  the  BMA  and  the  Association's  direct 
representative  on  the  GMC.  Specialising  in  problems  of  the  eye,  he  was  an  advocate  of  notification  of 
cases  of  ophtTialmia  neonatorum.  He  was  also  the  grandfather  of  the  present  government  minister, 
Harriet  Harman. 
3'  Brend  was  trained  in  both  law  and  medicine  and  was  a  lecturer  on  forensic  medicine  at  Charing 
Cross  Hospital  Medical  School.  His  article  appeared  in  the  BMJ  14  January  1922,64-66. 
115 becoming  the  established  policy  of  the  Association.  This  was  a  clear  indication  that 
the  more  moderate  approach  being  forwarded  by  the  CEC,  was  not  in  keeping  with 
the  majority  of  members'  opinions  in  the  aftermath  of  Elliot's  highly  publicised 
ordeal  in  court.  In  fact,  growing  discontent  characterised  the  atmosphere  surrounding 
the  issue  of  medical  confidentiality  throughout  1921.  Burton  and  the  Ilford  Urban 
District  Council  were  clearly  not  satisfied  with  either  the  Ministry  or  the  BMA's 
approach  to  the  whole  matter.  Furthermore,  there  were  clearly  those  who  felt  the 
opportunity  for  change  was  slipping  away  with  the  enforced  sidelining  of  Dawson's 
motion  in  the  House  of  Lords.  Elements  of  the  BMA  showed  signs  of  disappointment 
at  the  lack  of  action  from  `certain  government  departments.  '  The  CEC  were  not 
impressed  by  the  reversal  of  the  1920  Cambridge  resolution  and  the  widespread 
support  for  a  position,  in  resolution  48,  which  they  did  not  wish  to  advocate.  The 
divergence  of  opinion  between  certain  key  figures  of  Council  and  the  CEC  was 
prominent  in  the  special  meeting  of  Council  which  met  to  discuss  the  CEC  proposals 
based  on  Langdon-Down's  assessment  of  the  way  forward  in  early  1922.  This  dispute 
resulted  in  the  matter  being  referred  back,  once  again,  to  the  CEC.  But  the  importance 
of  arriving  at  a  clear  policy  for  the  Association,  and  the  pressure  of  time  before  the 
ARM  in  Glasgow  1922,  saw  some  important  characters  drafted  in  to  augment  the 
CEC.  The  Professional  Secrecy  Committee,  as  the  expanded  group  came  to  be  known, 
included  both  doctors  and  lawyers,  and  the  members  held  a  wide  range  of  opinions  on 
professional  secrecy.  It  is  perhaps  of  little  surprise,  then,  to  learn  that,  before  too  long, 
individuals  felt  obliged  to  break  away  and  publicise  their  opinions  elsewhere.  In  a 
pamphlet  which  reprinted  a  speech  on  professional  secrecy  that  he  had  given  to  the 
annual  meeting  of  the  South  Midland  Branch  of  the  BMA  in  late  June  1922, 
Crookshank  stated: 
`My  diffidence  in  dealing  with  this  subject  arises  from  the  fact  that,  with  your 
President,  I  have  been,  until  recently,  a  member  of  the  Central  Ethical 
Committee  of  the  British  Medical  Association,  which,  as  you  know,  has  given 
much  attention  to  the  questions  involved.  Unfortunately,  I  lately  felt 
compelled  to  dissociate  myself  from  the  work  of  that  committee  owing  to  my 
116 inability  to  find  my  own  views  in  harmony  with  the  policies  advocated  by 
some  of  those  in  greater  authority.  '38 
It  is  to  the  work  of  the  Professional  Secrecy  Committee,  charged  with  bringing  order 
out  of  chaos,  that  the  focus  of  attention  now  turns. 
1922 
The  guiding  light  of  conscience. 
BMA  professional  secrecy  committee. 
Meeting  1 
With  pressure  of  time  before  the  annual  representatives'  meeting  in  Glasgow,  the  first 
meeting  of  the  professional  secrecy  committee  took  place  at  the  end  of  March  1922. 
The  committee  members  were  to  discuss  the  CEC  recommendations  which  had  been 
put  forward  to  the  council,  two  further  memoranda,  one  from  Fothergill  and  another 
from  Dain,  and  Brend's  article  in  the  BMJ.  Specifically,  the  committee  was  to  focus 
upon  the  extent  to  which,  and  the  ways  in  which,  the  BMA  should  support  any  of  its 
members  who  refused  to  disclose  medical  information  in  court.  Other  than  the 
specific  emphasis  on  the  doctor's  obligation  in  court,  the  remit  matched  the  one  given 
to  the  BMA  council  by  the  representative  body  at  Cambridge  in  1920  -  testament  to 
the  frustrated  efforts  of  the  BMA  to  achieve  any  semblance  of  progress  towards  a 
fixed  policy  for  the  guidance  and  support  of  its  members  in  the  intervening  period.  39 
Yet,  time  was  of  the  essence,  as  the  council  wanted  a  final  report  before  its  meeting 
on  the  26  April. 
Fothergill's  memo  was  first.  As  he  had  made  clear  at  the  special  meeting  of 
council,  he  did  not  agree  with  the  recommendations  which  the  CEC  had  put  forward, 
and  he  advocated  their  rejection.  0  He  believed  that  the  CEC's  recommendations  had 
been  formulated  in  order  to  establish  the  law  in  the  strongest  possible  position  and 
that  they  failed  sufficiently  to  take  into  account  the  situation  which  had  arisen  in  the 
1921  annual  representatives'  meeting.  He  re-iterated  his  belief  that  the  Cambridge  and 
Newcastle  resolutions  were  not  antagonistic.  By  suggesting  they  were,  and  believing 
the  desire  for  privilege  to  have  stemmed  from  `professional  dignity,  pride  and 
38  FG  Crookshank,  Professional  Secrecy,  (London,  1922),  3. 
39  ARM  1920  Min.  76 
ao  His  objections  were  split  into  those  which  he  saw  as  fundamental  objections  and  those  which  were 
concerned  with  detail.  Only  the  former  will  be  given  overt  consideration  here. 
117 jealousy"",  the  CEC  had  disregarded  it  and  stressed  a  more  moderate  position.  But, 
given  the  strength  of  feeling  expressed  at  Newcastle,  the  CEC's  attempt  to  return  to 
the  earlier  position  threatened  to  set  the  debate  on  to  a  circular  trajectory. 
This,  in  Fothergill's  opinion,  was  wholly  avoidable  as  the  CEC's  report  had 
unwittingly  given  the  solution  to  the  confusion  over  professional  secrecy:  conscience. 
In  1896,  Justice  Avory  had  called  the  same  factor  `discretion';  a  report  of  the  CEC 
had  also  referred  to  it  as  `moral  obligation';  and,  in  order  to  sum  up  the  collective 
meaning  of  these  terms,  Fothergill  cited  the  words  of  Tredgold  : 
The  quality  of  mind  which  enables  a  man  to  feel  that  he  has  obligations  to 
society  which  makes  him  sensible  of  the  ideals  of  honour  and  honesty;  of 
compassion  and  chivalry;  of  patriotism  and  altruism;  and  which  not  only 
restrains  the  individual  from  doing  wrong,  but  impels  him  to  do  right  42 
Fine  words  indeed,  but  in  the  complex  world  of  practical  ethics,  a  phrase  such  as 
`patriotism  and  altruism'  could  pull  the  doctor  who  wished  to  serve  both  state  and 
patient,  in  opposite  directions.  Fothergill  suggested  that  resolution  48  should  not  be 
interpreted  as  giving  carte  blanche  to  members  to  disregard  the  demands  of  a  court. 
Rather,  no  support  should  be  expected,  or  given,  to  a  practitioner  who  refused  to 
disclose  from  a  desire  to  flout  the  court  or  appear  heroic.  The  backing  of  the  BMA 
should  only  be  given  to  practitioners  who  had  weighed  the  matter  carefully  and  acted 
in  the  interest  of  the  current  patient  and  other  patients'  future  concerns.  Fothergill's 
intention  was  quite  clear.  He  wished  to  separate  out  the  egotistical  attention  seeker 
from  the  principled  crusader,  but  beyond  this  broad  division  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  latter  half  of  the  sentence  could  be  interpreted  by  a  practitioner  who  found  himself 
in  the  middle  of  a  case  where  both  parties  were  patients  of  his.  Presumably,  the 
interest  of  one  patient  did  not  always  equate  well  with  the  interests,  future  or 
otherwise,  of  other  patients. 
Fothergill  turned  to  Brend's  article  on  professional  secrecy.  This  set  out  four 
conditions  which  should  be  fulfilled  before  the  BMA  provided  support  to  a  member 
41  This  remark,  made  by  Langdon-Down  was  quoted  by  Fothergill.  BMA  Professional  Secrecy 
Committee  minutes  31  March  1922. 
42  BMA  PSC  minutes  31  March  1922. 
118 who  refused  to  give  evidence  in  court.  43  Firstly,  communications  must  originate  in  a 
confidence  that  they  would  not  be  disclosed.  Secondly,  the  element  of  confidentiality 
must  be  essential  to  the  full  and  satisfactory  maintenance  of  the  relation  between  the 
parties.  Thirdly,  the  relation  must  be  one  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  community, 
ought  to  be  sedulously  fostered.  Lastly,  the  injury  that  would  result  to  the  relation  by 
disclosure  of  the  communications  must  be  greater  than  the  benefit  thereby  gained  for 
the  correct  disposal  of  litigation.  Fothergill  proposed  an  addition  to  Brend's  four 
criteria,  namely,  that  the  doctor  in  question  would  be  required  to  decline  the  court's 
request  in  a  phraseology  approved  by  the  annual  representatives'  meeting.  He 
believed  that  the  declaration  could  follow  the  lines  of  that  used  by  the  French: 
That  as  the  facts  on  which  he  is  being  interrogated  were  brought  to  his 
knowledge  whilst  acting  in  his  professional  capacity  and  therefore  were 
obtained  in  confidence  he,  in  the  exercise  of  his  conscience  finds  himself 
unable  to  disclose  them  without  his  patient's  consent.  44 
These  were  hardly  revolutionary  words,  having  been  the  standard  advice  given  out  by 
the  BMA  and  Ministry  of  Health  for  over  two  years.  Fothergill's  next  step  was  to 
outline  the  forms  of  support  that  a  practitioner  who  fell  into  difficulty  with  the  court, 
as  a  result  of  following  the  above  advice,  would  receive  from  the  BMA.  Support  was 
required  on  three  fronts.  Firstly,  there  was  the  tricky  issue  of  finance.  In  no  doubt  of 
the  scale  of  the  problem,  Fothergill  questioned  whether  the  funds  of  the  BMA  could 
be  used,  or  if  a  separate  fund  which  demanded  a  subscription  based  upon  a  percentage 
of  each  member's  practice,  would  be  required.  Secondly,  on  a  local  level,  each  branch 
would  have  to  have  a  centrally  approved  system  of  support  in  place,  in  order  to 
continue  the  work  of  a  member's  practice  during  any  period  of  imprisonment.  Lastly, 
on  a  central  level,  the  medico-political  committee  could  educate  and  focus  the  press, 
public,  legal  and  government  opinion  in  favour  of  the  member,  whilst  also  aiding  the 
local  branch  in  the  maintenance  of  the  member's  dependants  and  practice.  Having 
taken  account  of  all  his  proposals,  Fothergill  believed  the  BMA  would  then  be  in  a 
position  suitably  to  amend  resolution  48  for  resubmission  to  the  annual 
representves'  meeting  in  Glasgow  and  that,  either  before  or  afterwards,  a 
43  BMJ  14  January  1922,66. 
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119 committee  of  medical  and  legal  practitioners,  along  with  some  laymen,  should  be 
formed  to  discuss  the  whole  medico-sociological  question. 
Next  on  the  meeting's  agenda  was  Dain's  memo.  The  maintenance  or 
violation  of  professional  secrecy  was,  in  his  opinion,  a  moral  issue  and  consequently 
should  be  a  matter  for  individual  conscience.  Distinguishing  between  the  general  rule 
of  medical  confidentiality  and  the  question  of  medical  privilege,  Dain  accepted  that 
there  were  exceptions,  statutory  and  moral,  to  the  former.  In  the  case  of  medical 
privilege  he  drew  attention  to  the  acceptance  of  a  level  of  privilege  for  both  priest  and 
lawyer.  The  high  profile  cases  in  which  doctors  had  been  forced  to  break  professional 
confidences  in  the  early  1920s  had  made  it  clear  that  they  had  no  privilege  of  secrecy 
in  court.  According  to  Dain,  when  a  doctor  felt  bound  by  conscience  not  to  disclose, 
the  lack  of  support  from  the  BMA,  evident  in  the  account  given  by  Elliot  subsequent 
to  Needham  v  Needham,  made  it  nigh  on  impossible  to  resist  the  court's  demands.  It 
was  in  recognition  of  the  impact  that  guaranteed  support  would  have  on  doctors  who 
found  themselves  bound  by  conscience  to  maintain  secrecy,  that  the  two  previous 
annual  representative  meetings  had  passed  resolutions  advocating  BMA  support45 
Many  had  tried  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the  according  of  medical 
privilege  in  civil  cases,  but  not  in  criminal  cases.  In  the  latter,  the  state  required  the 
violation  of  secrecy  for  the  purposes  of  justice  in  the  detection  of  crime,  whereas  in 
the  former,  one  individual  was  seeking  the  breach  of  another  individual's  medical 
secrets  for  his  or  her  own  ends.  The  civil  cases  in  which  disclosure  was  most  often 
required  were  those  involving  divorce,  and,  in  Dain's  opinion,  these  could  largely  be 
avoided  if  the  law  of  divorce  was  altered  to  give  equality  to  the  sexes.  Medical 
evidence  could  be  used  to  prove  adultery  and  cruelty  in  divorce  cases,  both  of  which 
were  required  for  a  woman  to  divorce  her  husband.  But  Dain's  prediction  of  a  drastic 
drop  in  the  demand  for  medical  testimony,  if  women  had  parity  in  divorce 
proceedings,  was  perhaps  over  optimistic.  Certainly  the  cases  which  had  aggravated 
the  question  of  medical  confidentiality  in  the  immediate  post-war  period  had  centred 
on  medical  evidence  in  civil  divorce  hearings.  Yet,  husbands  had  demand  of  doctors' 
testimony  to  prove  the  adultery  of  their  wives.  John  Elliot  had  been  subpoenaed  by 
the  husband  in  the  Needham  v  Needham  case,  who  wanted  to  prove  his  wife's 
43  Minute  76  of  the  1920  meeting  in  Cambridge  and  resolution  48  of  the  1921  meeting  in  Newcastle. 
120 adultery. 
46  Parity  in  the  divorce  law  might  reduce  the  number  of  cases  in  which 
medical  evidence  was  demanded  but  it  would  by  no  means  eliminate  the  problem. 
Dain  disagreed  with  Langdon-Down  that  the  judge  was  best  placed  to  decide 
whether  a  patient's  confidence  was  to  be  betrayed.  A  judge  could  regard  the  doctor's 
testimony  as  an  easier  method  of  establishing  facts,  which  could  be  proved  in  other 
ways,  without  considering  the  damage  to  public  confidence  in  the  medical  profession. 
In  other  words,  Dain  was  sceptical  of  judges  always  weighing  the  pros  and  cons  of 
requiring  the  breach  of  medical  confidence  in  court,  particularly  when  a  doctor's 
testimony  could  save  the  court  time  and  bother.  Dain's  final  point  related  to  the 
semantics  of  resolution  48.  He  noted  that  it  committed  the  BMA  to  use  all  its  `power' 
not  `resources',  which  suggested,  to  him  at  least,  that  the  support  would  not  be 
monetary  but  rather  would  equate  to  influence  at  a  local  and  central  level.  Thus,  like 
Fothergill,  Dain  interpreted  resolution  48  as  being  applicable  only  to  bona  fide 
members  who  based  their  refusal  to  disclose  on  a  conscientious  belief,  in  keeping  with 
the  essentials  laid  down  by  Brend's  BMJ  article.  However,  unlike  Fothergill,  Dain 
clearly  did  not  feel  that  the  BMA  support  should  take  the  form  of  financial  aid. 
Dr  Stevens  put  forward  two  notices  of  motion  to  be  considered.  Firstly,  he 
suggested  that  a  practitioner  was  not  justified,  without  the  patient's  consent,  to 
disclose,  even  in  a  court  of  law,  professional  confidences  which  might  damage  the 
good  name  or  reputation  of  the  patient,  or  might  involve  him  in  any  harm  other  than 
of  a  purely  financial  nature.  In  cases  where  a  refusal  to  disclose  was  considered  to  be 
justified  and  yet  the  practitioner  still  fell  foul  of  the  court,  Stevens  urged  the  BMA  to 
make  suitable  representation  to  the  Home  Office,  and  ventilate  the  issue  in  the  BMJ. 
Secondly,  he  suggested  that  the  Hippocratic  Oath  should  be  published  in  the  BMJ, 
along  with  examples  of  the  forms  of  obligation  which  medical  graduates  were 
required  to  subscribe  to  in  universities  and  colleges  in  England,  Scotland  and  Ireland. 
Clearly  then  the  BMJ  was  once  again  being  invoked  as  a  strong  weapon  in  the  debate 
on  confidentiality.  However,  it  is  also  interesting  to  note  the  specific  exclusion  of 
financial  harm  from  the  justifications  for  protecting  a  patient's  confidences.  Argument 
was  made  in  chapter  two  that  the  doctor's  ideals  of  honour  were  not  always  easily 
distinguished  from  his  financial  interests,  and  here  Stevens  drew  a  clear  distinction 
'  In  Scotland  ophthalmia  neonatorum  was  a  notifiable  disease.  See  R  Davidson,  Dangerous  Liasons.  A 
Social  History  of  Venereal  Disease  in  Twentieth-Century  Scotland,  (Amsterdam,  2000),  178;  J 
Jenkinson,  Scotland's  Health  1919  -  1948,  (Bern,  2002),  164. 
121 between  the  hurting  of  a  patient's  reputation  and  damage  done  to  his  financial 
interests.  Stevens  was  emphasising  that  reputation  mattered,  money  did  not  -  at  least 
as  far  as  patients  were  concerned. 
Having  considered  the  report  of  the  proceedings  of  the  special  council 
meeting,  the  memos  from  Fothergill  and  Dain,  the  article  by  Brend,  and  the  notices  by 
Stevens;  Dawson  proposed  the  following  motion: 
That  the  proper  preservation  of  professional  secrecy  necessitates  a  measure  of 
privilege  being  recognised  for  medical  witnesses  in  Courts  of  Law  above  and 
beyond  what  is  accorded  to  the  ordinary  witness.  47 
The  proposal  was  unanimously  resolved.  Crookshank  proposed  that  the  term 
`privilege'  should  not  be  construed  as  meaning  `legal  privilege'.  After  considerable 
discussion  this  was  withdrawn  and  replaced  by  a  further  proposal  by  Crookshank  that 
the  term  `privilege'  should  be  construed  as  meaning  `legal  privilege'.  Wallace  Henry 
put  forward  an  amendment  which  clarified  that  the  measure  of  privilege  aimed  at  was 
that  no  registered  medical  practitioner  would  be  compelled  to  disclose  professional 
confidences  without  patient  consent.  The  amendment  was  carried,  also  as  a 
substantive  motion,  by  ten  votes  to  four.  Clearly  then,  despite  many  months  of 
focussed  discussion,  the  select  membership  of  the  professional  secrecy  committee 
were  having  difficulty  establishing  exactly  what  the  privilege,  which  they  all  wanted, 
actually  was.  Unanimity  was  restored  with  a  proposal  by  Arnold  Lyndon.  Lyndon 
joined  the  BMA  Council  in  1922  and  served  on  it  until  1935.  He  also  served  on  the 
Council  of  the  Medical  Defence  Union  and  on  the  Standing  Joint  Committee  of  the 
MDU  and  Medical  Protection  Society.  He  suggested  that  for  the  time  being  the  BMA 
should  support  in  every  way  possible  any  member  who,  in  the  opinion  of  the  council 
or  the  CEC  was  considered  to  be  justified  in  refusing  to  disclose  professional 
confidences.  It  was  further  resolved  that  Stevens'  motion  for  the  publication  in  the 
BMJ  of  the  Hippocratic  Oath  and  the  examples  of  forms  of  obligation  should  be 
forwarded  `for  the  favourable  consideration  of  the  Editor.  '48 
In  geeing  with  Lyndon's  proposal,  the  PSC  seemed  to  be  broadly  agreeing 
with  the  representative  body's  feeling  as  expressed  in  resolution  48,  but  with  two  key 
A7  BMA  PSC  minutes  31  March  1922. 
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122 exceptions.  Rather  than  the  having  the  possibility  of  unqualified  support  for  any  BMA 
member  who  refused  to  breach  secrecy  in  court,  which  resolution  48  technically 
permitted,  Lyndon's  proposal  only  granted  support  where  an  arbiter  deemed  the 
member's  actions  to  have  been  justified.  This  led,  naturally,  to  the  second 
qualification  -  that  the  arbitration  of  whether  a  member's  actions  fell  into  the 
`justified'  category  should  be  undertaken  by  the  council  or  CEC.  If  accepted,  this 
would  not  only  remove  the  potential  threat  of  indiscriminate  demand  on  the  BMA's 
resources,  but  it  would  also  place  control  of  the  BMA's  policy  on  confidentiality 
firmly  back  into  the  more  conservative  hands  of  the  council  and  CEC. 
Meeting-2 
The  next  meeting  of  the  professional  secrecy  committee  took  place  a  week  and  a  half 
later  with  only  a  fortnight  left  before  the  council  deadline.  Brend  had  been  asked  to 
furnish  the  committee  with  information  relative  to  the  privilege  granted  to  doctors  in 
certain  states  in  America,  particularly  focussing  on  the  objections  which  had  been 
made  to  the  privilege,  and  who  had  made  them.  After  the  unanimous  acceptance  of 
Lyndon's  proposal  at  their  previous  meeting,  Alfred  Cox  had  drawn  up  a  draft  report 
of  Council  to  be  considered  before  being  put  to  the  1922  annual  representatives' 
meeting.  There  were  also  memos  from  Fothergill  and  Hempson. 
Cox's  draft  report  examined  whether  the  claims  of  communal  interest,  as 
expressed  by  a  judge,  overrode  those  of  the  individual  patient.  The  BMA  council 
supported  the  representative  body's  belief  that  it  was  in  the  best  interests  of  the 
community,  and  in  keeping  with  the  best  traditions  of  the  medical  profession,  to 
support  a  medical  practitioner  who  refused  to  give  out  information  without  patient 
consent.  The  position  adopted  was  long  standing,  having  found  expression  in  the 
Hippocratic  Oath,  and  had  even  been  `fitfully'  endorsed  by  the  law  when  it  awarded 
high  damages  to  patients  whose  confidence  had  been  violated  -  presumably  a 
reference  to  Kitson  v  Playfair.  The  BMA  had  always  resisted  suggestions  by  the  law, 
that  doctors  should  use  their  position  to  aid  the  justice  system  by  providing 
information  on  criminals,  particularly  those  involved  with  abortion.  Their  grounds  for 
resisting  the  law's  advances  were  simply  that 
for  the  good  of  the  greater  number  it  is  essential  that  nothing  shall  be  done  to 
prevent  persons  who  are  ill  from  consulting  doctors  in  the  fullest  confidence 
123 that  their  secret,  even  if  it  be  that  they  have  connived  at  the  commission  of  a 
crime,  is  safe  with  the  doctor.  49 
Such  firm  assurance  of  the  sanctity  of  the  doctor  -  patient  relationship,  even  in  the 
context  of  past  crime,  is  strongly  reminiscent  of  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians' 
discussion  with  Avory  and  Clarke,  and  Saundby's  comments  in  Medical  Ethics  which 
had  incurred  the  wrath  of  the  law  in  1915.  This  represented  a  return  to  a  more 
fundamental  position  than  the  BMA  council  or  CEC  had  shown  since  the  1915 
confrontation.  Having  launched  out  to  a  strong  stance  against  the  law  in  the  pre-war 
debate  the  higher  echelons  of  the  BMA  had  recoiled  to  a  more  moderate  position  in 
the  discussion  of  the  early  1920s.  The  draft  report  was  even  keen  to  point  out  that  the 
notification  of  infectious  diseases,  while  recognised  as  the  only  exception  to 
confidentiality,  placed  the  responsibility  on  the  relatives  and  friends  of  the  patient  as 
well  as  the  doctor,  to  notify  the  authorities.  Furthermore,  the  law  of  notification  was 
well  known,  so,  implicit  consent  to  notification  could  be  taken  from  the  patient's 
willingness  to  consult  medical  opinion. 
Seemingly  advocating  a  strong  stance  in  favour  of  maintaining  medical 
confidentiality,  the  draft  report  then  muddied  the  issue  by  stating  that  everyone  was 
aware  that  there  were  occasions  on  which  individual  practitioners  would  feel  their 
duty  to  the  state  or  other  individuals  compelled  them  to  breach  the  confidence  of  their 
patient.  In  keeping  with  the  opinions  expressed  by  Fothergill  and  Dain,  this  was  taken 
to  be  a  matter  of  morals,  governed  by  individual  conscience,  and  therefore  could  not 
be  covered  by  a  general  pronouncement.  Having  dealt,  in  broad  terms,  with  the 
question,  Cox  turned  to  the  tricky  question  of  how  the  general  belief  in  the 
fundamental  importance  of  medical  confidentiality  could  be  reconciled  with  the  right 
of  the  state  to  demand  evidence  in  court.  The  privilege  given  to  lawyers  was  required 
for  the  legal  system  to  work  and  so  was  in  the  interests  of  the  general  public  as  well  as 
clients.  Although  there  was  no  official  privilege  granted  to  priests,  it  was  generally 
recognised  that  the  courts  understood  the  importance  of  secrecy  which  such  men 
attached  to  information  given  to  them  in  their  religious  capacity.  Thus,  in  recognition 
that  demanding  information  from  priests  would  only  incite  a  passive  resistance  `which 
49  BMA  PSC  draft  memo  council  to  RB  11  April  1922. 
124 would  be  stronger  than  the  law'50,  priests  were  understood  to  enjoy  a  greater  degree  of 
privilege,  despite  the  potential  detriment  to  the  administration  of  justice. 
The  case  against  medical  privilege  amounted  to  the  detrimental  impact  which 
it  would  have  on  the  detection  or  prosecution  of  crime.  Yet,  Cox  pointed  out,  the  same 
argument  could  be  levied  against  the  priest  and  lawyer.  The  crux  of  the  medical  case 
for  privilege  revolved  around  the  belief  that 
It  is  better  that  injustice  should  be  done  or  crime  left  undetected  on  rare 
occasions  than  that  fear  of  public  disclosure  should  be  placed  in  the  way  of 
perfectly  free  communications  between  patient  and  doctor.  If  this  free 
communication  is  impeded  disease  would  be  left  untreated  and  not  only  the 
individual  but  the  community  would  suffersi 
The  council  was  aware  that  there  was  a  conflict  of  roles  between  the  practitioner  as 
citizen,  with  his  duty  to  the  state,  and  the  practitioner  as  doctor,  with  his  duty  to  the 
individual  patient.  For  this  reason,  they  advocated  that  there  should  not  be  an  absolute 
privilege  for  the  medical  profession  on  a  par  with  lawyers  and  priests.  Rather  the 
conflict  of  roles  could  best  be  resolved  by  granting  a  modified  privilege  which 
prevented  the  court  from  compelling  a  medical  practitioner  to  divulge  information 
without  the  consent  of  his  patient.  It  is  not  immediately  clear  as  to  how  this 
substantially  differs  from  the  legal  and  religious  privilege,  for  presumably  neither 
group  would  have  much  difficulty  in  aiding  the  demands  of  justice  if  their  client  gave 
them  consent  to  do  so.  Indeed,  the  suspicion  that  this  was  more  of  a  comprehensive 
privilege  than  the  report  made  it  out  to  be  is  highlighted  by  its  similarity  to  BMA 
council  minute  542  of  27  Jan  1915: 
The  council  is  of  opinion  that  a  medical  practitioner  should  not  under  any 
circumstances  disclose  voluntarily,  without  the  patient's  consent, 
information  which  he  has  obtained  from  that  patient  in  the  exercise  of  his 
professional  duties. 
so  Ibid. 
51  Ibid. 
125 This,  as  previously  noted,  was  agreed  at  a  time  when  the  BMA  was  seeking  to 
establish  itself  in  a  strong  position  in  maintaining  secrecy  against  the  wishes  of  the 
law. 
Having  established  the  extent  of  the  privilege  which  was  to  be  sought,  Cox 
turned  to  assess  the  level  of  support  which  the  BMA  would  be  willing  to  give  its 
members.  The  professional  secrecy  committee  had  adopted  Lyndon's 
recommendation  from  the  previous  meeting.  Only  individuals  who  the  council  or 
CEC  deemed  were  justified  in  refusing  the  court's  request,  were  eligible  to  receive  the 
Association's  support.  The  criterion  for  assessing  each  case  was  fourfold.  The  first 
three  were  lifted  directly  from  Brend's  article  in  the  BMJ,  but  the  fourth  differed. 
Brend  had  emphasised  that  the  injury  which  the  disclosure  would  cause  to  the  doctor  - 
patient  relationship  would  have  to  be  greater  than  the  benefit  of  the  correct  disposal  of 
litigation  i.  e.  the  predicted  consequences  would  determine  BMA  support.  The 
professional  secrecy  committee  argued  that  the  practitioner  must  persuade  the  BMA 
council  that  the  information  came  to  his  knowledge  in  his  professional  capacity  and 
consequently  he  considered  himself  `morally  bound  to  plead  inability  to  disclose  them 
[the  patient's  confidences]  without  his  patient's  consent.  '52  This  change  from  Brend's 
fourth  criterion,  which  had  been  endorsed  by  Fothergill  at  the  previous  meeting,  to  the 
draft  report's  new  fourth  criterion,  demonstrated  a  clear  shift  in  the  way  in  which  the 
professional  secrecy  committee  was  thinking  about  privilege.  There  was  a  move  away 
from  consequentialist  arguments  which  had  failed  to  convince  the  judiciary  that  the 
benefits  to  public  health  of  maintaining  medical  confidentiality  in  court  could 
outweigh  the  loss  of  medical  testimony  to  the  legal  process.  The  justification  for 
lawyers'  privilege  was  that,  without  it,  individuals  could  not  openly  consult  legal 
advisers  and  thereby  it  would  hinder  the  effective  working  of  the  justice  system.  A 
similar  argument  had  been  put  forward  by  doctors  who  argued  that  privilege  was  a 
necessary  factor  in  an  effective  system  of  public  health.  However,  instead  of 
modelling  their  claims  on  the  consequentialist  model  of  legal  privilege,  the 
professional  secrecy  committee  was  now  attempting  to  align  the  doctor's  position 
with  that  of  the  religious  adviser:  an  individual  morally  bound  to  secrecy  whose 
strong  conviction  of  duty  made  him  immune  to  the  discipline  of  the  court.  Too  late  for 
Elliot  of  Chester,  the  BMA  was  setting  a  course  for  medical  martyrdom. 
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126 Elliot  had  succumbed  to  the  court's  demand  because  of  the  absence  of 
practical  professional  support.  Cox's  report  indicated  that  support  would  now  be 
available  on  three  different  levels.  The  local  division  would  be  responsible  to  the 
Council  for  successfully  maintaining  the  doctor's  practice.  The  BMA  would  organise 
public  opinion  through  the  press  and  parliament.  It  would  also  provide  legal  advice, 
and  their  funds  would  be  made  available  because  `the  cases  will  be  test  cases  on  a 
matter  which  affects  the  honour  and  interests  of  the  medical  profession'.  53  The  draft 
report  ended  on  a  rather  positive  note,  suggesting  that  any  enforced  imprisonment  of  a 
practitioner  would  probably  be  short;  the  courageous  act  of  going  to  prison,  rather 
than  betraying  a  patient's  confidence,  would  probably  enhance  a  practitioner's  long 
term  prospects,  and  if  any  additional  funds  were  needed  these  could  easily  be  raised 
by  special  appeal.  Thus,  the  final  paragraph  reads  somewhat  like  a  BMA  manifesto 
for  medical  martyrdom.  Elliot  had  been  willing  to  endure  prison  for  a  short  period, 
and  here  the  council  was  suggesting  that  imprisonment  would  not  last  long.  As  well  as 
promising  publicity  for  the  cause,  legal  advice,  and  the  funds  of  the  BMA,  additional 
sources  of  support  could  be  drummed  up  as  required,  so  potential  martyrs  need  not 
worry  about  any  damage  to  their  practice.  Indeed,  far  from  proving  detrimental, 
martyrdom  would  enhance  a  practitioner's  long  term  prospects,  presumably  by 
attracting  to  his  practice  patients  who  had  been  impressed  by  his  high  ethical 
standards.  The  similarities,  between  the  underpinning  philosophy  of  these  conclusions 
and  Caesar  Hawkins'  stance  in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  trial,  are  stark.  Just  as 
Hawkins  had  used  his  forced  appearance  in  court  to  advertise  his  ethical  approach  to 
medical  practice,  in  the  full  knowledge  that  such  a  high  profile  trial  would  be  closely 
followed  by  patients,  both  actual  and  potential,  so  the  professional  secrecy  committee 
were  reassuring  members  that  martyrdom  for  the  cause  of  medical  confidentiality 
would  reap  long  term  benefits  for  the  individual  concerned.  The  promise  of  the 
`organisation  of  public  opinion'  54  through  multiple  channels  of  press  and  government 
would  do,  for  the  individual  involved,  what  5,000  spectators  and  The  Gentleman's 
Magazine  had  done  for  Hawkins  146  years  prior. 
Having  considered  the  draft  report  the  professional  secrecy  committee  turned  to  a 
memo  byjothergill  on  the  conditions  and  terms  of  BMA  support  for  members. 
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127 Fothergill  proposed  three  additional  criteria  for  support  to  the  four  set  out  in  the  draft 
report  which  the  committee  had  just  considered.  The  first  addition  placed  an 
obligation  on  a  member  who  sought  BMA  support  to  get  in  touch  with  the  council  as 
soon  as  it  was  likely  that  he  would  be  called  upon  to  break  confidentiality  without 
consent.  He  would  also  have  to  express  in  writing  his  agreement  to  act  in  accordance 
with  the  council's  decision.  Fothergill's  second  addition  stipulated  that  the  member 
would  have  to  be  a  fully  paid  up  subscriber  to  the  medical  secrecy  defence  fund  (to  be 
set  up)  and  could  not  be  involved  as  a  defendant  in  any  ethical  procedure  at  any  level 
of  the  BMA.  Lastly,  the  member  would  also  have  to  be  a  member  of  a  recognised 
medical  defence  society  which  could  aid  him  should  he  feel  morally  bound  to  make  a 
disclosure  without  patient  consent. 
Unlike  the  draft  report,  which  advocated  the  use  of  BMA  funds,  Fothergill 
suggested  the  setting  up  of  a  medical  secrecy  defence  trust  fund  which  would  provide 
financial  assistance  of  up  to  a  year  and  a  half's  purchase  value  of  the  doctor's  practice 
as  assessed  by  an  independent  accountant.  As  Bartrip  notes,  the  significant  rise  in  the 
BMA  subscription  charges  in  1914  had  been  a  contributory  factor  to  a  decline  in 
membership  around  this  time,  and  the  Association's  finances  had  been  hard  hit  by  the 
national  health  insurance  struggle  and  the  First  World  War.  55  In  order  to  avoid  adding 
greatly  to  members'  costs,  it  was  proposed  that  members  who  paid  3  (or  5)  shillings 
into  the  medical  secrecy  defence  trust  fund  before  February  each  year  would  have  that 
amount  discounted  from  their  annual  BMA  membership  subscription.  The  fund  could 
also  be  bolstered  by  a  donation  from  the  medical  insurance  committee  and  by 
approach  to  some  of  the  recognised  medical  defence  societies.  Fothergill,  of  course, 
would  not  be  aware  of  the  London  and  Counties  Medical  Protection  Society's  request 
to  the  Ministry  of  Health  to  be  recompensed  for  their  financial  support  of  Elliot  the 
previous  year.  Yet,  Fothergill  echoed  the  belief  that  the  financial  loss  to  a  temporarily 
imprisoned  practitioner  would  be  both  small  and  consequently  offset  by  a  boom  in  his 
practice.  He  also  agreed  that  BMA  support  should  take  the  form  of  local  support, 
publicity/opinion  support,  and  financial  support  for  dependants,  and  suggested 
resolution  48  should  be  amended  accordingly. 
Fothergill's  other  major  point  of  interest  echoed  Crookshank's  enquiry  as  to 
whether  a.  doctor  holding  a  public  position  should  be  required  to  give  information  in  a 
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128 private  interest  case.  Building  on  what  he  had  stated  in  his  earlier  memo,  he  suggested 
the  forming  of  a  medico-sociological  committee  to  consider  this  and  other  questions, 
and  report  either  to  the  council  or  direct  to  the  annual  representatives'  meeting  in 
Glasgow.  If  this  was  not  satisfactory,  as  an  alternative,  he  suggested  approaching  the 
relevant  departments  of  government  with  a  view  to  `the  implied  pledge  being 
incorporated  in  an  Act  of  Parliament  and  not  being  left  to  orders  issued  by  a 
Department.  '56  This  referred  to  the  regulations  issued  in  conjunction  with  the 
government  VD  treatment  clinics,  which  Elliot  had  unsuccessfully  tried  to  cite  as  his 
justification  not  to  disclose  in  a  divorce  case.  The  judge  had  ruled  that  regulations, 
even  when  issued  by  government  departments,  did  not  have  force  in  a  court  of  law. 
Encapsulating  the  same  pledge  of  secrecy  in  an  act  of  parliament  would  prevent  the 
forced  disclosure  of  information  gained  by  a  doctor  working  in  a  government 
approved  scheme,  for  the  private  interest  of  a  divorce  case.  However,  as  the  previous 
two  years  had  shown,  getting  a  statutory  form  of  medical  privilege  would  be  an 
exceptionally  difficult  task. 
The  final  item  on  the  professional  secrecy  committee's  agenda  was  a  memo  by 
Hempson.  He  was  at  pains  to  dispel  the  belief  that  there  was  a  distinction  to  be  drawn 
between  medical  confidentiality  and  privilege.  In  his  view,  what  was  being  sought 
was  recognition,  within  the  law  courts,  of  the  generally  endorsed  practice  of  doctors 
maintaining  their  patients'  confidences.  There  were  four  stages  to  the  achievement  of 
this  objective.  Firstly,  doctors  needed  to  standardise  their  position  on  medical 
confidentiality.  Secondly,  the  general  public  had  to  be  made  aware  of  the  medical 
profession's  concerted  attitude.  This,  along  with  its  traditional  basis,  had  then  to  be 
instilled  into  the  mind  of  the  law.  Lastly,  support  would  be  needed  for  members  who 
suffered  as  `martyrs  to  the  cause'.  57 
Having  set  out  his  thoughts  on  the  way  the  BMA  should  proceed,  Hempson 
addressed  a  point  which  had,  thus  far,  been  overlooked.  In  formulating  their  position 
by  consideration  of  the  doctor's  obligation  to  his  patient,  the  BMA  had  failed  to 
consider  the  consequences  for  relations  within  the  profession.  Having  worked  as 
solicitor  to  the  Medical  Defence  Union,  Hempson  had  seen  many  cases  where  doctors 
had  been  cited  to  give  testimony  in  investigations  of  malpraxis.  If  an  individual  who 
brought  a.  case  of  malpraxis  against  a  practitioner  had  consulted  four  additional 
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129 doctors  but  only  called  the  two  whom  he  knew  would  give  favourable  evidence  on  his 
behalf,  what  would  be  the  position  of  the  two  doctors  who  were  not  subpoenaed  by 
the  plaintiff?  Even  if  subpoenaed  to  appear  by  the  defendant,  it  is  unlikely  they  would 
have  the  consent  of  the  patient  (plaintiff)  to  give  testimony  against  his  case.  What 
advice  and  support  could  the  BMA  offer  members  in  such  circumstances?  The 
example  seemed  to  leave  the  doctor  with  two  options:  either  breaking  the  patient's 
confidentiality  in  order  to  give  testimony  in  favour  of  the  defendant  (colleague),  or 
maintaining  it  to  the  defendant's  detriment.  In  the  former  case,  the  profession  would 
be  open  to  accusations  of  favouritism  in  relaxing  the  standards  which  it  applied  to 
itself.  In  the  latter,  the  proposed  rules  of  the  BMA  would  only  permit  practitioners  to 
give  evidence  against  each  other,  posing  a  threat  to  professional  harmony  and  unity. 
While  the  illustration  given  involved  a  civil  case,  the  same  issues  would  be  raised  if  a 
doctor  stood  trial  on  a  criminal  charge. 
Hempson  foresaw  a  further  difficulty  in  the  BMA's  proposed  policy.  If 
conscience  was  the  measure  of  justification  for  pleading  privilege  in  court  and  the 
support  or  otherwise  of  the  BMA  was  to  be  determined  by  the  council  in  light  of  the 
facts  of  each  case,  it  was  feasible  that  a  practitioner  could  refuse  to  disclose  in  court 
on  grounds  of  conscience,  while  the  BMA  council  might  later  disagree  with  his 
position.  The  merits  of  an  act  of  conscience  could  at  times  only  be  assessed  after  the 
event.  Moreover,  conscience  could  take  different  practitioners  in  different  directions. 
Behind  the  fine  rhetoric  of  Tredgold's  definition  of  conscience  lay  the  fact  that  `in 
man  there  are  varying  degrees  of  "conscience"  according  to  his  birth,  his  upbringing 
or  his  station  in  life'.  58  Conscience  was  not  a  simple  yardstick  with  which  to  measure. 
In  a  sub-appendix  to  the  printed  minutes  of  the  meeting,  Langdon-Down  tried  to  draw 
together  the  threads  of  agreement  which  had  emerged  in  the  professional  secrecy 
committee's  discussions.  There  were  four  things  required.  First,  the  maintenance  of 
the  public's  interests  as  patients,  although  it  was  recognised  their  interests  as  citizens 
sometimes  needed  priority.  Secondly,  they  sought  the  maintenance  of  professional 
dignity  in  court,  both  in  practitioners'  actions  and  in  the  court's  level  of  respect  for 
doctors.  Again,  it  was  realised  that  the  public's  interests  as  patients  or  citizens  was  of 
prior  impartance.  Thirdly,  the  profession  wished  to  avoid  `being  called  upon  to  do 
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130 violence  to  our  consciences,  whether  in  their  civic  or  their  professional  capacity.  '59 
This  simply  highlighted  the  dilemma  faced  by  a  profession  bound  by  a  strong  sense  of 
conscience  and  duty,  caught  between  the  tradition  of  obligation  to  private  patient  and 
the  obligation  which  the  early  twentieth  century  emphasis  on  collective  interest 
brought.  Lastly,  anarchical  methods  of  achieving  the  profession's  goals  were  to  be 
avoided. 
The  prolonged  debate  had  brought  Langdon-Down  to  the  conclusion  that 
legislation  was  too  rigid  and  ill-adapted  to  the  ends  which  the  BMA  were  now 
focussed  upon.  Absolute  privilege  was  not  aimed  at,  so  the  conscientious  difficulties 
faced  by  practitioners  would  best  be  removed  by  emphasising  to  the  public  that 
medical  secrecy  was  subject  to  certain  reservations.  Langdon-Down  suggested  that  a 
compromise  was  the  best  solution.  Practitioners'  should  not  antagonise  judges,  but 
make  clear  to  them  the  importance  of  maintaining  patient  confidentiality.  Therefore, 
while  the  doctor  had  a  duty  to  disclose  medical  evidence  to  prevent  `grave  injury  to 
the  State,  the  patient  or  other  persons'60  so  judges  should  recognise  a  duty  on  them  not 
to  compel  a  breach  of  medical  confidence  unless  absolutely  necessary.  If  there  was 
evidence  to  show  that  the  law  was  not  co-operating,  then  the  matter  could  be  taken 
back  to  the  law  officers  of  the  crown.  Thus  after  vast  numbers  of  memos  and 
proposals,  widespread  debate,  and  the  setting  up  of  a  professional  secrecy  committee 
to  advise  the  BMA,  the  CEC  chairman  suggested  that  the  solution  lay,  more  or  less, 
with  a  better  advertised  version  of  the  status  quo.  Like  siblings  arguing  over  a  toy, 
both  would  get  their  turn.  But  first  they  would  have  to  learn  to  compromise. 
Sibling  rivalry  and  `the  spoilt  child  of  the  professions.  ' 
Langdon  Down's  promotion  of  compromise  no  doubt  stemmed  both  from  many  years 
considering  the  question  as  chairman  of  the  CEC,  and  from  recent  events  at  the 
Medico-Legal  Society.  Lord  Dawson  of  Penn  had  delivered  a  controversial  address  on 
medical  secrecy  to  the  Medico-Legal  Society  in  the  period  between  the  special 
meeting  of  council  and  the  first  meeting  of  the  PSC  61  While  much  of  his  speech 
merely  reiterated  well-rehearsed  arguments  over  abortion,  VD,  and  precedents  from 
the  Duchess  of  Kingston  onwards,  he  overstepped  the  mark  in  his  assessment  of  the 
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131 privilege  given  to  lawyers.  Dawson  had  been  keen  to  point  out  that  medical 
practitioners'  sole  aim  was  gaining  privilege  in  the  interest  of  patients.  He  saw  no 
such  altruism  in  the  law:  `For  generations  the  law  has  occupied  a  favoured  position;  it 
is,  in  fact,  the  spoilt  child  of  the  professions.  '62  Moreover,  extension  of  privilege  to 
the  sister  profession  of  medicine  was  not  really  opposed  because  it  would  be 
detrimental  to  state  interests  but  because  it  would  be  inconvenient  to  legal  procedure. 
Such  comments  turned  the  debate  away  from  a  considered  discussion  of  the  problem 
at  hand  toward  an  inter-professional  argument  which  spilled  over  to  a  meeting  of  the 
society  the  following  week. 
The  propensity  of  certain  doctors  to  see  the  issue  in  terms  of  relative 
professional  prestige  proved  too  much  for  Crookshank.  His  resignation  from  the  CEC 
was  acknowledged  at  its  next  meeting  in  April  1922.  A  later  communication  gives  an 
indication  of  his  reasons:  `I  view  with  very  great  apprehension  certain  tendencies 
which  seem  to  me  to  be  forcing  the  BMA  into  an  attitude  of  disharmony  rather  than  of 
"co-operation",  in  respect  of  the  interests  of  the  social  organism,  and  particularly,  this 
matter  of  privilege.  '63  Clearly  passionate  about  the  issue,  Crookshank  continued  to 
speak  his  thoughts  -  notably  at  a  meeting  of  the  South  Midland  Branch  of  the  BMA  in 
June  1922  which  was  later  published.  64 
Others  were  also  feeling  the  heat  in  the  run  up  to  the  annual  representatives' 
meeting  in  Glasgow  1922.  While  Crookshank's  concern  was  over  professional  self- 
interest,  Hempson  was  worried  that  the  medical  profession's  interests  were  being 
overlooked:  `above  all  things  we  want  to  be  careful  that  our  altruistic  conceptions  for 
the  guidance  of  the  profession  in  aid  of  the  public  weal,  do  not  place  the  Profession 
itself  in  circumstances  of  difficulty...  '65  Clearly,  he  felt  his  point  on  the  doctor's 
obligation  in  malpraxis  cases  had  not  been  satisfactorily  resolved.  Alfred  Cox,  having 
drafted  the  professional  secrecy  committee's  report  to  the  BMA  council,  had  even 
graver  doubts: 
I  have  never  felt  less  comfortable  over  anything  than  I  do  over  this....  I  have 
tried  to  make  it,  within  the  limits  of  a  short  report,  as  convincing  to  myself  and 
others  as  I  could.  But  frankly  I  am  not  convinced  that  the  line  we  are 
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132 suggesting  will  stand  criticism....  it  is  quite  hopeless  to  try  to  build  up  a  series 
of  rules  and  regulations  and  to  try  to  make  it  look  watertight.  The  attitude  rests 
on  sentiment  and  tradition  and  it  is  no  good  trying  to  invest  it  with  logical 
consistency. 
66 
The  Annual  Representatives'  Meeting  1922 
Given  the  trepidation  which  had  gripped  certain  elements  of  the  CEC  since  the 
representative  body's  drive  to  make  resolution  48  official  BMA  policy,  the  annual 
representatives'  meeting  in  Glasgow,  1922  was  a  relatively  painless  affair.  The  annual 
report  of  council  had  already  softened-up  members  by  setting-out  why  the  general 
position  advocated  by  minute  48  was  unjustified  and  giving  indication  of  the 
circumstances  in  which  the  BMA  would  be  willing  to  give  support.  67  Prior  to  the 
annual  representatives'  meeting  the  CEC  requested  that  the  council  withdraw 
paragraph  110  of  their  report  . 
68  This  paragraph  set  out  the  four  criteria  that  the 
professional  secrecy  committee  had  agreed  would  need  to  be  satisfied  before  a 
member  could  claim  BMA  support,  the  last  of  which  had  demonstrated  a  shift  from 
consideration  of  the  consequences  of  doctors'  actions  back  to  an  emphasis  on  duty.  As 
Langdon-Down's  proposed  amendment  during  the  Glasgow  meeting  was  to  show,  the 
CEC  were  worried  that  an  emphasis  on  doctors'  duty  of  confidentiality,  with  no 
thought  of  the  consequences,  may  stir  memories  of  Elliot's  ordeal  and  push  the  BMA 
back  towards  indiscriminate  confrontation  with  the  law.  The  council  seem  to  have 
heeded  the  request,  as  paragraph  110  was  not  discussed.  Rather,  two  proposals  based 
on  the  professional  secrecy  committee's  resolutions  were  brought  before  the 
representative  body.  The  first  was  intended  to  quash  the  controversial  resolutions  of 
the  previous  year.  It  stated: 
That  Minute  48  of  the  ARM  1921  be  rescinded,  and  that  it  be  the  policy  of  the 
Association  to  support  in  every  way  possible  any  member  of  the  BMA  within 
the  UK  who,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Council  or  the  Central  Ethical  Committee 
acting  on  behalf  of  Council,  after  due  consideration  of  the  circumstances  is 
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133 deemed  to  have  been  justified  in  refusing  to  disclose  any  information  he  may 
have  obtained  in  the  exercise  of  his  professional  duties.  69 
Langdon-Down  guided  this  through  without  amendment.  70  Having  reined-in  the 
difficulties  of  the  previous  year,  the  second  Council  resolution  aimed  to  guide  the  RB 
into  a  more  moderate  agenda  for  change: 
That  the  Annual  Representatives  Meeting  1922,  express  the  opinion  that  the 
proper  preservation  of  professional  secrecy  necessitates  a  measure  of  special 
consideration  being  recognised  for  medical  witnesses  in  courts  of  law  above 
and  beyond  what  is  accorded  to  the  ordinary  witness.  71 
This  proposal  caused  more  of  a  stir.  Buttar  suggested  that  it  was  essential  that 
information  should  not  be  given  without  the  consent  of  the  patient.  72  Fothergill 
coupled  this  onto  the  Council's  original  motion  and  the  representative  body  agreed 
it.  73  On  putting  this  hybrid  forward  as  the  substantive  motion,  two  amendments  were 
proposed.  The  first  suggested  the  omission  of:  `without  the  consent  of  the  patient 
concerned.  '  Clearly  there  were  some  who  still  believed  in  the  profession's  right  to 
refuse.  The  amendment  was  lost.  74  No  doubt  concerned  that  the  motion  was  heading 
towards  too  rigid  a  position,  Langdon-Down  proposed  the  insertion  of.  `save  to 
prevent  grave  injury  or  injustice  to  the  state,  the  patient,  or  other  members  of  the 
community.  '75  This  amendment  was  also  rejected  and  Fothergill's  hybrid  adopted.  76 
The  BMA's  new  position  was  that  doctors  required  a  special  degree  of 
privilege  in  court  and  patient  consent  to  disclosure  was  essential.  Bearing  in  mind 
Cox's  view  of  the  impossibility  of  developing  watertight  rules,  CEC  hearts  might 
have  sagged  with  the  realization  they  would  be  given  the  task  of  detailing  what  the 
`special  degree  of  privilege'  should  be.  The  injunction  that  no  information  should  be 
given  without  patient  consent  was  too  rigid  without  Langdon-Down's  amendment. 
69  BMA  ARM  1922  minute  60. 
70  Though  there  were  seven  dissentients.  BMA  ARM  1922  Minute  62. 
71  BMA  ARM  1922  minute  63. 
72  Ibid.  minute  64. 
73  Ibid.  minute  65. 
74  Proposed  by  A  Blackhall-Morison  member  for  Marylebone.  Ibid.  minute  66. 
75  Ibid.  minute  67. 
76  Ibid.  minute  68. 
134 Yet  the  representative  body  was  not  finished.  They  rejected  a  proposal  to  press  for  a 
government  committee  enquiry  into  medical  secrecy,  but  resolved  that  an  appropriate 
BMA  committee  should  examine  a  proposed  scheme  for  the  modified  notification  of 
VD.  77  Thus,  the  1922  annual  representatives'  meeting,  in  addition  to  rescinding 
resolution  48,  had  delivered  more  or  less  the  council's  agenda.  The  BMA  were  neither 
supporting  the  road  to  courtroom  martyrdom  advocated  by  the  representative  body  in 
Newcastle,  1921,  nor  were  they  opting  for  Langdon-Down's  vision  of  a  better 
advertised  status  quo.  Rather,  they  were  somewhere  in  the  middle  with  a  notion  that 
doctors  should  have  privilege  not  to  disclose  without  patient  consent. 
Away  from  the  debates  over  medical  privilege,  there  was  little  change  in  the 
CEC's  staunch  defence  of  medical  confidentiality  outside  the  courtroom.  When  a  still- 
born  child  was  found  parcelled  up  and  left  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Wensum  in 
Norwich,  the  city  police  wrote  to  doctors  in  the  area  requesting  that  they  notify  the 
police  if  approached  by  a  woman  showing  signs  of  having  recently  given  birth.  On 
learning  of  this,  the  CEC  were  quick  to  resolve  that  the  police  should  be  informed  that 
BMA  members  were  advised  to  ignore  the  request  and  should  `in  no  circumstances' 
give  the  information  asked  for.  78  Whatever  their  position  in  relation  to  medical 
privilege,  doctors  were  not  to  be  used  as  detectives.  By  autumn  1922,  the  BMA 
council  had  established  that  the  CEC  were  willing  to  consider  applications  for  non- 
disclosure  in  court  by  members  and  advise  whether  the  BMA  would  support  their 
claim. 
79  The  CEC  were  also  asked  to  ascertain  the  views  of  the  legal  profession  and 
the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  and  Royal  College  of  Surgeons.  80  Everything  seemed 
to  be  heading  towards  a  concerted  effort  to  shore-up  the  boundaries  of  medical 
confidentiality  against  legal  encroachment.  Four  months  later  the  whole  question  had 
been  shelved. 
Moved  to  inertia  by  a  man  named  Smith.  The  British  Medical  Association  put 
privilege  on  long-term  hold. 
Several  factors  contributed  to  this  change.  The  annual  representatives'  meeting,  1922 
had  resolved  that  a  committee  should  consider  the  proposals  for  a  modified  form  of 
"The  first  proposal  by  CW  Cunnington  member  for  Hampstead;  the  second  by  Bishop  Harman.  BMA 
ARM  1922,  Minutes  69  and  73  respectively. 
78  BMA  CEC  SSC  Minutes,  10  July  1922. 
79  BMA  CEC  SSC  Minutes,  31  October  1922. 
60  BMA  CEC  SSC  Minutes,  14  November  1922. 
135 notification  of  VD.  In  September  an  ad  hoc  committee  was  formed.  8'  The  core 
problem  to  be  addressed  was  that  patients  attending  the  VD  clinics  were  not  finishing 
their  course  of  treatment.  In  1920  only  20,000  out  of  162,000  patients  had  continued 
treatment  until  cured  or  in  a  non-infectious  state.  82  Seeing  this  as  a  waste  of  state 
money,  it  was  being  suggested  that  all  people  who  sought  free  treatment  should  be 
compelled  to  complete  the  course  under  pain  of  notification  to  the  local  health 
authority  `who  would  have  power  to  warn  him,  and  if  still  recalcitrant,  take 
proceedings  to  ensure  the  completion  of  his  treatment.  '83 
The  committee  were  not  in  favour  of  notification  but  decided  to  obtain  the 
views  of  BMA  divisions  through  a  postal  questionnaire.  The  results  were 
overwhelmingly  against  notification.  There  was  a  unanimous  rejection  of  the 
suggestion  of  general  notification  by  name  and  address  of  cases  of  VD.  The  medical 
officer  in  charge  of  the  VD  clinic  in  Leicester  and  Rutland  suggested  that  such  a 
policy  would  close  the  clinic  as  no-one  would  attend.  84  There  were  traces  of  support 
for  modified  notification  if  patients  stopped  treatment  early  -  17  divisions  were  in 
favour  as  opposed  to  51  against.  However,  a  five  year  survey  in  Australia  had  shown 
that  modified  notification  had  failed  to  affect  attendance  rates  at  clinics.  By  July  1923, 
the  committee  had  little  difficulty  in  advising  the  council  that  any  form  of  notification 
of  VD  was  not  a  favourable  option  at  that  time.  Yet,  consideration  of  modified 
notification  itself  must  have  been  a  brake  on  the  drive  for  privilege.  Doctors  would  do 
well  to  justify  keeping  evidence  relating  to  VD  from  the  courts  if  they  were  able  to 
break  patient  secrecy  outside  the  courtroom. 
In  the  meantime  the  CEC, having  consulted  with  Dawson,  were  having 
problems  following  the  council's  instruction  to  open  negotiations  on  privilege  with 
the  legal  profession.  Their  main  concern  was  the  level  of  opposition  they  were  likely 
to  face  from  the  judiciary.  As  the  1915  debate  had  shown,  the  BMA  were  not  averse 
to  fighting  their  corner  against  unsympathetic  legal  minds.  This  time,  however,  they 
were  up  against  Lord  Chancellor  Birkenhead.  In  autumn  1921,  Birkenhead  had 
written  an  essay  on  medical  secrecy  which  he  circulated  to  all  judges  and  Lords  of 
Appeal.  Designed  to  provide  a  definitive  argument  against  the  granting  of  medical 
81  The  committee  consisted  of  the  Officers  of  the  Association,  together  with  Drs  HG  Dain,  ER 
Fothergill,  TWH  Garstang,  Mr  N  Bishop  Harman,  R  Langdon-Down,  J  McGregor-Robertson,  EB 
Turner  and  Sir  Jenner  Verrall.  BMA  Special  Committee  on  the  Notification  of  VD  1922-23. 
82  BMA  Spec.  Comm.  VD,  Turner  memo,  19  September  1922. 
83  Ibid. 
84  BMA  Spec.  Comm.  VD,  11  January  1923. 
136 privilege,  its  impact  filtered  beyond  legal  circles  and  it  was  published  under  the  title 
`Should  a  Doctor  Tell?  '  in  a  collection  of  essays  in  1922.85  Clearly  flustered  by  its 
contents,  the  CEC  stated  the  essay  was  `an  indication  of  the  opposition  which  the 
medical  profession  may  be  likely  to  encounter  in  its  plea  for  such  special 
consideration.  '  86  They  recommended  to  the  BMA  council  that  in  light  of  Birkenhead's 
views  the  best  way  forward  would  be  to  consult  with  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians 
and  the  Royal  College  of  Surgeons  in  order  to  develop  a  consensus  of  medical  opinion 
before  approaching  the  law.  However,  when  the  council  met  to  discuss  this  proposal 
in  early  1923  they  decided  to  recommend  that  no  further  action  be  taken  for  six 
months.  No  explicit  reason  is  given  and  it  can  only  be  assumed  that  the  council  shared 
the  CEC's  concerns  over  Birkenhead's  rallying  of  the  judiciary.  Council's  inaction  on 
the  matter  was  extended  indefinitely  in  September,  and  by  1924  their  resignation  was 
evident:  `the  Council  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  no  useful  purpose  would  be 
served  by  proceeding  further  with  it  at  present.  '87  The  wilting  drive  for  special 
consideration  had  retreated  past  the  Rubicon. 
85  FE  Smith;  `Should  a  doctor  tell?  ',  in  Points  of  view,  (London,  1922),  33-76. 
86  BMA  Council  agenda  14  February  1923. 
87  BMA  CEC  Minutes  25  September  1923  and  BMA  Council  Annual  Report  1923/1924. 
137 Chapter  6  --  The  Lord  Chancellor 
`The  very  pernicious  heresy  about  `medical  privilege'  I' 
The  Lord  Chancellor's  file  on  the  position  of  medical  witnesses  in  legal  proceedings 
opens  with  the  memorandum  sent  from  Christopher  Addison  requesting 
if  he  could  be  advised  what  steps  could  most  suitably  be  taken  to  secure  the 
end  which  is  contemplated  in  the  memorandum,  namely,  that  such  privilege 
should  be  extended  to  medical  men  in  legal  proceedings  as  will  secure 
absolute  secrecy  for  persons  who  attend  venereal  disease  clinics.  2 
Taking  action  on  this,  on  14  June  1920,  Birkenhead  wrote  to  the  Lord  Chief  Justice 
(Lord  Reading),  the  Master  of  Rolls,  and  the  President  of  the  Probate  Divorce  and 
Admiralty  Division  (Henry  Duke),  in  order  to  gain  their  views  on  the  issue.  It  was 
Duke  who  was  the  first,  and  as  it  turned  out  the  only  one,  to  respond.  He  saw 
Addison's  correspondence  as  raising  two  main  questions.  3  Firstly,  a  form  of  privilege 
should  be  extended  to  doctors  on  grounds  of  equality  of  treatment  of  learned 
professions.  Secondly,  that  communications  between  doctors  and  patients  with  regard 
to  the  treatment  of  VD  should  be  protected  from  disclosure,  even  in  court. 
To  the  first  of  these  arguments  Duke  was  at  pains  to  point  out  that  the 
privilege  which  prevented  lawyers  from  disclosing  information  about  their  clients  was 
in  fact  the  clients'  privilege  and  not  the  lawyers'.  The  complexity  of  legal  procedure 
meant  that  justice  required  that  individuals  caught  up  in  legal  proceedings  needed 
access  to  those  who  had  expert  knowledge  of  the  law  in  order  to  receive  a  fair  trial. 
Therefore,  claims  for  medical  privilege  based  on  equality  of  learned  professions  were 
misplaced.  Moreover,  there  were  rigorous  restrictions  upon  the  legal  privilege  which 
prevented  its  use  to  the  detriment  of  the  public  interest.  With  regard  to  medical 
evidence  relating  to  the  treatment  of  a  patient  with  VD,  again  Duke  saw  no  reason  for 
an  exception  to  be  made.  If  the  law  compelled  diseased  individuals  to  confide  in  a 
doctor  then  such  involuntary  confidences  should  not  be  voluntarily  disclosed. 
PRO  LCO  2/624  "Medical  witnesses  in  legal  proceedings:  as  to  position  of.  '  Phrase  used  by  Duke  in 
correspondence  with  B  irkenhead  22  October  1921. 
2  LCO  2/624  Barter  to  Schuster,  3  June  1920. 
LCO  2/624  Duke  to  Birkenhead,  3  July  1920. 
138 However,  voluntary  communications  to  a  doctor,  in  keeping  with  all  other 
communications,  save  those  which  sought  to  obtain  legal  advice  in  relation  to 
proceedings,  should  be  available  to  litigants  in  a  dispute. 
Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  Duke's  letter  to  Birkenhead  dealt  with  Addison's 
request  purely  from  a  legal  point  of  view.  The  language  he  used  focused  on 
compulsion  and  voluntariness  in  a  legal  sense  only.  The  law  might  not  compel 
someone  suffering  from  VD  to  confide  in  a  medical  practitioner  but  the  ill-effects  of 
the  disease  could  arguably  leave  an  individual  with  little  choice.  When  set  within  the 
context  of  highly  publicised  government  VD  treatment  schemes  which  guaranteed 
confidentiality,  it  is  clear  that  pressure,  from  the  government  and  self  welfare,  to  seek 
treatment,  leaves  Duke's  tight  legal  definition  of  voluntariness  in  somewhat  murkier 
waters.  In  the  same  vein,  his  interpretation  of  the  public  interest  was  also  limited  to  its 
relation  to  the  law.  His  argument  that  the  absence  of  secure  access  to  legal  advice 
could  mean  the  denial  of  justice  to  individuals  was  accurate  and  well-rehearsed. 
However,  it  did  not  take  account  of  the  similar  argument  that  to  deny  individuals 
suffering  from  a  disease  with  the  social  stigma  of  VD  from  access  to  confidential 
treatment  was  not  only  potentially  to  deny  them  recovery  of  their  health  but  to  put 
other  members  of  the  public  at  risk.  This  was  the  reason  that  the  Ministry  of  Health 
had  confirmed  the  pledge  of  confidentiality  governing  the  public  VD  treatment 
centres  when  it  took  over  the  scheme.  In  Duke's  mind,  the  public  interest  was  served 
when  legal  justice  was  rightly  administered.  But,  for  those  concerned  with  health,  on 
an  individual  and  communal  basis,  the  public  also  had  a  vested  interest  in  not 
jeopardising  the  schemes  set  up  to  tackle  the  scourge  of  VD. 
Considering  the  scale  of  the  problem  that  was  demanding  the  time  and 
efforts  of  the  BMA  and  Ministry  of  Health,  it  is  noteworthy  that  there  is  very  little  to 
be  found  in  Birkenhead's  file  on  confidentiality  between  Duke's  letter  of  early  July 
1920  and  May  the  following  year.  A  copy  of  the  Public  Health  (Venereal  Disease) 
Regulations  of  1916  and  a  copy  of  the  inter-departmental  committee  on  insurance 
medical  records  report  of  1920  are  to  be  found  amidst  sporadic  correspondence  with 
the  Ministry.  It  appears  that  Addison's  frustration  at  the  delay  in  Birkenhead's 
furnishing  him  with  an  adequate  response  to  his  original  request  was  not  wholly 
unfounded.  When  it  finally  came,  Birkenhead's  terse  response  indicated  that  the 
139 whole  question  was  a  `grave  legal  matter'°,  a  description  which  further  emphasised 
the  judiciary's  examination  of  medical  confidentiality  purely  in  terms  of  the  law.  Part 
of  the  delay  in  the  judiciary  reaching  a  communal  decision  was  caused  by  the  change 
of  Lord  Chief  Justice.  Having  replaced  Lord  Reading,  Lawrence  was  sent  a  copy  of 
Addison's  original  memo  and  a  copy  of  Duke's  thoughts  and  asked  to  furnish  his  own 
opinion  on  the  medical  privilege  being  sought.  In  keeping  with  his  predecessor  (who 
had  never  formally  set  down  his  views  before  leaving  office),  Lawrence  broadly 
agreed  with  the  views  of  Duke.  His  only  major  addition  to  the  argument  was  to  take 
issue  with  Addison's  belief  that  doctors  did  not  claim  privilege  in  criminal 
proceedings,  as  he  himself  had  been  obliged  to  threaten  doctors  with  committal  for 
withholding  evidence  material  to  a  criminal  case.  This  is  an  interesting  point  since  it 
echoes  a  recurring  discontent  amongst  the  law  that  medical  practitioners  could,  and  at 
least  sometimes  did,  hinder  their  work.  Medical  privilege,  even  if  initially  only 
granted  in  certain  classes  of  civil  cases,  could  seep  further  through  the  system  of 
courts,  eroding  as  it  went  the  law's  ability  to  draw  on  such  a  rich  source  of  evidence. 
If  the  Lord  Chancellor's  office  had  been  measured  in  its  approach  to  medical 
privilege  to  this  point,  the  announcement  that  Lord  Dawson  was  about  to  initiate  a 
debate  of  the  matter  in  the  House  of  Lords  with  the  aim  of  getting  it  referred  to  a 
select  committee,  sparked  them  into  action.  On  8  July  1921,  Schuster,  Birkenhead's 
personal  secretary,  wrote  to  David  Davies  in  the  Lord  Chief  Justice's  office 
requesting  that  he  prepare  a  detailed  brief  which  would  shed  light  on  the  nature  of  the 
legal  privilege  and  show  how  this  differed  from  the  proposed  privilege  for  medical 
practitioners. 
5  On  the  same  day,  Schuster  also  wrote  to  Sir  Archibald  Bodkin  in  the 
Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  department  asking  whether,  in  light  of  Dawson's 
motion,  he  could  supply  Birkenhead  with  'ammunition'.  Davies  replied  the  next  day 
indicating  that  he  would  create  a  file  on  medical  privilege.  Bodkins'  reply,  complete 
with  a  file  of  relevant  ammunition,  arrived  two  days  later. 
In  collecting  information  for  the  forthcoming  debate,  the  Lord  Chancellor's 
office  came  across  a  speech  made  by  Hempson,  the  solicitor  to  the  BMA,  which  drew 
comparison  between  the  position  of  the  doctor  and  that  of  a  priest.  While  it  was 
acknowledged  that  a  priest's  obligation  of  confidentiality  was  absolute,  Hempson  had 
4  PRO  LCO  2/624  Birkenhead's  reply  to  Addison's  letter  of  14  February  1921. 
5  LCO  2/624  Schuster  to  Davies  8  July  1921. 
6  LCO  2/624  Schuster  to  Bodkin  8  July  1921. 
140 expressed  the  view  that  the  doctor's  obligation  depended  to  a  large  extent  upon  his 
own  personal  relations  and  inclination.  However,  from  a  legal  point  of  view,  if 
Hempson  believed  there  were  times  when  a  doctor,  as  a  citizen  or  friend,  may  feel  it 
necessary  to  disclose  a  patient's  condition  then: 
the  claim  of  privilege  must  fall  to  the  ground,  and...  the  obligation  of  secrecy 
really  meant  no  more  than  an  honourable  understanding  that  a  doctor  would 
not  gossip  about  his  patient's  affairs.  7 
Many  members  of  the  medical  profession  certainly  saw  the  question  of  medical 
confidentiality  in  terms  of  honour.  Langdon-Down,  chairman  of  the  CEC,  realised  as 
much  when  he  stated  `the  strong  feeling  that  the  doctors  hold  about  this  is  just  due  to 
this,  that  it  hurts  the  deepest  feelings  of  decent  honourable  men  that  they  should 
divulge  information  received  under  such  circumstances.  '8  Alfred  Cox,  medical 
secretary  to  the  BMA,  also  came  to  express  a  very  similar  view:  `it  is  quite  hopeless 
to  try  to  build  up  a  series  of  rules  and  regulations  and  to  try  to  make  it  look  watertight. 
The  attitude  rests  on  sentiment  and  tradition  and  it  is  no  good  trying  to  invest  it  with 
logical  consistency-'9  Yet,  the  BMA  did  not  meet  with  the  Lord  Chancellor.  While  the 
BMA  and  the  Ministry  of  Health  met  to  discuss  medical  confidentiality,  and  the 
Ministry  corresponded  with  the  Lord  Chancellor's  office,  the  three  bodies  never  met 
together.  Thus,  three  different  interest  groups  each  had  multiple  persons  of  profile 
expressing  opinions  on  particular  areas  of  a  complex  issue,  with  little  co-ordinated 
debate.  Then  again,  as  the  Lord  Chancellor's  file  indicated,  the  BMA's  conference 
with  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  in  1915  had  not  led  to  a  very  satisfactory  result. 
With  Dawson's  proposed  motion  on  their  minds,  the  Lord  Chancellor's  office 
set  about  examining  the  law  relating  to  the  production  of  medical  information  in  legal 
proceedings.  10  They  found  a  clear  distinction  between  the  production  of  medical 
evidence  in  serious  criminal  cases  and  other  cases.  In  the  latter  set  of  cases,  no 
medical  information  was  to  be  made  available,  save  the  name  and  address  of  a 
medical  officer  who  could  give  evidence  if  subpoenaed.  Medical  reports  were  not,  in 
themselvess,  evidence  and  only  became  so  if  there  was  a  meaningful  discrepancy 
7  LCO  2/624  Davies  To  Schuster  11  July  1921. 
a  BMA  CEC  minutes  5  December  1921. 
9  BMA  Correspondence,  Cox  to  Hempson  6  April  1922. 
10  LCO  2/624  Document  entitled  38/Gen  No.  /946  Disclosures  and  production  of  records. 
141 between  what  a  medical  officer  had  written  in  a  medical  report  and  the  testimony 
which  he  subsequently  gave  in  court.  If  both  sides  in  a  case  consented,  a  medical 
report  could  be  read  as  evidence  in  order  to  save  the  time  and  expense  of  compelling 
its  writer  to  appear  in  court.  A  medical  officer  should  not  give  any  information  except 
on  subpoena  and,  even  then,  he  could  plead  professional  privilege  although  `this  will 
probably  be  overruled  by  the  court.  '  11  It  is  not  clear  when  these  guidelines  were 
written,  but,  as  the  BMA  and  Ministry  of  Health  were  only  too  well  aware,  the 
previous  18  months  had  firmly  underlined  this  last  point. 
In  serious  criminal  cases  all  ordinary  restrictions  could  be  waived,  with  both 
the  defence  and  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  having  access  to  all  information 
including  medical  records.  The  court  itself  could  request  to  see  such  documents  even 
if  the  defence  had  not  asked  for  them.  In  cases  where  the  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions,  or  the  police  acting  on  his  behalf,  requested  medical  documents  on  the 
understanding  that  they  would  not  be  produced  in  court,  this  was  deemed  permissible. 
However,  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  could  use  general  information  such  as 
the  fact  that  an  individual  had  been  in  hospital  or  been  treated  by  a  doctor  or  had 
suffered  a  particular  disease  `unless  this  is  of  such  a  nature  as  a  patient  might 
reasonably  wish  not  to  be  disclosed.  '  12  Who  determined  which  diseases  fell  into  the 
category  of  reasonable  objection  was  not  indicated.  Police  enquiries  made  without  the 
authority  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  and  enquiries  by  private  prosecutors 
were  to  be  treated  in  the  same  way  as  other  cases  falling  outside  the  serious  criminal 
case  category.  There  should  be  no  disclosure  of  medical  records  but,  if  possible,  the 
name  and  address  of  a  medical  officer  who  could  provide  relevant  comment  would  be 
made  available. 
Broadly  speaking  then,  a  distinction  was  drawn  between  the  law's  demand  on 
medical  information  in  serious  criminal  cases  and  other  forms  of  judicial  or  police 
investigation.  In  the  former,  the  courts  could  demand  all  forms  of  medical  information 
including  medical  records  while,  in  the  latter,  a  medical  officer  could  be  subpoenaed 
to  appear  before  a  court  to  give  testimony.  No  explicit  criteria  for  categorising  cases  is 
presented,  so  presumably  it  was  the  law  which  decided  if  a  criminal  case  fell  into  the 
category  which  allowed  the  court  unrestricted  access  to  medical  information.  This  is 
an  important  point  for  one  of  the  judiciary's  main  objections  to  the  proposal  of 
11  Ibid. 
12  Ibid. 
142 medical  privilege  was  the  power  it  gave  individual  doctors  to  determine  when  they 
would  give  medical  information.  This,  the  legal  authorities  argued,  hindered  the 
interests  of  justice  and  could  lead  to  inconsistency  in  practice.  While  some  cases 
would  be  easily  classified  in  the  category  of  serious  crime,  others  would,  perhaps,  rely 
far  more  on  judicial  discretion.  Similarly,  the  power  to  determine  when  a  patient's 
desire  not  to  have  details  of  his  or  her  illness  disclosed  was  `reasonable',  seems  to 
leave  the  law  in  a  similar  position  vis-a-vis  individual  and  public  health  as  the  medical 
practitioners  would  be  in  relation  to  justice  if  medical  privilege  were  allowed.  The 
legal  authorities  would  permit  the  law  an  amount  of  discretion  with  regard  to  matters 
of  health  in  connection  with  justice,  but  they  would  not  countenance  medical 
practitioners  having  a  level  of  discretion  in  matters  of  justice  connected  with  health. 
No  doubt,  status  played  an  important  role  in  this  distinction.  Judges  were  official 
public  servants  while  doctors,  although  increasingly  involved  with  the  state,  were  still 
private  sellers  of  medical  expertise.  Private  interest  could  cloud  the  doctor's  vision 
and  skew  judgement  on  the  admissibility  of  medical  evidence. 
It  is  natural  that  the  judiciary  would  regard  the  interests  of  justice  as 
paramount,  but,  as  thinking  individuals,  they  must  also  have  been  aware  of  the 
potential  damage  to  the  public  health  effort  which  would  be  caused  by  the  highly 
publicised  breaches  of  medical  confidentiality  during  the  enforced  court  appearances 
of  doctors  from  the  government's  VD  treatment  scheme.  A  further  explanation  for 
their  reluctance  to  consider  medical  privilege  was  the  perception  that,  even  without 
medical  privilege,  doctors  had  a  tendency  to  stifle  the  ends  of  justice  rather  than 
betray  a  patient's  confidence.  The  judiciary  were,  clearly,  still  suffering  from  the 
hangover  of  the  1915  debate.  Birkenhead's  file  contains  Avory's  charge  to  the  grand 
jury  from  the  trial  of  Annie  Hodgkiss  in  1914  which  had  sparked  the  confrontation 
with  the  BMA.  It  had  culminated  with  the  Lord  Chief  Justice's  failed  attempt  to 
impose  on  the  medical  profession  their  overriding  duty  to  aid  the  law  in  the 
administration  of  justice,  even  if  that  meant  contravening  patient  confidentiality. 
Lawrence,  the  new  Lord  Chief  Justice,  had  recounted  his  experience  of  doctors 
attempting  to  claim  medical  privilege  as  witnesses  in  criminal  trials.  In  preparing  for 
Lord  Dawson's  debate,  Birkenhead  wrote  to  the  Metropolitan  Police  Office  at  New 
Scotland  Yard,  requesting  details  of  cases 
143 in  which  there  either  has  been,  or  may  have  been,  a  failure  of  justice  due  to  the 
refusal  of  doctors  to  communicate  with  the  police  when  they  become  aware 
that  an  illegal  operation  has  been  performed.  13 
If  Birkenhead  was  going  to  defend  the  law  against  medical  privilege  then  he  needed 
hard  evidence  that  legal  thought  against  medical  practitioners  withholding 
information  was  well  founded.  The  case  of  Annie  Hodgkiss  was  one  well-known  and 
controversial  example  but  the  Metropolitan  Police  were  being  asked  to  provide  a 
series  of  cases  to  show  that  the  problem  was  a  recurring  one.  Trevor  Bigham  of  New 
Scotland  Yard  was  only  too  willing  to  comply.  Sending  details  of  five  cases  from 
1913-1919,  Bigham  added 
I  could,  I  have  no  doubt,  give  you  many  further  cases  if  you  desired,  but  I 
think  these  are  quite  sufficient  to  satisfy  you  as  to  the  general  line  taken  by  the 
medical  profession  and  as  to  the  practical  difficulties  the  police  have  to 
contend  with  in  consequence.  14 
Doctors  were  too  often  an  obstacle  in  the  administration  of  justice.  In  the  past,  their 
short-coming  had  been  their  failure  to  notify  the  police  in  cases  of  criminal  abortion 
before  the  mother  died,  a  point  which  had  been  discussed  at  length  in  1915  and  was 
reiterated  by  Bigham  in  his  letter.  To  extend  a  form  of  privilege  to  doctors  that 
allowed  them  to  withhold  medical  testimony  once  a  case  had  reached  court  would 
exacerbate  the  law's  problem.  Rather  than  allowing  doctors  greater  leeway,  Bigham 
followed  Lord  Chief  Justice  Reading's  line  of  thought  from  1915  and  advocated 
greater  emphasis  being  put  on  the  medical  practitioner's  duty  to  assist  the  authorities. 
It  seems  as  though  one  of  the  major  difficulties  in  addressing  the  question  of 
medical  privilege  was  that,  at  times,  the  various  sides  were  talking  past  each  other. 
The  Ministry  of  Health's  priority  lay  with  the  potential  detriment  which  a  lack  of 
medical  privilege  was  causing  to  the  effectiveness  of  their  VD  treatment  scheme,  and, 
thereby,  public  health.  They  were,  therefore,  only  seeking  privilege  for  doctors  in  civil 
cases.  The  Lord  Chancellor,  backed  by  other  members  of  the  judiciary  and  police,  was 
concerned-with  preventing  doctors  becoming  more  of  a  hindrance  to  the  criminal 
13  LCO  2/624  Bigham  to  Schuster  13  June  1921. 
14  Ibid. 
144 justice  system.  Meanwhile,  the  BMA  were  in  turmoil  with  the  council  and  CEC 
engaged  in  a  game  of  tug-of-war  with  the  representative  body  over  the  use  of  BMA 
resources  to  challenge  the  law  on  medical  privilege.  There  were  pockets  of  interaction 
on  the  issues.  Bodkin  wrote  to  Schuster  to  inform  him  that  he,  along  with  Blackwell 
of  the  Home  Office  and  Newman  from  the  Ministry  of  Health  had,  two  weeks  prior, 
had  a  long  meeting  to  discuss  the  attitude  of  VD  clinics  to  the  use  of  their  information 
in  legal  cases.  15  This,  along  with  McCardie  (Garner  v  Garner)  and  Horridge's 
(Needham  v  Needham)  pronouncements  on  confidentiality  in  the  divorce  courts,  and  a 
leader  in  the  Times,  Bodkin  offered  to  send  to  the  Lord  Chancellor.  In  an  aside, 
Bodkin  qualified  his  suggestion  that  the  documents  he  is  sending  might  tire 
Birkenhead,  by  stating  `but  it  seems  quite  impossible  that  the  Lord  Chancellor  can 
ever  get  weary!  '  Seemingly,  the  unhurried  approach  which  had  so  infuriated  Addison 
back  in  early  1920  had  been  replaced  with  a  great  sense  of  urgency  as  Birkenhead 
gathered  the  pieces  from  which  he  would  assemble  his  case  for  the  debate  on  27  July. 
As  Schuster  observed:  `The  Chancellor  attaches  great  importance  to  the  question  and 
to  this  particular  occasion  and  wishes  to  deliver  an  important  and  conclusive 
speech.  '  16 
A  letter  from  the  Home  Office  to  the  Lord  Chancellor  indicated  that  the  memo 
which  Bodkin  had  prepared  subsequent  to  the  meeting  between  the  Home  Office  and 
the  Ministry  of  Health,  had  not  gone  down  well  with  the  latter.  17  It  appeared  that  the 
Home  Office  had  felt  that  general  agreement  had  been  reached  that  it  would  be 
`convenient'  and  `reasonable'  for  a  doctor  to  give  a  statement  to  the  police  in  all  cases 
where  they  had  medical  information  about  an  individual.  The  Ministry  of  Health 
denied  assenting  to  such  a  proposal.  In  their  view,  a  doctor  should  inform  the  police 
of  information  which  would  exonerate  an  accused  individual,  but  in  all  other  cases  it 
should  be  left  to  the  doctor's  discretion  to  supply  voluntarily  information  to  the 
police. 
With  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  the  Home  Office  finding  it  difficult  to  reach 
agreement,  Alfred  Mond  wrote  to  Birkenhead  six  days  before  Dawson's  motion  was 
due  for  discussion-18  Having  read  Addison's  correspondence  with  Birkenhead,  Mond 
was  keen  ftr  a  meeting  to  agree  a  cabinet  line  on  the  question.  He  indicated  that  he 
's  LCO  21624  Bodkin  to  Schuster  11  July  1921. 
16  LCO  2/624  Schuster  to  Blackwell  18  July  1921. 
17  LCO  2/624  Blackwell  to  Schuster  15  July  1921. 
18  LCO  2/624  Mond  to  Birkenhead  21  July  1921. 
145 was  under  considerable  pressure  from  doctors  and  that  he  had  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  there  was  a  very  strong  case  for  a  medical  privilege,  akin  to  that  of  lawyers,  in 
civil  cases  only.  This,  he  suggested,  would  be  `only  fair'  to  doctors  and  in  keeping 
with  several  `respectable  precedents  both  abroad  and  in  our  self-governing 
dominions.  '  It  would  also  be  essential  to  the  interests  of  the  Ministry's  VD  policy 
the  essential  foundation  of  which  is  the  secrecy  of  the  transactions.  If  we 
cannot  secure  such  secrecy  to  the  doctors  in  civil  proceedings,  I  anticipate 
something  approaching  to  a  crisis.  19 
In  order  to  avoid  Dawson's  request  for  an  investigation  of  medical  privilege  by  a 
select  committee,  Mond  proposed  the  passing  of  a  short  bill  along  the  lines  of  the 
statutory  medical  privilege  in  New  Zealand  (a  copy  of  which  Mond  sent  to 
Birkenhead),  but  only  applicable  to  civil  cases.  If  Birkenhead  was  in  agreement  then 
Mond  would  explain  the  situation  to  Dawson,  otherwise  a  meeting  the  following  week 
would  be  in  order. 
In  stark  contrast  to  the  treatment  his  predecessor  had  received  from 
Birkenhead,  Mond  received  a  reply  from  the  Lord  Chancellor's  office  the  following 
day.  20  Apologising  for  not  being  able  to  write  in  person,  Birkenhead  welcomed 
Mond's  stance  against  a  medical  privilege  in  criminal  cases.  However,  he  made  clear 
that  he  was  not  wholly  convinced  of  the  Ministry's  intentions: 
There  has  lately  been  a  considerable  disposition  to  obstruct  criminal 
investigations  in  this  way  [claiming  medical  privilege],  and...  some  of  the 
communications  made  by  the  Ministry  of  Health  to  doctors  in  the  country  and 
to  the  Public  Prosecutor  and  the  Home  Office  have  lent  colour  to  the  idea  that 
the  Ministry  took  a  different  view  [to  that  now  expressed  by  Mond].  21 
Birkenhead  would  respond  to  Dawson's  motion  that  there  would  be  `no  possibility 
that  doctors  can  in  criminal  proceedings  be  allowed  to  escape  from  the  ordinary 
19  Ibid. 
20  LCO  2'624  Schuster  to  Mond  22  July  1921. 
21  Ibid. 
146 obligations  of  citizenship.  '  22  Clearly,  the  Lord  Chancellor  had  a  very  negative  view  of 
the  motives  and  potential  outcome  of  any  medical  privilege  which  had  effect  in 
criminal  cases.  As  for  civil  cases,  Birkenhead  expressed  his  awareness  of  the  excellent 
work  the  VD  clinics  were  doing  and  the  `national  importance  which  must  be  attached 
to  their  labours.  '23  Despite  this  he  found  himself  `reluctantly  unable  to  acquiesce  24 
with  Mond's  proposal  for  a  bill  based  on  the  New  Zealand  Evidence  Act.  His 
objection  focussed  on  the  distinction  between  a  doctor's  behaviour  when  giving 
testimony  in  a  civil  case  and  their  obligation  outside  the  courtroom.  Drawing  on 
Hempson's  speech  to  the  BMA  twelve  months  prior,  Birkenhead  noted  Hempson's 
belief  that  circumstances  could  leave  a  doctor  in  a  position  where,  as  citizen  or  friend, 
he  felt  it  necessary  to  disclose  information  which  had  been  gained  in  a  professional 
capacity. 
25  Hempson's  example  of  the  syphilitic  fiance  produced  a  dichotomous 
response  from  the  representative  body  at  the  BMA  annual  representative  meeting  in 
1920.  This,  in  Birkenhead's  view,  was  evidence  enough  that  public  opinion  would  not 
support  legislation  which  forbade  disclosure  of  medical  information  within  the 
context  of  a  civil  court  case,  but  left  disclosure  outside  the  courtroom  to  the  discretion 
of  the  individual  doctor  on  a  day  to  day  basis.  To  emphasise  the  unanimity  of  legal 
thought  on  the  matter  Birkenhead  cited  the  concurrence  of  his  views  with  those  of  the 
previous  Lord  Chief  Justice  (Reading),  the  current  Lord  Chief  Justice  (Lawrence),  the 
Master  of  the  Rolls,  the  President  of  the  Probate  Divorce  and  Admiralty  Division 
(Duke),  and  probably  all  of  the  high  court  judges. 
However,  although  the  judiciary  was  more  unified  in  its  opinion  on  medical 
confidentiality  than  the  BMA  representative  body  that  had  heard  Hempson's  speech, 
there  was  an  awareness  that  showing  up  inconsistencies  in  medical  opinion  would  not 
be  sufficient  justification  for  opposing  a  select  committee  inquiry  into  the  possibility 
of  legislation  on  medical  privilege.  Certainly,  they  were  primed  with  examples  in 
which  doctors'  reticence  to  provide  the  law  with  information  had  obstructed  the  ends 
of  justice,  but,  by  Birkenhead's  own  admission,  the  prevalence  of  VD  and  the 
importance  of  secrecy  to  the  efficacy  of  treatment  programmes,  made  medical 
confidentiality  key  to  another  public  interest:  the  nation's  health.  The  sanctity  of  the 
doctor-patient  relationship  was  a  foundation  stone  in  the  medical  profession's  belief 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid. 
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147 system,  and  one  which  had  already  been  shaken  by  government  measures  on 
notification  and  public  health  in  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries.  As 
medical  officers  working  in  the  VD  clinics  had  made  clear,  government  guarantees 
that  doctor  -  patient  confidentiality  would  be  central  to  their  work,  were  having  their 
limitations  highlighted  in  very  public  circumstances.  If  the  law  was  to  further 
undermine  confidentiality  by  rejecting  medical  privilege  even  in  cases  where  the 
information  was  received  under  the  rules  of  secrecy  for  VD  clinics  issued  by 
government,  it  had  to  do  so  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  push  the  medical  officers  at  the 
clinics  into  fulfilling  their  threat  of  resignation. 
In  a  letter  to  Schuster,  Bodkin  suggested  that  the  argument  for  privilege  on  the 
basis  of  the  sanctity  of  the  doctor-patient  relationship  could  be  undermined  by 
drawing  an  analogy  with  another  group  of  cases.  26  Under  common  law,  a  husband  or 
wife  was  forbidden  from  giving  evidence  against  their  spouse  because  of  the  law's 
regard  for  the  confidences  between  husband  and  wife.  By  section  one  of  the  Criminal 
Evidence  Act,  1898  (section  1,  proviso  D)  this  rule  was  formalised  in  statute. 
However  in  both  forms  of  the  law,  exceptions  were  made  in  instances  of  criminal 
activity  i.  e.  violence  on  a  spouse,  or  incest.  Bodkin  suggested  that  if  the 
confidentiality  that  existed  in  the  more  intimate  relationship  of  a  husband  and  wife 
was  subject  to  limitations  under  criminal  law,  then  there  was  less  reason  to  insist  that 
the  doctor  -  patient  relationship  should  be  privileged.  Certainly,  this  went  some  way 
to  undermining  the  central  argument  of  doctors  with  regard  to  the  special  nature  of 
their  relationship  with  clients,  even  in  the  sensitive  context  of  VD  treatment  clinics. 
But  by  Bodkin's  own  admission,  the  analogy  was  for  exceptions  in  criminal  cases 
alone. 
Davies,  having  acted  on  Birkenhead's  request  to  examine  the  proposals  for 
medical  privilege  and  provide  him  with  arguments  as  to  how  it  differed  from  the 
established  privilege  of  lawyers,  produced  a  lengthy  note  on  the  subject.  Citing  many 
cases,  he  payed  particular  attention  to  the  statement  given  by  Lord  Chancellor 
Brougham  in  the  case  of  Greenough  v  Gaskell,  1833.  He  quoted  at  length  Brougham's 
assertion  that: 
26  LCO  2/624  Bodkin  to  Schuster  21  July  1921. 
148 The  foundation  of  the  privilege  is  not  on  account  of  any  particular  importance 
which  the  law  attaches  to  the  business  of  the  legal  profession  or  any  particular 
desire  to  afford  them  protection.  But  it  is  out  of  regard  to  the  interests  of 
justice  which  cannot  be  upholden  and  to  the  administration  of  justice  which 
cannot  go  on  without  the  aid  of  men  skilled  in  jurisprudence,  in  the  practice  of 
the  courts  and  in  those  matters  affecting  the  rights  and  obligations  of  which 
form  the  subject  of  all  judicial  proceedings.  27 
Brougham's  words,  given  amidst  a  case  which  revolved  around  the  question  of  legal 
privilege,  seem  to  fit  perfectly  with  the  line  of  thought  advocated  by  Birkenhead.  The 
lawyer's  privilege  was  not  an  effect  of  judicial  favouritism  to  the  legal  profession,  but 
rather  a  necessary  element  in  the  process  of  an  equitable  justice  system.  However,  a 
closer  look  at  the  details  of  the  Greenough  v  Gaskell  case,  reveals  that  Davies  had 
been  somewhat  liberal  with  the  truth  in  trying  to  manufacture  a  continuity  in  legal 
opinion  from  the  1830s  through  to  the  1920s.  Without  giving  any  indication  that  he 
had  edited  Brougham's  statement,  Davies  removed  the  last  section  of  Brougham's 
first  sentence.  In  fact,  having  indicated  that  the  law  had  no  tendency  to  favour  or 
protect  the  legal  profession,  Brougham  actually  went  on  to  say: 
Though  certainly  it  may  not  be  very  easy  to  discover  why  a  like  privilege  has 
been  refused  to  others,  and  especially  to  medical  advisers.  28 
Clearly,  the  re-integration  of  these  words  into  Brougham's  statement  gives  an 
altogether  different  complexion  to  his  thoughts,  than  the  statement  presented  by 
Davies.  For  a  start,  consensus  on  privilege  between  Brougham  and  Birkenhead  only 
extended  to  the  legal  variety.  On  medical  privilege,  the  more  important  issue  for 
Birkenhead  and  Davies,  the  two  Lord  Chancellors  had  conflicting  ideas,  so  Davies 
simply  dropped  that  section  of  Brougham's  statement.  Considering  that  the  judiciary's 
argument  against  medical  privilege  was  rooted  in  the  need  for  all  relevant  information 
to  be  made  available  to  the  law,  it  was  more  than  a  touch  hypocritical  for  a  member  of 
the  Lord  Chief  Justice's  office  to  omit  highly  relevant  information  from  the  position 
27  LCO  2/624  Davies  to  LC.  No  date  given. 
28  Brougham  in  Greenough  v  Gaskell  (17&  31  Jan  1833).  IMY  &K  98. 
149 of  a  past  Lord  Chancellor  on  the  question  of  privilege,  because  it  did  not  suit  the 
argument  which  the  legal  authorities  wished  to  make  in  the  1920s. 
As  previously  noted,  Lord  Dawson  did  not  raise  the  question  of  medical 
secrecy  in  the  House  of  Lords.  In  a  printed  memo,  Birkenhead  indicated  that,  at  a 
cabinet  meeting  on  25  July,  where  the  Ministry  raised  the  question  of  Dawson's 
motion,  it  was  agreed  that  `no  time  would  be  available  for  the  discussion  of  the 
question  before  the  27th',  so  Dawson  would  be  asked  to  postpone  it.  29  Obviously,  the 
cabinet  wanted  to  discuss  the  matter  in  detail  and  reach  some  form  of  consensus 
before  a  general  discussion  in  the  House  of  Lords,  but  the  established  differences 
between  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  the  Lord  Chancellor  would  not  make  for  a  short 
discussion.  However,  Dawson,  in  complying  with  the  cabinet's  wishes,  indicated  that 
he  would  seek  to  raise  the  motion  again  in  the  near  future.  Pre-empting  any 
widespread  debate  on  confidentiality,  before  the  cabinet  could  have  the  chance  to 
discuss  the  question  at  length,  Birkenhead  sent  a  copy  of  his  views  on  the  question  to 
cabinet  members.  He  indicated  that  there  was  no  disagreement  between  Mond  and 
himself  on  the  question  of  medical  privilege  with  regard  to  criminal  cases:  neither 
supported  a  privilege.  In  other  circumstances,  however,  there  was  greater  division. 
Birkenhead  was  at  pains  to  point  out  the  unanimity  of  legal  opinion  against  the 
granting  of  any  form  of  medical  privilege,  suggesting  that,  once  cabinet  had  assessed 
the  merits  of  the  legal  and  medical  views,  it  could  announce  a  decision  on  the  matter. 
Mond,  clearly,  did  not  wish  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  a  select  committee  looking 
into  medical  privilege  `in  view  of  the  strength  of  medical  feeling  on  this  subject'30 
The  Ministry  of  Health  was,  by  this  stage,  proposing  that  legislation  on  medical 
confidentiality  should  be  along  the  lines  of  `A  physician  etc.  shall  not  without  the 
consent  of  his  patient  be  compellable  to  divulge  in  any  civil  proceeding,  etc.  '  For 
Birkenhead  this  was  proof  that  the  privilege  that  was  being  sought  was  in  fact  the 
doctor's  privilege  to  decide  when  he  gave  evidence.  This  being  the  case,  all 
comparisons  with  legal  privilege  were  forfeit,  for,  as  the  law  had  pointed  out  at 
length,  legal  privilege  was  the  privilege  of  the  client  not  the  lawyer.  A  medical 
privilege  of  the  nature  suggested  by  the  Ministry  of  Health  would  give  doctors  the 
powers  to  protect  or  injure  their  patients'  cases  during  hearings  in  court,  based  solely 
on  their  own  judgement.  Such  a  proposal  was  without  precedent.  Moreover,  the  Lord 
29  LCO  2/624  Birkenhead  memo  28  July  1921. 
30  LCO  2/624  Mond  to  Birkenhead  2  August  1921. 
150 Chancellor's  office  understood  that  doctors  wanted  a  privilege  which  covered  them  in 
civil  and  criminal  proceedings,  so,  even  if  the  Ministry  of  Health's  proposal  was 
agreed  to,  there  was  no  indication  that  the  medical  profession  would  be  content. 
Even  though  Dawson's  motion  was  edged  off  the  table  by  the  more  legally 
minded  members  of  cabinet,  Birkenhead  continued  to  be  occupied  with  the  medical 
profession's  claims  for  privilege.  Letters  still  came  in  presenting  more  examples  of 
medical  incompetence  obstructing  the  ends  of  justice,  clarifying  points  of  law  on  legal 
privilege  and  drawing  analogy  with  the  law's  attitude  to  the  confidentiality  of 
information  given  to  clergymen.  31  October  1921  was  a  particularly  busy  month  in 
which  Birkenhead's  memorandum  entitled  `Should  a  Doctor  Tell?  '  was  printed  and 
copies  circulated  to  all  judges  and  Lords  of  Appeal.  In  it,  Birkenhead  collected 
together  the  morsels  from  which  he  had  intended  to  produce  his  all  important  speech 
in  response  to  Dawson.  He  noted  that  an  exacerbation  of  the  problem  of  medical 
confidentiality  was  caused  by  the  lack  of  clarity  about  what  the  medical  profession 
were  actually  seeking,  their  claims  and  practice  being  `discordant  and  loose.  '32  He 
dealt  with  the  proposed  analogy  with  legal  privilege,  incorporating  unchanged, 
Davies'  inaccurate  version  of  Brougham's  statement  in  Greenough  v  Gaskell.  In 
ignorance  of  his  misrepresentation  of  fact,  Birkenhead  went  on  to  state  `since  the 
Duchess  of  Kingston's  case  it  has  never  seriously  been  questioned  that  the  law  is  as  it 
was  then  stated  to  be  by  Lord  Mansfield'.  33  He  further  noted  the  statutory  obligation 
on  doctors  to  breach  confidentiality  imposed  by  the  Infectious  Disease  (Notification) 
Act  1889  and  the  Notification  of  Births  Acts  of  1909  and  1915.  Yet,  unlike  the 
impression  which  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  (Reading)  had  conveyed  to  the  BMA  in 
1915,  Birkenhead  was  clear  that  the  doctor  was  not  to  act  as  spy  or  detective.  34 
Nonetheless,  in  keeping  with  the  impression,  conveyed  to  him  by  judiciary  and  police 
alike,  that,  too  often,  medical  men  impeded  the  law  through  lack  of  co-operation, 
Birkenhead  was  keen  to  stress  the  doctor's  role  in  aiding  the  cause  of  justice.  On  the 
question  of  the  notification  of  criminal  abortion  he  went  so  far  as  to  state  `the  attitude 
adopted  by  doctors  in  some  of  these  cases  almost  makes  one  regret  that  the  offence  of 
"  LCO  2/62IBodkin  to  Schuster  27  July  1921;  Davies  to  Schuster  4  August  1921;  Davies  to  Schuster 
10  October  1921;  LCO  2/624  Schuster  to  Roche  29  June  1922 
32  Ibid.  43 
33  Ibid.  47 
34  Ibid.  49 
151 "misprision  of  felony"  has  been  allowed  to  become  obsolete.  '35  Such  a  statement 
provides  a  sharp  contrast  to  the  opinions  expressed  by  Avory  and  Clarke  during  their 
consultation  with  the  RCP  in  1895.  However,  Birkenhead  was  aware  that  the  key 
issue  aggravating  the  early  interwar  debate  was  VD.  He  portrayed  the  reasonableness 
of  the  law's  demands  on  doctors  by  using  emotive  examples  involving  the  abuse  of 
women  and  children,  and  employing  evocative  phrases  such  as 
the  quarrel  here,  if  there  be  a  quarrel,  is  not  between  the  law,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  medical  profession  on  the  other.  It  is  between  those  who  claim  this 
privilege,  and  the  parents  of  little  children  whose  protection  is  the  primary  aim 
of  the  law.  36 
In  his  effort  to  provoke  sympathy  in  the  reader  for  the  parents  of  little  children, 
Birkenhead  appears  to  have  overlooked  the  contradiction  in  his  argument.  If  the 
primary  aim  of  the  law  was  the  protection  of  little  children  and  the  medical  profession 
were,  in  the  law's  eyes  at  least,  threatening  to  jeopardise  that,  then,  evidently,  the 
quarrel  did  exist  and  was,  indubitably,  between  the  law  and  the  medical  profession.  In 
such  points,  Birkenhead  seemed  more  concerned  with  inciting  the  support  of  public 
opinion  than  giving  an  accurate  account  of  the  debate.  Nonetheless,  he  claimed  to 
recognise  the  importance  of  medical  confidentiality,  particularly  with  regard  to  the 
national  problem  of  VD  and  the  fact  that  `the  complexities  of  life  in  a  civilised 
community  such  as  our  own  produce  a  web  of  confidential  relations  and  confidential 
communications  round  every  citizen.  '37  However,  even  in  situations  where 
confidentiality  was  central  to  a  relationship  -  be  it  in  connection  with  an  individual's 
finances  at  a  bank,  or,  (drawing  on  the  example  he'd  been  furnished  with  by 
Bodkins),  in  the  intimate  relationship  of  a  husband  and  wife  -  there  were  always 
exceptions  to  the  rule.  38  Save  for  the  growing  privilege  of  lawyers,  the  tendency  had 
been  towards  greater  openness  of  testimony  in  court,  and  Birkenhead,  backed  by 
`most  men  of  experience  in  every  branch  of  the  law'39  felt  it  would  be  a  retrograde 
step  to  create  an  unprecedented  level  of  privilege  for  doctors  or,  indeed,  nurses  and 
3S  Ibid.  55 
36  Ibid.  62 
37  Ibid.  72 
38  Ibid.  73 
39  Ibid.  75/6 
152 midwives,  for  Birkenhead  could  not  see  why  medical  privilege  would  not  extend  to 
them.  4o 
It  seems  that,  in  legal  quarters  at  least,  Birkenhead's  essay  was  very  well 
received.  The  Lord  Chief  Justice  sent  word  that,  at  the  meeting  of  judges, 
Birkenhead's  stance  against  medical  privilege  had  met  with  their  approval.  Again  the 
main  reason  appeared  to  have  been  the  detrimental  impact  that  such  a  privilege  would 
have  in  impeding  the  ends  of  justice.  41  While  outwardly  the  question  of  medical 
privilege  was  being  referred  to  by  high  legal  figures  as  `a  subject  of  great  and  pressing 
importancei42,  in  their  internal  correspondence  it  did  not  receive  such  high  praise.  In 
complementing  Birkenhead  on  his  published  memorandum,  the  President  of  the 
Probate,  Divorce  and  Admiralty  Division,  Sir  Henry  Duke,  wrote: 
I  am  delighted  to  find  that  you  have  made  time  to  explode  the  very  pernicious 
heresy  about  "medical  privilege"  which  has  spread  in  a  remarkable  way  in  the 
last  few  years.  43 
In  the  opinion  of  the  judiciary  and  law  officers  of  the  crown,  Birkenhead  had  used  his 
legal  `ammunition'  to  good  effect. 
40  Ibid.  70/1 
41  LCO  2/624  LCJ  to  Birkenhead  13  October  1921. 
42  LCO  2/624  Taken  from  printed  note  attached  to  `Should  a  Doctor  Tell?  '  memo  printed  for  cabinet.  43  LCO  2/624  Duke  to  Birkenhead  22  October  1921. 
153 Chapter  7  --  The  Attempts  to  Pass  Legislation 
`A  game  of  snakes  and  ladders"  is how  Roy  Jenkins  referred  to  the  process  of  getting 
a  private  members'  bill  passed  into  legislation.  Each  year  a  small  group  of  MPs, 
whose  names  are  drawn  from  an  open  ballot,  get  the  opportunity  to  propose  and 
promote  legislation  of  their  choice.  Since  1867,  the  government  has  dominated  the 
legislative  agenda  and  private  members'  bills  have  been  limited  to  Fridays  in  the  first 
twenty  weeks  of  each  parliamentary  session.  Success  in  the  ballot  allows  an  MP  to 
give  the  bill  its  first  reading  in  Parliament.  This  is  a  reading  of  the  bill's  title  only  and 
there  is  no  detailed  debate  -  indeed  often  the  specific  terms  have  not  been  drafted  by 
the  time  of  the  first  reading.  Having  been  announced,  a  date  and  time  is  set  for  its 
second  reading.  At  the  allocated  time,  if  there  are  no  objections  to  its  being  read  a 
second  time  then  the  bill  moves  to  be  considered  in  detail  by  a  committee  who  make 
recommendations  about  the  bill's  merits  to  the  House,  which  then  votes  to  accept  or 
reject  the  proposal.  In  order  to  become  law,  the  bill  must  go  through  these  three  stages 
in  both  the  House  of  Commons  and  the  House  of  Lords,  making  it  a  lengthy  process. 
If  a  bill  fails  to  make  it  through  the  committee  stage  before  the  end  of  the 
parliamentary  session  it  lapses  along  with  all  uncompleted  legislation  and  must  begin 
the  process  all  over  again  when  someone  chooses  to  re-introduce  it.  In  such  a  process 
the  threat  posed  by  the  `snakes',  to  which  Jenkins  referred,  must  be  minimised.  As 
another  authority  on  the  British  system  of  government  observed: 
To  get  a  bill  enacted  requires  skill,  patience,  determination,  a  measure  of 
support  from  more  than  one  party,  and  the  sympathy  of  the  ministers  most 
directly  affected.  2 
While  private  members'  bills  are  not  nearly  as  numerous  as  governmental  ones,  they 
do  at  times  lead  to  the  passing  of  important  legislation. 
Having  previously  examined  the  failed  attempts  to  set  a  new  common  law 
precedent  in  the  early  interwar  years,  this  chapter  analyses  two  attempts  to  pass 
legislation  conferring  a  level  of  privilege  to  doctors  in  court,  the  first  in  1927,  the 
second  in-1936.  Both  were  private  members'  bills  and  both  were  put  forward  by 
'AH  Birch,  The  British  System  of  Government  9'  edition  (London,  1993),  184. 
z  Ibid.  183. 
154 Ernest  Gordon  Graham-Little.  Born  in  Bengal  and  educated  in  South  Africa  where  he 
took  a  B.  A.  in  literature  and  philosophy  at  the  University  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
Graham-Little  won  a  Porter  scholarship  to  study  medicine  at  London  University. 
After  graduating,  he  spent  time  in  Dublin  and  Paris  before  specialising  in 
dermatology.  He  was  the  Independent  Member  of  Parliament  for  London  University 
from  1924  until  the  abolition  of  the  university  franchise  in  1950,  and  was  knighted  in 
1931.3  In  1931  he  also  changed  his  surname  by  deed  poll  from  Little  to  the 
hyphenated  Graham-Little.  4  While  neither  of  his  bills  passed  into  law,  they  merit 
closer  examination  than  they  have  hitherto  received.  Morrice  mentions  them  in 
passing  in  his  thesis,  seeing  them  as  nothing  more  than  the  re-working  of  old 
arguments. 
5  While  much  of  the  debate  associated  with  the  bill  was  similar  to  previous 
discussions,  this  is  indicative  of  the  ongoing  tension  surrounding  the  issue  of  medical 
confidentiality  throughout  the  interwar  years. 
It  would  be  easy  to  interpret  the  1927  attempt  at  legislation  as  a  direct  re-run 
of  the  early  interwar  years.  It  was  triggered  by  the  same  factor  as  the  immediate  post- 
war  debate:  a  divorce  hearing  in  which  medical  testimony  was  demanded  on  the 
existence  of  VD  in  one  of  the  parties.  Such  cases  were  important  factors  both  in  terms 
of  the  issues  they  raised  and,  particularly,  in  the  publicity  and  conspicuous  debate 
which  they  generated.  Nonetheless,  they  were  part  of  a  broader  underlying  unease  that 
surrounded  the  conflicting  viewpoints  on  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality, 
which  in  turn  reflected  uncertainty  in  the  relationship  between  the  relative  powers  of 
the  executive  and  the  judiciary.  As  previously  noted,  it  was  Birkenhead's  well- 
publicised  and  authoritative  rhetoric,  along  with  the  consistency  of  his  stance,  which 
had  worn-down  the  supporters  of  privilege  in  the  early  1920s.  Yet,  there  were  many 
areas  of  medical  practice  which  were  too  ill-defined  to  permit  of  the  type  of  definitive 
approach  which  Birkenhead  had  advocated.  The  CEC  had  come  to  this  conclusion 
when  they  were  asked  to  consider  guidelines  for  BMA  members  in  1920  and  Lord 
Riddell  took  a  similar  line  in  an  address  to  the  Medico-Legal  Society  in  June  1927. 
George  Allardice  Riddell  was  a  talented  lawyer  who  became  legal  adviser  to  the  News 
3  See  entry  for  Ernest  Gordon  Graham-Little  in  The  Dictionary  of  National  Biography  and  Who  Was 
Who  vol.  4  1941-50. 
°  The  Timesj2  February  1931. 
A  Morrice,  `Honour  and  Interests':  medical  ethics  in  Britain  and  the  work  of  the  British  Medical 
Association's  Central  Ethical  Committee,  1902-1939,  (University  of  London,  MD  Thesis,  1999),  279- 
280. 
6  BMA  CEC  minutes  9  November  1920;  for  Riddell's  address  see  BMJ  2  July  1927  p.  17. 
155 of  the  World.  By  1903  he  decided  to  move  from  law  into  journalism.  Being  on  good 
terms  with  Lloyd  George  he  was  often  used  as  liaison  officer  between  the  press  and 
British  delegations  to  major  international  conferences  such  as  the  Paris  peace 
conference  of  1919.  Despite  no  longer  practising  law,  Riddell  maintained  a  keen 
interest  in  medical  jurisprudence. 
Riddell  had  been  amongst  the  audience  at  Lord  Dawson's  controversial 
address  on  confidentiality  to  the  Medico-Legal  Society  in  1922.  In  the  prolonged 
discussion  following  that  speech,  Riddell  disagreed  with  Dawson's  belief  in  the 
sanctity  of  medical  confidences,  describing  the  latter's  approach  to  confidences  in 
civil  cases  as  `extraordinarily  nebulous'.  7  To  the  complex  problems  of  VD  doctors 
testifying  in  court,  Riddell  had  offered  a  simple  solution:  doctors  could  be  in  the  habit 
of  forgetting  certain  information  before  official  proceedings  got  underway,  in  which 
their  evidence  may  be  called:  `such  a  little  lapse  would  not  be  visited  with  penalty  on 
the  day  of  judgement.  '8  By  1927,  Riddell  was  not  so  light-minded  in  his  approach. 
The  fact  that  the  question  was  the  subject  of  two  high  profile  speeches  and  discussions 
in  a  short  space  of  time,  along  with  Riddell's  change  in  position,  testifies  to  the 
ongoing  difficulties  in  clarifying  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality.  The  aim  of 
the  Medico-Legal  Society  was  to  discuss  subjects  of  deep  interest  to  lawyers,  doctors 
and  the  public.  In  the  opinion  of  some  members,  there  was  none  as  apt  at  fulfilling 
those  criteria  as  medical  confidentiality.  9 
While  Riddell  had  become  more  sympathetic  to  the  case  for  the  sanctity  of 
secrecy,  his  address,  entitled  `The  law  and  ethics  of  medical  confidences',  was  by  no 
means  revolutionary  in  content.  In  general,  the  doctor's  duty  to  society  by  aiding  the 
law  was  clear  in  cases  of  crime  (abortion  continuing  to  prove  a  moot  point).  There 
were,  however,  other  areas  where  conscience  was  still  put  forward  as  the  guiding  light 
that  determined  whether  a  doctor  should  pass  on  information  to  a  third  party.  These 
were  the  areas  which  kept  the  question  rumbling-on  and  the  passage  of  time  brought 
yet  more  examples  to  be  added  to  the  list  of  difficult  scenarios.  Riddell  reeled-off  the 
familiar  problems  regarding  doctors'  duties  to  tell  when  they  were  employed  by 
someone  other  than  the  patient  or  in  cases  where  there  was  the  potential  of  grievous 
harm  being,  caused  to  a  third  party  -  the  syphilitic  fiancd  again  amongst  the  list  of 
7  BMJ  25  March  1922,  p.  495. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Sir William  Collins  in  Lancet  2  July  1927,  p.  14. 
156 illustrations.  More  original  was  his  querying  of  the  ethics  of  selling  doctors'  case 
books  containing  information  on  their  patients.  A  possible  solution  would  be  to  insist 
on  destroying  such  books  when  the  doctor  died  but  this  `might  rob  future  generations 
of  much  interesting  information'.  10  Duty  and  consequence  seemed  at  loggerheads 
again. 
Aside  from  the  dilemma  over  case  books,  Riddell's  address  essentially 
summarised  the  main  themes  of  the  debate  from  the  early  part  of  the  twentieth 
century.  Avory's  remarks  in  1914  and  their  heated  aftermath  were  re-examined;  the 
comparison  with  legal  and  spiritual  privileges  and  the  laws  of  other  countries  were 
rehearsed;  arguments  over  public  interest  and  the  relative  merits  of  public  health  vis- 
a-vis  justice  were  all  touched  upon;  and  the  pecuniary  interest  and  advertising 
elements  were  not  overlooked.  Martyrdom  and  the  treatment  of  John  Elliot  of  Chester 
came  up  in  discussion  and  the  report  of  the  address  ended  with  Sir  William  Willcox's 
view  that  the  `fair  and  proper  attitude'  for  a  doctor  to  adopt  when  called  as  a  witness 
was  to  refuse  to  answer  until  ordered  and  then  give  evidence  under  protest  i.  e.  the  line 
advocated  for  nearly  a  decade  by  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  the  BMA.  There  were 
some  indications  that  opinions  on  medical  privilege  were  shifting  as  Riddell 
suggested  that  limited  privilege  was  supported  not  just  by  medical  men  but  by 
`distinguished  lawyers'  -  presumably,  this  held  more  weight  than  the  support  given 
by  the  Solicitor's  Journal  in  1920.  On  the  whole,  however,  the  impression  conveyed 
was  that  the  emphasis  still  lay  on  legal  interests  over  medical. 
As  well  as  the  report  of  Riddell's  speech,  the  Lancet  carried  a  leading  article 
on  professional  secrecy  in  its  early  July  edition.  '  1  It  noted  that  the  old  and  honourable 
tradition  of  medical  secrecy  `does  not  fit  comfortably  into  legal  theory.  '  12  This  seems 
to  sum  up  the  problem  that  had  been  frustrating  participants  in  the  debate  since  at 
least  the  time  of  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  consultation  with  Avory  and  Clarke: 
how  to  marry  the  interests  of  medical  tradition  and  legal  procedure.  The  continued 
tension  in  the  1920s  suggested  that  the  solution  imposed  by  Birkenhead  would  not 
last.  However,  if  the  medical  profession  wanted  to  change  the  arrangement,  it  seemed 
that  one  essential  ingredient  was  still  missing:  `It  is  strange  that  the  public  has  never 
insisted  upon  a  change  in  the  law  and  upon  an  absolute  duty  of  medical  secrecy  in  the 
10  BMJ  2  July  1927,  p.  17. 
11  Lancet  2  July  1927,  p23- 
12  Ibid. 
157 law  courts'. 
13  That  the  writer  should  have  found  the  lack  of  public  support  strange,  is 
itself  intriguing.  There  had  not  been  much  cause  for  the  public  to  make  vocal  protest. 
Most  of  the  discussions  on  privilege  had  taken  place  in  private  meetings  between 
representatives  of  the  judiciary,  government  and  medical  profession  and  had  been 
reported  more  in  the  professional  journals  than  in  the  newspapers.  Indeed,  keeping  it 
out  of  the  press  had  been  one  of  the  criteria  stipulated  by  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  in 
1915.  The  one  exception  had  been  the  coverage  of  the  divorce  cases  -  Garner  v 
Garner  and  Needham  v  Needham.  Yet  even  in  those  instances  the  coverage,  though 
intense,  had  been  short-lived.  The  general  public  was  unlikely  to  be  spurred  into 
action  by  occasional  cases  involving  doctors  giving  evidence  about  venereal  disease 
in  a  divorce  hearing  which  had  little  relevance  to  them.  If  `the  public'  meant  those 
who  were  faced  by  divorce  proceedings  from  their  spouse,  who  in  turn  was  likely  to 
cite  VD  as  a  principal  ground  for  separation,  then  fear  of  guilt  by  association  might 
well  have  discouraged  the  formation  of  a  "Keep  my  VD  secret"  campaign.  All  in  all, 
the  general  discussion  of  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality  took  place  outside 
the  realms  of  the  general  public,  and  only  spilled  over  in  any  significant  sense  in  VD 
divorce  cases.  Important  as  the  treatment  of  VD  was,  and  significant  as  the  rise  in  the 
number  of  divorce  cases  in  the  1920s  was  also,  medical  privilege  -  widely 
acknowledged  to  be  a  complex  balancing  act  -  was  hardly  the  sort  of  bandwagon  that 
the  general  public  would  be  waiting  to  jump  on  in  large  numbers. 
If  public  support  was  not  likely  to  provide  a  useful  basis  to  challenge  the  status 
quo,  the  power  of  government  directives  would  have  to  be  used  again  as  the  principal 
weapon.  A  fortnight  after  the  reports  of  his  address,  Riddell  indicated  that  his 
attention  had  been  drawn  to  the  VD  regulations  issued  by  the  Local  Government 
Board  in  1916.14  The  terms  of  article  II  (2)  had  raised  the  possibility  in  Riddell's  mind 
that  statutory  secrecy  had  been  established  in  cases  of  doctors  attending  patients  at  the 
VD  clinics.  This  was  the  argument  that  Elliot  had  made  with  little  success  in  the 
Needham  v  Needham  case  and,  in  recounting  it  during  the  medico-legal  society's 
discussion,  Sir  William  Collins  expressed  his  deep  regret  that  Elliot  had  not  gone 
further  on  the  road  to  martyrdom.  15  An  article  in  the  Lancet,  focusing  specifically  on 
secrecy  and  the  VD  clinics,  followed  Riddell's  new  line  of  thought  by  suggesting  that 
13  Ibid. 
14  BMJ  16  July  1927,  p.  116. 
1s  BMJ  2  July  1922,  p.  18. 
158 the  government  regulations  might  override  the  judicial  power  to  force  medical 
disclosure,  though  it  was  unlikely  that  a  judge  would  take  this  view.  16  Citing  the 
ruling  in  Garner  v  Garner  which  stated  the  regulations  were  not  authority  to  exempt  a 
VD  medical  officer  from  giving  evidence  in  court,  the  Lancet  suggested  that  doctors 
should  strive  to  claim  the  utmost  degree  of  privilege  possible,  stressing  the 
importance  of  secrecy  to  the  success  of  schemes  to  tackle  VD.  A  week  later,  the  same 
journal  was  reporting  that  a  medical  witness  had  responded  to  the  call. 
Anything  you  say  will  be  taken  down  and  used  in  evidence  against  you.  17 
Thus,  within  a  month  of  Riddell's  address  to  the  Medico-Legal  Society,  the  case 
which  Graham-Little  was  to  cite  as  the  immediate  trigger  for  his  attempt  at  legislation, 
arose-'a  As  well  as  involving  a  VD  clinician  refusing  to  give  evidence  in  a  divorce 
hearing  on  grounds  of  medical  privilege,  the  case  had  two  other  similarities  with 
previously  significant  trials.  Firstly,  it  was  heard  at  the  Birmingham  Assizes  -  the 
same  court  from  which  Avory  had  delivered  his  tirade  against  the  medical 
profession's  code  of  secrecy  in  the  trial  of  Annie  Hodgkiss  in  December  1914.  More 
importantly,  it  was  heard  before  Justice  McCardie,  the  judge  involved  in  the  Garner  v 
Garner  case  which  had  sparked  the  Ministry  of  Health  into  action  in  1920.  The 
Solicitors  Journal  at  that  time  had  suggested  he  should  have  had  the  courage  to  rule  in 
favour  of  granting  a  measure  of  privilege  to  the  doctor,  but  in  the  1927  Birmingham 
Case  it  was  clear  that  McCardie's  position  remained  unchanged.  19  In  the  Garner  v 
Garner,  case  the  medical  testimony  on  the  presence  of  VD  was  sought  by  a  patient 
who  consented  to  the  disclosure  but,  in  the  1927  Birmingham  Case,  a  wife  was 
seeking  evidence  of  her  husband's  previous  treatment  for  VD  and  had  subpoenaed  Dr 
Assinder,  the  medical  head  of  the  VD  department  at  the  Birmingham  General 
Hospital.  In  the  witness  stand,  Assinder  explained  that  he  had  not  treated  the  man  in 
question  in  1924,  had  not  been  head  of  department  when  the  husband  was  alleged  to 
have  attended  and  that  a  number  of  doctors  were  engaged  in  the  work  at  the  clinic. 
Each  doctor  had  his  own  papers  which  were  personal  property  and  could  not  be 
produced  as  evidence  by  the  head  of  the  department.  Whilst  recognising  the  reasoning 
16  Lancet  16Tu1  1927,  p.  139. 
17  The  Lancat:  s  pessimistic  assessment  of  the  VD  doctor's  position  vis-ä-vis  patients  after  McCardie's 
ruling  at  Birmingham.  Lancet  23  July  1927,  p.  178. 
18  Although  reported  in  The  Times,  the  names  of  the  parties  involved  in  the  case  are  not  cited.  The  case 
will  hereafter  be  referred  to  as  the  1927  Birmingham  Case. 
19  Solicitors  Journal  24  January  1920. 
159 behind  this  position,  McCardie  emphasised  that  the  doctor  could  not  claim  privilege 
and  if  he  refused  to  comply  with  the  request  for  evidence  he  would  be  imprisoned  for 
contempt  of  court.  McCardie  further  threatened  that  if  the  doctor  did  not  give 
evidence 
every  medical  man  and  a  number  of  officials  from  the  hospitals  would  have  to 
be  called  to  the  court,  and  ultimately  the  documents  must  be  made  available.  If 
information  were  not  given  that  should  be  given,  and  if  documents  were  not 
produced  which  should  be  produced,  the  law.. 
.  would  be  enforced.  ° 
With  the  profile  of  the  medical  privilege  debate  on  the  rise  again,  McCardie  seemed 
keen  to  nip  it  in  the  bud.  Not  only  were  government  departmental  regulations  of 
inferior  authority  to  judicial  powers,  but  any  doctor  who  was  contemplating  taking 
Elliot's  martyr  approach  would  find  himself  in  prison  and  his  colleagues  on  the 
witness  stand  in  his  place.  It  is  worth  emphasising  this  point.  If  McCardie's  antidote 
to  medical  martyrdom  was  to  subpoena  the  rest  of  the  hospital  staff,  the  resultant 
disruption  of  services  at  the  Birmingham  General  Hospital  may  well  have  produced 
the  support  from  the  general  public  which  had,  so  far,  been  lacking.  The  judge  may 
seem  like  the  unreasonable  party  for  disrupting  medical  provision  in  order  to  get  at 
medical  evidence  -  covered  by  a  government  pledge  of  secrecy  -  for  use  in  a  civil 
divorce  suit.  The  Birmingham  population  would  presumably  be  unhappy  about  a 
judge  imprisoning  the  staff  of  the  local  hospital  in  such  circumstances.  Consequently 
it  would  be  feasible  that  the  precedent  for  medical  privilege  could  be  set. 
However,  McCardie  could  always  bank  on  the  converse  being  true.  The 
public,  which  had  thus  far  failed  to  show  interest  in  the  medical  privilege  cause,  might 
react  against  the  doctor,  who,  having  been  warned  of  the  consequences  of  his  failure 
to  give  evidence,  still  maintained  silence  -  leading  to  the  disruption  at  the  hospital. 
McCardie,  having  addressed  the  question  in  the  early  1920s,  would  be  aware  that  the 
medical  profession  would  have  far  more  difficulty  in  making  a  persuasive  case  to 
change  the  status  quo  than  the  judiciary  would  have  in  defending  it.  In  such  a  complex 
debate,  the-clear-cut  ruling  from  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  case  would  always  give 
the  law  the'upper  hand. 
20  Lancet  23  July  1927,  p.  178. 
160 After  an  adjournment  of  five  days  while  further  evidence  was  produced,  the 
surgeon  to  the  hospital,  B.  T.  Rose,  gave  evidence  under  protest.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
while  McCardie  was  clear  that  there  was  no  medical  privilege,  he  asked  the  counsel  to 
the  petitioner  `if  he  had  considered  the  question  whether  or  not  a  doctor  was  bound  to 
disclose  to  the  court  information  obtained  by  him  when  acting  confidentially  in  the 
special  treatment  of  a  particular  disease.  '21  In  other  words,  what  weight  should  be  put 
on  the  1916  VD  regulations  that  guaranteed  secrecy  to  patients  attending  VD  clinics? 
Counsel  did  not  think  the  regulations  equated  to  privilege  in  court,  and,  consistent 
with  his  own  ruling  in  Garner  v  Garner  and  the  line  taken  by  Justice  Horridge  in 
Needham  v  Needham,  McCardie  agreed.  The  question  that  had  been  posed  by  Riddell 
and  the  medical  journals,  only  two  days  prior,  had  already  been  answered. 
Regulations  issued  by  a  government  department  were  clearly  not  sufficient  to  prevent 
the  breach  of  confidence  when  evidence  was  required  in  court  -  even  when  the  case 
was  a  civil  divorce  suit.  The  BMJ  concluded:  `the  only  way  in  which  the  Ministry  of 
Health  can  implement  its  promise  of  secrecy  to  patients  attending  venereal  disease 
centres  will  be  by  direct  legislation  stating  in  clear  terms  that  communications  by 
patients  are  protected  from  disclosure  in  a  court  of  law.  '22  Perhaps  Graham-Little,  a 
regular  contributor  to  the  BMJ,  read  this.  In  any  event,  it  was  this  legislation  that  his 
private  members'  bill  hoped  to  provide. 
In  Mr  Neville  Chamberlain's  hands  the  matter  will  not  be  allowed  again  to  be 
forgotten  23 
Naturally,  the  crescendo  of  interest  in  confidentiality  had  not  passed-by  the  Ministry 
of  Health.  Within  days  of  McCardie's  ruling,  memoranda  started  circulating  on  the 
subject.  Many  of  the  civil  servants  at  the  Ministry  had  been  engaged  in  the  early 
interwar  debate.  Given  their  experience  of  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  question, 
there  was  no  repeat  of  Addison's  enthusiastic  move  to  the  judiciary  with  a  request  that 
they  grant  privilege  to  doctors.  On  the  contrary,  there  was  a  palpable  uneasiness  in  the 
air,  particularly  amongst  three  experienced  figures:  Machlachlan,  Robinson  and 
Newman.  Machlachlan  sent  a  memo  to  the  others  on  21  July  indicating  that 
McCardie_&  ruling  in  the  1927  Birmingahm  case  looked  set  to  reopen  the  question. 
21  BMJ  Supplement,  23  July  1927,55. 
221bid. 
23  BMJ  30  July  1927,  p.  179. 
161 The  Birmingham  clinic  was  an  important  one  and  it  was  feared  that  the  press  coverage 
would  deter  patients.  Moreover,  just  as  the  clinic  advertisements,  with  their  prominent 
pledge  of  secrecy,  had  been  criticised  in  the  aftermath  of  the  early  interwar  rulings, 
VD  doctors  were  again  questioning  their  own  position  with  regard  to  the  guarantee  of 
secrecy.  The  director  of  the  Birmingham  clinic  who  had  originally  been  called  before 
McCardie  was  reported  to  be  saying  that  he  would  not  issue  any  more  pamphlets  on 
which  the  government  pledge  of  secrecy  appeared.  Having  dissuaded  Dawson  from 
pursuing  privilege  in  1921,  the  Ministry  would  now  have  to  return  to  a  consideration 
of  legislation.  As  Robinson  put  it:  `this  is  a  most  thorny  subject  and  we  must  take  it 
up  where  we  left  it  in  1921.  '24  For  the  time  being  they  would  have  to  prepare  to  field 
parliamentary  questions  on  it.  All  three  were  agreed  that  a  general  statement, 
indicating  that  the  Ministry  were  aware  of  the  1927  Birmingham  Case  and  were 
giving  it  careful  consideration,  would  suffice  for  the  time  being. 
On  25  July,  Dr  Vernon  Davies,  Conservative  MP  for  Royston,  enquired  in 
parliament  if  McCardie's  ruling  at  Birmingham  had  come  to  the  attention  of  the 
Minister  of  Health  (Neville  Chamberlain).  Furthermore,  he  wanted  to  know  whether 
Chamberlain  would  consider  introducing  legislation  which  allowed  doctors  to  refuse 
to  give  evidence  about  confidential  information  `at  least  in  the  case  of  this  disease'.  5 
Sir  Kingsley  Wood,  parliamentary  secretary  to  Chamberlain,  following  the  advice 
given  by  Machlachlan's  memo,  stated  that  they  were  aware  of  the  ruling  and  the 
difficulty  of  the  questions  involved  and  would  give  it  careful  consideration.  They 
were  still  giving  it  consideration  in  November  when  Vernon  Davies  repeated  his 
question. 
6  Meanwhile,  the  medical  journals  provided  a  measure  of  the  difficulty  to 
which  Wood  referred.  On  the  same  day  that  Davies'  question  to  the  Ministry  was 
reported,  the  Lancet's  correspondence  pages  contained  three  letters  on  the  subject.  27 
The  first,  from  W.  P.  Herringham,  was  clearly  on  the  side  of  the  judiciary  and  pointed 
out  firmly  that  executive  departments  could  not  be  law-makers.  Moreover,  he  was 
willing  to  state  categorically  that  justice  was  more  important  than  the  dignity  of 
medicine  or  any  damage  that  may  be  done  to  public  health. 
H.  Wansey  Bayly,  a  Harley  Street  doctor,  took  the  opposite  view:  confidences 
should  be-kept  at  all  costs.  He  indicated  that  `not  infrequently  a  married  patient  has 
24  PRO  MH  55/184  Machlachlan  memo  21  July  1927. 
23  BMJ  30  July  1927,  p.  194. 
26  BMJ  12  November  1927,  p.  904. 
27  Lancet  30  July  1927,  p.  253-4. 
162 asked  me  whether  all  information  that  is  given  will  be  treated  in  absolute  confidence 
even  in  the  event  of  legal  proceedings  being  instituted  in  the  future.  '28  This  is  an 
important  example  of  the  worry  that  lay  behind  the  perceived  need  for  privilege:  that 
disclosure  would  undermine  patients'  confidence  in  the  system  and  deter  them  from 
seeking  proper  treatment.  Wansey  Bayly  was  an  advocate  of  martyrdom,  `willing  to 
go  to  prison  for  conscience  sake,  as  honourable  men  have  so  frequently  been  called 
upon  to  do  in  the  past'.  29  Such  eloquence  in  describing  the  principled  martyr  is 
reminiscent  of  another  Harley  Street  advocate  of  martyrdom:  the  Dr  Baley  who  made 
similar  claims  in  the  Daily  Chronicle  at  the  time  of  the  Needham  v  Needham  case.  30 
Whether  this  was  the  same  individual  or  not,  his  well  advertised  and  patient  attracting 
willingness  to  sacrifice  himself  to  honour  seems  never  to  have  been  put  to  the  test. 
The  third  letter  came  from  Graham-Little.  Beyond  McCardie's  ruling, 
Graham-Little  had  been  aggrieved  by  what  he  saw  as  attempted  encroachment-by- 
stealth  into  medical  confidentiality.  The  House  of  Commons  had  recently  considered 
a  bill  which  contained  a  clause  from  the  Corporation  of  the  City  of  Liverpool  that 
would  have  made  it  compulsory  for  doctors  within  the  area  to  notify  a  public  authority 
of  patients  suffering  from  VD.  The  clause,  which  would  override  the  1916 
regulations,  was  part  of  a  136-page  document  and  was  only  noticed  at  the  last 
moment.  Graham-Little  believed  that  public  opinion  was  ripe  for  a  change  in  the  law 
in  favour  of  medical  privilege,  indeed  it  would  be  like  `forcing  an  open  door  ') 
. 
31 
On  the  same  day  as  Graham-Little's  letter  was  published  the  BMJ  carried  an 
article  which  recited  the  failed  attempts  to  claim  privilege  in  the  early  1920s.  It  also 
extended  the  claim  it  had  made  a  week  earlier,  stating  that  the  only  remedy  left  was 
special  legislation  which  `should  deal  not  only  with  venereal  clinics,  but  with  other 
regulations  under  which  the  same  or  similar  questions  arise.  '32  The  slide  towards 
vagueness  was  already  occurring.  If  they  were  to  learn  from  the  earlier  debates,  the 
medical  privilege  lobby  would  have  to  establish  a  clear  definition  of  the  legislation 
they  sought.  But  experience  indicated  that  ring-fencing  an  area  where  privilege 
applied  would  be  exceptionally  difficult.  The  difficulty  would  be  compounded  by  the 
need  to  convince  people  that  it  merited  overturning  150  years  of  case  law  which 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Daily  Chronicle  19  November  1921. 
31  Lancet  30  July  1927,  p.  254. 
32  BMJ  30  July  1927,  p.  179. 
163 provided  a  simple  and  categorical  rule:  in  the  interests  of  public  justice  there  was  no 
medical  privilege. 
For  the  next  three  months,  the  question  lay  beneath  the  surface,  both  in  the 
medical  press  and  at  the  Ministry.  Personnel  at  the  latter  were  aware  that  their  first 
step  had  to  be  to  address  the  case  Birkenhead  had  advanced  against  medical  privilege 
in  1922,  and  the  lull  in  publicity  on  the  issue  masks  the  tactical  thinking  going  on 
behind  the  scenes.  A  writer  to  the  BMJ  in  mid-August,  Alan  Gemmell,  suggested  that 
legislation  was  the  wrong  route  to  take.  Legislation  was  unlikely  to  provide  the  pro- 
privilege  lobby  with  what  they  wanted  and  `as  the  problem  has  nothing  to  do  with 
votes,  Parliament  would  never  find  time  for  it.  '33  Honour  was  the  key  element  for 
Gemmell  and  he  joined  those  in  favour  of  maintaining  confidences  even  if  it  entailed 
martyrdom  -  raising,  yet  again,  the  analogy  with  penitent  and  priest.  For  RM 
Courtauld,  however,  the  analogy  was  imperfect.  Responding  to  Gemmell  the 
following  month,  Courtauld  provided  reasons  why  the  medical  position  was  more 
contentious  than  the  priest's.  For  instance,  the  priest  only  knew  what  he  was  told 
whilst  the  doctor  had  the  knowledge  gained  by  virtue  of  his  observation  and  training. 
Thus,  the  latter  was  the  more  valuable  witness.  Moreover,  it  was  relatively  easy  to 
trace  the  doctor  who  had  treated  a  particular  patient  when  compared  to  the  difficulties 
in  establishing  which  priest  had  heard  a  penitent's  confession. 
If  the  required  doctor  was  as  little  discoverable  as  the  required  priest,  and  if 
his  evidence  was  confined  to  relating  verbal  confidences  that  he  had  received 
from  his  patient,  he  would  be  as  little  troubled  by  subpoenas  as  is  the  priest.  34 
The  Ministry  of  Health  were  also  looking  at  ways  to  avoid  resorting  to  legislation  to 
resolve  the  apparent  conflict  of  interests.  Writing  in  August,  Slator  summarised  the 
position  from  the  early  interwar  debate,  noting  in  particular  Birkenhead's  essay.  He 
summarised  Riddell's  address  to  the  medico-legal  society  and  the  details  of 
McCardie's  Birmingham  ruling  which  had  come  just  a  month  later.  In  light  of  all 
these,  he  foresaw  no  easy  way  to  achieve  the  changes  which  had  been  sought  in  1921. 
Rather  than-taking  such  a  difficult  route,  Slator  suggested  a  new  solution  which  `while 
not  solving-the  matter,  would  meet  with  less  opposition  and  would  minimise  the  harm 
33  BMJ  20  August  1927,  p.  329. 
34  BMJ  10  September  1927,  p.  470. 
164 done  to  the  venereal  disease  campaign'.  35  In  an  attempt  to  steer  a  middle  course 
through  the  extremes  of  new  legislation  or  medical  martyrdom,  Stator  suggested  that 
the  evidence  of  VD  medical  officers  could  be  heard  in  camera.  Recent  legislation  was 
noted  to  have  extended  the  courts  facilities  to  hear  evidence  in  private  and  Stator 
believed  that  private  hearings  would  reduce  the  level  of  publicity  which  such  cases 
received  and  consequently  there  would  be  less  of  a  deterrent  for  patients  seeking 
treatment. 
Naturally,  Gemmell  and  others  who  saw  the  matter  strictly  in  terms  of  honour 
would  not  have  been  mollified  by  such  an  approach  as  doctors  would  still  be  breaking 
their  patients'  confidences.  Duty  requires  the  same  action  whether  it  is  in  public  or 
private.  From  their  view  of  ethics  the  fact  that  an  action  would  not  be  widely  seen  did 
not  affect  its  wrongness.  But,  just  as  Riddell  had  acknowledged  that  the  law  and  ethics 
seemed  at  times  irreconcilable,  the  Ministry  were  looking  for  a  pragmatic  approach. 
No  scenario  was  likely  to  meet  with  universal  approval.  Therefore,  rather  than  going 
down  the  difficult  route  of  legislation,  why  not  try  to  find  the  best  angle  on  the  status 
quo?  The  public  had  been  most  heavily  involved  in  the  subject  when  the  newspapers 
had  covered  the  divorce  cases  in  which  doctors  had  unsuccessfully  claimed  privilege. 
Their  articles  had  suggested  that  the  whole  philosophy  underpinning  the  treatment 
schemes  had  been  put  under  threat  -  comments  which  had  sparked  the  Ministry  into 
action  in  1920.  If  the  negative  publicity  could  be  reduced,  or  even  done  away  with,  by 
having  the  evidence  given  in  private,  then  the  Ministry  hoped  to  solve  the  problem 
without  having  to  do  the  seemingly  impossible  by  reconciling  the  warring  factions. 
A  month  later,  Coutts  was  pointing  to  deficiencies  in  Stator's  proposed 
position.  36  Giving  evidence  in  private  would  presumably  not  prevent  protest  being 
made  and,  Coutts  surmised,  in  all  likelihood  that  protest  would  become  public.  While 
not  questioning  the  undesirability  of  negative  press,  Coutts  indicated  that  the  history 
of  the  VD  clinics  showed  little  change  in  attendance  despite  the  detrimental  press 
coverage  of  cases  like  Garner  v  Garner.  He  suggested  that  the  real  problem  was  not 
sufferers  being  deterred  from  seeking  treatment,  but  that  VD  medical  officers  were 
uncomfortable  with  their  situation.  The  evidence  certainly  pointed  towards  more 
unrest  amongst  the  VD  doctors  than  the  patients.  The  Ministry  had  received  a  number 
of  complaints  about  the  prominence  of  the  guarantee  of  confidentiality  on  posters  and 
33  PRO  MH  55/184  Memo  by  FS  25/8/1927. 
36  PRO  MH  55/184  Memo  by  Coutts  20/9/1927. 
165 leaflets  advertising  the  clinics  in  the  early  interwar  years.  The  doctors  involved  in  the 
high  profile  cases  -  Elliot  in  Needham  v  Needham  and  Assinder  in  the  1927 
Birmingham  Case  -  had  clearly  been  made  uncomfortable  in  their  position  relative  to 
their  patients.  Assinder  was  threatening  to  withdraw  the  clinic's  advertisements.  Elliot 
had  threatened  resignation.  Coutts  suggested  that  they  had  taken  too  literal  an 
interpretation  of  the  regulations  as  binding  them  to  absolute  secrecy.  In  his  view  the 
regulations  were  intended  to  provide  no  more  than  a  general  rule  of  confidentiality 
because  of  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  complaint  and  the  importance  of  secrecy  to  its 
treatment. 
Having  seemingly  argued  against  the  case  for  medical  privilege,  Coutts  then 
suggested  that  the  resolution  was  best  found  in  establishing  the  right  for  VD  doctors 
to  refrain  from  breaking  confidences  without  patient  consent.  Criminal  cases  would  be 
exempt  from  such  a  rule  and  there  would  be  provisos  for  consultations  made  on  behalf 
of  insurance  companies,  and  for  doctors  to  defend  themselves  in  malpraxis  cases. 
Further  exemptions  might  include  a  patient  being  examined  at  the  request  of  a  parent 
or  employer,  and  communications  with  mentally  defective  or  unsound  individuals. 
Special  measures  would  also  have  to  be  considered  for  pathologists  who  had  to 
examine  specimens  for  VD  clinics.  Thus,  Coutts  had  moved  from  a  relatively  simple 
position  -  educate  the  VD  doctors  that  secrecy  was  a  rule  that  could  be  broken  when 
giving  evidence  in  court  -  to  one  in  which  VD  doctors  should  maintain  secrecy,  even 
in  court,  but  with  a  number  of  other  exceptions.  Experience  indicated  that  the  latter 
approach  was  likely  to  be  more  complicated. 
The  following  day,  Colonel  Harrison,  the  Ministry's  adviser  on  VD,  wrote  to 
Coutts  with  his  interpretation  of  the  situation.  37  In  essence  his  argument  was  that  VD 
treatment  was  an  exceptional  instance  in  which  medical  confidentiality  was  more 
important  than  medical  testimony  in  court.  In  stressing  the  importance  of  encouraging 
sufferers  to  seek  early  treatment  by  guaranteeing  confidentiality,  he  was  speaking 
from  a  basis  of  knowledge: 
Some  instances  in  my  own  experience  of  men  concealing  their  venereal 
disease,  or  their  suspicions  of  such,  for  years  are  almost  unbelievable.  Often 
37  PRO  MH  551184  Memo  by  Harrison  21/9/1927. 
166 enough  in  the  meantime  these  persons  have  passed  on  their  diseases  to  others, 
and  frequently  they  have  become  mental  wrecks.  38 
It  was  not  enough  to  assess  whether  people  turned  up  at  the  clinics  for  treatment.  Just 
as  important  was  encouraging  early  treatment.  Consequently,  anything  which  cast 
doubt  into  the  sufferer's  mind  that  may  result  in  a  delay  in  seeking  treatment  would  be 
of  detriment  both  to  the  individual  and  possibly  the  community  as  well.  Therefore 
Harrison  argued  that,  save  in  criminal  cases,  anything  which  implied  that  the 
guarantee  of  confidentiality  was  not  as  extensive  as  it  had  seemed,  would  be 
detrimental  to  the  treatment  schemes  and  the  community.  Clearly,  Harrison  was 
making  an  argument  based  on  personal  knowledge  and  expertise  rather  than  theory  or 
conjecture  and  he  claimed  the  support  of  `all  medical  officers  I  know  who  are  closely 
acquainted  with  the  psychology  of  venereal  patients.  '39 
Doctors  had  previously  presented  the  public  interest  case  for  allowing  VD 
officers  a  level  of  privilege.  Harrison  would  have  known  it  would  not  in  itself  be 
enough.  Rather  than  focussing  solely  on  defending  the  medical  position,  he  turned  to 
attack  the  legal  stance.  Birkenhead  and  others  had  stressed  the  importance  of  medical 
evidence  to  the  ends  of  justice.  Treading  carefully,  Harrison  ventured  that  medical 
evidence  may  not  be  helpful  and  indeed  it  could  be  `positively  harmful  unless  the 
judge  and  barristers  possess  the  knowledge  of  a  VD  specialist.  '40  On  a  number  of 
occasions  the  opinion  had  been  expressed  that  the  judge  was  best  placed  to  decide 
when  medical  testimony  was  important  enough  to  override  confidentiality.  Harrison 
was  implicitly  attacking  this  assertion  by  querying  the  extent  to  which  legal  minds 
had  a  sufficient  understanding  of  the  medicine  involved  to  make  an  informed 
decision.  Taking  one  of  Birkenhead's  hypothetical  cases  from  1922,  Harrison  outlined 
the  difficulty  of  interpreting  the  medical  evidence  to  prove  with  certainty  which 
member  of  a  couple  had  transmitted  VD  to  the  other.  It  is  worth  quoting  at  length  his 
comments  on  the  subject. 
In  most  cases  of  the  kind  assumed  here  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  prove 
either  A.  B.  or  his  wife  were  guilty.  Assuming  that  A.  B.  had  taken  the  steps  most 
3a  Ibid. 
39  Ibid. 
ao  Ibid. 
167 favourable  to  a  decision  by  seeking  medical  advice  at  once  for  an  early  primary 
sore  and,  on  the  diagnosis  being  pronounced,  having  his  wife  examined  at  once, 
the  evidence  would  have  to  prove  not  only  the  earliness  of  the  husband's  syphilis 
and  the  greater  age  (by  weeks)  of  the  wife's  but  also  the  finding  of  a  primary  sore 
in  the  wife  in  a  situation,  such  as  the  cervix  uteri,  where  it  could  have  been 
acquired  only  by  illicit  relations.  I  venture  to  say  that  such  a  combination  would 
not  be  discovered  once  in  a  thousand  times.  The  most  usual  event,  even  when  the 
husband  had  been  so  prompt  as  supposed,  would  be  failure  to  find  any  primary 
sore  in  the  wife,  and  even  if  she  were  proved  to  have  acquired  syphilis,  it  would 
be  unjust  to  conclude  that  she  had  done  so  other  than  accidentally.  In  most  cases 
the  story  starts  with  the  doctor  at  a  much  later  date  when  nobody  can  say  with 
certainty  which  party  was  infected  first;  the  evidence  is  extorted  but  proves 
nothing  to  an  informed  mind.  In  Birkenhead's  case  A.  B.  might  go  to  the  doctor 
with  a  relapse  of  a  primary  sore  having  been  infected  two  or  three  months  before 
and  been  treated  by  another  doctor  but  having  in  the  meantime  infected  his  wife. 
The  doctor's  "simple  sentence"  might  be  to  the  effect  that  he  found  a  primary  sore 
on  the  husband  and  a  syphilitic  rash  on  the  wife.  The  first  conclusion,  without 
careful  cross-examination  based  on  expert  knowledge,  could  easily  be  that  the 
wife  had  acquired  the  disease  first  and  had  infected  her  husband.  4' 
Medical  evidence  should  not,  therefore,  be  seen  as  an  easy  route  to  the  truth,  as  it 
could  not  always  establish  with  any  certainty  the  order  of  events  which  had  led  to  the 
infection  of  either  party.  It  is  important  to  note  that  Harrison  was  not  belittling 
medical  expertise.  Rather,  in  understanding  the  complexities  of  the  disease,  VD 
doctors  were  able  to  foresee  the  difficulty  of  using  medical  testimony  to  establish 
facts  on  which  legal  cases  could  be  decided.  It  was  their  superior  knowledge  of  the 
possible  sequences  of  infection  which  led  to  their  inability  to  provide  strict  factual 
evidence.  The  more  they  knew  of  the  disease,  the  more  they  knew  they  could  not  be 
sure  of  its  history  of  transmission.  2  Following  from  this,  if  medical  testimony  did  not 
serve  the  ends  of  justice  in  such  cases  and  confidentiality  was  beneficial  to  the 
41  Ibid. 
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168 treatment  of  VD,  then  it  was  in  the  public  interest  for  VD  officers  to  have  a  privilege 
of  secrecy. 
As  it  turned  out,  the  Ministry  did  not  opt  to  follow  the  line  taken  by  Slator, 
Coutts  or  Harrison.  At  a  Cabinet  meeting  on  the  morning  of  11  September, 
Chamberlain  spoke  to  the  Lord  Chancellor  (Cave)  about  medical  privilege.  Contrary 
to  Addison's  approach  to  Birkenhead  in  1920,  Chamberlain  did  not  believe  that 
legislation  was  required.  Rather  he  suggested  that  the  situation  would  be  alleviated  if 
the  Lord  Chancellor  asked  judges  `not  to  make  a  parade  of  their  insistence  of  the 
evidence  being  given  as  was  done  by  Mr  Justice  McCardie  in  the  1927  Birmingham 
Case.  '43  Presumably  this  referred  to  McCardie's  threat  to  subpoena  the  whole  of  the 
staff  at  the  Birmingham  hospital,  which  naturally  attracted  press  attention.  The  Lord 
Chancellor  agreed  to  talk  to  Lord  Merrivale,  the  President  of  the  Probate  Divorce  and 
Admiralty  Division.  This  approach  would  help  to  solve  the  problem  of  doctors' 
perceptions  that  they  were  being  unfairly  treated  by  judges  and  also  the  press  interest 
in  open  confrontation  between  doctors  and  the  judiciary  in  the  public  arena  of  the 
courtroom.  However,  Robinson  saw  two  outstanding  issues.  It  was  unclear  if  the 
BMA  were  going  to  press  the  matter  and  Robinson  suggested  that  in  light  of 
Birkenhead's  well-known  hostility  to  medical  privilege,  it  was  best  to  keep  them 
quiet.  Moreover,  if  there  was  to  be  no  legislation,  there  was  still  a  question  of  whether 
anything  should  be  done  regarding  the  pledge  of  confidentiality  given  at  the  VD 
clinics.  This  had  been  a  sticking-point  for  many  of  the  VD  officers  and  the  Ministry's 
proposed  action  would  do  little  to  change  that.  Robinson's  suggestion,  endorsed  by 
Chamberlain,  was  simple:  `I  am  for  doing  nothing  and  I  do  not  think  such  passivity 
will  do  harm.  '44  High  profile  cases  were  infrequent  and  if  the  judges  tempered  their 
demands  for  medical  testimony  they  should  receive  even  less  publicity.  There  was, 
however,  one  key  unknown  factor  -  the  likely  impact  of  Ernest  Graham-Little's 
proposed  bill. 
The  Medical  Practitioners'  Communications  Privilege  Bill. 
Graham-Little  announced  his  intention  to  introduce  a  bill  on  medical  privilege  in  The 
Times  on  14  November  1927.  The  following  day  he  proposed  to  postpone  the  motion 
until  22  November,  `so  as  to  give  opportunity  of  further  consideration  of  the  measure 
43  PRO  MH  55/184  Memo  9/11/1927. 
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169 by  all  concerned.  '45  On  the  same  day  he  wrote  to  Wood  at  the  Ministry  enclosing  a 
draft  of  his  bill46  Unlike  the  proposals  which  Dawson  had  advocated  in  1921, 
Graham-Little  was  proposing  to  limit  the  legislation  to  communications  made  under 
the  1916  VD  regulations.  He  stressed  the  strength  of  feeling,  evident  in  the  medical 
press,  that  there  was  a  need  for  change  either  in  the  law  relating  to  evidence,  or  in  the 
regulations  which  guaranteed  secrecy.  The  former  was  the  preferred  option,  and  his 
bill  had  the  support  of  several  MPs.  If  the  Ministry  was  to  support  the  bill,  he  believed 
its  success  would  be  assured. 
The  Ministry  drafted  a  response  to  Graham-Little  indicating  that,  despite  its 
limited  scope,  the  bill  would  raise  the  whole  question  of  medical  privilege  `as  to 
which  there  are  marked  differences  of  opinion.  A7  In  the  circumstances  no  guarantee 
of  Ministerial  support  could  be  given.  It  is  not  clear  whether  this  letter  was  sent,  but 
Kingsley  Wood  did  speak  with  Graham-Little  before  the  date  he  was  due  to  present 
his  bill  to  the  House  of  Commons.  Noting  that  the  question  required  careful 
consideration,  Wood  informed  Graham-Little  that  parliamentary  business  would  leave 
no  time  for  his  bill  in  the  current  session.  48  Clearly,  Wood  was  trying  to  dissuade 
Graham-Little  from  pursuing  the  matter  in  Parliament  in  the  same  way  as  Robinson 
had  dissuaded  Dawson  in  1921.  Graham-Little  was  not  so  willing  to  comply. 
Graham-Little  was  not  the  only  one  still  concerned  with  medical  confidences. 
The  day  before  his  bill  was  due  to  be  heard  in  the  House  of  Commons,  a  joint  meeting 
of  the  Bournemouth  Legal  Society  and  the  Bournemouth  Division  of  the  BMA  was 
held  to  discuss  whether  medical  confidences  should  be  privileged  in  civil  and  criminal 
legal  procedure.  49  The  discussion  was  opened  by  Dr  EK  Le  Fleming,  who  put 
forward  three  arguments  for  medical  privilege:  honour;  public  demand  for  it;  and  the 
example  of  most  European  countries  and  some  American  states.  These,  along  with  the 
other  views  put  forward  at  the  meeting,  were  well-worn  arguments.  Marshall  Harvey 
of  the  legal  society  stressed  the  importance  of  medical  evidence  to  legal  proceedings 
and  the  role  played  by  a  doctor's  conscience.  Dr  LA  Weatherley,  asked  to  speak  at 
short  notice,  pointed  to  a  recognised  medical  privilege  in  Scotland.  In  this  he  was 
mistaken,  as  the  Scottish  courts,  while  accepting  that  confidentiality  was  an  integral 
45  The  TimeU5  November  1927. 
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170 part  if  the  doctor  -  patient  relationship,  recognised  that  some  circumstances  justified 
breaching  patient  confidences.  Disclosure  at  the  demand  of  a  judge  in  court  was  one 
such  justification.  Weatherly  also  suggested,  as  Slator  had  done  at  the  Ministry,  that 
evidence  could  be  heard  in  camera.  Mr  D'Angibau  of  the  legal  society  pointed  out 
that  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  change  a  law  which  had  been  in  force  since 
1776  -  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  ongoing  legacy.  While  there  did  not  seem  to  be  too 
much  agreement  between  the  lawyers  and  doctors  -  Le  Fleming  suggested  that  the 
legal  society  were  unable  to  refute  his  arguments  for  privilege  -  there  was  some.  Mr 
Maud  from  the  legal  society  supported  privilege  for  both  doctors  and  priests.  But, 
with  the  standard  broad  arguments  and  divergence  of  opinions,  Bournemouth  did  not 
provide  a  good  omen  for  Graham-Little's  bill  entering  parliament  the  following  day. 
In  the  House  of  Commons  on  22  November  1927,  Graham-Little  sought  leave  to 
introduce  his  bill.  It  was  drafted  in  the  following  terms: 
Be  it  enacted  by  the  King's  most  excellent  Majesty,  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Lords  Spiritual  and  Temporal,  and  Commons,  in  this  present 
Parliament  assembled,  and  by  the  authority  of  the  same,  as  follows:  - 
1.  Any  information  obtained  by  a  duly  registered  medical  practitioner  in  regard 
to  any  person  treated  for  VD  under  a  scheme  approved  in  pursuance  of  Article 
II  (2)  of  the  Public  Health  (Venereal  Diseases)  Regulations,  1916  shall  be 
regarded  as  confidential,  and  shall  be  privileged  from  disclosure  under  the 
court  of  law. 
Provided  that  the  information  obtained  shall  have  been  obtained  for  the  purpose  of 
a  cure  or  assisting  in  a  cure,  of  a  person  so  treated. 
And  provided  also  that  this  privilege  shall  not  extend  to  any  communication  made 
with  the  object  of  committing  or  aiding  in  the  committing  of  any  fraud  or  crime. 
2.  For  the  purpose  of  this  Act  "Duly  recognised  medical  practitioner"  shall  mean 
a  person  whose  name  is  on  the  "medical  register". 
3.  This  Act  shall  be  called  the  Medical  Practitioners  Communications  Privilege 
Act  .  1927. 
Graham-Little  declared  that  the  bill  was  aimed  at  removing  the  deadlock  between  the 
authority  of  the  VD  regulations  and  the  judiciary  over  the  secrecy  of  treatment  at  VD 
171 clinics.  Using  information  from  the  Royal  Commission  Report,  Graham-Little  made 
clear  the  prevalence  of  VD  in  Britain.  He  noted  that  it  was  the  third  biggest  killer, 
after  cancer  and  tuberculosis,  `and  probably  ought  to  come  first  as  it  predisposes  in 
very  many  cases  to  those  diseases'.  50  In  strong  rhetoric  reminiscent  of  Birkenhead,  he 
noted  the  extremely  high  mortality  rates  it  caused  amongst  children.  As  well  as 
`slaying  their  tens  of  thousands'51,  venereal  diseases  topped  the  list  of  disabling 
diseases,  were  responsible  for  a  large  proportion  of  cases  of  insanity  and  caused  many 
diseases  of  the  nervous  system  `which  make  life  a  prolonged  agony.  '52  Again  quoting 
the  figures  from  the  Royal  Commission,  he  estimated  I  in  10  persons  were  infected, 
and  that  half  of  all  cases  of  blindness  in  `quite  young  children'53  were  attributable  to 
VD. 
When  the  VD  treatment  clinics  had  been  set  up  after  the  report  of  the  Royal 
Commission  in  1916,  the  regulations  had  made  clear  the  prime  importance  of 
confidentiality  to  the  success  of  the  scheme.  In  Graham-Little's  opinion,  all 
information  at  the  clinics  was  to  be  regarded  as  `absolutely  confidential.  '54  A  bold 
interpretation  of  article  II  (2),  this  was  in  keeping  with  the  strong  language  he  used  to 
build  the  case  for  his  bill.  Modem  treatment  of  VD  had  `revolutionised'  prognosis. 
Deterrence  factors  to  treatment  may  cause  `irreparable'  damage,  presumably  to 
patient  and  community.  Two  key  factors  were  required  for  the  success  of  the  VD 
scheme:  the  enthusiastic  co-operation  of  the  doctors  involved  and  the  complete 
confidence  of  patients.  A  judicial  ruling  like  that  of  McCardie  in  the  1927 
Birmingham  Case  undermined  both  elements.  Moreover,  by  implication  any  proposed 
remedy  that  did  not  guarantee  complete  confidence  -a  taming  of  the  regulations  for 
instance  -  would  be  detrimental.  Graham-Little  went  further,  suggesting  that  forcing 
VD  doctors  was  not  only  a  `betrayal'  of  Hippocratic  ethics,  but  was  an  affront  to 
parliament,  `because  Parliament  must  be  responsible  in  some  measure  for  the  acts  of 
one  of  the  most  important  Ministries  under  the  Government.  'S5  Clearly,  he  was 
attempting  to  portray  the  situation  as  a  stand-off  between  Parliament  and  the 
judiciary,  rather  than  an  inter-professional  dispute  between  law  and  medicine.  The 
50  Official  Report  of  Parliamentary  Debates.  House  of  Commons.  Vol.  210  (1927),  p.  1608. 
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172 argument  would  have  had  more  force  if  it  had  come  from,  or  been  strongly  supported 
by,  the  Ministry  itself. 
Thus  far  in  his  speech,  Graham-Little  had  adopted  similar  techniques  to  those 
Birkenhead  had  employed  with  such  success  in  the  early  1920s.  His  vocabulary  and 
illustrations  had  evoked  strong  images  of  the  need  for  absolute  confidentiality  - 
revolutionary  treatment;  irreparable  damage;  betrayal  of  trust;  and  children  suffering 
the  consequences.  He  even  followed  Birkenhead  in  being  somewhat  liberal  in  his 
interpretation  of  past  events,  claiming  that  his  bill  sought  to  sanction  legally  as 
privileged  `communications  which  have  been  erroneously  supposed  during  the  past  12 
years  to  be  privileged.  06  In  light  of  the  legal  rulings  against  medical  privilege  of  the 
early  interwar  debate,  this  was  a  highly  dubious  claim.  For  his  finishing  flurry,  he 
presented  a  choice:  either  the  law  had  to  change  or  the  regulations  had  to  be  scrapped. 
He  had  been  assured  by  `eminent'  MPs  that  any  legal  difficulties  could  be  `readily 
overcome'.  If,  however,  the  House  opted  to  scrap  the  regulations,  `the  fate  of  a  highly 
successful  and  important  ministerial  and  medical  effort  is  sealed.  '  57  A  first  reading  of 
the  bill  was  agreed  to,  and  the  second  reading  was  scheduled  for  the  following 
Monday. 
An  almost  verbatim  account  of  Graham-Little's  speech  in  the  House  of 
Commons  was  published  in  the  BMJ.  58  The  correspondence  pages  of  the  same  issue 
burgeoned  with  letters  on  the  subject.  Dr  H  Pinkhof  from  Amsterdam,  while 
expressing  appreciation  of  the  line  taken  by  Graham-Little,  was  amazed  that  he  had 
been  advised  to  restrict  the  privilege  to  cases  involving  VD.  If  such  a  limited  privilege 
were  granted,  then  anyone  claiming  the  privilege  was  implicitly  confirming  the 
presence  of  VD.  Pinkhof  noted  that  the  High  Court  of  the  Netherlands  had  recently 
granted  doctors  the  right  to  refuse  to  give  evidence  in  court  after  one  practitioner  had 
served  as  martyr  for  the  cause  and  been  imprisoned.  59  WG  Aitchison  Robertson, 
author  of  Medical  Conduct  and  Practice,  took  a  very  different  line.  He  thought  far  too 
much  was  made  of  claims  to  medical  privilege  and  that  it  was  right  that  judges,  as 
accredited  representatives  of  the  King,  had  the  power  to  demand  medical  evidence. 
The  problem  of  negative  publicity  could  be  overcome  by  giving  evidence  in  writing 
56  Ibid. 
57  Ibid. 
58  BMJ  26  November  1927,  p.  1010. 
59  BMJ  3  December  1927,  p.  1055. 
173 or  in  camera.  Otherwise  the  law  should  be  accepted  as  it  stood  . 
60  This  letter 
confirmed  the  views  expressed  by  Aitchison  Robertson  in  his  textbook  of  1921.  While 
recognising  the  importance  of  confidentiality  to  medical  practice,  he  emphasised  the 
importance  of  the  doctor's  duty  to  society  by  aiding  the  law  in  cases  of  crime  or 
giving  evidence  during  legal  proceedings  -  in  Aitchison  Robertson's  view 
Mansfield's  ruling  from  1776  `still  holds  good'  61 
A  lengthy  letter  was  received  from  one  of  the  participants  in  the  Bournemouth 
discussion.  Lionel  Weatherly,  having  been  given  insufficient  time  at  the  Bournemouth 
meeting,  wanted  to  use  the  BMJ  to  voice  his  `very  definite  views  on  this  burning 
subject.  '62  He  suggested  that  judges  had  less  respect  for  medical  secrecy  than  they  had 
shown  forty  years  previously.  Weatherly  opposed  the  BMA's  position  that  general 
rules  could  not  be  laid  down  and  he  was  also  against  martyrdom  as  a  route  to 
privilege.  Rather,  he  supported  Graham-Little's  bill  because  it  resolved  the 
inconsistency  between  the  Ministry's  pledge  of  secrecy  and  the  judiciary's  demand 
that  the  pledge  be  broken  and,  also,  because  secrecy  was  so  important  in  successfully 
combating  VD.  If  evidence  had  to  be  heard  -  and  each  case  where  the  question  arose 
should  be  considered  on  its  own  merits  -  the  evidence  should  be  given  in  camera.  In 
other  words,  Weatherly  advocated  a  privilege  for  VD  doctors,  but  if  it  could  not  be 
granted  then  the  judge  in  each  case  should  consider  whether  medical  evidence, 
received  at  the  price  of  deterring  sufferers  from  seeking  treatment,  was  really 
necessary.  If  it  was,  then  the  damage  should  be  limited  by  keeping  the  proceedings  as 
private  as  possible. 
The  Lancet  also  carried  a  summary  of  Graham-Little's  speech.  In  an  article  on 
medical  confidences  in  the  same  issue,  it  was  stressed  that  privilege  would  have  to  be 
consistently  applied.  63  Obviously  thinking  along  the  same  lines  as  Pinkhof,  the  Lancet 
quoted  the  Solicitors  Journal's  belief  that  a  privilege  which  applied  only  to  VD 
treatment  would  be  liable  to  provide  evidence  by  implication  whenever  a  doctor 
claimed  privilege.  Arguably,  doctors  should  not  even  waive  privilege  at  the  request  of 
the  patient  as  it  would  have  a  negative  reflection  on  defendants  who  chose  not  to 
consent  to  medical  disclosure.  The  privilege  would  have  to  be  sought  on  grounds  of 
6°  Ibid. 
61  WG  Aitchison  Robertson,  Medical  Conduct  and  Practice.  A  Guide  to  the  Ethics  of  Medicine, 
(London,  1921),  Mansfield  is  quoted  on  p135. 
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174 public  interest,  but,  in  the  article's  view,  `health  is  hardly  a  less  urgent  national  need 
than  justice.  '64 
While  the  medical  journals  were  assessing  Graham-Little's  bill,  at  the 
Ministry  of  Health  Machlachlan  instructed  Slator  to  consult  with  the  solicitors'  branch 
and  draw  up  a  memo  in  response.  65  Slator  acted  on  this  the  following  day  raising  the 
following  points  for  the  solicitor  to  consider.  6  Would  the  proposed  privilege  prevent 
evidence  being  given  where  the  patient  consented  to  disclosure?  Which  patients 
would  be  covered  by  the  privilege?  Under  the  strict  terms  of  Graham-Little's  bill, 
only  information  relating  to  individuals  treated  at  the  VD  clinics  would  be  privileged. 
Thirty  percent  of  people  turning  up  at  the  treatment  centres  were  found  not  to  be 
infected  so  would  presumably  not  be  covered  by  the  law.  Similarly  a  'number  were 
diagnosed  with  VD  who  then  abstained  from  treatment  and  so  would  also  be  denied 
privilege  by  the  semantics  of  the  bill.  Slator  also  queried  the  purpose  of  the  first 
proviso  and  the  wording  of  the  second  proviso  to  the  first  clause. 
On  8  December  Slator  wrote  back  to  Machlachlan,  indicating  that  the  bill 
would  need  drastic  redrafting  and  was,  therefore,  not  worth  devoting  much  time  to.  As 
example  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  draft,  Slator  pointed  out  that  the  bill  would  only 
protect  communications  between  the  doctor  and  patient,  not  the  information  which  the 
doctor  obtained  by  his  own  observations  or  from  laboratory  reports.  He  suggested  that 
the  first  clause  would  be  better  re-worded  as: 
A  registered  medical  practitioner  shall  not,  except  at  the  request  or  with  the 
consent  of  his  patient,  be  compellable  in  any  civil  proceedings  to  disclose  any 
information  obtained  by  him  in  the  course  of  attendance  on  the  patient  at  an 
institution  or  centre  for  the  treatment  of  VD  established  by  or  under 
arrangements  made  with  the  local  authority.  Nor  shall  he  be  compellable,  for 
the  purpose  of  disclosing  any  such  information,  to  produce  any  books  or 
documents  kept  at  such  institution  or  centre.  67 
This,  in  itself,  would  be  insufficient  if  there  were  any  documents  in  the  custody  of 
nurses  or  her  staff  which  could  be  called  as  evidence  in  place  of  the  doctor  and  his 
64  Ibid. 
65  PRO  MH  55/184  Note  from  Machlachlan  to  Slator  2  December  1927. 
66  PRO  MH  55/184  Note  from  Slator  to  solicitor  3  December  1927. 
67  PRO  MH  55/184  Note  from  Slator  to  Machlachlan  8  December  1927. 
175 records.  It  was  pointed  out  that  at  large  treatment  centres  the  register  of  patients  was 
filled  out  by  a  clerk  on  behalf  of  the  medical  officer  in  charge.  Therefore,  the  clerk 
could  be  a  valid  witness.  Other  employees  could  also  be  liable  to  provide  appropriate 
testimony: 
an  orderly  who  prepared  a  solution  of  arsenobenzene  and  saw  the  medical 
officer  administer  it  to  a  patient  whom  he  could  identify  in  Court  might  be  a 
useful  witness  if  privilege  was  extended  only  to  medical  officers  of  the 
centre.  68 
Clearly,  the  definition  of  the  privilege  would  have  to  be  more  extensive  than  Graham- 
Little  had  envisaged  -  at  the  very  least  covering  all  staff  and  documents  at  the  VD 
clinics. 
At  the  bottom  of  the  memo,  a  handwritten  note  from  Machlachlan  suggested 
that  the  matter  could  be  put  on  hold  as  there  was  no  likelihood  of  the  bill  making 
progress  in  the  current  parliamentary  session.  He  was  right  -  the  bill  did  not  resurface 
until  nearly  a  decade  later.  Talk  of  legislation  did  continue  in  the  interim.  Vernon 
Davies,  a  keen  supporter  of  Graham-Little's  bill,  approached  the  Ministry  to  get  a 
clause  inserted  into  a  National  Health  Insurance  bill  in  early  1928.  Frustrated  that 
there  was  insufficient  time  to  get  a  general  bill  enforcing  article  II  (2)  of  the  1916 
regulations,  Davies  was  attempting  to  get  at  least  a  legislative  guarantee  of  secrecy  for 
insured  persons  undergoing  VD  treatment,  by  inserting  a  clause  in  a  bill  that  was 
already  going  through  parliament.  Coutts  and  Slator,  who  met  with  Davies,  pointed 
out  that  such  a  limited  applicability  was  illogical.  While  agreeing  that  uninsured 
persons  should  also  have  a  guarantee  of  secrecy,  Davies  argued  that  insurance  patients 
were  often  afraid  to  seek  official  treatment  for  VD  and  in  the  long-run  this  had  a 
greater  impact  on  insurance  funds.  Coutts  and  Slator  suggested  that  Davies  draft  a 
clause  and  the  Ministry  could  comment  on  whether  they  felt  it  worthwhile  pursuing. 
Davies  had  a  different  plan.  If  the  Ministry  were  to  draft  a  clause  along  the  lines 
which  they  felt  best  calculated  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  secrecy  and  it  was  then  to 
fall  into  hi.  -hands,  `he  would  receive  it  confidentially  and  introduce  the  clause  as  his 
68  PRO  MH  55/184  Note  from  unnamed  to  Stator  9  December  1927. 
176 own  without  making  any  reference  to  the  Ministry.  '69  Having  attempted  puppetry  with 
Elliot  in  1921,  the  Ministry  gave  the  impression  they  were  not  too  keen  to  go  along 
with  Davies'  plan.  Coutts  summarised  their  response  as  follows: 
We  mentioned  the  objections  to  such  a  procedure  and  did  not  encourage  him 
to  think  that  we  should  be  able  to  do  as  he  requested,  but  we  promised  that  the 
matter  should  be  considered  in  the  department  and  that  a  communication 
should  be  sent  to  him.  0 
Machlachlan  asked  Slator  to  contact  Sir  Walter  Kinnear,  controller  of  insurance  and 
pensions  at  the  Ministry  of  Health.  71  Slator  wrote  back  suggesting  that  any  clause 
which  sought  to  protect  the  secrecy  of  insured  persons  alone  would  be  `out  of 
order'. 
72  Machlachlan  passed  this  opinion  on  to  Kinnear,  who  in  turn  persuaded 
Vernon  Davies  that  `we  cannot  deal  with  a  general  question  of  this  magnitude  in  a 
NHI  Bill.  973  This  negative  response  to  Vernon  Davies  brought  the  question  of  medical 
privilege  to  a  close  as  far  as  the  Ministry  was  concerned. 
An  additional  reason  for  the  Ministry's  reluctance  to  support  medical  privilege 
was  the  simultaneous  rise  of  interest  in  the  benefits  of  notification  of  VD.  This 
campaign  was  driven  from  Scotland  where  there  was  considerable  interest  in  adopting 
legal  coercion  to  get  patients  to  undergo  early  and  full  treatment.  The  Edinburgh 
Corporation  (Venereal  Disease)  Bill  that  sought  to  implement  these  measures  on  a 
trial  basis  in  Edinburgh  received  its  first  reading  in  the  House  of  Commons  in 
February  1928  and  forced  the  Ministry  of  Health  to  seriously  consider  its  merits.  The 
bill  did  not  succeed,  being  defeated  by  156  votes  to  93  on  its  second  reading  in  the 
House  of  Commons  after  a  `lively'  four  hour  debate  on  19  April.  74  Its  failure  does  not 
detract  from  the  impact  it  had  as  a  counterbalance  to  those  lobbying  the  Ministry  to 
support  a  bill  aimed  at  medical  privilege  in  cases  of  VD.  It  emphasised  the  fact  that 
there  were  conflicting  views  on  medical  privilege,  even  in  connection  with  VD  and 
the  Ministry  would  not  solve  its  problems  by  supporting  a  bill  like  Graham-Little's. 
69  PRO  MH  "5/184  Coutts'  memo  27  April  1928. 
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177 However,  while  the  Ministry  had  long  since  lost  the  desire  to  pursue  the 
question  of  medical  privilege,  for  others  the  question  of  legislation  was  still  open. 
Speaking  to  the  St  Pancras  members  of  the  BMA  in  October  1928,  Graham-Little 
announced  his  intention  to  reintroduce  his  bill,  claiming  he  had  `received  some 
encouragement  from  the  Government  Whips'.  75  The  fact  that  the  Ministry  of  Health 
had  closed  their  file  on  the  question  makes  this  an  unlikely  move  from  the  Whips,  but, 
if  accurate,  they  were  amongst  other  voices  giving  support  for  Graham-Little's  bill. 
At  the  Royal  Institute  of  Public  Health  in  January  1928,  Lord  Justice  Atkin 
expressed  support  whilst  presiding  over  a  discussion  on  the  position  of  medical 
witnesses.  Roland  Burrows,  a  lawyer,  gave  a  speech  entitled  `the  medical  practitioner 
in  relation  to  the  administration  of  justice',  in  which  he  expressed  the  opinion  that 
there  was  insufficient  reason  to  grant  doctors  privilege.  Drawing  attention  to  the 
uneasy  relationship  between  lawyers  and  medical  witnesses,  Burrows  acknowledged 
that  on  occasions  counsel  did  seem  to  have  overstepped  the  limits  of  decorum  76 
, 
but 
often  medical  witnesses  seemed,  a  priori,  to  object  to  cross-examination.  Cross- 
examination  was  important  in  establishing  the  strength  of  the  evidence,  and  it  was  a 
key  reason  why  medical  evidence  could  not  take  the  form  of  a  written  report.  Burrows 
suggested  that  a  doctor  should  understand  the  case  before  he  took  to  the  witness  stand 
so  that  he  could  have  clear  in  his  own  mind  what  information  was  relevant  and  could 
be  stated  as  fact.  He  should  also  be  conscious  of  not  overstepping  the  mark  with 
inference  or  hypothesis,  making  clear  when  he  was  simply  expressing  opinion.  There 
is  something  in  Burrows  words  that  is  strongly  reminiscent  of  the  textbook  writers  on 
medical  jurisprudence  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  idea  that  medical  witnesses  were 
uncomfortable  in  the  witness  stand,  facing  questions  which  probed  how  much  they 
knew  and  could  be  sure  of  their  subject. 
Lord  Justice  Atkin  stressed  the  importance  of  medical  evidence  to  the  justice 
system  and  suggested  that,  as  a  group,  doctors  received  sympathetic  treatment  from 
the  courts.  Agreeing  with  Burrows  that  often  cross-examination  was  difficult  for 
medical  witnesses,  Atkin  proffered  his  own  golden  rule:  make  clear  when  you  are  not 
sure  of  the  evidence  you  are  giving.  Such  an  approach  would  leave  the  witness  in  a 
stronger  position.  As  for  medical  privilege,  Atkin  placed  the  claims  of  justice  on  one 
side  of  the-balance  and  those  of  public  health  on  the  other.  In  his  opinion: 
75  The  Times  II  October  1928. 
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178 In  some  cases,  especially  in  connexion  with  venereal  disease,  he  was  of 
opinion  that  the  claims  of  public  health  far  outweighed  the  claims  of  justice, 
and  he  would  be  quite  glad  to  see  even  the  very  small  change  in  the  law  that 
was  sought  to  be  introduced  by  Dr  Graham-Little's  bill.  77 
This  was  more  than  empathetic  rhetoric.  When  Graham-Little  made  his  second 
attempt  at  introducing  medical  privilege  legislation  in  1937,  Atkin  had  drafted  many 
of  the  bill's  clauses. 
One  hour  and  forty  minutes  on  a  `not  altogether  unusual'78  Friday  afternoon. 
Given  the  voices  calling  for  medical  privilege  in  the  months  following  the  first 
reading  of  Graham-Little's  bill  in  1927,  an  explanation  is  needed  as  to  why  it  took  a 
decade  to  reappear.  Certainly,  the  government  had  not  made  it  a  priority  and  judging 
by  the  memos  at  the  Ministry  of  Health,  they  were  hoping  that  the  matter  would  fade 
away.  However,  in  announcing  his  intention  to  make  a  new  attempt  at  legislation  in 
'37,  Sir  Ernest  Graham-Little,  as  he  now  was,  gave  his  main  reason  for  putting  his  bill 
on  hold  a  decade  earlier: 
I  did  not  proceed  further  with  the  early  Bill,  as  inquiries  convinced  me  that 
even  if  the  Bill  passed  the  Commons,  the  Lords,  led  by  Lord  Birkenhead, 
would  reject  it.  I  believe  there  will  be  less  opposition  now  from  legal  members 
of  both  houses,  and  this  belief,  as  well  as  another  consideration,  has  weighed 
with  me  in  making  my  new  Bill  of  wider  application.  79 
Clearly,  Birkenhead's  shadow  had  loomed  large  in  Graham-Little's  mind  in  1927. 
Birkenhead's  death  in  1930  lessened  the  obvious  barriers  to  medical  privilege.  From 
the  time  of  his  early  involvement  in  the  debate  as  Lord  Chancellor,  Birkenhead  had 
been  the  leader  of  opposition  to  medical  privilege.  His  essay  in  Points  of  View  had 
become  a  kind  of  talisman  for  the  anti-privilege  cause  and  a  warning  for  those  who 
sought  to  change  the  law.  His  presence  in  the  House  of  Lords  at  the  time  of  Graham- 
"  Ibid. 
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179 Little's  first  drive  for  legislation  was  clearly  a  disincentive  to  the  bill's  supporters 
who  chose  rather  to  bide  their  time.  Though  his  written  words  remained,  the  loss  of 
Birkenhead's  presence  and  considerable  debating  skills,  coupled  with  support  from 
prominent  lawyers,  would  certainly  increase  the  chances  of  a  new  attempt  at 
legislation  being  successful.  Moreover,  by  1937  Birkenhead  was  not  the  only  key 
figure  to  have  been  lost  from  the  anti-privilege  lobby  of  previous  debates.  Henry 
McCardie,  responsible  for  two  important  precedents  against  the  concept  of  medical 
privilege,  died  in  1933. 
Graham-Little  was  not,  of  course,  simply  waiting  for  the  key  opponents  of  his 
bill  to  die.  Beaten  by  the  demands  on  parliament's  time  in  1927,  he  had  taken  stock  of 
the  measure  he  was  proposing.  His  bill  had  been,  by  his  own  admission,  a  reactionary 
response  to  McCardie's  ruling  in  the  1927  Birmingham  Case.  Seeing  a  public  health 
problem  arising  from  a  conflict  between  the  1916  government  regulations  and  the 
judicial  ruling,  Graham-Little  had,  on  the  advice  of  legal  friends,  limited  his  proposal 
to  cases  involving  VD  treatment  alone.  On  further  consideration  he  realised  that  with 
such  a  limited  definition,  any  plea  for  privilege  would  by  default  confirm  an 
allegation  of  VD.  Clearly  this  was  unsatisfactory,  and  the  privilege  would  have  to  be 
given  a  broader  definition.  Graham-Little  was  able  to  use  his  expertise  in  dermatology 
to  investigate  what  that  broader  definition  should  be. 
In  1935,  the  Ninth  International  Congress  of  Dermatology  was  held  in 
Budapest.  Graham-Little  presided  over  a  committee  appointed  by  the  congress  to 
consider  medical  problems  affecting  public  interests.  As  one  of  the  subjects  for 
discussion,  he  asked  members  of  the  committee  to  indicate  the  degree  of  protection 
given  to  medical  confidentiality  in  their  home  country.  With  most  European  countries 
represented,  along  with  the  United  States,  Graham-Little  felt  the  result  was  quite 
clear.  In  a  letter  to  the  BMJ  on  1  February  1937,  he  summed  it  up  as  follows: 
It  became  obvious  that  the  protection  given  to  the  "professional  secret"  abroad 
was  much  more  efficient  than  in  our  own  courts,  and  no  miscarriage  of  justice 
from  this  protection  was  recorded  by  the  various  speakers.  80 
80  Ibid. 
180 In  November  1936,  Graham-Little's  bill  had  been  read  for  the  first  time.  Its  wording 
was  almost  identical  to  that  of  the  long  title  of  the  1927  bill:  `to  provide  that  certain 
communications  between  medical  practitioners  and  their  patients  shall  be  privileged 
from  disclosure  in  evidence  in  courts  of  law.  '  Being  no  more  than  a  formal 
notification  of  the  bill,  the  first  reading  gave  little  indication  of  the  extent  and 
application  of  the  privilege  Graham-Little  was  going  to  propose.  With  the  date  of  the 
second  reading  set  for  5  February  1937,  Graham-Little  was  using  his  letter  to  the  BMJ 
to  indicate  his  intention  to  push  for  a  more  extensive  privilege  than  he  had  sought  in 
1927,  and  to  reassure  doubters  that,  given  the  experience  of  other  countries,  medical 
privilege  would  not  be  followed  by  untoward  results.  81  In  fact,  this  letter  was  not 
published  until  the  day  after  the  debate  took  place  in  parliament. 
At  1.40  p.  m.  on  5  February  1937,  Graham-Little  requested  a  second  reading 
for  his  Medical  Practitioners'  Communications  (Privilege)  Bill  in  the,  far  from  busy, 
House  of  Commons.  82  His  introduction  outlined  the  development  of  the  debate 
throughout  the  1920s,  stressing  the  importance  of  secrecy  to  VD  treatment.  He  cited 
the  report  of  the  London  County  Council  which  indicated  that  in  one  year  there  had 
been  1,050,000  attendances  at  VD  clinics  in  the  area,  emphasising  the  scale  of  the 
public  health  question  involved.  83  While  he  cited  other  areas  in  which  medical  secrecy 
was  needed,  Graham-Little  was  basing  his  bill  largely  on  the  circumstances  which  had 
arisen  around  McCardie's  ruling  in  the  1927  Birmingham  Case.  This  was  where  his 
problems  in  persuading  the  House,  began.  He  described  his  new  attempt  at  legislation 
as  `very  much  the  same'84  as  his  1927  bill  but  without  the  restriction  to  VD  cases 
only.  However,  while  touching  on  the  need  for  protecting  medical  information  in 
other  circumstances  -  young  unmarried  mothers  afraid  of  stigmatisation;  or  national 
health  insurance  patients'  medical  records  for  example  -  the  greatest  time  and  detail 
was  given  to  a  reiteration  of  the  arguments  over  VD.  The  familiar  arguments  came  to 
the  fore  -a  rise  in  the  number  of  divorce  proceedings  and  an  extension  of  the  ways  in 
which  medical  evidence,  particularly  of  VD,  could  be  useful,  led  to  a  rise  in  the 
demand  for  medical  testimony.  Consequently  the  guarantee  of  medical  confidentiality 
was  being  broken  on  a  regular  basis  and  this  undermined  confidence  in  the  VD 
81  BMJ6  February  1937,  p.  302. 
82  At  one  point  the  discussion  was  interrupted  while  the  number  of  MPs  was  counted  to  see  if  there 
were  forty  present.  Official  Report  of  Parliamentary  Debates.  House  of  Commons.  Vol.  319  (1936-7), 
1995.  ýi 
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181 treatment  scheme.  Drawing  on  his  investigations  into  the  position  in  other  countries, 
he  cited  examples  in  which  secrecy  was  recognised  by  the  law  in  other  countries  with 
little  damage  for  justice.  The  Academy  of  Medicine  had  reaffirmed  this  as  the  French 
position  in  1927.  In  order  to  emphasise  international  consensus  over  the  protection  of 
medical  secrecy,  Graham-Little  indicated  that  the  dermatology  congress  in  Budapest 
had  passed  a  resolution  stating  that  medical  confidences  should  be  legally  protected 
from  disclosure  except  in  cases  of  crime. 
Having  put  forward  the  case  as  to  why  medical  privilege  should  be  recognised, 
he  gave  two  options  as  to  how  it  could  be  achieved.  Either  it  could  be  established  in 
common  law  or  by  statute  law.  The  former  approach  had  proved  unsuccessful  - 
judges  had  always  ruled  against  medical  privilege.  There  was  the  option  of  pursuing  a 
common  law  precedent  via  the  martyrdom  route  but  Graham-Little  was  not  a  strong 
advocate  of  this,  favouring  `alteration  by  quiet,  orderly  Parliamentary  procedure 
[rather]  than  in  response  to  an  explosion  of  public  opinion  which  may  or  may  not 
occur,  but  which  is  not  the  best  way  to  reform  abuse.  iSS  Reform  not  revolution  was 
the  way  advocated  by  Graham-Little,  but  his  words  did  seem  to  carry  the  implied 
threat  that  martyrdom  was  always  a  possibility.  Anyone  opposing  his  current  bill 
would  have  to  consider  a  scenario  of  public  outcry  as  judges  sent  doctors  to  prison 
because  parliament  had  refused  to  go  down  the  peaceful  route  of  legislation. 
Despite  claiming  to  have  had  the  bill  vetted  by  `one  of  our  most  eminent 
judges'86,  Graham-Little  finished  by  offering  a  potential  compromise.  If  MPs  were 
unwilling  to  accept  the  bill's  wider  scope,  he  would  be  willing  at  the  committee  stage 
to  limit  the  application  of  privilege  to  VD  cases.  While  on  the  face  of  it  this  seemed  to 
demonstrate  a  reasonable  willingness  to  compromise  and  reach  the  best  solution,  in 
fact,  it  was  simply  illustrating  the  vagueness  that  constantly  shrouded  the  definition  of 
medical  privilege.  Graham-Little's  arguments  had  stressed  that  his  previous  bill  which 
focussed  on  VD  was  not  sufficient.  He  had  ventured  examples  of  other  settings  in 
which  medical  secrecy  had  to  be  protected  in  court  and  pointed  to  the  fact  that  other 
countries  benefited  from  medical  privilege.  Yet,  he  finished  by  saying  his  original  bill 
would  be  available  as  a  compromise  -  thereby  negating  his  previous  arguments. 
Unsurprisingly,  the  opponents  of  the  bill  noticed  the  inconsistency. 
gs  Ibid.  p.  1992. 
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182 Graham-Little  had  taken  36  minutes  to  expound  on  the  merits  of  his  bill.  By 
contrast,  Lovat-Fraser  took  only  seven  minutes  to  second  it.  Searching  for  the  earliest 
precedent  on  the  question,  he  had  found  the  Duchess  of  Kingston  case.  While  citing 
Lord  Mansfield  as  `probably  the  greatest  judge  who  ever  administered  justice  in  this 
country',  Lovat-Fraser  emphasised  that  the  law  as  set  down  in  that  precedent  had  to 
be  altered.  This  was  not  because,  having  examined  the  details  of  Caesar  Hawkins' 
plea,  Lovat-Fraser  had  realised  that  common  law  precedent  was  built  on  shaky 
foundations,  rather,  he  simply  thought  that  there  should  be  a  medical  privilege  like 
that  given  to  lawyers,  spouses  and  public  officers.  He  cited  Justice  Hawkins' 
endorsement  of  the  concept  of  medical  secrecy  in  1896  as  further  support  for  privilege 
-a  somewhat  liberal  interpretation  of  Hawkins'  remarks.  On  the  whole,  he  kept  his 
speech  succinct,  indicating  that  really  all  that  needed  to  be  said  had  been  put  forward 
by  Graham-Little.  87 
In  contrast,  Dingle  Foot,  MP  for  Dundee,  was  detailed  and  lengthy  in 
proposing  an  amendment  that  the  second  reading  of  the  bill  should  be  delayed  for  six 
months. 
Those  of  us  who  have  looked  at  this  Bill  find  ourselves  in  a  position  which  is 
not  altogether  unusual  on  a  Friday  when  Private  Members'  Bills  are 
introduced.  We  can,  of  course,  sympathise  with  the  objects..  . 
but  it  does  seem 
to  me  and  to  some  of  my  friends  who  have  examined  the  Bill  that  those  who 
are  its  sponsors  have  entirely  failed  to  appreciate  what  the  consequences 
would  be  if  the  Bill  passed  into  law. 
Foot  was  implying  that,  despite  having  had  almost  a  decade  to  clarify  his  original  bill, 
Graham-Little  and  his  cohort  of  supporters  had  presented  an  ill  thought  through 
proposal.  In  fact,  Foot  suggested  that  it  would  have  been  better  if  they  had  stuck  to  the 
terms  of  their  original  bill,  which  had,  at  least,  made  clear  when  the  privilege  would 
be  applicable.  The  new  bill  granted  the  possibility  of  privilege  to  safeguard 
information  gained  in  a  professional  capacity,  without  any  specific  guidelines  as  to 
how  a  determination  of  the  applicability  of  privilege  would  be  made  in  each  case. 
This  gave-the  strong  impression  that  the  privilege  was  more  that  of  the  doctor  than  of 
87  Ibid.  p.  1994. 
183 the  patient  which  clearly  negated  any  analogy  with  lawyer/client  privilege.  This 
vagueness  was  one  of  the  key  criticisms  Foot  had  of  the  bill.  In  addition,  he  portrayed 
the  situation  vis-a-vis  VD,  the  main  problem  which  the  proposed  bill  sought  to 
remedy,  in  a  very  different  light.  Quoting  the  Lancet,  Graham-Little  had  painted  a 
picture  of  significant  growth  of  divorce  cases  in  which  medical  evidence  was 
required.  By  contrast,  Foot's  characterisation  of  the  situation  was  that  VD  only 
occasionally  arose  in  divorce  cases.  Yet,  even  if  they  accepted  Graham-Little's 
compromise  of  limiting  privilege  to  VD  cases  only,  there  would  still  be  problems. 
Foot  pointed  out  that,  if  medical  evidence  was  essential  for  a  wife  to  prove  her 
husband  had  knowingly  infected  her  with  VD,  then  the  narrower  bill  would  prevent 
that  medical  evidence  being  given.  Thus: 
If  you  have  the  possibility  of  disclosure  on  the  one  side  it  is  a  hardship,  and  I 
agree  with  that  statement,  but  in  the  instance  which  I  have  just  put  forward  we 
have  a  hardship  on  the  one  side  and  a  hardship  and  an  injustice  on  the  other.  85 
This  was  a  poor  characterisation  of  the  equation.  Foot  lumped  the  personal  detriment 
to  the  patient,  the  professional  affront  to  the  doctor  and  the  potential  damage  to  the 
VD  treatment  scheme  (and  by  extension  public  health)  into  one  `hardship'.  Correcting 
this  misrepresentation  should  have  been  the  pro-privilege  lobby's  response,  but, 
instead,  Vice-Admiral  Taylor  queried  a  semantic  distinction  as  to  whether  the  bill  did 
not  only  prevent  disclosure  of  what  doctors  had  been  told.  That  would  allow  the 
doctor  in  the  example  Foot  had  given  to  recount  what  he  had  learned  on  his 
examination  of  the  patient,  thereby  allowing  justice  to  be  done.  Foot  seized  this 
opportunity  to  drive  home  his  point: 
The  hon.  and  gallant  Member,  whose  name  is  on  the  back  of  the  Bill,  ought  to 
have  read  the  Bill....  How  ridiculous  it  would  be  for  the  doctor  to  be  called, 
and  say:  "Yes,  this  man  was  suffering  from  this  disease,  but  I  have  found  it  out 
for  myself  and  he  did  not  tell  me.  Therefore,  there  is  no  privilege  attaching  to 
it.  "89 
as  Ibid.  p.  1999. 
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184 The  proponents  of  the  bill  were  themselves  demonstrating  its  protean  nature  and 
thereby  highlighting  the  vagueness  which  their  opponents  had  pointed  to  as  its  chief 
weakness.  His  case  more  or  less  having  been  made  for  him,  Foot  finished  by  drawing 
attention  to  the  comer  into  which  the  supporters  of  the  bill  had  been  talked: 
I  can  only  suggest  that  those  who  drafted  the  Bill  did  not  appreciate  the  effect 
of  what  they  were  doing.  If  they  did  appreciate  it,  it  appears  to  me  that  it 
would  not  merely  be  a  case  of  righting  a  wrong,  but  it  would  almost  amount  to 
conspiracy  to  defeat  the  ends  of  justice.  90 
Having  managed  to  unsettle  the  pro-privilege  lobby,  Foot  sought  to  mix  fear  with 
confusion  and  thereby  seal  the  fate  of  the  bill. 
Seconding  Foot's  amendment,  Ernest  Evans  -  MP  for  the  Welsh  universities  - 
further  emphasised  the  lack  of  public  demand  for  medical  privilege.  In  his  view, 
public  apathy  meant  there  was  no  need  to  get  bogged-down  in  a  debate  over  the 
relative  demands  of  public  health  and  justice.  The  bill  sought  privilege  for  the  doctor 
not  the  patient,  and  this  could  prove  detrimental  to  the  latter  as  the  bill  did  not  make 
clear  that  patient  consent  would  override  the  privilege  of  the  doctor.  Thus,  to  agree  the 
bill  would  be  to  give  the  medical  profession  `a  privilege  to  which  they  are  not  entitled, 
and  what  is  much  more  serious,  imposing  upon  them  a  responsibility  which  I  should 
imagine  very  few  of  them  would  wish  to  have.  '91  So,  in  addition  to  possible 
unfairness  to  the  patient  and  interference  with  justice,  the  bill  would  give  doctors  an 
added  burden  of  controversial  responsibility  which  they  may  not  want. 
Again,  the  pro-privilege  lobby's  response  was  less  than  robust.  Sir  J  Withers 
suggested  that,  just  as  in  the  case  of  solicitors,  the  court  could  decide  when  medical 
privilege  applied.  His  response  to  the  accusations  that  the  privilege  was  more  the 
doctor's  than  the  patient's  was  tentative  at  best:  `if  the  Bill  goes  to  Committee  and  is 
dealt  with  sympathetically,  I  am  sure  this  question  of  privilege,  whether  it  is  of  the 
doctor  or  the  patient,  could  be  cleared  up.  '92  Seeming  to  play  on  the  sympathy  which 
had  been  expressed  at  the  difficulty  of  the  doctor's  position  by  opponents  of  the  bill, 
its  supporters  pointed  to  the  committee  stage  as  the  area  where  the  complexities  could 
40  Ibid.  p.  2001. 
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185 be  ironed  out.  Given  the  unease  demonstrated  by  the  pro-privilege  lobby  when  the 
bill's  foundations  were  questioned,  the  impression  is  given  that,  Graham-Little's 
lengthy  introduction  aside,  they  had  assumed  that  the  bill  would  get  to  Committee 
stage  where  the  real  debate  would  take  place. 
The  penultimate  speaker  was  Sir  Terence  O'Connor,  the  Solicitor-General. 
Speaking  with  the  authority  of  position,  his  arguments  again  expressed  the  problems 
of  interpreting  the  bill.  Imperfect  as  the  current  situation  was,  it  certainly  would  not 
benefit  from  the  new  difficulties  which  could  arise  under  the  proposed  legislation. 
That,  in  short,  was  the  key  problem:  finding  a  definition  of  privilege  which  would 
overcome  the  perceived  shortcomings  in  the  current  situation,  without  creating  a 
whole  new  set  of  problems  of  equal  or  greater  consequence. 
I  think  the  promoters  of  the  Bill,  when  they  came  to  describe  what  privilege 
was,  found  themselves  in  the  same  difficulty  as  I  should  be  in  if  I  attempted  to 
put  into  statutory  form  any  of  the  safeguards  of  justice  93 
This  was  the  crux.  Since  1914,  those  in  favour  of  medical  privilege  had  struggled  to 
encapsulate  with  any  exactitude  the  privilege  they  sought.  Legal  privilege  was 
recognised  in  the  common  law  and  had  not  needed  to  go  through  the  complex 
procedure  of  defining  itself  in  a  specific  enough  way  to  satisfy  parliament  that  it 
should  be  written  into  statute.  By  contrast,  common  law  precedent  recognised  no 
privilege  for  medical  practitioners  -a  situation  stemming  (arguably,  falsely)  from  the 
Duchess  of  Kingston's  case.  Being  the  first  attempt  at  getting  statutory  privilege  for  a 
profession,  O'Connor  suggested  that  an  already  complex  bill  would  be  further 
complicated  by  amendments  at  the  committee  stage  which  sought  clauses  dealing 
with  the  secrecy  of  communications  to  members  of  the  clergy.  94  The  analogies  which 
had  been  used  to  bolster  the  cause  of  privilege  in  the  past  were  coming  back  to  haunt 
it  in  O'Connor's  speech.  The  clergy  would  complicate  the  bill  and  may  prevent  it 
getting  through  committee  stage,  and  a  prominent  member  of  the  judiciary  was  openly 
stating  that  he  did  not  think  legal  privilege  could  be  well  enough  defined  to  pass  as 
statute  laves  though,  of  course,  it  did  not  need  to  be.  O'Connor's  position  was  clear: 
93  Sir  Terence  O'Connor.  Ibid.  p.  2005. 
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186 I  venture  to  think  that  I  am  not  overstating  the  matter  when  I  say  that  there  is 
hardly  any  branch  of  the  law,  civil  or  criminal,  in  which  the  passage  of  this 
Bill  in  anything  like  its  present  form  would  not  impede  the  administration  of 
justice.  95 
An  hour  and  a  half  after  it  began,  HG  Williams,  became  the  final  speaker  in  the 
debate.  He  stressed  that,  while  he  understood  Graham-Little's  intentions  were 
connected  not  with  professional  self-interest  but  with  the  difficulty  arising  from  the 
demands  on  medical  information,  nonetheless,  the  proposed  bill  was  vague.  Did  it 
entail  that  doctors  were  bound  to  absolute  secrecy  or  that  a  court  could  not  compel 
disclosure?  If  a  doctor  could  choose  when  to  disclose  information,  this  would  open  up 
the  possibility  of  a  doctor  blackmailing  his  patient.  Doctors  demanding  money  in 
order  to  provide  their  patients  with  the  evidence  relevant  to  their  cause  would  be  a 
rare  occurrence  in  what  was  perceived  as  an  honourable  profession.  Yet,  even  the 
possibility  of  such  a  position  was  intolerable.  A  better  outcome  would  be  if  a  doctor 
called  as  witness  who  felt  he  had  strong  justification  not  to  give  evidence  could, 
privately,  give  his  reasons  and  let  the  judge  decide  whether  evidence  should  be  heard. 
There  was  no  need  of  legislation  to  achieve  this  and  Williams  finished  by  presenting  a 
positive  slant  on  rejecting  the  bill: 
I  have  no  doubt  that  those  eminent  in  the  law  will  take  notice  of  the 
discussion,  and,  possibly,  where  the  practice  has  been  defective  it  may  be 
improved  as  a  result  of  the  debate96 
Williams'  opinions  had  been  expressed  without  interruption  or  objection  from  the 
bill's  supporters.  In  voting,  the  House  voted  against  an  immediate  second  reading  and 
in  favour  of  the  amended  time  of  six  months.  Effectively,  this  was  a  rejection  of  the 
bill  as  it  would  fail  to  reach  conclusion  by  the  end  of  the  parliamentary  session  and 
thus  would  have  to  be  introduced  afresh.  That  Graham-Little  asked  leave  to  withdraw 
his  bill,  is  an  indication  that  he  had  been  persuaded  of  its  well-intentioned  inadequacy. 
After  an  hour  and  forty  minutes  deciding  the  fate  of  medical  privilege,  the  House 
95  Ibid.  p.  2006. 
96  Ibid.  p.  2011. 
187 turned  its  attention  to  the  abolition  of  the  tipping  system  for  waiters,  chambermaids 
and  porters  in  hotels  and  restaurants.  97 
Conclusion 
Graham-Little's  1927  attempt  at  legislation  got  further  than  Dawson's  in  1922.  While 
the  Ministry  of  Health  had  dissuaded  Dawson  from  introducing  the  question  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  they  did  not  manage  to  convince  Graham-Little  to  keep  it  out  of  the 
Commons.  His  determination  to  proceed  with  his  private  members'  bill  is  testimony 
to  the  strength  of  feeling  that  the  issue  of  medical  confidentiality  still  provoked.  The 
relative  powers  of  the  judiciary  vis-ä-vis  ministerial  regulations  were  continuing  to 
cause  tension,  and  discussions  like  that  of  the  medico-legal  society  in  early  1927 
emphasised  the  lack  of  a  resolution  to  the  question  in  1922.  Birkenhead's  essay  had 
been  a  key  factor  in  blocking  the  promoters  of  a  stronger  definition  of  medical 
confidentiality  at  that  time,  but  it  had  not  satisfactorily  resolved  the  underlying 
difficulties  between  the  competing  interests.  McCardie's  ruling  at  Birmingham 
brought  press  attention  to  bear  on  the  discrepancy  between  article  II  (2)  of  the  VD 
regulations  and  the  overruling  of  this  by  judges  in  the  growing  number  of  divorce 
cases,  thereby  making  more  public  an  issue  which  had  continued  to  be  debated  in 
professional  circles.  While  there  continued  to  be  marked  differences  of  opinions  over 
medical  privilege,  there  was  also  evidence  of  a  higher  level  of  cross-professional 
support.  Riddell  certainly  thought  there  was  a  case  to  be  made  for  a  limited  privilege, 
and  Atkin  lent  the  weight  of  his  support  to  the  1937  bill.  Both  bills  received  the 
support  of  some  lawyers  in  the  Commons  -  an  important  step  considering  that  a 
greater  number  of  MPs  came  from  legal  than  from  medical  backgrounds. 
While  Graham-Little  was  to  cite  the  lack  of  time  on  the  parliamentary  agenda, 
and  the  threat  of  a  hostile  House  of  Lords  (led  by  Birkenhead),  as  the  reasons  for  the 
failure  of  his  first  attempt,  the  key  factor  was  undoubtedly  the  lack  of  ministerial 
support.  The  specificity  of  the  focus  on  giving  statutory  protection  to  a  governmental 
regulation  in  the  1927  bill,  made  the  lack  of  visible  support  from  the  Ministry  of 
Health  a  highly  conspicuous  shortcoming.  From  their  file,  it  seems  that  the  memory  of 
the  difficulties  which  the  Ministry  had  experienced  in  trying  to  extend  the  boundaries 
of  confidentiality  in  the  early  interwar  years  was  still  too  fresh  in  their  mind.  In 
97  Hotels  and  Restaurants  (Gratuities)  Bill.  Ibid.  p.  2011. 
188 contrast  to  Addison,  a  quiet  word  to  the  Lord  Chancellor  requesting  that  judges  tone- 
down  their  demands  for  medical  evidence  was  as  much  as  Chamberlain  was  willing  to 
do. 
By  contrast,  supporters  of  privilege  resorted  to  more  extreme  measures  to  get  a 
statutory  privilege  for  doctors,  Vernon  Davies'  attempt  to  get  a  clause  inserted  into  a 
national  health  insurance  bill  being  a  notable  example.  But  it  was  not  until  late  1936 
that  Graham-Little  got  another  chance  to  promote  the  cause  in  the  Commons.  Having 
used  the  intervening  time  to  investigate  further  the  question,  particularly  at  the 
conference  in  Budapest  the  previous  year,  his  new  bill  sought  to  emulate  the  broader 
concept  of  medical  secrecy  that  he  had  found  dominant  in  Europe  and  certain  states  in 
America.  Making  it  a  stage  further  than  he  had  done  in  1927,  Graham-Little's  request 
for  a  second  reading  of  his  1937  bill  was  met,  not  unjustly,  by  queries  about  its  scope, 
applicability  and  intent.  Avoiding  the  minutiae  of  the  problems  that  needed  to  be 
addressed,  presumably  because  of  the  difficulty  of  the  task,  the  bill  had  been  framed 
in  broad  terms  in  the  hope  that  it  would  receive  a  second  reading  and  could  have  its 
finer  points  defined  at  the  committee  stage.  But,  broad,  in  this  case,  meant  vague  and 
the  critics  of  the  bill  had  little  difficulty  in  demonstrating  that  even  the  signatories  of 
the  proposal  had  conflicting  views  of  what  it  would  mean  in  practice.  Graham-Little's 
offer  to  confine  the  terms  of  his  bill  to  VD  alone  if  it  would  prove  more  satisfactory 
only  compounded  the  confusion,  coming,  as  it  did,  after  arguments  as  to  why  the 
broader  privilege  was  needed.  By  the  end  of  the  discussion  in  the  Commons,  it  was 
apparent  that  Graham-Little  had  himself  been  persuaded  of  the  inadequacies  of  his 
proposal.  Hope  for  legislation  would  temporarily  have  to  turn  into  hope  that  the 
process  of  seeking  legislation  would  itself  have  caused  a  change  in  judicial 
perception.  The  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality  were  no  nearer  to  being  defined 
in  a  wholly  satisfactory  way,  and  there  would  continue  to  be  issues  and  questions 
probing  away  beneath  the  surface.  Having  familiarised  themselves  with  the  `snakes' 
of  statutory  change,  any  future  promoters  of  medical  privilege  in  parliament  would 
have  to  focus  on  the  `ladders'  of  skilled  legislative  craftsmanship  and  ministerial 
support. 
189 Chapter  8-  The  varied  context  of  medical  confidentiality 
Introduction 
The  issue  of  VD  dominated  the  debate  between  the  BMA,  the  judiciary  and  the 
Ministry  of  Health  over  the  boundaries  of  medical  confidentiality  in  the  early  interwar 
years  and  was  still  evident  at  the  times  of  Graham-Little's  two  attempts  at  legislation. 
However,  its  prominence  as  an  issue  should  not  obscure  the  fact  that  questions 
relating  to  medical  confidentiality  were  being  raised  in  a  number  of  different  contexts 
in  the  interwar  years.  What  follows  illustrates  some  of  the  various  contexts  in  which 
questions  of  medical  confidentiality  arose.  These  range  from  the  position  of  ship 
surgeons  in  the  enclosed  community  on  a  sea  voyage,  to  the  confidentiality  of  medical 
records  relating  to  mentally  ill  patients.  Examination  will  also  be  made  of  the  impact 
of  a  significant  change  in  the  divorce  law  through  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  of 
1937.  Two  specific  legal  cases  will  also  be  looked  at.  The  case  of  the  `Kissing 
Doctor'  will  examine  the  position  in  relation  to  medical  confidentiality  of  a  doctor 
called  to  defend  himself  against  allegations  of  improper  conduct.  A  review  of  the 
coroner's  inquest  into  the  death  of  Vera  Evelyn  Norris  in  1938  will  question  the 
extent  to  which  progress  had  been  made  in  clarifying  the  doctor's  duty  to  notify 
suspected  cases  of  criminal  abortion  since  the  Royal  College  of  Physicians' 
consultation  with  Clarke  and  Avory  in  the  late  nineteenth  century. 
Andrew  Morrice  has  already  drawn  attention  to  many  of  the  queries  which 
made  a  relatively  brief  appearance  in  the  minutes  of  the  BMA  central  ethical 
committee  in  the  interwar  years.  These  ranged  from  the  demand  that  doctors  break 
secrecy  to  help  the  police  inquiry  into  the  Brighton  Trunk  murder,  to  interpretations  of 
who  was  allowed  to  be  present  in  the  room  during  the  medical  examination  of 
children  at  school.  '  One  key  example  which  Morrice  did  not  select  was  the  position  of 
ship  surgeons  with  regard  to  confidentiality  at  sea.  With  its  empire,  Britain  had  a  large 
mercantile  fleet  and  a  major  interest  in  emigrant  and  passenger  liners.  A  high  number 
of  ships  meant  that  a  temporary  placement  as  a  ship  surgeon  was  a  relatively  common 
occurrence  for  young  medical  graduates.  Crowther  and  Dupree  estimate  that  1  in 
every  10  medical  graduates  from  Glasgow  and  Edinburgh  universities  took  on  a  post 
A  Morrice,  `Honour  and  Interests:  Medical  Ethics  in  Britain  and  the  Work  of  the  British  Medical 
Association's  Central  Ethical  Committee,  1902-1939',  280-283. 
190 as  ship  surgeon. 
2  As  relatively  young  and  inexperienced  doctors  they  were 
particularly  vulnerable  to  questions  of  medical  ethics.  It  is  with  this  significant  class 
of  medical  practice  that  analysis  will  begin. 
Blowing  the  whistle  on  Ocean  Liners 
In  writing  the  preface  to  the  first  edition  of  his  Ship  Surgeon's  Handbook  in  1906, 
Vavasour  Elder  asserted  that  `no  class  of  men  undertake  their  professional  duties 
knowing  less  of  the  surroundings  in  which  these  are  performed  than  surgeons  going  to 
sea  for  their  first  voyage.  '3  The  positive  response  evoked  by  this  guide  prompted  a 
second  edition  in  1910,  by  which  time  Elder  had  made  the  substantial  addition  of  five 
chapters,  including  one  on  medical  logs.  Commenting  on  this  chapter  in  the  preface, 
he  noted  that  `special  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  question  of  "professional  secrecy" 
in  relation  to  ship-surgeons,  as  it  has  always  seemed  that  the  prevailing  custom  at  sea 
is  somewhat  at  variance  with  generally  accepted  rules  of  procedure,  and  one, 
moreover,  which  should  be  settled  by  a  medical  authoritative  body.  '4  In  1914,  the 
BMA  council  attempted  to  do  just  that  by  publicising  the  following  decision:  `That 
professional  secrecy  should  be  maintained  by  ship  surgeons  in  respect  of  all  cases  of 
illness  attended  by  them  on  board,  except  in  those  cases  of  illness  which  come  within 
the  quarantine  regulations  of  any  port  visited  or  other  legal  obligations.  '5  Yet,  despite 
this  clear-cut  statement  by  an  authoritative  medical  body,  the  CEC  were  still  receiving 
queries  about  medical  secrecy  on  passenger  ships  in  the  interwar  years.  This  section 
examines  the  question  of  confidentiality  in  regard  to  ship  surgeons,  showing  how  it 
fits  into  a  broader  picture  of  discontent  amongst  the  profession  over  the  perceived 
value  and  status  of  seagoing  doctors. 
In  1912,  the  BMJ  drew  attention  to  the  deficiencies  in  medical  provision  on 
certain  classes  of  emigrant  ships.  Referring  to  the  `large  tide'  of  emigration  flowing 
out  of  England  destined  for  Canada  and  Australia,  it  pointed  to  the  implications  for 
the  medical  profession.  In  addition  to  the  ordinary  passenger  liners  -  which  were 
enjoying  year  round  high  passenger  numbers  -  another  class  of  ship  was  tapping  in  to 
the  boom  in  demand.  `The  majority  of  emigrants  are  being  carried  in  vessels  purely  of 
2  Informatiq  supplied  by  MA  Crowther  and  M  Dupree  on  the  basis  of  their  late  19`s  century  database 
of  the  careers  of  Glasgow  and  Edinburgh  medical  students. 
'  A.  Vavasour  Elder,  Ship  Surgeon's  Handbook  (London,  1927)  Preface  to  first  edition  p.  11. 
4  Ibid.  p.  9. 
'  As  noted  in  BMA  CEC  minutes  1  June  1937. 
191 the  cargo-boat  type,  temporarily  fitted  -  according  to  legal  specifications  of  course  - 
for  the  carriage  of  emigrants  on  the  outward  passage.  Homeward  bound  they  revert  to 
their  original  function.  '6  Carrying  around  double  the  number  of  passengers  of 
ordinary  liners,  these  cargo  ships  had  caused  a  rapid  increase  in  the  demand  for  ship 
surgeons  to  look  after  the  `1400  to  1500  souls  on  board  for  a  period  of  six  weeks  in 
continually  changing  climatic  conditions.  '  The  Merchant  Shipping  Acts 
recommended  that  ships  carrying  more  than  1300  "statute  adults'  ,7  should  have  more 
than  one  medical  officer,  but  as  the  ships  reverted  to  non-human  cargo  on  the  return 
journey,  they  were  not  required  to  have  a  medical  officer  unless  the  crew  amounted  to 
greater  than  one  hundred  people.  For  this  reason,  at  least  one,  but  often  both,  of  the 
medical  officers  on  board  the  ship  would  be  doctors  who  were  themselves  emigrating 
and  sought  passage  work.  In  light  of  Elder's  warning  of  the  unforeseen  challenges  of 
medicine  at  sea,  the  idea  that  inexperienced  passage-work  doctors  should  be 
employed  to  deal  with  such  large  numbers  of  passengers  was  problematic. 
Outlining  the  heavy  workload,  the  poor  living  and  working  conditions  and  the 
potential  strain  of  dealing  with  epidemic  disease  on  board,  the  BMJ  noted  that  the 
surgeon  was  an  `important  official...  vested  with  powers  which  are  almost  paramount 
should  he  consider  it  necessary  to  enforce  them.  '8  While  such  a  description  suggested 
the  utility  of  employing  experienced  ship  surgeons,  steamship  owners  were 
businessmen  whose  primary  concern  was  profit.  The  cost  of  using  an  experienced 
ship  surgeon  was  greater  than  giving  free  passage  to  an  emigrating  doctor  willing  to 
undertake  the  relevant  duties  in  return.  Thus,  not  only  did  passage  work  doctors  get  a 
bad  deal,  they  also  denied  more  experienced  ship  surgeons  employment  opportunities 
and  allowed  ship  owners  to  fill  the  position  on  the  basis  of  minimising  running  costs. 
The  article's  conclusion  was  simple:  ship  surgeons  must  demand  better  pay. 
It  remains,  as  in  other  instances,  entirely  with  members  of  the  medical 
profession,  either  as  permanent  or  as  temporary  ships  surgeons,  to  demand 
adequate  remuneration  for  the  work  they  perform....  Shipowners  are  business 
6  BMJ  21  September  1912,  p.  734. 
'A  "statute  adult"  was  equivalent  to  one  adult  person  or  two  children  between  the  ages  of  one  and 
twelve. 
8  BMJ  21  September  1912,  p.  734. 
192 men,  and  cannot  be  expected  to  drive  any  but  business  bargains.  Medical  men 
are  in  duty  bound  to  their  profession  to  do  likewise.  9 
This  dual  concern  over  the  pay  and  status  of  ship  surgeons  was  to  dominate  coverage 
of  the  issue  in  the  BMJ  in  the  years  that  followed.  In  March  1913,  a  letter  from 
Manchester  indicated  that  there  was  a  general  movement  to  raise  the  scale  of  pay  for 
all  ship's  officers  and,  thus,  made  it  `the  time  for  a  master  stroke  from  the  medical 
profession  as  regards  its  seagoing  members.  '  1°  The  author  called  for  a  unified 
approach  which  sought  better  pay  and  the  establishment  of  a  minimum  wage  for  ship 
surgeons.  The  following  week,  another  writer  called  for  the  BMA  to  take  the  lead, 
`for  unless  the  matter  is  taken  up  by  the  whole  profession  it  is  useless  for  individuals 
to  strive  for  higher  pay.  "'  Acknowledging  that  one  of  the  problems  in  establishing  a 
wage  rate  was  the  broad  spectrum  of  ships  on  which  a  surgeon  could  be  employed  - 
from  the  luxury  liners  who  might  retain  a  professional  ship  surgeon,  to  the  makeshift 
emigrant  ships  which  gave  an  emigrating  doctor  free  passage  in  return  for  his  services 
-  the  author  recounted  the  conditions  he  had  recently  experienced  as  medical  officer 
on  a  round  trip  from  Glasgow  to  Canada.  Firstly,  he  had  to  examine  the  majority  of 
the  300  passengers  and  vaccinate  those  with  no  sign  of  a  previous  vaccination  mark. 
With  bad  weather  on  the  crossing,  there  was  a  very  high  incidence  of  seasickness  and 
bad  colds  with  the  result  that  he  was  working  `almost  all  day.  '  On  the  journey  back  to 
Glasgow  these  problems  were  exacerbated  by  the  outbreak,  amongst  crew  and 
passengers,  of  scabies.  However,  it  was  not  only  the  amount  of  work  but  the 
conditions  which  caused  difficulty.  Describing  the  quarters  which  he  had  to  visit  to 
treat  the  firemen,  the  writer  explained:  `they  all  lived  and  ate  in  a  small  dirty 
unventilated  cabin  where  the  air  was  thick  with  tobacco  smoke,  and  a  heavy  foul 
odour  seemed  to  overcome  me  when  I  entered.  '  12  If  ship  owners  and  the  wider 
medical  profession  were  made  aware  of  these  conditions  there  would  soon  be  a  rise  in 
the  ship  surgeon's  salary. 
Professional  unity  was  again  stressed  by  a  letter  published  in  the  BMJ  at  the 
end  of  March.  Whilst  noting  that  demand  for  ship  surgeons  exceeded  supply  and  that 
consequently  there  had  been  a  rising  trend  in  wages,  the  author  reiterated  the  problem 
9  Ibid.  p.  735. 
10  BMJ  1  March  1913,  p.  472-3. 
"  BMJ  8  March  1913,  p.  532. 
12  Ibid. 
193 of  passage  workers  undercutting  more  experienced  ship  surgeons:  `Any  sensible 
person  must  see  that  the  action  of  these  two  classes  of  doctors  tends  seriously  to 
lessen  the  social  and  professional  standing  of  doctors  generally.  '  The  writer's 
proposed  solution  was  that  doctors  should  only  accept  ship  surgeon's  posts  through  a 
medical  agency  promoted  by  medical  schools  and  the  BMA  alike.  No  such  scheme 
was  established,  but  the  BMJ  did  engage  a  policy  of  refusing  to  print  adverts  for  ship 
surgeon's  posts  if  the  proposed  wage  was  less  than  £10. 
The  issue  of  remuneration  was  further  blurred  by  the  policy  of  some  shipping 
companies  to  allow  the  ship  surgeon  to  charge  for  attendance  on  first  and  second  class 
passengers.  This  meant  that  the  monthly  wage  paid  to  the  medical  officer  on  board 
was  not  a  simple  indicator  of  how  much  money  the  doctor  made.  Indeed,  the 
impression  given  was  that  ships  which  paid  less  in  wages  per  month  but  allowed  the 
doctor  to  charge  non-steerage  passengers  for  private  attendance  were  actually  more 
profitable  for  the  doctor.  13  This  was  not  guaranteed,  as  the  additional  income 
depended  upon  the  health  status  of  the  first  and  second  class  passengers.  Nonetheless, 
for  some  the  answer  to  the  financial  problems  experienced  by  ship  surgeons  lay  not  in 
seeking  a  minimum  wage  but  in  uniting  to  establish  a  fixed  scale  of  fees  reflecting  the 
class  of  passenger  treated.  `Now  is  the  time  if  there  are  any  regular  ship  surgeons  in 
the  vertebrate  division,  to  combine  and  make  their  terms,  '  14  suggested  one  writer  who 
again  pointed  to  the  imbalance  between  supply  and  demand  of  seagoing  doctors.  This 
apparent  deficit  is  of  interest  as  it  represents  a  significant  change  from  the  late 
nineteenth  century.  It  is  possible  that  the  employment  opportunities  afforded 
practitioners  by  the  National  Insurance  scheme  were  diverting  them  away  from 
getting  early  experience  in  ship  surgeon's  posts.  Obviously,  the  First  World  War 
significantly  reduced  the  number  of  doctors  available  for  civilian  passenger  ships  but 
that  would  not  have  been  an  issue  in  1913.  Whatever  the  reasons  for  its  existence, 
there  was  a  possibility  to  use  the  undersupply  of  ship  surgeons  to  negotiate  better 
terms  for  their  employment.  All  that  was  needed  was  some  spine. 
Certainly,  some  shipping  companies  did  not  expect  stiff  opposition  from  their 
surgeon.  One  correspondent  to  the  BMJ  enclosed  a  letter  from  the  owner  of  a  ship  on 
which  he  was  about  to  sail. 
13  BMJ  8  March  1913,  p.  532. 
14  BMJ  Supplement  5  June  1913  p.  56. 
194 Dear  Sir, 
You  are  employed  on  board  this  steamer  as  medical  adviser  to  the  crew  and 
passengers  from  the  time  she  leaves  here  until  her  return  to  this  port.  Your 
special  duty,  among  others,  is  to  give  all  possible  professional  attention  to  the 
crew  as  well  as  the  passengers,  so  please  see  this  is  done.  Should  the  Master 
find  it  necessary  to  report  neglect  on  your  part  in  this  respect,  we  shall  have  to 
treat  the  matter  seriously  and  in  a  form  that  will  be  as  disagreeable  to  you  as  to 
ourselves. 
Yours  faithfully.  15 
There  was  clearly  a  growing  body  of  opinion  that  a  concerted  effort  was  required  to 
improve  the  lot  of  the  ship  surgeon,  both  in  terms  of  the  financial  remuneration  of  the 
post,  and  in  the  status  of  the  position  on  board  ship.  A  deficit  in  supply  to  demand  for 
surgeons  presented  a  context  conducive  to  negotiating  terms  and  the  final  ingredient 
would  be  professional  unity  on  the  issue.  The  BMA  was  taking  action  to  this  end.  In 
1912,  its  annual  representative  meeting  had  set  £10  as  the  base  wage  appropriate  to 
the  work  of  ship  surgeons  and  had  subsequently  refused  to  publish  any  advert  offering 
less.  It  encouraged  other  medical  journals  to  do  the  same.  In  addition  to  these 
preventive  measures,  a  system  had  been  set  up  to  include  `appointments  deemed  to  be 
undesirable'  16  in  the  warning  notice  published  weekly  in  the  BMJ.  The  BMA's  ship 
surgeons'  subcommittee  stated  it  would  be  `glad  to  have,  from  ship  surgeons  or  others 
interested,  prompt  information  as  to  cases  in  which  these  officers  are  being  treated 
unfairly.  '  17 
Despite  these  actions,  letters  continued  to  appear  in  the  BMJ  complaining  of 
the  pay  and  working  conditions  for  surgeons  aboard  ships.  '  8  The  ship  surgeons' 
subcommittee  reiterated  their  commitment  to  tackling  these  problems  through 
warning  notices  and  requested  that  prospective  ship  surgeons  support  the  cause  by 
passing  on  information  to  the  BMA  and,  importantly,  by  not  accepting  any  position 
that  offered  less  than  the  recommended  minimum  of  £10.  However,  it  seems  that 
concerns  had  spread  beyond  pay  and  status  into  the  territory  of  medical  confidentiality 
on  ships.  The  committee  made  clear  that  the  rules  of  professional  secrecy  were  to  be 
15  BMJ  14  June  1913,  p.  1304. 
16  BMJ  5  July  1913,  p.  4. 
17  Ibid. 
18  BMJ  18  Oct  1913,  p.  1048.  &  25  Oct  1913,  p.  1124. 
195 maintained  by  ship  surgeons  for  both  passengers  and  crew  members;  `in  other  words, 
information  as  to  the  nature  of  a  case  should  be  withheld  from  the  captain  unless  it  be 
one  falling  within  the  quarantine  regulations  of  any  port  to  be  visited,  or  other  legal 
obligations.  '  19  This  statement  was  reiterated  as  a  recommendation  to  the  medico- 
political  committee  in  the  supplement  to  the  same  issue  of  the  BMJ,  and  formed  the 
basis  of  the  BMA  council's  pronouncement  on  the  rule  of  secrecy  for  ship  surgeons 
given  in  1914.20 
Letters  continued  to  arrive  in  1915.  In  early  October,  `Nauticus'  suggested  that 
one  of  the  obstacles  in  the  path  of  doctors  becoming  ship  surgeons  was  the  `expense 
of  providing'  and  `indignity  of  wearing  a  uniform  which  places  them  in  the  same 
category  as  a  purser  or  second  engineer.  21  In  contrast  to  the  description  of  the  powers 
of  the  ship  surgeon  given  by  the  BMJ  in  1912,  `Nauticus'  claimed  the  surgeon  had  no 
authoritative  status  on  board  ship  and  that  consequently  the  uniform  was  no  more  than 
`a  badge  of  servitude  to  the  company.  '22  Doctors  would  far  rather  be  regarded  as 
something  distinct  from  the  crew  of  the  ship  and  if  shipping  companies  did  away  with 
the  requirement  of  the  uniform  they  would  receive  more  applications  from  `self- 
respecting'  practitioners.  The  following  week,  `Nauticul'  suggested  that  `Nauticus' 
had  been  too  generous  in  his  description  of  the  ship  surgeon's  place  in  the  ship's 
hierarchy: 
To  compare  their  status  on  board  ship  with  that  of  a  purser  or  second  engineer 
is  an  insult  to  these  occupations.  The  surgeon's  status  on  board  is  that  of  the 
second  steward  or  ship's  barber.  Their  cabins  are  generally  placed  next  to  the 
latrine,  and  invariably  on  a  lower  deck,  where  ventilation  in  rough  weather  is 
impossible...  even  our  premier  passenger  liners  have  allotted  to  their  surgeons 
a  cabin  placed  in  such  a  disgusting  position  that  the  ship's  builders  could  only 
have  built  it  for  the  latrine  attendant.  23 
In  the  same  edition  `Nauticus  Olim'  took  issue  with  the  idea  that  the  uniform  was  an 
unnecessary  obstacle.  The  surgeon  must  have  a  distinctive  badge  to  identify  him  as 
19  BMJ  8  Nov  1913,  p.  1246. 
20  BMJ  Supplement  8  Nov  1913,  p.  396.  For  details  of  the  1914  pronouncement,  see  f.  n.  3. 
21  BMJ9  Oct  1915,  p.  556. 
22  Ibid. 
23  BMJ  16  Oct  1915,  p.  592. 
196 such  and  while  first  and  second  class  passengers  could  be  treated  as  private  patients, 
the  surgeon  was  employed  by  the  ship's  owners  to  treat  third  class  passengers  and 
crew.  On  this  basis  alone,  and  regardless  of  whether  the  surgeon  had  to  wear  a 
uniform,  he  was  `the  servant  of  the  owners  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
commander.  ' 
This  series  of  letters  illustrate  concisely  the  factors  that  were  troubling  the 
medical  profession  and  also  how  the  matter  affected  the  question  of  medical 
confidentiality.  Pay  and  status  were  traditional  medical  concerns.  Nauticus's  letter 
expressed  discontent  that  ship  surgeons  were  not  being  given  the  respect  they 
deserved  as  members  of  the  medical  profession.  Rather  than  being  linked  to  the 
menial  members  of  the  ship's  crew,  they  should  be  given  separate  recognition  as 
`doctor  on  board'24  -a  title  which  would  associate  them  with  an  established 
profession  with  considerably  higher  status  than  second  steward  or  barber.  But,  while 
`Nauticus'  claimed  that  it  was  the  uniform  which  represented  the  servile  status  of  the 
ship  surgeon,  `Nauticus  Olim'  made  clear  that  it  was  the  terms  of  employment  by  the 
ship's  owners.  First  and  second  class  patients  may  be  treated  independently  as  private 
patients,  but,  as  employer  of  the  surgeon,  the  shipping  company  and,  by  extension,  the 
ship's  captain,  claimed  a  right  to  the  doctor's  knowledge  of  the  health  of  the 
passengers  and  crew  of  the  ship.  The  surgeon's  inferior  status,  therefore,  had 
implications  which  went  beyond  the  concerns  of  remuneration  or  pride  and  more 
firmly  into  the  area  of  professional  ethics. 
`Twixt  devil  and  deep  sea.  25 
In  his  chapter  on  medical  logs,  Elder  made  clear  the  difficulties  that  faced  the  ship 
surgeon  with  regard  to  medical  confidentiality.  In  addition  to  the  standard 
consideration  of  the  interests  of  the  patient  and  the  surgeon,  `the  extraneous  factor  of 
third  parties  has  to  be  considered  at  sea.  '26  Typically,  the  third  party  was  the  ship 
owner  or  quarantine  or  immigrant  official.  From  the  ship  owners'  point  of  view,  there 
were  three  key  concerns.  They  had  to  be  aware  of  crew  members  who  could  not  carry 
out  their  work  on  medical  grounds;  they  had  to  protect  themselves  against  complaints 
about  the-medical  attention  on  board  their  ship  from  passengers  or  crew;  and  all 
24  BMJ  9  Oct  1915,  p.  566. 
25  Elder's  assessment  of  the  ship  surgeon's  position  when  required  to  give  medical  details  about  his 
patients  to  third  parties.  A  Vavasour  Elder,  The  Ship  Surgeon's  Handbook  (London,  1927). 
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197 departments  on  the  ship,  including  the  medical  department,  were  required  to  provide 
written  evidence  of  the  satisfactory  performance  of  their  duties  on  every  voyage.  In 
addition  to  these  concerns,  quarantine  and  immigrant  officials  required  ship  surgeons 
to  notify  them  of  passengers  suffering  from  particular  diseases,  a  list  of  which  was  set 
by  each  country.  Clearly,  the  ship  surgeon's  position  with  regard  to  confidentiality 
was  complicated. 
Elder  suggested  that  the  only  reason  the  profession  had  not  sought  clarification 
was  the  relative  infrequency  of  court  cases  involving  medical  secrecy  at  sea  -  further 
confirmation  of  the  importance  of  the  law  in  determining  the  boundaries  of  medical 
confidentiality.  Nonetheless,  in  such  cases,  the  surgeon  was  caught  between  liability 
for  damages  to  the  patient,  if  he  revealed  professional  details,  and  being  sacked  by  the 
company,  if  he  refused.  The  matter  was  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  ship 
surgeon  occupied  three  roles  with  three  levels  of  responsibility.  As  medical  officer  to 
the  ship  as  a  community,  the  surgeon  had  the  right  of  entry  into  any  cabin  on  board 
ship  if  he  believed  there  was  a  person  suffering  from  a  dangerous  disease.  As  medical 
attendant  to  the  crew  and  third  class  passengers,  he  had  a  right  of  entry  granted  by  the 
Board  of  Trade  -  but  one  he  must  be  careful  not  to  abuse.  As  medical  practitioner  to 
first  and  second  class  passengers,  he  had  no  more  right  to  intrude  on  their  privacy  than 
a  doctor  on  land.  The  ship  surgeon's  role  therefore  `requires  very  careful  playing  to 
prevent  him  being  considered  unduly  officious  on  the  one  hand,  and  yet  to  be  fully 
aware  of  what  is  occurring  on  board  his  ship  from  a  medical  standpoint  on  the 
other.  '27 
As  a  rule,  Elder  suggested  that  any  first  or  second  class  passenger  staying  in 
their  cabin  for  longer  than  forty-eight  hours  should  be  reported  to  the  surgeon  by  the 
cabin  attendant  who  would  then  decide  whether  to  make  an  official  visit.  Elder  did  not 
agree  with  the  idea  that  first  class  passengers  should  be  left  without  interference.  In 
his  experience  these  passengers  were  more  likely  to  leave  the  ship  to  "see  the  sights" 
at  foreign  ports  and  thereby  bring  contagion  back  on  board,  unlike  the  third  class 
passengers  who  were  examined  both  on  embarkation  and  during  the  voyage. 
However,  the  fact  that  he  had  to  stress  the  point  suggests  that  often  a  class  distinction 
was  drawn.  Dealing  with  first  class  patients  was  not  always  a  straightforward 
business,  -not 
least  because  some  had  a  preconceived  dislike  of  ship  surgeons. 
27  Ibid.  351. 
198 Therefore,  a  first  class  passenger  who  remained  in  her  cabin  for  forty-eight  hours  may 
indeed  be  unwell  but  not  necessarily  with  a  disease  which  threatened  the  well-being 
of  the  ship's  community  which  would  entitle  the  doctor  to  demand  right  of  entry. 
Elder  recommended  that  the  doctor  ascertain  as  much  information  as  possible  on  the 
condition  of  the  passenger  and,  if  a  consultation  seemed  advisable,  to  approach  any 
other  doctors  on  board  to  see  if  they  would  agree  to  participate.  It  was  stressed  that  no 
professional  offence  should  be  taken  at  a  first  class  patient's  unwillingness  to  consult 
the  ship  surgeon,  but  that,  if  another  doctor  was  consulted,  the  surgeon  should  be 
present.  In  part,  this  was  because  he  would  have  to  supply  any  drugs  or  appliances, 
but  also,  because  his  position  entitled  him  to  be  aware  of  what  went  on. 
Infectious  disease  posed  a  particularly  acute  problem  on  ships  and  immediate 
isolation  of  patients  was  the  key  to  combating  it.  Unlike  other  cases  of  disease, 
epidemic  disease,  particularly  when  it  involved  children,  should,  in  Elder's  view,  be 
made  public.  This  would  allow  parents  to  take  any  precautions  they  felt  necessary  to 
protect  their  children.  From  experience,  Elder  had  discovered  that  parents  preferred  to 
know  straight  away  of  any  dangers.  Smallpox  was  another  instance  where  immediate 
notification  was  deemed  wise.  This  allowed  isolation  of  the  patient  and  all  `contacts' 
and  enabled  those  who  wished  to  be  vaccinated  to  receive  early  consideration. 
Venereal  disease  was  given  special  consideration  by  Elder.  An  official  report 
that  a  crew  member  was  suffering  from  VD  would  result  in  his  removal  from  service 
when  the  ship  returned  to  its  home  port.  While  in  some  cases  this  was  necessary  for 
the  benefit  of  the  crew  as  a  whole,  the  fear  of  being  entered  into  the  `log'  would  be  a 
deterrent  for  crew  members  consulting  the  surgeon.  As  Roger  Davidson  relates 
`seamen  often  concealed  their  infections  from  ships'  surgeons  for  fear  of 
victimization  from  their  employers  or  from  other  members  of  the  crew.  '28  However, 
the  crew  would  be  unlikely  to  submit  to  any  physical  examination  to  search  for  cases 
of  VD  so  the  surgeon  had  to  rely  on  voluntary  disclosure  and  work  to  minimise 
deterrents.  Seeing  VD  as  a  `sociological  factor  deserving  a  more  comprehensive  and 
broader  understanding  by  all  than  is  usual  in  England,  '  Elder  stressed  that  the  doctor 
had  to  be  neutral  -  treating  both  the  clinical  and  social  causes  of  the  disease  but  never 
acting  as  a  `moral  scourge  to  his  patients.  Rather  let  him  enact  the  role  of  true 
28  R  Davidson,  Dangerous  Liasons,  (Amsterdam,  2000),  67. 
199 physician  -  guide,  philosopher  and  friend.  '29  Thus,  for  Elder  the  balance  of  interests 
between  notification  of  VD  and  minimising  deterrence  was  best  found  by  the  surgeon 
in  each  particular  situation.  This  mirrors  the  thinking  of  the  central  ethical  committee 
of  the  BMA  in  the  early  interwar  years,  when  they  advocated  that  each  practitioner's 
conscience  should  be  the  guide  to  best  practice  on  confidentiality.  However,  in  the 
small,  enclosed  community  at  sea,  conscience  was  often  tempered  by  pragmatic 
considerations:  `to  dismiss  all  venereal  cases  indiscriminately  is  tantamount  to 
stopping  a  ship  for  want  of  crew,  or  perhaps  depriving  her  of  some  of  her  best 
workers.  '  30 
The  final  area  of  concern  for  ship  surgeons  with  regard  to  confidentiality  was 
the  keeping  of  medical  records.  There  were  two  key  reasons  for  keeping  records  of  all 
medical  attendance.  In  the  first  instance,  as  previously  stated,  the  medical  department 
of  the  ship  had  a  responsibility  to  demonstrate  to  the  ship  owner  that  they  had  carried 
out  their  duties  in  line  with  the  terms  of  their  employment.  Some  dubiety  existed  as  to 
whether  the  ship  owner's  entitlement  to  medical  information  stretched  only  as  far  as 
the  crew  and  passengers  who  were  treated  free  of  charge,  and  did  not  cover  first  and 
second  class  passengers  who  opted  to  pay  for  private  treatment.  For  Elder,  there  was 
no  ethical  distinction  between  gratuitous  and  paid  attendance.  Both  the  surgeon  and 
the  ship  owner  had  an  interest  in  keeping  records  of  all  medical  attendance  in  order  to 
counter  any  complaints  or  claims  for  compensation  against  either  the  company  or  the 
individual  surgeon: 
In  support  of  this  it  may  be  stated  that  claims  are  pending  personally  against 
the  writer  in  American  courts  at  the  present  moment  for  considerable  amounts, 
for  alleged  malpractice  in  the  treatment  of  passengers,  and  which  are  being 
contested  on  the  strength  of  full  records  being  kept.  31 
While  the  keeping  of  records  was  clearly  important,  it  brought  with  it  the  problem  of 
who  had  the  right  to  access  them.  The  considerations  of  the  ship  owner's  right  to  the 
evidence  of  work,  and  the  need  for  a  record  as  a  form  of  legal  protection  had  to  be 
balanced  b  concerns  for  patient  confidentiality.  While  some  elements  of  medical 
29  A  Vavasour  Elder,  Ship  Surgeon's  Handbook,  (London,  1927),  350. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid.  345. 
200 practice  differed  from  land  to  sea,  the  belief  that  any  encroachment  into  medical 
confidentiality  would  result  in  patients'  natural  reticence  hindering  efficiency  applied 
in  both  contexts. 
32  Consequently,  Elder  recommended  different  forms  of  record.  The 
official  report  for  the  ship  owner  should  contain  only  the  name  and  class  of  patient, 
the  date  of  first  and  last  attendances  and  a  column  for  remarks  including  the  result  of 
treatment.  The  ship  owner  would,  therefore,  have  an  index  containing  the  list  of  work 
performed  by  the  surgeon.  The  surgeon  himself  should  keep  a  private  day  book  in 
which  he  would  enter  the  name,  symptoms,  diagnosis  and  treatment  of  all  visits  he 
made  to  patients,  noting  in  particular  the  date  of  cure  or  discharge.  This  would  be  kept 
by  the  surgeon  for  reference  and  as  protection  against  legal  proceedings  and  not 
presented  to  the  ship  owner  as  an  official  report.  In  addition,  a  special  book  would  be 
kept  to  record  all  accidents  and  serious  cases  which  would  constitute  special  reports. 
Throughout  his  writing,  Elder  worked  on  the  assumption  that  the  ship  owner 
was  interested  only  in  general  medical  information  about  both  passengers  and  crew.  If 
he  required  any  detail  beyond  the  fact  that  a  passenger  received  medical  attention 
between  certain  dates,  or  that  the  crew  were  being  adequately  dealt  with,  he  would 
have  to  make  direct  representation  to  the  surgeon.  Elder  believed  that  such 
information  would  be  of  no  interest  to  the  ship  owner  in  normal  circumstances  and  `is 
so  decidedly  contrary  to  the  ethics  of  medical  practice.  '33  Even  where  members  of  the 
crew  were  considered  unfit  for  service,  the  report  which  the  ship's  surgeon  provided 
to  the  owner  could  be  presented  with  a  minimum  of  medical  detail.  Elder's  own 
practice  was  to  compile  a  list  of  men  unfit  for  service  in  each  of  the  ship's 
departments  and  submit  it  under  the  following  heading:  `The  undermentioned  should 
not  be  re-engaged,  on  medical  grounds.  '34  Written  in  triplicate,  the  original  would  be 
sent  to  the  head  of  the  department  concerned  without  the  addition  of  the  medical 
details  regarding  each  case.  These  details  would  be  inserted  on  copies  two  and  three, 
before  the  former  was  sent  to  the  medical  superintendent  of  the  shipping  company  and 
the  latter  was  filed  in  the  surgeon's  own  records.  Elder  believed  that  a  second  opinion 
was  needed  before  a  man  was  rejected  from  service  on  a  ship  but  was  adamant  that 
the  opinion  should  come  from  a  doctor  with  sea  experience  as  `there  are  many  men  in 
32  Ibid.  341. 
33 
Ibid.  348. 
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201 the  mercantile  marine  doing  hard  and  continuous  work  who  would  never  be  passed 
for  duty  on  service  standards,  or  even  those  obtaining  in  civil  employ  on  land.  935 
The  combination  of  roles  which  the  surgeon  carried  out  in  the  enclosed 
community  of  a  ship  demanded  special  consideration  of  his  duties  vis-a-vis 
confidentiality.  As  medical  officer,  he  had  to  think  in  terms  of  the  welfare  of  all 
members  of  crew  and  passengers  and  break  confidentiality  in  cases  of  contagious 
disease.  As  employee  of  the  ship  owner,  his  dealings  with  the  crew  and  third  class 
passengers  had  to  be  related  to  the  company  as  evidence  of  fulfilling  the  terms  of  his 
service  and  also  in  case  of  complaint.  However,  it  was  clear  that  the  rules  governing 
certain  diseases  -  notably  VD  -  were  subject  to  a  large  measure  of  individual 
interpretation,  and  that  the  scale  of  the  problem  amongst  seamen  made  strict 
adherence  to  a  policy  of  notification  all  but  impossible.  In  order  to  balance  the  interest 
of  various  parties  in  the  medical  information  from  a  ship  with  considerations  of 
confidentiality,  the  surgeon  had  to  keep  a  number  of  record  books.  For  the  shipping 
company,  only  the  most  general  information  should  be  supplied,  while  for  the 
doctor's  own  records,  a  more  detailed  account  should  be  kept  in  case  of  legal 
complaints  about  treatment.  As  if  the  ship  surgeon's  position  was  not  complicated 
enough,  Elder's  assumption  that  third  parties  were  only  ever  interested  in  general 
information  about  medical  treatment  aboard  ship  was  to  come  under  attack  in  the 
interwar  years. 
Gossip,  Scandal  and  Rumour  Spreading!  Queries  to  the  BMA  central  ethical 
committee  on  secrecy  at  sea. 
A  highly  contrasting  picture  of  medical  provision  at  sea,  to  that  described  by 
correspondents  to  the  BMJ  prior  to  the  First  World  War,  accompanied  an  enquiry  to 
the  central  ethical  committee  in  February  1925. 
The  company  in  question  has  made  rather  a  specialty  of  its  medical  service, 
the  medical  staff  on  each  ship  including  trained  nurses,  a  dispenser,  a  hospital 
attendant  and  in  some  cases  a  qualified  masseuse.  The  equipment  is  very 
35  Ibid.  349. 
202 complete  and  includes  a  laboratory  outfit  with  incubators,  various  culture 
36 
media  etc. 
While  such  specialty  would  not  be  standard,  it  nonetheless  demonstrated  that  medical 
provision  could  be  seen  as  an  important  and  valued  element  of  the  ship's  service. 
However,  some  things  showed  little  signs  of  having  changed.  There  was  still  an 
underlying  worry  about  litigation  against  shipping  companies  for  poor  medical 
provision  and  as  a  result  some  required  `the  most  complete  and  detailed'  records  to  be 
kept  on  the  treatment  of  all  passengers  and  crew.  Although  this  was  correct  procedure 
from  a  medical  point  of  view,  the  writer  indicated  that  the  company  for  which  he 
worked  required  their  ship  surgeons  to  submit  these  records  to  the  ship's  commander 
for  daily  inspection.  Unsurprisingly,  the  writer  saw  this  not  only  as  a  breach  of 
medical  etiquette  which  might  lead  to  legal  proceedings  against  the  surgeon,  but  also 
highlighted  that  such  a  policy  was  a  deterrent  for  people  `requiring  attention  for 
illnesses  of  a  special  nature.  '37  Clearly  this  was  not  the  form  of  general  report  that 
Elder  had  advocated.  The  writer  stressed  that  the  submission  of  such  an  `intimate' 
report  was  not  the  policy  in  most  shipping  companies.  The  fact  that  it  was  in  the 
company  for  which  he  worked  meant  that  the  majority  of  the  crew,  as  insured  persons 
dependent  on  the  ship  surgeon  for  their  medical  attention,  could  not  seek  medical 
advice  on  the  same  terms  of  strict  confidence  which  they  would  experience  on  shore. 
However,  any  surgeon  who  failed  to  keep  a  complete  record  of  all  cases  treated, 
despite  protestation  from  the  patient,  would  be  open  to  severe  reprimand.  The  writer 
sought  the  CEC's  opinion  so  that  he  could  either  approach  the  medical  superintendent 
of  the  company  to  get  the  practice  abolished  or  reassure  the  medical  officers  who  had 
queried  their  position  of  the  correctness  of  the  practice. 
The  central  ethical  committee  asked  if  the  writer  would  have  any  objection  to 
their  communicating  with  the  company  in  question.  He  consented  to  this  with  two 
qualifications.  He  wanted  no  publicity  or  record  kept  of  the  name  of  the  company  - 
Canadian  Pacific  Steamship  Ltd.  -  in  connection  with  the  query,  and  he  wished  that 
any  decision  which  the  BMA  reached  would  be  communicated  directly  to  him  as  he 
had  made  the  approach  independently  of  his  senior.  Both  these  qualifications  are 
significant..  The  latter  places  the  query  in  the  category  of  whistleblowing  -  itself  an 
36  BMA  CEC  minutes  24  Feb  1925. 
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203 interesting  ethical  question.  While  the  BMA  records  still  contain  the  name  of  the 
company  in  question,  there  is  no  mention  of  the  name  of  the  individual,  which,  given 
the  verbatim  inclusion  of  his  correspondence,  suggests  a  deliberate  attempt  to 
preserve  his  anonymity.  The  demand  that  the  shipping  company  should  be  given  no 
negative  publicity  indicates  that  the  employee  was  not  dissatisfied  with  the  company 
or  his  terms  of  employment  in  any  general  sense.  On  the  contrary,  he  had  a  very  high 
regard  for  the  company  `which  otherwise  has  done  more  to  raise  the  status  of  the 
medical  officer  at  sea  than  probably  any  other  steamship  line.  In  fact,  it  is  the  present 
high  standard  of  medical  service  which  makes  the  regulation  in  question  so 
objectionable.  '38  There  is  therefore  both  a  link  and  a  distinction,  in  the  writer's  mind, 
between  the  status  of  the  ship  surgeon  and  the  ethics  of  medicine  at  sea.  Status  was  a 
necessary  precursor  to  influencing  the  company's  policy  on  confidentiality.  However, 
having  achieved  high  status  within  the  company,  the  medical  officers  were  still 
concerned  with  the  policy  on  secrecy  because  of  its  contravention  of  their 
understanding  of  medical  ethics.  Status  and  ethics  were  linked  but  separate  issues. 
Re-enforcing  the  significance  of  status,  the  writer  indicated  that  the  practice  of 
giving  the  ship's  captain  access  to  detailed  accounts  of  the  ship  surgeon's  work  was  a 
remnant  from  `by-gone  days  when  it  was  thought  necessary  to  have  some  check  on 
the  surgeon  to  ensure  he  was  carrying  out  his  duties.,  39  The  fact  that  not  all  companies 
continued  the  practice  was  taken  to  be  evidence  that  it  was  no  longer  necessary. 
Rather  than  the  captain  providing  a  check  on  the  surgeon,  the  policy  of  giving  all 
medical  information  to  the  captain  increased  the  chance  of  sensitive  information 
slipping  out.  In  that  regard,  the  captain  was  now  more  of  a  liability  than  the  surgeon. 
The  CEC  tended  to  agree  with  this  assessment  and  resolved  that  `the  action  of  the 
company  in  requiring  medical  records  to  be  submitted  to  the  ships'  commanders  is 
inimical  to  the  public  interest  and  a  violation  of  professional  secrecy.  40 
Consequently,  the  CEC  resolved  to  support  the  employee  who  had  raised  the  question. 
By  May,  the  committee  had  received  word  that,  as  a  result  of  their  opinion  relayed  to 
the  company  through  the  anonymous  employee,  the  Canadian  Pacific  Steamship 
Company  had  discontinued  the  practice.  This  must  represent  the  most  easily  obtained 
and  clear-scat  success  that  the  central  ethical  committee  enjoyed  on  the  issue  of 
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204 medical  secrecy  in  the  interwar  years.  As  previously  noted,  the  BMA  had  attained 
much  respect  as  a  result  of  their  organisation  of  medical  provision  during  the  First 
World  War.  It  is  likely  that  this  enhanced  reputation  as  an  authoritative  body  played  a 
significant  role  in  the  Canadian  Pacific  Steamship  Company's  readiness  to  follow  the 
BMA's  recommendations.  Naturally,  the  report  was  received  with  satisfaction  by  the 
CEC  members. 
41 
The  CEC's  success,  though  significant,  was  limited  in  application  to  the 
Canadian  Pacific  Steamship  company.  In  June  1937,  another  request  on  secrecy  at  sea 
was  received.  Its  author,  Dr  Meighan,  presented  his  query  in  a  similar  manner  to 
previous  writers.  Shipping  companies  had  a  vested  interest  in  the  health  of  their 
workforce  which  made  it  impossible  to  preserve  medical  confidentiality  for  members 
of  a  ship's  crew,  but  Meighan  argued  that  a  greater  measure  of  secrecy  should  be 
allowed  to  passengers.  He  noted  that  some  companies  still  required  their  surgeons  to 
present  the  ship's  captain  with  a  daily  written  or  verbal  report  describing  all  the  cases 
of  illness  on  board  `which  is  usually  followed  by  much  inquisitive  questioning  by  the 
Captain.  '42  Acknowledging  that  secrecy  was  difficult  to  maintain  at  sea,  Meighan 
pointed  to  the  fact  that  many  ship  captains  `fancying  themselves  (from  previous 
"experience"  on  cargo  ships)  as  amateur  "doctors"  even  suggest  treatment!  A3  The 
surgeon's  position  was  difficult  as  the  captain  had  influence:  `the  captain  always  has 
the  ear  of  the  head  office,  to  whom  a  word  from  him  may  mean  dismissal.  A4 
Without  a  test  case  for  breach  of  medical  secrecy  at  sea,  Meighan  wanted  to 
know  where  the  boundaries  of  patient  confidentiality  lay.  The  CEC  responded  by 
sending  Meighan  a  copy  of  the  decision  of  the  BMA  council  from  1914.  Meighan 
wrote  again,  re-emphasising  his  objections  and  reiterating  a  request  that  the  matter 
might  be  considered  by  the  ship  surgeons'  committee.  The  CEC  saw  no  reason  to 
change  their  opinion.  They  re-affirmed  the  decision  of  council  from  1914,  further 
commenting: 
the  master  of  a  ship  has  a  special  responsibility  for  the  welfare  of  the  crew  and 
passengers  and  may  reasonably  expect  to  be  informed  of  any  event  likely  to  be 
hurtful  to  their  welfare.  Most  certainly  a  doctor  in  attendance  on  a  patient  on 
41  BMA  CEC  minutes  12  May  1925. 
42  BMA  CEC  minutes  1  June  1937. 
43Ibid. 
44  Ibid.  Emphasis  as  in  original. 
205 board  ship  is  not  less  bound  than  his  colleagues  on  shore  to  respect  his 
patient's  confidence  and  to  abstain  from  any  communication  either  to  the 
master  or  to  any  other  person  which  would  be  to  his  patient's  disadvantage  - 
subject  to  the  general  considerations  herein  stated.  45 
Recognising  that  the  master  of  a  ship  had  a  right  to  medical  information,  even  detailed 
medical  reports  in  exceptional  circumstances  involving  the  welfare  of  crew  or 
passengers,  the  resolution  suggested  that  in  ordinary  circumstances  the  ship  surgeon 
should  respect  patient  confidentiality.  Meighan  felt  this  response  too  vague  and 
general  to  be  of  practical  assistance.  Echoing  the  sentiments  expressed  by  Dr  Burton, 
the  medical  officer  of  health  in  Ilford  in  the  early  interwar  years,  Meighan  complained 
11  feel  that  the  members  of  the  standing  subcommittee  (of  the  central  ethical 
committee)  have  had  little  or  no  experience  of  a  ship  surgeon's  work.  A6  The  master  of 
a  ship  could  compel  his  surgeon  to  answer  questions  about  his  patients.  The  P&O 
company  required  daily  information  on  the  nature  of  illness  and  condition  of  every 
patient  on  board.  Moreover,  these  factors  were  exacerbated  by  `the  magnified 
inquisitiveness  of  most  Captains  about  illness  and  how  to  treat  it.  '47 
Meighan  saw  no  easy  solution  in  extending  the  duty  of  confidence  to  ship 
captains,  who  did  not  seem  to  rate  very  highly  in  his  estimation.  `If  he  is  informed,  it 
is  soon  all  over  the  ship,  A8  Meighan  suggested  in  his  first  letter.  He  was  yet  more 
candid  in  his  description  by  July:  `my  present  captain  is  a  ls`  class  gossip-,  scandal-, 
and  rumour-spreader.  '49  He  suggested  that  the  BMA  should  write  to  the  Board  of 
Trade  to  ask  that  ship  captains  be  instructed  to  adhere  to  strict  rules  of  medical 
confidence,.  and  to  request  that  ship  surgeons  receive  a  right  to  withhold  information 
considered  detrimental  to  the  patient.  On  receiving  this  communication  from 
Meighan,  the  CEC  invited  the  ships  surgeons'  subcommittee  to  review  the 
correspondence.  This  it  did  on  1  March,  concluding  that  `there  was  nothing  in  the 
regulations  governing  the  relations  between  a  ship  surgeon  and  the  captain  of  the  ship 
which  would  violate  professional  secrecy.  '50  No  further  action  was  taken. 
45  Ibid. 
46  BMA  CEC  minutes  6  July  1937. 
47  Ibid. 
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49  BMA  CEC  minutes  6  July  1937. 
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206 The  debate  over  medical  confidentiality  at  sea  was  not  insignificant.  It 
highlighted  a  connection  between  the  status  of  the  doctor  within  the  ship's  crew  and 
the  relative  weight  that  was  placed  on  professional  ethics.  The  pre-War  drive  to 
improve  the  status  and  conditions  of  ship  surgeons  was  tied-in  with  concerns  over 
their  obligation  to  give  information  to  individuals  above  them  in  the  ship's  hierarchy. 
By  calling  for  professional  unity,  an  attempt  was  made  to  improve  respect  for  the  ship 
surgeon's  position.  Rather  than  being  seen  in  the  lowly,  servile  position  described  in 
pre-War  correspondence  in  the  BMJ,  ship  surgeons  would  be  recognised  as  members 
of  a  learned  profession.  By  extension,  the  ship  surgeon  would  also  be  bound  by  the 
profession's  code  of  ethics  -  an  important  element  of  professional  identity.  Thus,  the 
doctor  who  helped  provide  the  excellent  medical  service  for  passengers  travelling 
with  the  Canadian  Pacific  Steamship  Company  was  still  concerned  with  the 
company's  policy  on  medical  confidentiality  even  though  he  was  otherwise  very 
satisfied  with  his  position. 
Status  was  also  important  for  the  level  of  confidentiality  given  to  passengers 
aboard  ship.  While  Elder  believed  first  class  passengers  should  not  be  given  special 
consideration  in  this  regard,  it  is  unlikely  his  advice  was  followed  in  practice.  Many 
of  the  correspondents  on  the  subject  distinguished  between  giving  information  to  the 
shipping  company  regarding  members  of  the  crew  or  steerage  passengers  who  had 
received  free  treatment,  while  respecting  the  confidentiality  of  first  class  passengers 
who  paid  for  private  treatment.  The  isolation  of  a  patient  with  an  infectious  disease 
was  much  easier  in  the  case  of  first  and  second  class  passengers  who  had  private 
cabins  -  mirroring  the  class  distinction  regarding  the  notification  of  infectious  disease 
on  land. 
The  Case  of  the  Kissing  Doctor 
A  central  problem  faced  by  the  advocates  of  medical  privilege  was  the  recognition 
that  there  were  circumstances  in  which  medical  confidentiality  should  be  breached. 
For  instance,  the  dictates  of  medical  ethics  did  not  prevent  a  doctor  accused  of 
misconduct  from  mounting  a  defence  simply  because  professional  information  was 
bound  by  strict  rules  of  medical  confidentiality.  During  the  meetings  of  the 
professional  secrecy  committee  in  1922,  the  BMA  lawyer,  Turner,  had  expressed  his 
concern  that  the  drive  for  privilege  might  result  in  doctors  either  being  unable  to 
mount  a  defence  in  malpraxis  cases,  or  employing  a  double  standard  which  allowed 
207 breach  of  confidence  to  protect  professional  reputation  but  not  in  other  cases.  The 
case  of  the  Kissing  Doctor  provides  an  example  of  the  basic  need  of  doctors  to  be  able 
to  speak  about  their  professional  life  when  involved  in  legal  proceedings  connected  to 
their  professional  reputation.  Moreover,  while  individual  conscience  was  often  held 
up  as  the  guiding  light  for  doctors,  the  Kissing  Doctor  illustrates  that  the  medical 
profession  was  not  without  eccentric  characters  whose  perception  of  correct  action 
would  not  necessarily  be  in  keeping  with  majority  opinion.  Conscience  may 
illuminate  different  paths  for  different  practitioners. 
In  June  1921  the  case  of  Vidal  v  Vidal  and  Wilson  was  heard  before  Sir  Henry 
Duke,  President  of  the  Divorce  Court.  Edward  Vidal  was  petitioning  for  divorce  from 
his  wife,  Primrose  Violet  Vidal,  on  the  grounds  that  she  had  committed  adultery  with 
Dr  Arthur  W  Wilson  (the  Kissing  Doctor).  The  case  was  decided  against  the 
petitioner.  Wilson  subsequently  brought  a  libel  action  against  twenty  one  individuals 
who  lived  nearby  the  Vidal's  home,  for  writing  a  letter  to  the  Vidal's  landlord 
alleging  that  the  house  had  been  used  as  a  brothel  and  that  Wilson  visited  it  almost 
every  night.  The  case  was  heard  in  the  High  Court  before  the  appropriately  named 
Justice  Darling.  Wilson  was  aged  between  fifty  and  sixty,  his  wife  was  an  invalid  and, 
in  addition  to  his  private  practice,  he  had  a  substantial  panel  practice  which  provided 
him  with  a  good  income.  In  court,  Wilson's  lawyer  portrayed  him  as  a  generous 
character  always  looking  to  help  out  patients  in  whatever  way  he  could,  including 
sharing  his  love  of  music  with  them 
He  was  often  heard  singing  on  his  rounds,  and  it  was  no  uncommon  thing  for 
him  to  sing  in  his  patients'  houses.  He  asked  them  whether  they  would  like  a 
little  music  and  then  he  carolled  forth  to  cheer  them  up.  There  could  be  no 
doubt  that  he  was  very  odds' 
Wilson  had  known  Primrose  Vidal  since  he  had  been  called  in  to  visit  her  after  a 
miscarriage  in  1916.  It  was  not  just  the  frequency  of  Wilson's  visits  to  Primrose 
Vidal's  house  that  provoked  suspicion,  Wilson  also  paid  the  rent,  rates  and  taxes  and 
had  paid  for  singing  lessons  for  her  as  well  as  giving  her  a  gold  ring  for  improved 
singing.  His  pseudonym  as  the  kissing  doctor  came  from  his  practice  of  kissing  his 
51  The  Times  9  March  1921. 
208 female  patients,  a  point  best  left  for  explanation  by  Wilson's  evidence  under  cross 
examination  by  Mr  Thomas  during  the  hearing: 
Thomas:  After  you  first  met  her  (Mrs  Vidal)  you  acquired  the  habit  of  kissing 
her,  a  woman  who,  owing  to  the  exigencies  of  the  war,  was  separated  from  her 
husband? 
Wilson:  Yes. 
Darling:  Is  this  a  habit  you  practice  with  all  your  patients? 
Wilson:  Not  all;  with  many,  when  I  got  very  friendly  with  them.  52 
Wilson  further  acknowledged  that  he  had  kissed  Primrose  Vidal  in  bed.  He  assured 
the  court  that  he  had  not  done  this  often  and  it  was  only  because  she  was  a  very  dear 
friend. 
Darling  -  Don't  you  realise  that  a  doctor  who  necessarily  must  go  into  the 
bedrooms  of  women  is  in  a  very  delicate  position  with  regard  to  them? 
Wilson  -  Yes 
Darling  -  And  that  ordinary  men  would  strongly  object  to  a  man's  coming  in 
and  kissing  their  wives? 
Wilson  -  It  depends  upon  how  these  things  are  done,  My  Lord.  53 
Unfortunately,  Wilson  did  not  elaborate  on  the  appropriate  way  in  which  to  enter  the 
bedroom  of  a  married  woman  and  kiss  her  without  provoking  objection  from  her 
husband.  Later  in  his  evidence,  Wilson  indicated  that  there  were  `about  two  dozen  of 
his  patients  whom  he  quite  frequently  kissed  without  anyone's  objecting.  He  could 
mention  numerous  patients  also  on  whom  he  had  spent  money.  '54  Suspicious  as  the 
whole  story  sounds,  it  illustrates  a  salient  point.  Because  a  doctor's  work  involved 
matters  of  a  sensitive  nature  he  was  open  to  litigation  from  a  number  of  angles.  One 
of  the  reasons  that  the  medical  privilege  lobby  had  difficulties  defining  the  boundaries 
of  what  they  sought  was  because  doctors  often  needed  to  be  able  to  stand  up  and 
defend  themselves  in  court.  It  was  difficult  to  portray  this  exception  to  medical 
privilege  as  anything  but  a  double  standard  grounded  in  professional  self-interest. 
52  Ibid. 
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209 It  is  simple  to  see  how  the  circumstances  involving  Wilson  and  Primrose  Vidal 
could  be  construed  in  a  very  bad  light,  but  it  is  also  possible  that  Wilson's  motives 
were  entirely  altruistic.  As  Primrose  Vidal  testified,  `she  knew  of  no  other  man  who 
had  done  for  her  what  he  did  without  exacting  something  from  her  in  return.  '55  Her 
father  testified  that  he  had  no  objection  to  Wilson  kissing  his  daughter  or  his  wife, 
`the  doctor  often  kissed  them  both.  s56  If  a  doctor  was  bound  to  absolute  secrecy  he 
would  not  be  able  to  stand  in  court  and  give  his  side  of  the  argument.  Moreover, 
Wilson's  accepted  eccentricity  demonstrates  that  there  was  no  uniform  mould  for 
doctors.  The  central  ethical  committee's  decision  that,  with  specific  guidelines  on 
confidentiality  impossible,  individual  doctors  should  rely  on  their  conscience  to  guide 
them,  would  struggle  for  consistency  in  a  world  of  practice  that  included  figures  like 
Arthur  Wilson. 
As  an  interesting  aside,  there  were  further  legal  ramifications  to  the  failure  of 
Vidal's  divorce  case.  The  loss  of  the  case  infuriated  Edward  Vidal's  father,  Vitale 
Benvenisti.  Originally  from  Turkey,  Benvenisti  had  become  a  naturalised  British 
subject  in  1897.  A  tobacconist  by  trade,  he  had  been  declared  bankrupt  in  1907. 
Believing  that  there  had  been  a  conspiracy  against  his  son,  Benvenisti  decided  that  the 
best  way  to  get  the  evidence  for  this  claim  was  to  antagonise  the  judge  from  the  case, 
Sir  Henry  Duke,  into  suing  him  for  libel.  In  order  to  achieve  this,  he  printed  one 
thousand  copies  of  a  pamphlet  accusing  the  President  of  the  Probate,  Divorce  and 
Admiralty  Division;  three  firms  of  solicitors;  a  barrister  and  Dr  Wilson  of  defrauding 
the  courts  of  justice.  Not  content  with  this,  he  also  employed  two  men  to  parade 
outside  the  courts  in  Carey  Street  and  in  Parliament  Square  throughout  the  day 
wearing  sandwich  boards  which  read 
Is  Judge  Sir  Henry  Duke  Afraid  to  Prosecute  Me?  I  accuse  him  to  be  a  traitor 
of  his  duty  and  of  having  defrauded  the  Courts  of  Justice  for  the  Benefit  of  the 
Kissing  Doctor.  57 
As  well  as  attention  for  his  cause,  these  antics  resulted  in  a  CID  tail  for  Benvenisti. 
With  no  let  up  in  his  persistence,  eventually  Benvenisti  was  brought  before  a 
55  Ibid. 
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210 Divisional  Court  consisting  of  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  and  Justices  Avory  and  Sankey. 
He  reiterated  his  claims  that  the  solicitors  had  been  incompetent  and  left  his  son  with 
inadequate  counsel  during  the  divorce  hearing,  and  that  subsequently  Dr  Wilson  had 
attempted  to  bribe  Edward  with  £200  and  an  agreement  to  provide  him  with  evidence 
of  his  wife's  adultery  with  another  man  in  an  undefended  suit,  if  he  agreed  not  to  give 
evidence  against  him.  Sir  Henry  Duke  was  accused  of  being  so  keen  to  get  the  Kissing 
Doctor  off  the  hook,  that  he  had  abused  his  position  and  colluded  in  the  judgement  of 
not  guilty.  These  arguments  did  not  impress  the  Lord  Chief  Justice,  who  in  his 
judgement  stated 
The  defendant  adhered  to  and  insisted  upon  the  allegations  he  had  made, 
which  were  scandalous  abuse  of  the  worst  description,  and  that  he  (Benvenisti) 
had  expressed  no  regret  and  therefore  in  the  circumstances  the  Court  ordered 
that  he  should  be  committed  to  prison  for  four  months  for  contempt  of  court.  58 
Although  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  Kissing  Doctor's  encounter  with  the  law 
were  exceptional,  the  case  illustrates  that  doctors  needed  to  breach  confidentiality  to 
defend  themselves  against  allegations  of  improper  practice.  Vavasour  Elder 
emphasised  this  when,  as  noted  in  the  last  section,  he  pointed  to  the  fact  that  he  was 
contesting  a  number  of  allegations  of  malpraxis  on  grounds  of  having  kept  full 
medical  records.  The  knowledge  that  professional  self-interest  was  a  valid  ground  for 
breaching  confidentiality  was  therefore  a  constant  restraint  on  the  advocates  of 
medical  privilege. 
Inviting  doctors  to  prophesy:  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  1937 
The  most  publicised  threat  to  medical  confidentiality  in  the  early  interwar  years  was 
judicial  insistence  on  the  evidence  of  doctors  from  VD  treatment  centres  during 
divorce  hearings.  The  liberalisation  of  the  divorce  law  in  England  was  a  slow  process. 
In  1923,  women  were  given  access  to  divorce  for  adultery  on  an  equal  basis  with  men, 
but  it  was  not  until  1937  that  the  grounds  for  divorce  were  themselves  extended  to 
include  three  years'  desertion,  cruelty  and  prolonged  and  incurable  insanity.  59  The 
SB  PRO  MEPO  3/379.  Letter  from  Inspector  Cooper  to  Chief  Inspector  Metropolitan  Police  16  Oct 
1922. 
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211 Matrimonial  Causes  Act  was  a  private  members'  bill  that  Alan  Herbert,  MP  for 
Oxford  University  and  a  leading  campaigner  for  divorce  law  reform,  had  introduced 
and  succeeded  in  getting  passed.  While  the  medical  profession  might  have  hoped  that 
the  ability  to  petition  for  divorce  on  grounds  other  than  adultery  would  diminish  the 
importance  of  medical  testimony  on  the  presence  of  VD,  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act 
brought  them  a  new  set  of  problems.  Clause  2  (d)  of  the  Act  stated: 
A  petition  for  divorce  may  be  presented  to  the  High  Court  either  by  the 
husband  or  the  wife  on  the  ground  that  the  respondent...  is  incurably  of 
unsound  mind  and  has  been  continuously  under  care  and  treatment  for  a  period 
of  at  least  five  years  immediately  preceding  the  presentation  of  the  petition6° 
The  clause  raised  concerns  within  the  BMA  CEC  that  doctors  might  be  put  into 
ethical  and  legal  difficulty  for  breach  of  confidence  when,  prior  to  any  legal 
proceedings  being  started,  they  were  asked  to  state  whether  or  not  a  patient  was 
incurably  insane.  This  differed  from  other  situations  in  which  a  doctor  might 
legitimately  give  patient  information  (i.  e.  in  the  witness  box  or  during  a  precognition) 
because  the  doctor's  opinion  was  sought  in  order  to  determine  whether  a  petition  for 
divorce  could  be  submitted.  As  legal  proceedings  were  not  officially  underway  at  the 
time  of  the  consultation,  the  doctor's  opinion  would  not  be  considered  as  prima  facie 
privileged.  In  February  1938,  the  CEC  asked  the  BMA's  legal  advisers  to  examine  the 
position.  Their  response  indicated  that  a  breach  of  confidentiality  alone  was  unlikely 
to  lead  to  legal  action,  but  if  the  breach  were  coupled  with  an  allegation  of  libel, 
slander  or  negligence  this  would  pose  more  problems.  Their  advice  was  that  doctors 
should  decline  to  give  an  opinion  on  a  case  until  directed  by  a  court,  but  that  they 
could  allow  an  independent  medical  expert  to  examine  relevant  records  on  behalf  of 
the  petitioner. 
The  CEC  passed  on  a  copy  of  these  remarks  to  the  BMA's  psychological 
medicine  group  committee  with  a  suggestion  that  amending  legislation  was  needed  to 
protect  doctors  under  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act,  and  that  the  two  committees  might 
co-operate  to  discuss  the  position.  The  psychological  medicine  group  committee 
agreed  anda  joint  subcommittee  was  formed.  At  their  first  meeting,  they  reiterated  the 
60  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  1937,  section  2  clause  d). 
212 problem.  The  doctor  was  bound  by  professional  secrecy  and  should  only  give 
information  at  the  direction  of  a  court,  but  the  medical  opinion  was  needed  for  the 
petition  for  divorce  to  be  filed  which  would  get  legal  proceedings  underway.  Not  to 
give  such  opinions  would  amount  to  obstructing  justice.  Therefore,  the  problem  was 
not  so  much  the  disclosure  as  its  timing,  and  the  subcommittee  agreed  with  the  CEC 
that  the  resolution  lay  in  amending  legislation  `which,  by  placing  the  practitioner 
under  a  statutory  obligation  to  provide  the  required  information,  would  protect  him 
both  against  the  danger  of  offending  ethically  and  against  the  danger  of  incurring 
serious  legal  risks.  '61 
A  letter  to  the  BMJ  in  early  March  indicated  that  the  London  &  Counties 
Medical  Protection  Society  were  also  concerned  about  professional  secrecy  under  the 
Act 
A  patient  is  placed  under  the  doctor's  care  by  some  person  or  authority  who  is 
responsible  for  the  patient  -  whether  it  be  a  relation  or  local  authority  matters 
little.  It  may  be  argued  that  the  doctor  is  responsible  not  to  the  patient  but  to 
the  person  who  employs  him  for  the  purpose  of  caring  for  the  patient.  In 
ordinary  circumstances  presumably  a  doctor  without  hesitation  would  give 
information  regarding  the  health  and  prognosis  of  a  patient  to  a  husband  or 
wife.  Is,  therefore,  the  extent  of  the  information  sought,  or  the  purpose  a  factor 
to  be  considered  by  a  practitioner  in  giving  or  withholding  information?  62 
Because  mentally  ill  patients  were  not  deemed  competent  to  give  consent,  relevant 
information  was  normally  given  to  a  close  relative  or  guardian.  Often  this  was  the 
spouse  of  the  patient,  but  in  the  case  of  clause  2  d)  of  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act,  the 
passing  of  the  information  to  the  spouse  might  actually  be  detrimental  to  the  interests 
of  the  patient.  The  person  who  was  supposed  to  protect  the  patient's  interests  could 
therefore  pose  a  threat  to  them  and  the  question  became:  can  information  that  would 
normally  be  passed  on,  be  denied  on  grounds  that  the  guardian  may  use  it  against  the 
patient?  In  discussing  this  position  in  April,  the  joint  subcommittee  at  the  BMA  again 
reiterated  the  belief  that  amending  legislation  was  necessary  including  a  provision  that 
`an  opinion  should  be  given  under  Clause  2  d)  of  the  Act  only  by  order  of  the  Master 
61  BMA  CEC  minutes  1938.  Joint  subcommittee  re:  Matrimonial  Causes  Act 
62  BMJ  12  March  1938.  Letter  from  Richard  W  Durand,  p591. 
213 of  Lunacy'63.  Indication  that  the  embers  of  the  early  interwar  debate  still  glowed  was 
given  in  the  joint  subcommittee's  acknowledgement  that  a  similar  protection  was 
needed  under  Clause  7  c)  which  permitted  petitioning  for  divorce  on  the  grounds  that 
a  spouse  was  suffering  from  a  communicable  form  of  VD  at  the  time  of  marriage. 
The  joint  subcommittee  passed  on  its  thoughts  as  recommendations  to  the 
CEC  and  suggested  that  the  Board  of  Control  should  be  courted  for  support.  This 
suggestion  was  acted  upon  and  Sir  Lawrence  Brock,  secretary  of  the  Board  of 
Control,  was  consulted.  Brock  distinguished  between  the  legal  and  ethical  position  of 
doctors  under  Clause  2  d).  He  suggested  that  the  ruling  in  the  case  of  McEwan  v 
Watson  (discussed  below)  made  clear  that  the  doctor  would  be  legally  entitled  to  give 
the  required  information.  This  did  still  leave  the  ethical  problem  but  Brock  suggested 
that  as  the  doctor  would  be  forced  to  give  the  information  in  the  witness  box  during 
the  hearing,  it  was  `questionable  whether  he  would  be  protecting  the  interests  of  his 
patient  by  declining  to  give  it  at  an  earlier  stage.  In  many  cases,  he  would  be  acting  in 
the  interests  of  his  patient  in  giving  his  opinion  to  the  prospective  petitioner,  who 
would  then  abandon  his  or  her  intention  of  bringing  an  action.  '64  In  terms  of  allowing 
the  Master  of  Lunacy  to  determine  when  information  should  be  divulged,  Brock 
thought  there  were  no  legal  grounds  on  which  the  Master  could  differentiate  between 
cases  and,  therefore,  the  proposal  was  unwise.  In  response  to  Brock's  opinions,  the 
joint  subcommittee  made  a  specific  statement  of  the  fact  that  it  would  be  unethical  for 
a  doctor  to  give  information  to  a  prospective  petitioner  in  the  circumstances  described 
under  clause  2  d).  Thus,  they,  too,  were  acknowledging  that  there  could  be  two 
separate  issues  -  unethical  behaviour  and  legal  liability.  In  order  to  get  clarification  on 
the  legal  position,  they  asked  a  BMA  solicitor  to  consider  the  position  in  the  light  of 
the  McEwan  v  Watson  ruling. 
Watson  v  McEwan  was  a  case  that  had  originated  in  the  Scottish  Court  of 
Session,  but  was  taken  on  appeal  all  the  way  to  the  House  of  Lords  in  1905.  The 
circumstances  were  as  follows.  Jessie  McEwan  was  married  in  1900.  The  marriage 
was  not  a  success  and  in  September  1901  she  moved  out  of  the  marital  home  and 
instructed  her  lawyer  that  she  was  considering  petitioning  for  divorce  on  grounds  of 
cruelty.  With  this  in  mind,  she  consulted  and  was  examined  by  Sir  Patrick  Heron 
Watson,  a-very  eminent  physician,  in  October  1901.  Jessie  McEwan  petitioned  for 
63  BMA  Joint  subcommittee  re:  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  25  April  1938. 
64  Ibid. 
214 divorce  in  December  1902,  on  grounds  of  ill  health  as  a  result  of  cruelty.  The  proof 
hearing  was  started  in  July  1903  and  then  adjourned  until  October.  Jessie  McEwan  did 
not  call  Watson  to  testify.  On  20  October  1903,  Thomas  McEwan's  lawyers  asked 
Watson  to  re-examine  Jessie  McEwan  with  a  view  to  giving  evidence  for  Thomas 
McEwan's  defence  at  the  adjourned  hearing.  Watson  agreed  to  the  request  and  gave 
evidence  on  24  October.  He  also  passed  over  to  Thomas  McEwan  and  his  lawyers, 
without  Jessie  McEwan's  consent  and,  allegedly,  `in  the  knowledge  that  such  consent 
would  have  been  withheld  if  asked  for'  the  notes  he  had  made  at  the  time  of  his  initial 
consultation  in  190165  He  further  alleged,  both  in  the  witness  box  and  during  his 
precognition  with  Thomas  McEwan's  lawyers,  that  at  the  time  of  the  1901 
consultation,  Jessie  McEwan  had  been  `bent  upon  inducing  premature  labour,  so  as  to 
free  her  of  any  permanent  reminder  of  her  marriage  with  said  Thomas  McEwan, 
meaning  thereby  that  the  pursuer  was  desirous  criminally  to  procure  abortion.  '  It  was 
this  slur  on  her  character  which  Jessie  McEwan  perceived  as  the  reason  for  the 
subsequent  failure  of  her  divorce  petition.  Consequently,  she  brought  an  action 
against  Watson  for  damages. 
Four  charges  were  laid  against  Watson.  He  was  accused  of  breaching  medical 
confidentiality  both  in  the  witness  box  and  by  giving  Thomas  McEwan  and  his 
lawyers  information  about  Jessie  McEwan  prior  to  the  divorce  hearing.  The  remaining 
two  charges  were  for  slander  connected  to  his  alleging,  both  prior  to  and  in  the 
witness  box,  that  Jessie  McEwan  had  intended  criminally  to  procure  abortion.  In  the 
first  hearing,  the  judge  -  Lord  Kincaimey  -  dismissed  the  charges  of  breach  of 
confidentiality  and  slander  regarding  Watson's  testimony  in  the  witness  box,  on  the 
ground  that  these  were  prima  facie  privileged.  However,  he  upheld  the  two  charges 
relating  to  the  disclosure  during  the  prior  conversation  with  Thomas  McEwan  and  his 
lawyers,  basing  his  decision  largely  upon  the  precedent  of  ABvCD,  1851  (the 
prenuptial  fornication  case  discussed  in  chapter  2)  that  confidentiality  was  an  integral 
part  of  the  doctor  -  patient  relationship.  On  appeal,  Watson  succeeded  in  having  the 
outstanding  charge  of  slander  overturned  so  that  only  the  charge  of  breach  of 
confidentiality  outside  the  witness  box  stood.  A  further  appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords 
saw  the  Lord  Chancellor  (Halsbury)  and  the  law  lords  unanimously  conclude  that  this 
charge  sheuld  also  be  disallowed.  The  main  reason  for  the  decision  was  that,  if 
65  Watson  v  McEwan,  The  Scots  Law  Times  Reports  Vol.  12  (Edinburgh,  1905),  249. 
215 statements  given  to  parties  in  preparation  for  a  trial  were  not  privileged,  the  process  of 
justice  would  be  made  more  cumbersome  as  witnesses  would  have  no  opportunity  to 
indicate  what  testimony  they  would  give  in  the  witness  box.  While  the  Lord 
Chancellor  appreciated  that  his  interpretation  of  the  law  might  lead  to  some 
potentially  slanderous  information  being  given  to  a  lawyer  for  a  case  which  never 
came  to  trial  (and  therefore  was  not  privileged),  this  information  would  not  be 
publicised  and  did  not,  therefore,  pose  a  sufficient  threat  to  justify  litigation. 
The  BMA  interpreted  this  decision  as  providing  a  defence  for  a  doctor  who 
was  alleged  to  have  broken  confidentiality  before  legal  proceedings  were  officially 
underway.  However,  it  did  not  prevent  a  legal  action  being  brought.  Even  if  such  an 
action  was  likely  to  fail,  it  was  nonetheless  a  burden: 
Even  if  a  man  is  a  member  of  one  of  these  (medical)  protection  societies  he 
nonetheless  has  to  make  a  considerable  sacrifice  in  time  and  money  in  order  to 
assist  the  society  in  getting  up  the  case  for  his  defence,  he  has  to  attend  on 
many  occasions  at  the  solicitor's  office,  he  has  to  attend  court,  and  he  is  of 
course  faced  with  the  worry  of  such  proceedings  and  the  possible  adverse 
effect  they  may  have  on  his  practice  or  upon  his  standing  in  the  profession.  66 
These  ill  effects  might  be  sufficient  reasons  for  someone  who  felt  ill-done  by  a  doctor 
to  seek  revenge,  even  with  the  knowledge  that  the  case  itself  was  likely  to  fail. 
Moreover,  it  was  not  always  possible  to  recover  costs  from  such  cases,  particularly 
those  involving  mentally  ill  patients.  In  light  of  this,  the  argument  that  there  would  be 
a  strong  defence  of  privilege  in  the  event  of  litigation,  was  insufficient.  Doctors  either 
needed  separate  legislation  which  protected  them  from  legal  proceedings  resulting 
from  the  giving  of  information  under  Clause  2  d)  or  the  legislature  should  use 
independent  examiners  to  determine  whether  or  not  there  was  suitable  medical 
evidence  for  a  petition  for  divorce  to  be  filed. 
The  BMA  was  receiving  publicity  for  its  dissatisfaction.  During  a  debate  at  the 
Medico-Legal  Society,  Dr  JL  Moir  made  reference  to  the  BMA's  concern  that 
doctors  would  not  be  protected  under  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act.  At  the  same 
meeting,  Dr  RD  Gillespie  echoed  the  feelings  of  anxiety  but  stressed  that  it  was  not 
66  BMA  CEC  Letter  from  solicitor  12  May  1938. 
216 rooted  purely  in  self-interest:  `they  were  deterred  by  a  natural  loyalty  to  their  patients, 
apart  from  any  desire  to  protect  themselves.  '67  Gillespie's  comments  are  significant  in 
highlighting  the  twin  forces  of  professional  ethics  and  professional  self-interest  that 
had  been  evident  in  earlier  debates  over  medical  confidentiality.  Whereas  the  benefit 
of  medical  confidentiality  to  public  health  had  been  stressed  in  the  debates  involving 
VD  treatment,  under  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  breach  of  confidentiality  only  posed 
a  threat  to  a  small  class  of  mentally  ill  patients.  Moreover,  the  disclosure  was  made  to 
the  spouse,  who,  as  guardian,  was  normally  permitted  to  receive  such  confidential 
information.  Gillespie  was,  therefore,  reverting  to  the  ideal  of  traditional  doctor  - 
patient  confidentiality  in  order  to  maintain  a  fig-leaf  of  ethics  whilst  arguing  for 
protection  under  the  law. 
The  BMA's  discontent  was  also  being  discussed  in  the  House  of  Commons. 
On  9  May  1938,  Alan  Herbert,  the  author  of  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  drew 
attention  to  the  potential  defects  in  his  bill  which  the  medical  profession  had 
highlighted: 
The  (BMA)  Council  has  considered  the  ethical  position  of  the  medical  man  in 
charge  of  an  insane  patient...  when  approached  for  an  opinion  by  a  prospective 
petitioner  and  the  legal  position  of  the  medical  man  in  the  event  of  a  patient 
whom  he  has  stated  to  be  incurably  of  unsound  mind  subsequently  recovering. 
The  Council  is  advised  that  any  opinion  expressed  by  the  medical  practitioner 
as  to  the  patient  being  of  unsound  mind  would  not  be  covered  by  the 
protection  given  under  the  Mental  Treatment  Act  or  the  Lunacy  Act;  that  the 
safest  course  would  be  for  the  practitioner  to  decline  to  express  any  opinion 
save  by  the  direction  of  the  court.  -The  adoption  of  this  attitude  would, 
however,  make  the  Act  unworkable,  and  the  Council  feels  that  the  most 
satisfactory  way  out  of  the  difficulty  would  be  the  introduction  of  amending 
legislation.  68 
The  BMJ  continued  to  carry  articles  relating  to  the  Act.  In  June,  a  report  in  the 
medico-legal  section  suggested  that  `as  the  patients  to  whom  the  inquiries  relate  will 
67  BMJ7  May  1938,  p.  1021.  Report  of  Medico-Legal  Society  debate  on  medico-legal  aspects  of  the 
Matrimonial  Causes  Act  (1937),  on  28  April  1938. 
68  Parliamentary  Debates,  House  of  Commons  vol.  335,  p1361. 
217 almost  certainly  be  certified,  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the  confidential  relation 
between  doctor  and  patient  exists  in  such  a  form  as  to  prevent  an  officer  charged  by 
the  law  with  the  detention  and  care  of  the  patient,  from  giving  information  for  the 
purposes  of  assisting  the  administration  of  justice.  '69  This  seemed  to  imply  a  two-fold 
security  for  doctors.  Not  only  was  there  a  different  form  of  confidential  relationship, 
presumably  because  there  was  often  a  guardian  involved  as  a  third  party,  but,  as  the 
breach  of  secrecy  was  for  the  purpose  of  justice,  the  doctor's  communication  would 
be  privileged.  This  approach  emphasised  the  principle  that  the  information  was  given 
for  legal  purposes,  ignoring  the  fact  that,  at  the  time  of  communication,  legal 
proceedings  were  not  underway.  In  this  scenario,  privilege  would  effectively  be 
subject  to  future  events  i.  e.  the  start  of  official  legal  proceedings.  However,  the  article 
pointed  to  the  fact  that  none  of  the  cases  which  the  courts  had  heard  thus  far  had  led  to 
legal  problems  for  the  doctors  involved. 
In  early  June  1938  the  President  of  the  Divorce  Court,  Sir  Boyd  Merriman, 
heard  a  relevant  test  case  in  which  he  ruled  that,  subject  to  considerations  of  public 
interest,  the  Board  of  Control  could  disclose  to  any  properly  constituted  guardian  ad 
litem,  prior  to  trial,  documents  and  records  in  the  Board's  possession  as  it  `must 
unquestionably  be  in  the  interests  of  justice.  '70  Effectively,  this  ruling  permitted 
lawyers  to  request  the  medical  records  of  mentally  ill  patients  from  the  Board  of 
Control  in  order  to  determine  whether  divorce  could  be  sought  under  clause  2  d)  of 
the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act.  The  Board  of  Control  had  opposed  the  petition. 
In  September,  the  BMA  council  met  with  Brock  from  the  Board  of  Control. 
The  council  stressed  that  their  aim  was  to  get  legislation  which  would  assure  doctors 
that  legal  actions  could  not  be  brought  against  them  -a  stronger  assurance  than  the 
idea  that  they  would  have  a  good  defence  of  privilege  when  cases  were  brought.  They 
recommended  that  amending  legislation  should  be  along  the  lines  of  clause  16  of  the 
Mental  Treatment  Act  1930  which  stressed  that  a  doctor  carrying  out  his  duty  under 
the  Act  would  only  be  liable  to  any  legal  proceedings,  civil  or  criminal,  if  he  had 
acted  in  bad  faith  or  without  reasonable  care.  Whether  these  grounds  for  action  had 
been  met  was  to  be  determined  by  the  High  Court  and  if  they  agreed  that  a  case  could 
69  BMJ  4  June  1938,  p.  1237. 
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218 be  made,  the  doctor  in  question  had  to  be  notified  and  given  an  opportunity  to  defend 
himself.  71 
While  Brock  agreed  that  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  was  open  to  criticism  on 
the  ground  that  `it  invited  the  doctor  to  prophesy,  '72  he  suggested  that  a  resolution 
may  be  found  in  amending  the  English  legislation  to  bring  it  in  line  with  the  Divorce 
(Scotland)  Act,  1938,  `which  makes  continuous  detention  under  care  and  treatment 
for  five  years  adequate  proof  of  incurability,  the  onus  of  proving  curability  being 
placed  on  the  respondent.  '73  Although  not  discussed  during  the  meeting,  the  question 
of  how  strict  an  interpretation  should  be  put  on  the  continuity  of  treatment  over  five 
years  -  did  an  occasional  weekend  out  or  visit  home  negate  the  continuity?  -  was 
queried  elsewhere. 
74  Brock  indicated  that  while  he  would  recommend  the  views  of  the 
Association  to  the  Minister  for  `favourable  consideration,  '  it  was  unlikely  that  the 
government  would  sponsor  an  amending  bill  unless  there  was  clear  evidence  that  the 
Matrimonial  Causes  Act  had  broken  down.  In  light  of  this,  a  private  members  bill  was 
a  better  prospect.  Pressed  as  to  which  of  the  two  proposed  amendments  Brock 
favoured,  he  indicated  that  the  main  consideration  was  which  would  be  more 
successful. 
I  am  not  sure,  he  said,  that  it  would  be  easier  to  get  the  House  to  adopt  the 
Scottish  formula.  He  added  that  the  argument  that  it  was  unfair  to  expect  a 
doctor  to  prophesy  was  one  which  might  commend  itself  to  the  House  whereas 
the  amendment  proposed  by  the  Association  might  appear  on  the  face  of  it  to 
be  an  attempt  to  increase  medical  privilege  in  which  case  the  House  would 
probably  be  reluctant  to  support  it.  75 
The  prospect  of  a  private  members  bill  dealing  with  medical  privilege,  only  a  year 
after  Graham-Little's  failed  attempt,  was  not  a  happy  one.  Moreover,  despite  Brock's 
optimism  that  the  House  might  be  sympathetic  to  the  difficulty  of  prophesy, 
elsewhere  it  was  argued  that  the  doctor  was  only  being  asked  as  to  the  likelihood  that 
71  Mental  Treatment  Act  1930,  Section  16  No.  1-3. 
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219 a  patient  would  recover  to  a  sufficiently  good  state  of  health  to  be  capable  of  leading  a 
normal  married  life.  76  The  prospects  of  getting  amending  legislation  did  not  seem 
good. 
The  problem  was  put  to  the  Minister  of  Health  in  Parliament  on  22  November. 
His  response  was  that  `the  Board  of  Control  had  suggested  to  the  Mental  Hospitals 
Association  that  the  position  of  a  medical  superintendent  might  be  safeguarded  if  the 
visiting  committee  gave  him  definite  instructions  to  answer  reasonable  enquiries.  The 
Minister  of  Health  was  not,  however,  empowered  to  give  visiting  committees  any 
direction  in  this  matter.  '77  By  the  following  February,  the  mental  hospitals  committee 
of  the  London  County  Council  was  indicating  that  the  supply  of  medical  reports  by 
the  council's  medical  officers  or  their  appearance  as  witnesses  in  court  would  be 
`subject  to  conditions  and  payment  of  fees  as  the  committee  may  prescribe.  '  78 
That  collective  responsibility  seemed  to  be  one  resolution  to  the  problem  was 
emphasised  in  June  1939,  when  the  President  of  the  Probate,  Divorce  and  Admiralty 
Division  (Merriman)  complained  that  while  `all  other  mental  hospitals  assisted  the 
courts  as  much  as  they  could  in  supplying  information  on  the  condition  of  patients,  '79 
the  authority  responsible  for  Warlingham  Mental  Hospital  had  failed  to  do  so.  The 
authority  in  question,  Croydon  Corporation,  issued  an  early  apology  and  a  fortnight 
later  the  medical  superintendent  of  Warlingham  wrote  to  the  BMJ  emphasising  that  he 
had  always  complied  with  the  legislation.  80  While  `after  some  discussion'  the  Board 
of  Control  and  the  local  authorities  had  agreed  to  place  relevant  patient  records  at  the 
disposal  of  the  court  in  order  that  the  petitioner's  solicitors  could  build  a  case,  debates 
as  to  the  implications  for  doctors  of  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  rumbled  on8' 
While  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  1937  represented  a  liberalisation  of  the 
divorce  law  in  England,  this  did  not  ease  the  position  of  doctors  with  regard  to  giving 
medical  evidence  in  divorce  cases.  The  major  concern  was  that  a  professional  opinion 
was  being  sought  before  legal  proceedings  were  begun  and  consequently  the  doctor's 
statement  was  not  privileged  against  litigation.  Clearly,  doctors'  primary  concern  was 
to  protect  their  own  interests  by  seeking  amending  legislation.  However,  a  separate 
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77  BMJ  3  December  1938,  p.  1184. 
78  BMJ  25  Fbruary  1939,  p.  410. 
79  BMJ  3  June  1939,  p.  1156. 
so  BMJ  17  June  1939,  p.  1268. 
81  See  for  instance  the  opinions  expressed  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  Mental  Hospitals  Association  on 
6  July,  as  reported  in  the  BMJ  22  July  1939,  p.  189-90. 
220 ethical  concern  was  raised  in  so  far  as  the  disclosure  to  a  spouse  who  would  use  the 
information  to  divorce  the  patient  clearly  questioned  the  doctor's  position.  Was  the 
doctor's  duty  to  assess  the  ends  to  which  the  medical  information  would  be  put?  In 
the  early  interwar  years  the  CEC  had  been  asked  a  similar  question  in  connection  with 
the  issuing  of  certificates  declaring  a  person  to  be  free  from  VD.  In  that  instance  they 
had  resolved  that  the  purpose  was  not  important.  In  the  case  of  their  mentally  ill 
patients,  doctors  seem  to  have  decided  to  follow  the  interests  of  the  courts  in 
supplying  the  relevant  information  once  they  were  satisfied  that  they  could  do  so  with 
little  threat  of  legal  repercussions  to  themselves. 
A  Chance  pregnancy  highlights  the  ongoing  problem  of  confidentiality  in 
relation  to  abortion. 
The  most  persistent  issue  involving  medical  confidentiality  from  the  late  nineteenth 
century  through  to  the  end  of  the  interwar  years  was  the  doctor's  duty  to  notify  cases 
of  criminal  abortion.  The  coroner's  inquiry  into  the  death  of  Vera  Evelyn  Norris 
following  an  alleged  abortion  in  1938  demonstrates  that  the  doctor's  duty  to  notify  the 
police  was  little  clearer  at  the  end  of  the  interwar  years  than  it  had  been  at  the  time  of 
the  Royal  College  of  Physicians'  consultation  with  Clarke  and  Avory  in  1896.  Norris 
became  pregnant  during  the  summer  of  1938,  most  likely  by  James  Miles  Chance.  In 
August,  the  same  month  in  which  she  admitted  to  Chance  that  she  was  pregnant,  she 
consulted  Annie  Christina  McAuliffe,  a  trained  nurse  and  midwife.  McAuliffe,  the 
mother  of  an  acquaintance  of  Norris,  later  claimed  that  Norris  had  consulted  her  for 
constipation.  However,  she  suspected  that  Norris  was  pregnant  and  when,  in 
September,  she  indicated  to  Norris  that  giving  her  enemas  for  constipation  would  not 
cause  her  to  abort,  Norris  indicated  that  `everything  would  be  in  order  as  she  had 
managed  three  miscarriages  before.  '82  McAuliffe  subsequently  claimed  that  she  had 
refused  to  administer  any  further  treatment.  A  long-time  friend  and  former  lover  of 
Norris's,  Bernard  Austen  Barrington,  was  also  aware  of  her  pregnancy  by  the  end  of 
August.  She  indicated  to  him,  as  she  did  to  Chance,  that  she  wanted  an  abortion.  On 
10  October  Barrington  took  her  to  see,  Marguerite  Stewart,  a  female  doctor  who  lived 
close  to  hi  own  home.  According  to  Stewart's  account  of  the  consultation,  Norris 
gave  a  false  name  and  address  before  stating  that  she  was  four  months  pregnant: 
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221 and  did  not  think  it  right  to  bring  a  child  into  the  world  under  such 
circumstances.  She  had  no  friends  or  money.  She  said  she  had  received 
treatment  to  procure  an  abortion  and  had  received  injections  into  the  thigh. 
She  also  stated  that  she  had  taken  thirty  grains  of  quinine  each  night,  and  had 
been  syringed  with  a  hot  substance  by  a  trained  nurse.  83 
Stewart  made  an  abdominal  examination  and  sent  her  away  with  a  bottle  of  medicine. 
Norris  visited  McAuliffe  again  on  the  afternoon  of  12  October,  by  which  time  she  was 
complaining  of  a  headache  and  shivers.  McAullife  claimed  that  Norris  had  asked  if 
she  knew  of  a  doctor  who  would  perform  an  abortion  but  she  had  refused  to  give  her  a 
name.  During  the  night  Norris  had  a  miscarriage  in  the  bathroom  of  her  flat.  Chance 
was  with  her  at  the  time  and  the  next  morning  put  her  in  a  taxi  as  `she  said  she  wanted 
to  round  to  a  nurse  friend  of  hers  to  be  examined  about  the  afterbirth.  '84  According  to 
McAuliffe,  she  looked  very  ill  and  could  not  walk  very  well.  Norris  asked  if  she  could 
be  nursed  at  home,  but  McAuliffe  said  she  could  not  nurse  her  until  she  had  returned 
home  and  called  in  a  doctor.  Norris  did  go  home  but  did  not  call  a  doctor.  Barrington 
called  to  her  flat  at  5  p.  m.  and  found  her  ill  in  bed.  He  did  not  stay  as  Chance  was  due 
to  arrive  and  `he  did  not  particularly  want  to  meet  him.  '85  Chance  arrived  at  7  p.  m. 
and  immediately  called  Arnold  Harbour,  Metropolitan  Police  surgeon,  who,  on 
examination  of  her,  advised  her  immediate  removal  to  hospital.  Norris  was  admitted 
to  St  Mary  Abbots  Hospital  at  12.40  a.  m.  on  14  October,  where  the  assistant  medical 
officer,  Llewellyn  Edwards  assessed  her  condition  as  `very  poor-signs  of  a  recent 
miscarriage  were  present.  '86  Norris  died  the  following  morning  at  10  a.  m. 
A  police  investigation  provided  no  conclusive  evidence  that  Nurse  McAuliffe 
had  performed  the  abortion  that  led  to  Norris's  death.  At  the  coroner's  inquest,  Mr 
Oddie  (the  coroner)  stated  that  there  was  little  doubt  that  this  was  in  fact  what  had 
happened  and  `it  is  most  unfortunate  that  Dr  Harbour  or  the  hospital  authorities  did 
not  inform  us  before  Ms  Norris  died.  '87  However,  he  stressed  that  he  did  not  blame 
83  Ibid. 
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222 Harbour  and  acknowledged  the  dispute  between  the  legal  and  medical  professions 
about  the  doctor's  duty  in  such  circumstances. 
While  admitting  that  there  is  a  moral  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  doctor  to 
preserve  confidential  relations  between  him  and  his  patients,  there  are  certain 
circumstances  in  which  that  confidence  should  be  over-ridden  by  the  duty,  in 
the  interests  of  justice,  to  inform  the  authorities  of  the  committing  of  a  crime. 
The  position  ought  to  be  considered  by  the  authorities  as  to  what  a  doctor 
should  do  in  these  particular  circumstances.  It  is  important  to  protect  the 
public  against  these  crimes  which  so  often  lead  to  death.  88 
In  light  of  the  primary  interest  in  detecting  the  abortionist,  it  is  particularly  significant 
that  Harbour  was  a  Metropolitan  Police  divisional  surgeon.  Despite  his  connection  to 
the  police,  he  did  not  inform  them  after  he  was  called  in  to  see  Norris.  Harbour 
concluded  his  statement  to  the  police  with  the  following:  `I  consulted  my  solicitors 
the  following  morning  and  they  advised,  or  in  fact  instructed  me  not  to  communicate 
with  the  police.  '  This  clearly  emphasises  the  confusion  on  the  issue.  Even  a  police 
doctor  was  unsure  of  his  position  in  cases  of  abortion  and  his  solicitors  instructed  him 
not  to  communicate  information  to  the  police.  With  such  precedents,  it  is  little  wonder 
that  the  notification  of  cases  of  illegal  abortion  continued  to  prove  a  very  grey  area  for 
the  medical  profession. 
Conclusion 
The  foregoing  examples  add  to  the  list  of  questions  involving  medical  confidentiality 
in  the  interwar  period.  They  demonstrate  the  wide  range  of  subjects  which  prompted 
such  questions,  from  medical  secrecy  at  sea  to  confidentiality  in  relation  to  mental 
patients.  The  examples  demonstrate  the  persistence  of  medical  confidentiality  as  an 
issue.  Only  a  year  after  Graham-Little's  failure  to  get  his  private  members  bill  to  the 
committee  stage,  the  BMA  council  were  contemplating  another  attempt  at  a  private 
members'  bill,  this  time  in  connection  with  medical  privilege  under  the  Matrimonial 
Causes  Act.  Moreover,  each  case  illustrates  the  different  nuances  of  the  debate  over 
the  boundaries  of  confidentiality  which  made  it  so  difficult  for  the  CEC  in  the  early 
SB  Ibid. 
223 interwar  years,  or  for  Graham-Little  later  in  the  period,  to  draw  up  clearly  defined  and 
comprehensive  guidelines  for  doctors. 
224 Chapter  9-  Conclusion 
Having  taken  a  chronological  approach  in  the  body  of  the  thesis,  it  is  worth  pausing 
in  the  conclusion  to  draw  out  some  of  the  key  points  and  recurrent  themes. 
People 
It  is  clear  that  the  debate  over  medical  confidentiality  involved  some  very  influential 
figures.  From  the  imposing  legal  reputation  of  Lord  Mansfield  in  the  eighteenth 
century  through  to  the  Law  Officers  of  the  Crown  in  the  early  interwar  years,  some 
of  the  keenest  legal  minds  were  engaged  in  delineating  the  boundaries  of  medical 
confidentiality.  Similarly,  challenges  to  the  law  came  from  the  most  senior  figures  at 
the  Ministry  of  Health  and  the  BMA.  Of  the  many  individuals  involved,  two  stand 
out:  Birkenhead  and  Addison.  As  figureheads  of  their  respective  sides  at  the 
highpoint  of  the  debate  in  the  early  interwar  years,  they  played  a  significant  role  in 
determining  the  outcome  of  the  confrontation  over  medical  privilege. 
Birkenhead  was  instrumental  in  fending  off  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  BMA 
in  their  drive  for  medical  privilege  and  his  influence  continued  to  be  felt  at  the  time 
of  Graham-Little's  private  members'  bill  in  1927.  While  Birkenhead  was  evidently 
not  in  favour  of  a  change  in  the  law  from  the  outset,  the  political  uncertainty  of  the 
coalition  government  at  the  end  of  the  War,  including  the  position  of  Addison  in  the 
Ministry  of  Health  and  the  change  in  Lord  Chief  Justice,  gave  him  a  measure  of 
breathing  space  to  build  his  case  against  the  Ministry's  proposals.  The  publication  of 
his  views  in  `Should  a  doctor  tell?  '  represented  a  clear  warning  of  the  difficulties 
which  future  advocates  of  privilege  would  face.  The  BMA  central  ethical  committee, 
no  doubt  tired  of  re-considering  the  issue  by  1922,  were  clearly  further  demoralised 
by  his  strong  refutation  of  the  grounds  for  medical  privilege.  When  the  Ministry  were 
approached  in  an  attempt  to  gain  their  support  for  legislation  in  the  late  1920s,  they 
too  pointed  to  Birkenhead's  essay  as  a  strong  reason  not  to  get  too  prominently 
involved.  Yet,  for  all  Birkenhead's  skill  in  defending  the  legal  position,  the  fact  that 
he  was  defending  the  status  quo  made  his  task  considerably  easier.  His  ability  to 
point  to  150  years  of  case  law  which  supported  his  position  (although  in  at  least  one 
case  judicial  comment  had  been  edited  to  suit  his  purpose),  placed  the  onus  on 
supporters  of  privilege  to  justify  the  overturning  of  precedent.  This,  as  became 
225 evident,  was  a  highly  complex  task  owing  to  the  varied  and  wide-ranging 
circumstances  in  which  confidentiality  could  be  invoked  or  breached. 
Addison's  decision  to  take  the  problem  straight  to  the  Lord  Chancellor  and 
ask  for  his  support  in  changing  the  law  is  difficult  to  construe  as  anything  other  than 
naive.  Perhaps  Addison  overestimated  his  influence  within  the  coalition  government 
or  simply  believed  that  Birkenhead  would  appreciate  the  fundamental  importance  of 
confidentiality  in  combating  VD.  Either  way,  there  was  little  likelihood  of  the  law 
endorsing  a  measure  that  would  remove  a  level  of  medical  testimony  from  the  courts 
at  a  time  when  a  rise  in  divorce  petitions  meant  the  testimony  of  VD  doctors  was  in 
high  demand.  It  is  feasible  that  a  concerted  effort  to  stir-up  public  opinion  in  favour 
of  protecting  the  confidentiality  of  VD  schemes  would  have  provided  greater 
leverage  with  which  to  challenge  the  law.  However,  as  the  head  of  a  new  Ministry 
with  a  tough  agenda  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  First  World  War, 
confidentiality  was  only  one  of  many  concerns. 
Issues 
One  of  the  key  problems  for  proponents  of  medical  privilege  was  the  great  range  of 
issues  and  variety  of  circumstances  in  which  questions  of  confidentiality  could  be 
raised.  The  BMA  central  ethical  committee's  belief  that  the  specificity  of  each  case 
meant  that  no  general  rules  could  be  laid  down  is  a  sentiment  echoed  in  modern 
writings  on  confidentiality.  '  Graham-Little's  second  private  members  bill  on  medical 
privilege  demonstrated  the  knots  into  which  proponents  of  privilege  could  tie 
themselves  whilst  trying  to  demarcate  firmly  the  boundaries  of  what  would  and 
would  not  be  covered  by  the  legislation.  While  the  range  of  issues  is  fundamental  to 
understanding  the  complexity  of  legislating  on  medical  confidentiality,  it  is  clear  that 
certain  subjects  received  more  attention  than  others  -  in  particular,  VD  and  abortion. 
It  is  not  difficult  to  see  modem  day  parallels  to  these  in  debates  over  HIV/AIDS  or 
the  concerns  over  confidential  abortions  given  to  girls  under  the  age  of  16.  In  part, 
the  continued  interest  in  these  subjects  can  be  explained  by  the  reflection  of  Mason 
and  McCall  Smith  that  `sexuality  is  so  integral  a  part  of  human  nature  that  its 
influence  pervades  the  doctor's  surgery.  '2  But,  the  social  circumstances  of  the  early 
twentieth  century  exacerbated  the  fact.  State  interest  in  tackling  the  public  health 
'  Mason  and  McCall  Smith,  Law  and  Medical  Ethics  4th  ed.  (London,  1994),  171. 
2  Ibid.  29. 
226 problem  of  VD  became  entangled  with  judicial  concerns  in  administering  efficiently 
the  public  justice  system.  Individual  divorce  cases  became  battlegrounds  in  which 
competing  ideals  of  public  interest  were  contested,  in  which  ministerial  regulations 
were  set  against  judicial  authority  and  in  which  traditional  professional  ethics  were 
confronted  by  established  legal  precedent.  A  similar  situation  emerged  in  relation  to 
abortion.  Legal  inquiries  into  post-abortion  deaths  questioned  the  doctor's  role  in 
society.  In  the  eyes  of  the  law,  the  doctor's  primary  duty  was  to  society,  while  for 
private  medical  practitioners  the  traditional  obligation  of  confidentiality  prevented 
them  becoming  an  additional  arm of  the  law. 
Comparisons 
Two  analogies  recurred  time  and  again  during  the  debates:  the  privilege  of  the  lawyer 
-  client  in  the  preparation  and  execution  of  legal  proceedings  and  the  privilege 
customarily  recognised  between  clergymen  and  those  who  turn  to  them  for  spiritual 
advice.  Neither  has  a  basis  in  statute  law  and  the  former  has  a  more  sure  foundation 
in  precedent  than  the  latter.  Although  at  some  points  argument  was  made  that  doctors 
sought  a  similar  privilege  to  that  given  to  lawyers  as  a  matter  of  professional 
equivalence  and  status,  in  general,  the  analogy  was  drawn  to  question  whether  the 
justification  for  the  lawyer  -  client  privilege  was  not  equally  applicable  to  the  doctor 
-  patient  relationship.  The  law  pointed  to  the  fact  that  the  privilege  was  the  client's 
and  not  the  lawyer's,  but  this  refuted  only  those  doctors  concerned  with  privilege  as  a 
badge  of  status.  Lawyers  and  doctors  both  claimed  a  level  of  expertise  which  the 
public  needed  liberty  to  access  without  underlying  concerns  that  the  consultation 
might  be  used  against  them  at  a  later  date.  The  English  legal  system  had  evolved  in  a 
way  which  acknowledged  the  public  interest  in  legal  privilege.  By  contrast,  the 
precedent  excluding  medical  privilege  dated  from  the  late  eighteenth  century  when 
medicine  operated  solely  in  a  private  market,  meaning  that  no  equivalent  argument 
could  be  made  for  public  health. 
The  comparison  with  the  privilege  given  to  clergymen  was  connected  more  to 
duty  than  consequence.  The  advocates  of  medical  martyrdom  wished  to  portray 
doctors  as  members  of  an  honourable  profession,  bound  by  a  long  tradition  of  ethics, 
including  an  obligation  to  maintain  their  patients'  confidentiality.  Such  a  position 
was  impossible  for  them  to  maintain.  While  the  clergyman's  silence  was  absolute, 
the  doctor's  was  more  of  an  optional  mute.  Even  the  hallowed  text  of  the  Hippocratic 
227 Oath  was  easily  interpreted  as  permitting  disclosure:  `anything  which  I  see  in  the 
course  of  my  profession  which  ought  not  to  be  spoken  of  abroad  I  will  not  disclose'. 
More  significantly,  the  doctor's  ethical  position  was  entangled  with  self-interest. 
From  Caesar  Hawkins  in  1776  to  Bayly  in  the  aftermath  of  Needham  v  Needham,  it 
was  apparent  that  stressing  the  importance  of  confidentiality  was  a  good 
advertisement  in  a  competitive  medical  marketplace.  Moreover,  the  dictates  of 
professional  ethics  did  not  prevent  a  doctor  breaching  confidentiality  to  protect 
himself  or  a  colleague  during  litigation. 
The  other  set  of  frequently  used  comparisons  were  those  between  English  law 
and  that  of  other  countries.  Despite  their  separate  legal  systems,  England  and 
Scotland  held  essentially  the  same  position  on  medical  confidentiality.  There  were 
occasional  misinterpretations  of  Scottish  legal  precedent  as  endorsing  a  measure  of 
medical  privilege.  This  was  factually  inaccurate  as  the  two  major  cases  in  point  (AB  v 
CD,  1851  and  the  three  stages  of  McEwan  v  Watson,  1904-5)  only  went  so  far  as  to 
recognise  an  implicit  contract  of  confidentiality  in  the  doctor  -  patient  relationship 
which  could  be  broken  either  in  the  witness  box  or  during  a  precognition.  Both  sides 
of  the  debate  over  privilege  looked  to  international  law  for  precedents  which 
supported  their  position.  While  many  European  countries  had  measures  of  medical 
privilege  written  into  their  penal  codes,  it  was  to  New  Zealand  that  the  Ministry  of 
Health  turned  to  illustrate  the  legislation  which  they  thought  was  necessary  in  the 
early  interwar  years.  This  would  be  an  interesting  point  to  examine  further  as  New 
Zealand  was  strongly  connected  to  the  UK  via  the  Commonwealth.  It  became  a  self- 
governing  dominion  in  1907  and  passed  the  law  which  the  Ministry  sought  to 
emulate  in  1908.  The  scope  and  funding  of  the  present  thesis  has  not  allowed  any 
further  examination  of  this  point.  However,  it  is  suggested  as  an  area  requiring  more 
work.  While  the  influence  of  British  writing  and  legislation  on  medical 
confidentiality  extended  beyond  its  shores,  international  law  seems  to  have  had  very 
little  practical  impact  upon  the  system  in  Britain  during  the  period  of  study. 
Objectives 
The  debate  over  medical  confidentiality  encapsulated  a  multitude  of  objectives. 
Although  at  times  there  was  an  explicit  citing  of  specific  aims,  at  others  it  seems  that 
the  dividing  line  between  motivations  was  not  easily  drawn.  It  is  clear  that 
throughout  the  whole  period,  confidentiality  was  a  key  element  in  the  medical 
228 profession's  sense  of  identity.  Ethics  was  a  key  way  of  delineating  the  profession 
from  the  quack  or  unregistered  doctor,  and  confidentiality  was  an  issue  that  had  long 
been  prominent  in  codes  of  ethics.  The  citations  of  the  Hippocratic  Oath  in  the  BMJ 
in  the  early  interwar  years  is  a  clear  example  of  the  medical  profession  not  only 
promoting  its  sense  of  a  long-standing  tradition  of  ethical  practice,  but  also  using  that 
to  promote  itself  as  an  established  profession. 
There  were  times  in  the  debate  where  the  boundaries  of  ethics  and  self- 
interest  were  dubious.  Having  examined  in  detail  the  circumstances  surrounding 
Hawkins'  plea  for  privilege  in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  trial  it  is  difficult  not  to  see 
self-interest  as  a  central  motivating  factor.  His  desire  to  protect  his  elevated  status 
within  the  profession  and  society,  complete  with  its  associated  trappings,  by 
advertising  his  belief  in  the  sanctity  of  confidentiality  to  a  packed  House  of  Lords  is 
a  crucial  omission  from  all  subsequent  citations  of  Mansfield's  ruling  as  precedent. 
That  ethics  could  be  used  as  a  means  of  advertising  to  patients,  even  without  the 
inconvenience  of  appearing  in  the  witness  box,  was  a  point  picked  up  in  the  interwar 
years  by  Dr  Baley  of  Harley  Street.  Using  the  media  attention  given  to  the  issue  in 
the  aftermath  of  Needham  v  Needham,  Baley  announced  to  newspaper  readers  that  he 
would  never  breach  patient  confidentiality,  even  if  it  meant  going  to  prison.  Given 
the  restrictions  on  advertising  in  the  medical  marketplace  at  the  time,  such  comments 
were  an  acknowledged  means  to  promote  one's  interests  in  a  seemingly  ethical  way. 
The  relative  weight  of  money  and  morals  in  defining  who  had  access  to 
patient  information  was  also  challenged  by  the  changing  circumstances  of  medical 
employment.  By  the  interwar  years  the  advent  of  partially  state-funded  employment 
under  national  insurance  presented  new  questions  about  the  doctor's  obligation.  Only 
occasionally,  as  in  the  case  of  VD  treatment,  did  the  interests  of  the  state  correspond 
with  the  tradition  of  confidentiality  between  doctor  and  patient.  More  often  doctors 
had  to  weigh  up  the  potential  benefits  to  public  health  of  breaking  confidentiality  e.  g. 
their  endorsement  of  notification  of  infectious  disease  and  their  unwillingness  to  see 
notification  of  criminal  abortion  as  an  absolute  duty.  Money  had  a  role  to  play  in  all 
these  areas.  The  state  paid  fees  for  notification  of  births  and  levied  fines  on  doctors 
who  fled  to  notify  infectious  disease.  While  the  amounts  of  money  involved  were 
small;  they  were  not  without  significance  for  doctors.  At  the  BMA's  annual 
representatives'  meeting  in  Newcastle  in  1921,  the  representative  body  passed  a 
resolution  demanding  that  the  council  `continue  to  press  for  the  restoration  of  the  2s. 
229 6d.  notification  fee  forthwith  and  without  delay.  '3  While  National  Insurance  brought 
state  contribution  to  the  provision  of  health,  doctors  were  still  far  from  being  state 
employees.  Relative  financial  independence  from  the  state  allowed  them  greater 
license  to  oppose  collective  measures  with  which  they  disagreed  and  private 
employment  still  placed  the  emphasis  on  the  traditional  obligation  to  the  patient.  This 
latter  point,  as  the  oft-repeated  quandary  of  the  syphilitic  fiancee  made  clear,  was  not 
without  its  own  problems. 
Allegations  that  doctors  wanted  privilege  for  reasons  of  status,  while  not 
without  foundation,  were  not  accurate  for  the  majority  of  those  involved  in  the 
question  at  either  the  Ministry  of  Health  or  the  BMA.  The  Ministry's  agenda  was 
clearly  connected  to  their  responsibility  for  public  health.  In  light  of  this,  the 
Ministry  was  usually  interested  in  doctors  breaking  confidentiality  to  notify  births, 
abortions  or  infectious  disease.  VD  provided  an  exceptional  circumstance  in  which 
medical  privilege  was  aligned  with  the  Ministry's  policy  on  public  health.  The 
implications  of  the  spread  of  VD  for  the  health  of  a  population  recovering  and 
rebuilding  after  war  were  significant,  and  the  fundamental  importance  of 
confidentiality  in  combating  the  problem  was  at  the  heart  of  the  Ministry's  support 
for  privilege. 
The  BMA's  role  in  protecting  the  interests  of  its  members  was  complicated 
when  doctors  could  be  engaged  in  different  forms  of  medical  practice.  Clearly, 
traditional  concepts  of  ethics  and  the  ideal  of  the  doctor  as  an  honourable  individual 
drove  the  BMA  to  defend  staunchly  legal  encroachment  into  medical  confidentiality 
in  1914-15.  However,  an  examination  of  the  practicalities  of  obtaining  a  change  in 
the  law  led  to  a  split  between  the  representative  body  and  the  BMA  council.  The 
compromise  of  the  resolutions  passed  at  the  annual  representatives'  meeting  in  1922, 
suggested  that  while  the  BMA  was  still  ready  to  challenge  the  law  on  medical 
privilege,  the  more  conservative  minds  of  the  CEC  and  council  would  decide  when 
BMA  resources  would  be  given  in  support  of  the  cause. 
The  judiciary's  main  concern  was  the  provision  of  an  efficient  justice  system. 
Medical  evidence  was  very  useful  in  this  regard,  and,  consequently,  the  law  officers 
were  reluctant  to  encourage  any  measures  which  would  curb  their  ability  to  demand 
such  -evidence  in  court.  This  was  exacerbated  in  the  interwar  years  by  the  escalation 
BMA  minutes  of  ARM,  1921  (Newcastle)  -  Min  285. 
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crucial.  Nonetheless,  while  the  key  members  of  the  judiciary  remained  staunchly 
opposed  to  medical  privilege,  there  were  some  legal  voices  expressing  support  for 
the  cause.  The  legal  journals  and  the  debates  at  the  medico-legal  society  revealed  that 
legal  opinion  was  not  wholly  blinded  to  the  importance  of  medical  confidentiality, 
but  in  court  it  was  always  regarded  as  a  subsidiary  interest  to  the  law. 
Class 
While  theoretically  doctor  -  patient  confidentiality  was  a  principle  unaffected  by 
class  considerations,  it  is  possible  to  identify  class  issues  at  key  points  of  the  debate. 
Social  standing  was  integral  to  the  whole  of  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  trial,  from  its 
taking  place  in  the  House  of  Lords  to  the  large  upper  class  audience  it  attracted. 
Social  standing  was  also  important  to  an  understanding  of  the  pleas  for  privilege 
from  witnesses,  including  Caesar  Hawkins  whose  plea  for  privilege  was  a  display 
aimed  at  protecting  and  promoting  his  image  as  an  honourable  gentleman. 
As  Barbara  Brookes  has  made  clear,  social  class  was  an  important  factor  in 
determining  attitudes  to  abortion  and  McLaren's  assessment  of  Kitson  v  Playfair 
emphasises  the  point.  The  success  of  Linda  Kitson  in  portraying  herself  as  a  wronged 
middle-class  woman  was  central  to  the  verdict  against  her  brother-in-law.  In 
McLaren's  words  `class  played  a  key  role  in  colouring  nineteenth-century  notions  of 
confidentiality'4.  This  was  more  than  a  recognition  that  the  press  and  public  opinion 
would  be  more  likely  to  defend  the  honour  of  a  middle-class  lady,  but  an 
acknowledgement  that  the  lower  classes  would  struggle  for  the  funds  to  mount  legal 
proceedings. 
Morrice  notes  the  concern  of  private  practitioners,  and  particularly  the 
medical  elite,  that  they  could  be  forced  to  breach  not  only  their  professional  honour 
but  the  honour  of  their  patients  in  having  to  give  evidence  about  their  `sexual 
misdemeanours'  resulting  in  abortion  or  VD:  `for  Dawson  the  threat  to  the  social 
fabric  through  the  avoidance  of  medical  advice  or  the  exposure  of  sordid  secrets 
among  the  upper  classes  was  prominent..  . 
he  wished  to  keep  the  elite  out  of  the  cruel 
glare  of  public  exposure's.  However,  the  cases  which  caused  such  difficulty  in  the 
interwar  years  tended  to  involve  patients  who  had  been  treated  at  the  government 
4A  McLaren,  `Privileged  Communications',  141. 
5A  Morrice,  `Should  the  doctor  tell?  ',  74. 
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profile  of  secrecy  in  connection  with  patients  from  the  lower  classes  reflected  both 
the  development  of  public  funded  treatment  for  VD,  and  changes  in  the  divorce  law 
which  opened  up  the  courts  to  the  less  wealthy.  Thus,  while  the  key  cases  of  the 
eighteenth  and  the  nineteenth  century  had  involved  middle  and  upper  class  patients, 
the  twentieth  century  cases  involved  the  lower  classes.  This  change  reflected  the 
growth  of  state  interest  in  health.  The  poor  who  had  access  to  public  VD  treatment 
centres  also  had  greater  access  to  the  divorce  courts. 
Other  state  sponsored  schemes  discriminated  the  level  of  medical 
confidentiality  on  the  basis  of  class.  The  Ministry's  medical  record  card  system  for 
national  insurance  patients  was  seen  as  a  threat  to  the  confidentiality  of  working  class 
patients  alone.  The  notification  of  infectious  disease  was  unnecessary  if  the  patient 
could  be  isolated  within  his  or  her  own  accommodation  -a  measure  intrinsically 
biased  towards  the  more  spacious  dwellings  of  the  middle  and  upper  classes.  A 
similar  position  was  evident  at  sea,  where  passengers  with  their  own  cabin  could  be 
isolated  with  greater  ease.  Moreover,  in  the  eyes  of  some  ship  surgeons  at  least,  if  a 
passenger  paid  for  treatment  then  their  position  as  a  private  patient  removed  them 
from  the  gaze  of  the  shipping  company's  medical  records  -  except  in  serious  cases. 
Therefore,  while  class  was  theoretically  not  a  factor  in  medical  confidentiality,  in 
practice  its  influence  was  evident. 
Gender 
With  the  topics  of  abortion  and  VD  so  central  to  the  debate  it  is  no  surprise  that 
questions  of  gender-bias  arise  in  connection  with  medical  confidentiality.  McLaren 
leaves  no  doubt  that  gender  played  an  important  role  in  Linda  Kitson's  success: 
the  public  was  willing  in  the  case  of  this  pretty,  persecuted  woman  to  believe 
in  the  possibility  of  a  sixteen  month  pregnancy.  Claiming  all  the  while  that  in 
her  `lightheaded'  way  she  did  not  know  what  she  was  doing,  Linda  Kitson,  in 
perfectly  portraying  the  role  of  the  female  martyr,  got  away  with  adultery, 
perhaps  abortion,  and  £12,000  as  well.  6 
6A  McLaren,  `Privileged  Communications',  146. 
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level  of  confidentiality  given  to  women,  in  practice  the  medical  profession  were 
reluctant  to  notify  unless  it  appeared  the  woman  in  question  was  dying.  In  part,  this 
can  be  attributed  to  fear  of  legal  repercussions  if  the  allegation  proved  false  -  the 
large  damages  imposed  on  Playfair  would  have  preyed  on  practitioners'  minds. 
However,  there  is  clear  evidence  of  doctors'  beliefs  that  fear  of  notification  would 
keep  injured  women  from  seeking  medical  assistance,  and  they  strongly  resisted  the 
attempts  by  the  judiciary  to  turn  them  into  private  detectives  for  the  law. 
The  combination  of  VD  and  divorce  provides  an  obvious  pointer  towards 
gender  discrimination.  The  VD  element  was  also  inherently  tied-in  with  class  issues. 
Measures  to  tackle  VD  which  included  any  form  of  compulsion,  either  in  notification 
or  treatment,  were  seen  as  targeting  the  lower  classes  of  society,  in  particular,  female 
prostitutes.  In  the  upper-classes  the  perception  was  that  (predominantly  male)  doctors 
were  not  likely  to  inform  a  married  woman  that  she  suffered  from  VD  `because  to  do 
so  would  reveal  that  her  husband  or  husband-to-be  had  been  unfaithful.  '  In  light  of 
the  divided  response  to  Hempson's  example  of  the  syphilitic  fiancee  at  the  1920 
BMA  annual  representatives'  meeting,  it  is  clear  that  doctors  were  not  of  one  mind 
on  the  issue.  Although  there  was  a  disparity  in  the  divorce  law  at  the  time  of  the  high 
profile  cases  of  Garner  v  Garner  (1920)  and  Needham  v  Needham  (1921),  it  is  not 
clear  that  gender  played  any  significant  role  in  determining  the  doctor's  reluctance  to 
give  evidence  in  either  case.  There  were  clear  agendas  put  forward  -  the  impact  on 
public  health  from  a  loss  of  faith  in  the  secrecy  of  treatment  centres  and  the 
dishonour  to  the  profession  for  seeming  to  have  engaged  patients  on  a  false  premise. 
The  strength  of  opinion  on  the  latter  question  led  some  doctors  at  the  clinics  to 
threaten  resignation.  Beyond  this,  medical  testimony  on  VD  was  required  by  both 
men  and  women  as  proof  of  adultery.  In  Garner  v  Garner,  the  wife  sought  proof  of 
her  own  VD  to  demonstrate  that  her  husband  had  infected  her.  In  Needham  v 
Needham  it  was  the  husband  who  wanted  evidence  that  his  wife  had  suffered  from 
VD  contracted  during  an  adulterous  relationship.  In  both  instances,  the  medical 
officers  called  to  testify  made  clear  their  reluctance  to  give  information  because  of 
their  belief  in  the  strength  of  the  government  pledge  of  confidential  treatment.  As 
examination  of  the  cases  shows,  the  doctor's  protest  against  breaching  confidentiality 
Ibid.  145. 
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wife.  VD  was  a  gendered  issue  and  the  disparity  in  the  divorce  law  did  not  aid  the 
situation.  However,  the  use  to  which  VD  doctors  were  put  in  proving  adultery  would 
have  kept  the  fundamental  problem  at  the  fore,  even  if  the  sexes  had  been  on  an 
equal  footing.  For  these  reasons,  it  is  less  likely  that  gender  was  of  primary  concern 
to  the  public  health  doctors  who  sought  privilege  in  the  high  profile  cases  that 
triggered  debate  in  the  early  interwar  years. 
General  Conclusion 
As  a  period  in  which  the  government,  the  judiciary  and  the  medical  profession  were 
all  engaged  in  the  debate,  the  interwar  years  were  a  key  stage  in  the  evolution  of 
medical  confidentiality  in  Britain.  The  rise  of  state  interest  in  the  health  of  the 
population,  the  law's  increased  demand  for  medical  information  and  the  changing 
form  of  medical  employment,  presented  unprecedented  challenges  to  the  medical 
profession's  traditional  concept  of  medical  confidentiality.  As  such,  it  forced  doctors 
to  assess  the  relative  weight  of  their  duty  to  the  state,  the  law,  public  health  and  the 
individual  patient.  While  this  represented  a  considerable  change  from  the  context  in 
which  Caesar  Hawkins  had  practised  medicine  in  the  late  eighteenth  century,  the 
precedent  which  he  had  played  an  important  role  in  setting  was  still  very  much  in 
force.  In  this  way,  the  action  of  one  doctor,  in  attempting  to  protect  his  elevated 
status  in  eighteenth  century  society,  came  to  bind  the  whole  of  an  evolving  medical 
profession  on  the  issue  of  medical  confidentiality. 
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